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   Theories	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  seek	  to	  explain	  dependency	  shifts	  
based	  on	  positional	  assets	  and	   relative	   capabilities.	   This	  analysis	  of	   the	  efforts	  of	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  to	  promote	  and	  direct	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  
industry	  from	  1977	  to	  1990	  reveals	  a	  bargaining	  landscape	  that	  is	  more	  dynamic	  than	  
the	  traditional	  bargaining	  model	  anticipates.	  This	  thesis	  explains	  the	  variable	  nature	  of	  
bargaining	  gains	  and	  losses	  by	  analysing	  the	  on-­‐going,	  complex	  interplay	  of	  political,	  
industry	  and	  market	  forces.	  	  	  
	   Despite	  industry	  characteristics	  that	  favoured	  foreign	  capital,	  both	  México	  and	  
Brazil	   achieved	   bargaining	   gains	   in	   the	   computer	   industry.	   Brazilian	   state	   actors	  
enticed	  national	  finance	  and	  industrial	  groups	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  industry,	  prompted	  the	  
development	  of	  indigenous	  technological	  capacity,	  and	  limited	  the	  market	  influence	  of	  
computer	  transnationals	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  With	  more	  limited	  policy	  ambition,	  
support	   and	   duration,	   México	   had	   initial	   success	   prompting	   TNC	   minority	   joint	  
ventures	  in	  microcomputers	  and	  extracting	  concessions	  from	  the	  TNCs	  for	  exports.	  	  
	   In	  both	  cases,	  however,	  bargaining	  gains	  were	  not	  secure;	  shifts	  in	  dependency	  
were	  not	  progressive	  and	  one-­‐directional.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  study	  exposes	  a	  reverse	  trend	  
toward	  greater	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  capital	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  one	  
may	  not	  employ	  either	  case	  to	  support	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  in	  high	  technology	  
industries.	  
This	   thesis	   highlights	   three	   factors	   neglected	  by	   the	   traditional	   bargaining	  
construct:	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  global	  computer	  industry	  which	  opened	  and	  closed	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windows	  of	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐strike	  the	  bargain,	  and	  presented	  enormous	  challenges	  
for	  the	  states	  to	  adapt	  policy	  to	  the	  rapidly	  evolving	  industry	  realities;	  host	  country	  
situational	  factors	  and	  the	  states’	  ability	  to	  forge	  and	  maintain	  coalitions	  of	  support	  for	  
the	  policy;	  and	  the	   importance	  of	  firm	  level	  strategy	  and	  capability	  to	  explain	  the	  
enduring	  success	  of	  a	  few	  national	  players	  amidst	  the	  commercial	  failure	  of	  so	  many	  
others.	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PREFACE	  
Every	   doctoral	   student’s	   experience	  must	   be	   common	   in	  many	   ways	   and	  
doubtless	   unique	   in	   some.	   While	   the	   particulars	   of	   my	   own	   experience	   are	   not	  
relevant	  per	  se	  to	  the	  academic	  merits	  of	  this	  thesis,	  some	  aspects	  of	  my	  academic	  
journey	  to	  this	  point	  require	  explanation.	  This	  doctoral	  dissertation	  is	  late.	  Most	  of	  the	  
concerted	  work	  for	  it	  was	  done	  from	  1985	  to	  1988	  –	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  century	  ago.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  Preface	  therefore	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  long	  hiatus,	  clearly	  delineate	  the	  
timeframe	  that	  the	  work	  addresses	  and	  affirm	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  research	  today.	  	  
The	  Hiatus	  
I	  enrolled	  as	  a	  graduate	  research	  student	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Government	  at	  
the	  LSE	  in	  1985.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1986	  I	  had	  refined	  and	  agreed	  the	  focus	  of	  my	  doctoral	  
research	  and	  planned	  a	  year	  of	  fieldwork,	  self-­‐funded	  from	  savings.	  My	  wife	  and	  I	  then	  
spent	  two	  months	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  six	  months	  in	  México	  and	  nearly	  four	  months	  
in	  Brazil	  where	  I	  conducted	  and	  documented	  structured	  interviews	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  
of	  stakeholders	  and	  observers	  in	  each	  of	  these	  countries:	  directors	  of	  transnational	  
and	  domestic	   computer	   firms,	   government	  ministers	   and	  officials	   responsible	   for	  
policy	   implementation,	   trade	   association	   leaders,	   academics,	   journalists,	   industry	  
analysts,	   and	  major	   commercial	   and	   industrial	   users	  of	   computer	   equipment	   and	  
services.	   I	   returned	   to	   London	  at	   the	  end	  of	  1987	  and	  began	  writing	  my	   thesis.	   I	  
completed	  a	  first	  draft	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1988.	  	  
In	  April	  of	  1988,	  the	  first	  of	  our	  three	  daughters	  was	  born.	  That	  same	  month	  
we	  exhausted	  our	  savings	  and	  I	  needed	  to	  find	  paid	  employment.	  I	  returned	  to	  the	  
strategy	  consultancy	  where	  I	  had	  worked	  previously,	  and	  tried,	  for	  another	  year	  or	  so,	  
to	  combine	  working	  full	  time	  with	  revising	  and	  refining	  my	  doctoral	  thesis.	  Whilst	  I	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made	   some	  progress,	   the	   professional	   demands	   of	   client	   deadlines	   and	   constant	  
international	   travel,	   coupled	   with	   the	   personal	   obligations	   of	   a	   growing	   family,	  
squeezed	  out	  the	  quality	  time	  required	  to	  complete	  and	  submit	  the	  thesis.	  	  
In	  the	  ensuing	  years,	  my	  consulting	  career	  took	  off	  while	  my	  doctoral	  research	  
and	  draft	  thesis	  languished	  in	  boxes.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  maintained	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  
developing	   economies	   and	   what	   constituted	   effective	   development	   policies	   and	  
action.	  In	  2002,	  I	  had	  an	  opportunity	  to	  give	  more	  direct	  expression	  to	  these	  interests.	  
I	   left	   consulting	   to	   help	   start	   up	   and	   then	   lead	   a	   firm	   (Geneva	   Global	   Inc.	   –	  
www.genevaglobal.com)	   that	   researched,	   managed	   and	   evaluated	   grants	   to	  
indigenous	  relief	  and	  development	  programs	  in	  the	  global	  south.	  Six	  years	  and	  $85	  
million	  of	  grants	  later,	  I	  left	  to	  start	  a	  social	  investment	  fund	  providing	  venture	  capital	  
to	  businesses	  in	  East	  Africa	  whose	  products	  and	  services	  generate	  significant	  benefits	  
to	  low-­‐income	  households	  (e.g.,	  fuel-­‐efficient	  cook	  stoves,	  public	  health	  information	  
via	   SMS	   text,	   etc.).	   This	   social	   venture	   capital	   fund	   –	   SpringHill	   Equity	   Partners	  
(www.springhillequity.com)	  –	  engages	  with	  live	  case	  studies	  of	  entrepreneurs,	  firms,	  
industry	  development	  and	  government	  policy	  in	  developing	  economies	  every	  quarter.	  
Our	  investment	  activities	  and	  approach	  have	  also	  generated	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  
opportunities	  to	  engage	  with	  academics	  and	  students	  about	  what	  works	  and	  what	  
doesn’t	  in	  development	  and	  frontier	  market	  investing.	  	  
This	  current	  focus	  of	  my	  activity	  led	  me	  back	  to	  the	  doctoral	  research	  that	  I	  did	  
in	  the	  late	  1980s	  on	  business,	  politics	  and	  development.	  The	  geographic	  focus	  of	  my	  
current	  work	  is	  now	  in	  Africa,	  not	  Latin	  America.	  Nevertheless,	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  we	  
encounter	  as	  investors	  in	  and	  partners	  of	  firms	  in	  developing	  economies	  are	  the	  same	  
as	   those	   I	   studied	   in	  México	  and	  Brazil:	  navigating	   the	  complexities	  and	  changing	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priorities	   of	   government	   policy,	   identifying	   sources	   of	   competitive	   advantage,	  
accessing	  markets	  at	  home	  and	  abroad,	  anticipating	  changes	  in	  industry	  structure,	  and	  
supporting	   the	   efforts	   of	   local	   entrepreneurs.	   I	   am	   enjoying	   this	   convergence	   of	  
academic	   and	   professional	   interests	   and	   hope	   to	   continue	   in	   both	   of	   these	  
active/reflective	  spheres	  in	  the	  years	  ahead.	  	  
In	   the	   autumn	   of	   2010	   I	   enquired	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   reviving	   and	  
submitting	  my	  thesis	  in	  order	  to	  complete	  my	  Ph.D.	  I	  was	  delighted	  (and	  somewhat	  
surprised)	  to	  learn	  that	  this	  was	  allowed	  under	  the	  rules	  and	  determined	  to	  seize	  this	  
second	  chance.	  
The	  Context	  
As	  explained	  above	  and	  reflected	  in	  the	  title	  of	  this	  work,	  my	  thesis	  is	  based	  
mainly	  on	   the	  world	   as	   it	  was	   in	   the	  1970s	   and	  1980s.	   The	   research	   reviews	   the	  
experience	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  in	  those	  two	  
decades	  and	  identifies	  implications	  for	  TNC-­‐host	  country	  bargaining	  in	  this	  dynamic,	  
high	  technology	  industry.	  I	  have	  not	  initiated	  comprehensive	  new	  research	  to	  explore	  
in	  detail	  the	  development	  of	  government	  policy	  and	  the	  informatics	  industry	  from	  
1990	  until	  today.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  am	  first	  submitting	  the	  thesis	  in	  2011	  with	  the	  potential	  benefit	  
of	  more	  than	  two	  decades	  of	  hindsight	  and	  considerably	  more	  practical	  experience.	  It	  
is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  main	  policy	  and	  industry	  developments	  since	  1990	  to	  
ascertain	  whether	  any	  of	  them	  alter	  (or	  even	  invalidate)	  the	  conclusions	  I	  have	  drawn	  
from	  the	  cases.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  2011	  I	  reviewed	  literature	  that	  has	  been	  
published	  on	  the	  Mexican	  and	  Brazilian	  cases	  since	  1990.	  I	  have	  summarized	  these	  
developments	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  each	  case	  in	  an	  Afterword	  that	  immediately	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follows	  the	  discussion	  of	  each	  case	  (Chapters	  5	  and	  9).	  My	  conclusions	  in	  the	  final	  
chapter	  have	  incorporated	  these	  perspectives.	  	  
In	   each	   of	   the	   two	   cases,	   policy	   and	   industry	   developments	   since	   1990	  
confirmed	   the	   key	   conclusions	   in	  my	   thesis.	   This	   is	   not	   because	   I	   was	   unusually	  
prescient;	  the	  direction	  of	  travel	  in	  each	  case	  was	  already	  discernible	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  
The	  benefit	  of	  such	  a	  long	  hindsight	  is	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  hyper-­‐dynamism	  of	  the	  
globalizing	   informatics	   industry	  and	   the	  difficulties	   such	   rapid,	  continuous	  change	  
presents	  to	  policy	  makers	  and	  implementers.	  An	  industry	  was	  forming	  with	  global	  
technology	  standards	  controlled	  by	  a	  few	  international	  companies	  like	  IBM,	  Microsoft	  
and	  Intel.	  It	  is	  easier	  now	  to	  see	  the	  global	  industry	  structure	  that	  was	  emerging	  in	  the	  
1980s	  and	  appreciate	  how	  it	  placed	  unbearable	  pressure	  on	  protectionist	  policies,	  
particularly	   as	   information	   technology	   became	   the	   critical	   lynchpin	   to	   overall	  
economic	  growth	  and	  competitiveness.	  I	  am	  more	  convinced	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  firm	  
level	   strategy	   and	   management	   to	   eventual	   success	   and	   failure	   of	   industry	  
participants.	  And	  the	  explanatory	  shortcomings	  of	  static	  models	  that	  credit	  structural	  
advantages	  at	  a	  point	  in	  time	  with	  bargaining	  victories	  have	  come	  into	  sharper	  relief.	  
Relevance	  
Twenty-­‐three	  years	  have	  passed	  since	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  this	  thesis	  was	  written.	  
Is	   the	   original	   research	   still	   relevant	   today?	   I	   submit	   that	   it	   is,	   for	   three	   primary	  
reasons.	  	  
First,	  the	  documentation	  of	  the	  two	  cases	  based	  on	  original	  empirical	  research	  
enriches	   our	   understanding	   of	   host	   country	   –	   high	   technology	   TNC	   bargaining	   in	  
developing	  economies.	  The	  Brazilian	  case	  has	  received	  more	  attention	  since	  I	  did	  my	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fieldwork.1	   However,	  my	   analysis	   of	   policy	   impact	   and	   emphasis	   on	   the	   dynamic	  
interplay	  between	  market	  and	  political	  forces	  is	  distinctive.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Mexican	  
case	  has	  continued	   to	  be	   relatively	  neglected,	  especially	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  host	  
country	   politics	   surrounding	   policy	   development	   and	   implementation.2	   	   The	   case	  
material	  alone	  on	  México	  therefore	  adds	   to	   the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	   the	  4+	  
years’	  market	  reserve	  experiment	  in	  that	  country.	  	  
Secondly,	   this	   thesis	   adds	   to	   the	   body	   of	   literature	   that	   compares	   the	  
experiences	  of	  developing	  economies	  with	  the	  international	  informatics	  industry.3	  The	  
cases	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  have	  not	  been	  compared	  with	  a	  view	  to	  drawing	  lessons	  for	  
TNC	  –	  host	  country	  bargaining.	  In	  fact,	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  rarely	  discussed	  together.4	  
                                                
1	  Evans,	  Peter	  B.	  Embedded	  Autonomy:	  States	  and	  Industrial	  Transformation.	  (Princeton,	  
NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Evans,	  Peter	  B.,	  Claudio	  Frischtak,	  and	  Paulo	  Bastos.	  
Tigre.	  High	  Technology	  and	  Third	  World	  Industrialization:	  Brazilian	  Computer	  Policy	  in	  
Comparative	  Perspective.	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  International	  and	  Area	  Studies,	  University	  of	  
California	  at	  Berkeley,	  1992);	  Schoonmaker,	  Sara.	  “High-­‐Tech	  Development	  Politics.”	  The	  
Sociological	  Quarterly	  36.2	  (Spring,	  1995):	  369-­‐395;	  Schoonmaker,	  Sara.	  High-­‐Tech	  Trade	  
Wars:	  U.S.	  –	  Brazilian	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy.	  (Pittsburgh,	  PA:	  University	  of	  
Pittsburgh	  Press,	  2002).	  
2	  Alberto	  Montoya	  Martín	  del	  Campo	  wrote	  his	  doctoral	  dissertation	  on	  the	  1981	  
Computer	  Development	  Policy	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  investment	  in	  education	  and	  training,	  
focusing	  on	  the	  development	  of	  professional	  technical	  competence	  in	  the	  country.	  
Montoya	  completed	  his	  research	  in	  1986,	  just	  after	  the	  policy	  was	  decisively	  tested	  by	  IBM	  
and	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department.	  Montoya	  Martín	  Del	  Campo,	  Alberto.	  Mexican	  State	  
Informatization	  Policies	  [Unpublished	  PhD	  Thesis].	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  
Department	  of	  Education,	  1986).	  See	  also	  the	  book	  Montoya	  edited,	  Montoya	  Martín	  Del	  
Campo,	  Alberto,	  ed.,	  México	  ante	  la	  revolución	  tecnológica.	  (México,	  D.F.:	  AMIC,	  Editorial	  
Diana,	  1992);	  and	  Borja,	  Arturo.	  El	  estado	  y	  el	  desarrollo	  industrial.	  (México	  D.F.:	  Centro	  de	  
Investigación	  y	  Docencia	  Económicas,	  1995).	  In	  his	  book,	  Borja	  offers	  useful	  comparisons	  of	  
different	  policy	  instruments	  adopted	  by	  México,	  South	  Korea	  and	  Brazil.	  
3	  Brazil’s	  experience	  with	  the	  international	  informatics	  industry	  has	  been	  compared	  at	  
some	  level	  to	  India	  and	  Korea	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  and	  late-­‐1990s	  in	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1995;	  and	  
Evans,	  Frischtak	  and	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1992.	  	  
4	  A	  summary	  comparison	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  liberalization	  on	  the	  computer	  industries	  in	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Dedrick,	  Jason,	  Kenneth	  L.	  Kraemer,	  Juan	  J.	  Palacios	  and	  
Paulo	  Bastos	  Tigre.	  “Economic	  Liberalization	  and	  the	  Computer	  Industry:	  Comparing	  
Outcomes	  in	  Brazil	  and	  México.”	  World	  Development	  29.7	  (2001):	  1199-­‐1214,	  though	  
there	  is	  very	  little	  discussion	  of	  host	  country	  politics	  or	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  in	  
the	  article.	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Yet	  the	  two	  cases	  are	   interesting,	  not	   just	  because	  they	  offer	  a	  test	  and	  potential	  
refinement	  of	  bargaining	  theory	  in	  high	  technology	  industries.	  Both	  cases	  developed	  in	  
a	  period	  of	  national	  history	  characterized	  by	  growing	  democratization	  and	  transition	  to	  
free	  market	  economies	  –	  economic	  policies	  that	  have	  largely	  endured	  to	  this	  day.	  	  
Thirdly	   and	   finally,	   I	   submit	   that	   the	   long	   hiatus	   offers	   an	   advantageous	  
possibility	  that	  didn’t	  exist	  when	  the	  thesis	  was	  originally	  drafted	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  It	  is	  
possible	   now	   to	   view	   the	  Mexican	   and	  Brazilian	   cases	  with	  hindsight	   that	   is	   long	  
enough	  to	  see	  them	  all	  the	  way	  through	  the	  liberal	  market	  reforms	  of	  the	  early	  1990s.	  
Conclusions	  and	  implications	  drawn	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  cases	  can	  be	  offered	  with	  
more	  certainty.	  In	  the	  late	  1980s	  I	  could	  assert	  that	  bargaining	  gains	  were	  not	  secure.	  
Today	   I	   can	  more	   confidently	   distinguish	   transient	   from	   longer	   lasting	   gains	   and	  
identify	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   policy,	   industry	   structure	   and	   dynamics,	   and	  
country-­‐specific	   assets	   such	   as	   the	   size	   and	   geographic	   location	   of	   the	   domestic	  
market.	  	  




	   This	   thesis	   charts	   the	   attempts	   of	   Brazilian	   and	   Mexican	   state	   actors	   to	  
promote	  and	  direct	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry	  from	  1977	  to	  
1990.	   The	   primary	   aim	  of	   this	   research	   project	   is	   to	   explain	   the	   policy	   initiatives	  
followed	  and	   the	   factors	   that	  explain	  different	  policy	  outcomes	   in	   the	   two	  cases,	  
thereby	  enriching	  our	  understanding	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining,	  emphasising	  
country-­‐specific	  factors.	  	  
	   The	  bargaining	  construct	  rests	  on	  four	  basic	  assumptions:	  (i)	  relations	  between	  
host	  countries	  and	  TNCs	  are	  characterised	  both	  by	  divergent	  and	  mutual	  interests;	  (ii)	  
there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  shared,	  non-­‐zero-­‐sum	  gains;	  (iii)	  the	  actual	  distribution	  of	  
benefits	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  of	  each;	  and	  (iv)	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  over	  
time	  in	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  host	  country.	  This	  fourth	  assumption	  
is	  commonly	  known	  as	  “the	  obsolescing	  bargain”.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  host	  
country,	   the	   state’s	   effective	   bargaining	   power	   –	   and	   therefore	   the	   expected	  
distribution	  of	  benefits	  –	  is	  thought	  to	  depend	  on	  six	  factors:	  
	   (i)	   Host	  country	  ability	  to	  monitor	  investor	  and	  industry	  behaviour;	  
	   (ii)	   The	  cost	  of	  duplicating	  or	  forgoing	  what	  the	  investor	  offers;	  
	   (iii)	  	   Competition	  within	  the	  industry;	  
	   (iv)	  	   The	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   foreign	   assets	   and	   earnings	   to	   adverse	  
treatment	  by	  the	  host	  country;	  
(v)	   The	  ability	  of	  the	  host	  country	  to	  discount	  the	  international	  political	  
tension	  caused	  by	  investment	  disputes;	  
	   (vi)	  	   The	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  investment	  project.5	  
	  
                                                
5	  C.	  Fred	  Bergsten,	  Thomas	  Horst,	  and	  Theodore	  Moran,	  American	  Multinationals	  and	  
American	  Interests,	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institute,	  1978),	  pp	  369-­‐370.	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Theories	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  thus	  seek	  to	  explain	  dependency	  
shifts	   based	   largely	   on	   positional	   assets	   and	   relative	   capabilities.	  While	   these	   six	  
factors	  are	  each	  important	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  this	  analysis	  of	  the	  efforts	  of	  México	  and	  
Brazil	  to	  promote	  and	  direct	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry	  reveals	  
a	  bargaining	  landscape	  that	  is	  far	  more	  dynamic	  than	  the	  traditional	  bargaining	  model	  
anticipates.	  This	  thesis	  explains	  the	  variable	  nature	  of	  bargaining	  gains	  and	  losses	  by	  
analysing	  the	  on-­‐going,	  complex	  interplay	  of	  political,	  industry	  and	  market	  forces.	  	  	  
	   Despite	  industry	  characteristics	  that	  favoured	  foreign	  capital,	  both	  México	  and	  
Brazil	   achieved	   bargaining	   gains	   in	   the	   computer	   industry.	   Brazilian	   state	   actors	  
enticed	  national	  finance	  and	  industrial	  groups	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  industry,	  prompted	  the	  
development	  of	  indigenous	  technological	  capacity,	  and	  limited	  the	  market	  influence	  of	  
computer	  transnationals	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  With	  more	  limited	  policy	  ambition,	  
support	   and	   duration,	   México	   had	   initial	   success	   prompting	   TNC	   minority	   joint	  
ventures	  in	  microcomputers	  and	  extracting	  concessions	  from	  the	  TNCs	  for	  exports.	  	  
	   In	  both	  cases,	  however,	  bargaining	  gains	  were	  not	  secure;	  shifts	  in	  dependency	  
were	  not	  progressive	  and	  one-­‐directional.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  study	  exposes	  a	  reverse	  trend	  
toward	  greater	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  capital	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  one	  
may	  not	  employ	  either	  case	  to	  support	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  in	  high	  technology	  
industries.	  
In	   addition	   to	   calling	   bargain	   theory’s	   fourth	   assumption	   (the	   obsolescing	  
bargain)	  into	  question,	  this	  thesis	  highlights	  three	  fundamental	  and	  critically	  important	  
factors	  neglected	  by	  the	  traditional	  bargaining	  construct:	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  global	  
computer	  industry	  which	  opened	  and	  closed	  windows	  of	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐strike	  the	  
bargain,	  and	  presented	  enormous	  challenges	  for	  the	  states	  to	  adapt	  policy	  to	  the	  
rapidly	  evolving	   industry	   realities;	  host	   country	   situational	   factors	  and	   the	   states’	  
ability	  to	  forge	  and	  maintain	  coalitions	  of	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  (referred	  to	  in	  this	  
thesis	  as	  a	  bargaining	  “game-­‐within-­‐the-­‐game”);	  and	  the	   importance	  of	   firm	   level	  
strategy	   and	   capability	   to	   explain	   the	   enduring	   success	   of	   a	   few	  national	   players	  
amidst	  the	  commercial	  failure	  of	  so	  many	  others.	  A	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	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the	  experience	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  must	  
take	  good	  account	  of	  these	  three	  factors.	  
	  
Introduction	  
	   In	  the	  early	  1970s	  Brazil	  began	  isolated	  efforts	  to	  foster	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
indigenous	  capability	  in	  electronic	  data	  processing.	  	  These	  efforts	  culminated	  in	  the	  
government's	   decision	   in	   1977	   to	   reserve	   the	   domestic	   minicomputer	   and	  
microcomputer	  markets	  to	  Brazilian–owned	  firms.	  	  An	  indigenous	  computer	  industry	  
developed	  thereafter.	  
	   Brazil's	  policy	  of	  market	  reserve	  in	  computers	  has	  been	  widely	  acclaimed.
6	  	  To	  
many,	   the	   Brazilian	   experience	   with	   the	   international	   computer	   industry	   is	   an	  
unexpected	  success	   in	  need	  of	  explanation.	   	   	  The	  successes	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  policy	  
include:	  	  the	  increase	  in	  employment	  in	  the	  sector	  (doubling	  from	  21,000	  in	  1981	  to	  
42,021	  in	  1986);
7
	  the	  development	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  scientists	  and	  technicians	  in	  
computers;	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  national	  capability	  in	  minicomputer,	  microcomputer,	  
and	  peripherals	  manufacturing;	  and	  the	  resultant	  reduction	  of	  foreign	  dominance	  of	  
the	  industry,	  illustrated	  by	  the	  increase	  in	  market	  share	  of	  locally–owned	  companies	  
from	  23%	  in	  1979	  to	  55%	  in	  1986.
8	  	  
	   Emphasising	   the	   importance	   of	   shared	   developmental	   ideology	   among	  
strategic	  elites	  in	  Brazil,	  Adler	  argues	  that	  	  
	  
"the	  Brazilian	  computer	  case	  strengthens	  the	  claims	  by	  advocates	  of	  	  
bargaining	   theory––as	   reformulated	   to	   include	   high–technology	  
                                                
6	   	   See	   for	   example	   Paulo	   Tigre,	   Technology	   and	   Competition	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   Computer	  
Industry.	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martins	  Press,	  1983);	  Emanuel	  Adler,	  The	  Power	  of	  Ideology:	  	  The	  
Quest	   for	   Technological	   Autonomy	   in	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil,	   (Berkeley,	   CA:	   	   University	   of	  
California	   Press,	   1987);	   and	   Peter	   Evans,	   "State,	   Capital,	   and	   the	   Transformation	   of	  
Dependence:	  	  The	  Brazilian	  Computer	  Case",	  in	  World	  Development,	  v.	  14,	  n.	  7,	  (1986)	  pp.	  
791–808.	  	  I	  am	  greatly	  indebted	  to	  these	  early	  studies	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  case,	  which	  
laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  my	  own	  investigations,	  moving	  me	  more	  rapidly	  along	  the	  'learning	  
curve'.	  	  	  
7	  Secretaria	  Especial	  de	  Informática,	  "Panorama	  do	  Setor	  de	  Informática",	  Boletim	  Informativo	  
v.	  7,	  n.	  16	  (August	  1987),	  p.	  14.	  
8	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	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sectors––that	   developing	   countries	   that	   skilfully	   mobilise	   their	  
resources	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   MNCs	   can	   reduce	   industrial	   and	   technological	  




	   	  
Peter	  Evans
10
	  admitted	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  indigenous	  computer	  industry	  in	  Brazil	  
would	   seem	   to	   contradict	   his	   earlier	   assertions
11
	   that	   transnational	   corporations	  
would	  dominate	  industries	  where	  proprietary	  technology	  and	  marketing	  expertise	  
were	  the	  key	  sources	  of	  competitive	  advantage,	  especially	  if	  those	  industries	  were	  
highly	  oligopolistic.	  	  Upon	  reviewing	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  case,	  Evans	  appended	  his	  
earlier	  argument,	  explaining	  that	  technological	  change	  offers	  "moments	  of	  transition"	  
and	  opportunity	  when	  host	  countries	  may	  be	  able	  to	  reduce	  dependency	  and	  shift	  the	  
position	  of	  local	  industry	  in	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labour.
12
	  
	   Moreover,	  Brazil	   is	  not	  alone	  in	  its	  surprising	  computer	  success.	  	  India	  also	  
followed	  a	  policy	  aiming	  at	  greater	  technological	  independence	  and	  was	  successful	  in	  
transforming	   its	  ties	  with	  the	   international	  computer	   industry	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  
increase	  its	  share	  of	  the	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  interactions	  between	  the	  country	  and	  
the	  international	  computer	  industry.	  	  In	  his	  study	  of	  the	  Indian	  computer	  case,	  Joseph	  
Grieco	  admits	  that	  lessons	  from	  the	  case	  may	  not	  be	  applied	  generally	  to	  developing	  





"India's	  industrial	  structure	  is	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  Brazil	  and	  México...	  
Hence,	   India's	   bargaining	   success	   with	   multinationals	   might	   be	  
achieved	  as	  well	  by	  Brazil	  and	  México	  at	  present."	  
	  
                                                
9	   	   Emanuel	   Adler,	   “Ideological	   Guerrillas	   and	   the	   Quest	   for	   Technological	   Autonomy”,	  
International	  Organization	  v.	  40,	  n.	  3,	  Summer	  1986,	  p.	  704.	  
10	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1986),	  	  p.	  791.	  
11	  Peter	  Evans,	  Dependent	  Development:	  The	  Alliance	  of	  Multinational,	  State	  and	  Local	  Capital	  
in	  Brazil.	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1979).	  
12	  	  Evans	  remained	  rather	  more	  sceptical	  than	  Adler	  about	  Brazil's	  longer–term	  prospects	  for	  
technological	  autonomy,	  however.	  
13	   	   Joseph	   Grieco,	   Between	   Dependency	   and	   Autonomy:	   India's	   Experience	   with	   the	  
International	  Computer	  Industry.	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1984),	  p.	  7.	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When	  Grieco	  published	  his	  study	  of	  India,	  Brazil	  had	  already	  achieved	  a	  good	  measure	  
of	   'success'	  as	  noted	  above,	  while	  México	  had	  just	  begun	  to	  try.	   	  What	  happened	  
there?	  
	   In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  Brazil,	  México	  has	  not	  had	  the	  same	  attention	  lavished	  on	  
its	   efforts	   to	   alter	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   international	   computer	   industry	   and	  
develop	  indigenous	  capabilities	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  	  México's	  policy	  efforts	  
in	   this	  area	  began	  much	   later	  and	  were	   less	  ambitious	   than	  Brazil's.	   	   In	  1981	   the	  
Mexican	   government	   formulated	   an	   industrial	   development	   policy	   for	   computers	  
which	   sought	   to	   reserve	   the	  market	   for	  microcomputers	   and	   their	   peripherals	   to	  
Mexican–owned	  companies.	  	  México's	  policy	  initiative	  seemed	  to	  crumble	  just	  four	  
years	  later	  when	  IBM	  gained	  entry	  into	  the	  Mexican	  microcomputer	  market	  with	  a	  
wholly–owned	  subsidiary	  based	  in	  México,	  thereby	  contradicting	  the	  1981	  guidelines	  
which	  restricted	  foreign	  ownership	  in	  microcomputer	  ventures	  to	  49%.	  
	   Thus,	   while	   Brazil's	   experience	   seemed	   to	   validate	   the	   argument	   that	  
developing	   countries	   can	   overcome	  dependency	   on	   foreign	   capital	   even	   in	   high–
technology	  industries,	  México's	  seemed	  to	  contradict	  it.	  	  Yet	  these	  two	  countries	  are	  
comparable	  in	  their	  level	  of	  economic	  development;	  this	  is	  not	  a	  comparison	  of	  Brazil	  
and	  Bangladesh.	  	  Each	  has	  experienced	  periods	  of	  very	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  
transformation:	  	  Brazil's	  'economic	  miracle',	  1968–73;	  and	  México	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  
1960s.	  	  And	  each	  experienced	  fundamental	  political	  stability	  from	  1970	  to	  1990.	  	  So	  
several	  questions	  are	  in	  need	  of	  examination:	  	  Did	  Brazilian	  policy	  in	  fact	  achieve	  the	  
success	  claimed	  for	  it?	  	  Were	  México's	  policy	  efforts	  comprehensively	  thwarted	  by	  the	  
computer	  transnationals	  led	  by	  IBM?	  	  What	  factors	  explain	  the	  different	  policy	  courses	  
followed	  in	  México	  and	  Brazil,	  and	  what	  factors	  explain	  the	  different	  policy	  results?	  	  
These	  are	  questions	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  
	  
Research	  Questions	  and	  Thesis	  Objectives	  	  	  
	   The	  central	  objective	  of	  this	  research	  project	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  policy	  initiatives	  
followed	  and	   the	   factors	   that	  explain	  different	  policy	  outcomes	   in	   the	   two	  cases,	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thereby	  deepening	  our	  understanding	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining,	  emphasising	  
country-­‐specific	  factors.	  The	  thesis	  thus	  addresses	  itself	  to	  four	  tasks	  in	  order:	  	  (i)	  to	  
describe	   the	   Mexican	   and	   Brazilian	   experience	   with	   the	   international	   computer	  
industry	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s;	   (ii)	   to	   evaluate	   the	   results	   of	  Mexican	   and	  
Brazilian	  government	  policy	  in	  this	  sector	  in	  light	  of	  the	  policies'	  objectives;	  	  (iii)	  to	  
explain	  the	  relative	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  policy	  initiatives;	  and	  (iv)	  to	  draw	  relevant	  
implications	   for	   theories	   of	   host	   country–TNC	   bargaining,	   emphasising	   country–
specific	  factors.	  	  
	   In	   describing	   the	   experiences	   of	   the	   two	   countries	   with	   the	   industry	   this	  
dissertation	  focuses	  on	  the	  development	  of	  government	  policy:	  	  what	  are	  the	  forces	  
that	  shaped	  policy	  and	  its	  objectives?	  	  The	  thesis	  also	  examines	  the	  objectives	  and	  
strategies	  of	  the	  computer	  transnationals	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  two	  countries,	  the	  role	  
of	  local	  capital,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  local	  industry.	  	  Given	  the	  vital	  nature	  of	  
the	   computer	   electronics	   industry	   to	   the	   future	   of	   industrialising	   countries,	   the	  
descriptive	  material	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  computer	  policies	  and	  industries	  in	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  is	  important	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  of	  the	  material	  
on	  México	  which,	  to	  date,	  has	  been	  neglected	  in	  favour	  of	  studies	  on	  the	  computer	  
industries	  of	  Brazil,	  India,	  Argentina	  and	  South	  Korea.
14	  	  
	   Having	  described	  the	  development	  of	  the	  computer	  policy	  and	  industry,	  there	  
follows	  a	  detailed	  examination	  of	   the	   local	   industry	   in	  order	   to	  ascertain	   to	  what	  
extent	  government	  policy	  has	  achieved	  (or	  is	  moving	  toward)	  its	  explicit	  and	  implicit	  
objectives.	  	  Having	  examined	  policy	  successes	  and	  failures,	  the	  thesis	  then	  explores	  
the	  reasons	  behind	  them.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  the	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  differences	  between	  México	  and	  Brazil	  in	  
government	  policy,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  local	  and	  foreign	  capital,	  and	  the	  resultant	  impact	  
on	   the	   local	   computer	   industries	   of	   these	   countries.	   	   This	   exploration	   will	   have	  
implications	  for	  theories	  of	  dependency	  and	  bargaining;	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  aim	  of	  
                                                
14	  	  See	  or	  example,	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1987)	  and	  Peter	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995).	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this	  research	  project	  to	  prove	  or	  disprove	  one	  or	  other	  of	  these	  hypotheses.	   	  This	  
study	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  a	  rigorous	  testing	  of	  theoretical	  models,	  which	  are	  too	  often	  
presented	  as	  caricatures	  and	  then	  easily	  refuted	  in	  case	  study	  literature	  of	  this	  kind.	  	  




"The	  most	  general	  and	  formal	  of	  Gunder	  Frank's	  works	  are	  received	  as	  
though	   they	   were	   his	   best,	   the	   formal	   definition	   of	   dependency	  
furnished	  by	  Theotonio	  dos	  Santos	  is	  appended,	  the	  problematic	  of	  
'subimperialism'	   and	   'marginality'	   is	   sometimes	   inserted,	   one	   or	  
another	  of	  my	  works	  or	  of	   Sunkel	   is	   footnoted,	   and	   the	   result	   is	   a	  
'theory	  of	  dependency'––a	  straw	  man	  easy	  to	  destroy."	  
	  
	   Nor	  is	  this	  study	  proposed	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  new	  theoretical	  structure	  by	  which	  to	  
think	  about	  foreign	  investment	  and	  development.	  	  Rather	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  add	  to	  the	  
existing	  body	  of	   case	   study	   literature	   in	   this	  area,	  enriching	   the	  understanding	  of	  
relations	  between	  transnational	  corporations	  and	  host	  governments	  of	  developing	  
countries.	  	  By	  presenting	  a	  comparative	  case	  study	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  two	  countries	  
with	  a	  particular	  industry,	  the	  researcher	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  appreciation	  of	  historical	  
country–specific	  factors,	  which	  have	  too	  often	  been	  neglected	  in	  a	  rush	  to	  validate	  or	  
invalidate	  (or	  even	  formulate	  new)	  theoretical	  principles	  based	  on	  the	  author's	  prior	  
ideological	  commitments.	  	  What	  follows,	  therefore,	  is	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  empirical	  
studies	  of	  host	  country–TNC	  relations,	  which	  David	  Becker	  sees	  as	  the	  groundwork	  for	  




"Needed	  today	  is	  a	  political	  theory	  of	  transnational	  corporate	  action	  in	  
the	  developing	  countries	  whose	  progressive	  value	  commitments	  do	  not	  
stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  comprehending	  late–capitalist	  phenomena	  that	  
have	  surfaced	  since	  the	  Marxian	  classics	  were	  written...	  It	  will	  not	  be	  
deduced	  from	  philosophical	  or	  ideological	  first	  principles	  but	  will	  be	  
built	  up	  inductively	  on	  a	  groundwork	  of	  empirical	  studies."	  
	  
                                                
15	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso,	   "The	  Consumption	  of	  Dependency	  Theory	   in	   the	  U.S.,"	   III	  
Scandinavian	  Research	  Conference	  on	  Latin	  America,	  (Bergen,	  1976),	  p.	  13.	  
16	  David	  G.	  Becker,	  The	  New	  Bourgeoisie	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Dependency:	  	  Mining,	  Class,	  and	  
Power	  in	  "Revolutionary"	  Peru,	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1983),	  pp.	  323–
324.	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Methodology	  
	   This	  Methodology	  section	  describes	  the	  rationale	  for	  –	  and	  limitations	  of	  –	  the	  
chosen	  research	  design	  and	  cases	  studied,	  and	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  researcher	  
collected	  and	  analysed	  the	  data.	  	  This	  section	  concludes	  with	  an	  outline	  of	  research	  
scope	  and	  definitional	  notes	  on	  sub-­‐segments	  of	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  the	  1970s	  
and	  1980s.	  As	  computing	  power	  has	  grown	  exponentially	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time,	  this	  
brief	  historical	  outline	  will	  be	  a	  useful	  guide	  to	  the	  21st	  Century	  reader.	  	  	  
Research	  Design17	  
	   The	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  project	   is	   to	  explain	  the	  relative	  success	  of	  policy	  
initiatives	   adopted	   by	   Mexican	   and	   Brazilian	   state	   actors	   toward	   the	   computer	  
industry,	  and	   thereby	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  
emphasising	  country-­‐specific	  factors.	  A	  comparative	  case	  study	  approach	  is	  well	  suited	  
to	  this	  purpose.	  Of	  necessity,	  this	  approach	  entails	  a	  dialog	  between	  the	  researcher’s	  
ideas,	  competing	  theories	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining,	  and	  the	  empirical	  data.	  
The	   researcher	   has	   examined	   each	   case	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   compared	   the	   cases	   as	  
“wholes”,	  making	  few	  simplifying	  assumptions	  so	  as	  not	  to	  restrict	  or	  constrain	  the	  
examination	  of	  the	  evidence	  from	  the	  cases.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  basis	  for	  examining	  how	  
conditions	  and	  actors	  combined	  in	  different	  ways	  and	  in	  different	  contexts	  to	  produce	  
different	  outcomes.	  Following	  Lijphart,	  the	  approach	  employed	  in	  this	  research	  project	  
is	  “a	  method	  of	  discovering	  empirical	  relationships	  among	  variables,	  not	  a	  method	  of	  
measurement.”18	  	  	  
By	  focusing	  the	  research	  on	  (a)	  actual	  policymaking	  in	  historical	  context,	  (b)	  
empirically	  observable	  relationships	  between	  TNCs,	  state	  actors,	  local	  capital	  and	  local	  
and	  international	  markets,	  and	  (c)	  identifiable	  results,	  the	  thesis	  provides	  a	  rich	  data	  
set	  that	  informs	  existing	  theories	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  relations.	  In	  this	  comparative	  
                                                
17	  In	  this	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  comparative	  case	  study	  approach,	  the	  researcher	  
benefits	  from	  Charles	  Ragin,	  The	  Comparative	  Method,	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1987	  
and	  Arend	  Lijphard,	  “Comparative	  Politics	  and	  the	  Comparative	  Method”,	  The	  American	  
Political	  Science	  Review,	  Volume	  65,	  Issue	  3	  (September	  1971),	  682-­‐693.	  
18	  Lijphard,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  683.	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case	  study	  approach,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  treated	  as	  an	  exogenous	  “black	  box”	  –	  essential	  
for	  economic	  growth	  but	  unable	  to	  play	  more	  than	  a	  general	  contextual	  governance	  
role.	  As	  Evans	  advocates,	  	  
“Looking	  at	  state	  agencies	  involved	  in	  particular	  industrial	  sectors	  is	  one	  
way	  of	  putting	  more	  empirical	  meat	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  scarcity	  rather	  
than	  surfeit	  of	  bureaucracy	   that	   impedes	  development.	  The	  key	   is	   to	  
identify	  differences	  in	  the	  way	  states	  are	  organised	  and	  then	  connect	  
these	  differences	  to	  variations	  in	  developmental	  outcomes.”19	  
The	  case	  approach	  pays	  equal	  attention	  to	  the	  information	  technology	  sector	  
and	  the	  firms	  operating	  in	  it;	  it	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  analyse	  the	  competence	  and	  politics	  
associated	  with	  the	  host-­‐country	  states	   in	  question.	   Indeed,	  Susan	  Strange’s	   later	  
works	  recognised	  the	  declining	  role	  of	  the	  state	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  market	  in	  the	  study	  of	  
what	  she	  termed	  “who-­‐gets-­‐what”	  questions.	  She	  advocated	  more	  granular	  study	  of	  
state	  interaction	  with	  particular	  firms	  and	  industries	  to	  advance	  the	  discipline:	  	  
“If	   the	   host-­‐state	   is	   not	   always	   the	   most	   important	   independent	  
variable,	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  compare	  the	  politics	  of	  two	  host	  states	  in	  
general…	  such	  [international	  political	  economy	  research]	  work	  when	  it	  
deals	  with	  sectors	  like	  cars,	  textiles,	  air	  transport,	  oil	  or	  banking	  cannot	  
by	  its	  nature	  ignore	  the	  role	  of	  firms,	  nor	  the	  technological	  and	  market	  
variables	  affecting	  them,	  and	  their	  consequent	  impact	  and	  influence	  on	  
state	  policies.”20	  
	   The	  common	  critique	  of	  the	  comparative	  case	  method	  is	  put	  simply:	  “too	  many	  
variables	  and	  too	  few	  cases.”21	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  considered	  is	  
inevitably	  too	  small	  to	  allow	  confident	  control	  for	  identified	  variables.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  
not	  possible	  to	  draw	  hard-­‐and-­‐fast,	  generalised	  conclusions	  from	  a	  study	  of	  this	  kind.	  
The	   researcher	   accepts	   this	   constraint.	  However,	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   subject	   being	  
studied	  doesn’t	  lend	  itself	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  statistical	  treatment	  in	  any	  case.22	  	  And	  the	  
thesis	  does	  not	   seek	   to	  offer	  a	  definitive	   rebuttal	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  bargain	  
theory,	  nor	  does	  it	  seek	  to	  formulate	  a	  new	  theory	  altogether.	  Rather,	  its	  aim	  is	  to	  
examine	  historical	  decisions,	  actions	  and	  interactions	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  specific	  policy	  
                                                
19	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995),	  p.	  40.	  
20	  Susan	  Strange,	  The	  Retreat	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Diffusion	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  World	  Economy.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996,	  p.	  188.	  
21	  Lijphard,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  685.	  
22	  At	  least	  as	  a	  doctoral	  research	  project	  necessarily	  constrained	  by	  time	  and	  resource.	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outcomes	   and	  draw	   clear	   but	   limited	   implications	   for	   existing	  bargain	   theory	   –	   a	  
purpose	  that	  is	  well	  served	  by	  the	  comparative	  case	  study	  method.	  
Case	  Selection	  
	  
“If	   one	   does	   put	   politics	   and	   political	   systems	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   one’s	  
analysis,	  one	  has	  to	  abandon	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  developing	  countries	  face	  
essentially	  the	  same	  predicament.	  Evidently,	  the	  fact	  of	  plurality	  need	  not	  
undermine	  the	  insights	  of	  theory	  but	  it	  does	  pose	  problems	  of	  its	  own.	  If	  
one	  still	  believes	   in	   the	  value	  of	  comparison,	  what	   is	   the	  appropriate	  
unit?”23	  
Professor	  George	  Philip	  goes	  on	  to	  answer	  his	  own	  question,	  outlining	  “two	  
kinds	  of	  approach	   to	  political	  economy	   that	  have	  proved	   to	  be	  both	   feasible	  and	  
useful…	  The	  first	  approach	   is	  to	  study	  comparatively	  (and	  historically)	  a	  particular	  
industry,	  issue	  or	  economic	  sector.”24	  As	  noted	  above,	  this	  research	  project	  employs	  
precisely	   that	   approach,	   examining	   the	   experience	  of	  México	   and	  Brazil	  with	   the	  
international	  computer	  industry.	  The	  remaining	  methodological	  questions	  are	  then:	  
“Why	  the	  computer	  industry?”	  and	  “Why	  México	  and	  Brazil?”	  
	   The	  computer	  industry	  was	  selected	  for	  three	  main	  reasons.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  
is	  the	  industry’s	  strategic	  importance	  to	  development	  in	  the	  late	  20th	  Century	  and	  
beyond.	   When	   the	   choice	   of	   sector	   was	   made,	   computers	   –	   and	   more	   broadly,	  
informatics	   –	   could	   already	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   strategic	   industry	   for	   economic	  
development.	  It	  is	  an	  industry	  complex	  whose	  effect	  on	  overall	  economic	  growth	  and	  
competitiveness	  would	  grow	  more	  profound	  each	  year	  as	  it	  permeated	  the	  production	  
processes	   of	   all	   sectors.	   Effective	   deployment	   of	   information	   technology	   drives	  
extraordinary	  efficiency	  gains	  –	  indeed,	  has	  changed	  the	  terms	  of	  competition	  in	  an	  
increasing	  number	  of	  industries.	  If	  an	  emerging	  market	  state	  could	  find	  ways	  to	  shape	  
and	   harness	   this	   industry,	   it	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   drive	   economic	   growth	   and	  
significantly	  improve	  its	  competitive	  position	  among	  nations.	  As	  such,	  the	  symbolic	  
national	   salience	   of	   high-­‐technology	   industries	   transcended	   its	   potential	   as	   an	  
                                                
23	  George	  Philip,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Development,”	  Political	  Studies,	  38:3	  
(September	  1990)	  p.	  495.	  
24	  Ibid.,	  p	  496.	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economic	  engine	  only.	  In	  some	  cases	  (Brazil	  among	  these),	  indigenous	  capability	  in	  the	  
industry	  was	  itself	  seen	  as	  a	  symbol	  and	  milestone	  of	  development.	  	  
The	  second	  reason	  for	  choosing	  the	  computer	  industry	  for	  examination	  was	  the	  
researcher’s	   familiarity	   with	   the	   industry	   from	   his	   background	   consulting	   to	  
information	  technology	  firms	  in	  the	  Silicon	  Valley	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  As	  Philip	  notes,	  
“an	  immediate	  if	  mundane	  problem	  for	  the	  researcher	  is	  the	  question	  of	  expertise…	  
One	  cannot	  really	  write	  about	  oil	  without	  knowing	  something	  of	  how	  the	  industry	  
works.”25	  With	  respect	  to	  information	  technology	  (if	  not	  to	  oil),	  the	  researcher	  was	  
able	  to	  bring	  some	  prior	  knowledge	  and	  expertise	  to	  bear.	  
	  The	   third	  main	   reason	   for	   selecting	   the	   computer	   industry	  was	   access	   to	  
information.	   In	   the	   late	  1980s,	   the	   industry	  was	   increasingly	  well	  documented	  by	  
independent	  research	  and	  consulting	  firms.	  Thus,	  information	  gleaned	  from	  interviews	  
could	   be	   tested	   against	   a	   growing	   array	   of	   independently	   documented	   industry	  
phenomena.	   Information	   access	   was	   further	   enabled	   by	   the	   researcher’s	   prior	  
contacts	  in	  some	  of	  the	  leading	  transnational	  firms	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  
Once	  the	  industry	  was	  identified,	  the	  choice	  of	  countries	  to	  study	  was	  relatively	  
straightforward.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  policy	  outcomes	  meaningfully,	  the	  
states	  needed	  to	  be	  comparable	   in	  that	  they	  shared	  a	   large	  number	  of	   important	  
characteristics.	  Apart	  from	  being	  in	  the	  same	  hemisphere,	  México	  and	  Brazil	  were	  
comparable	   in	   their	   economic	   development	   during	   the	   period	   under	   study;	   each	  
having	  enjoyed	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  economic	  growth	  spurred	  by	  similar	  industrial	  
development	   policies.	   These	   two	   states	   –	   at	   the	   time	   –	  were	   arguably	   the	  most	  
‘developmental’	  in	  Latin	  America,	  where	  each	  state	  sought	  to	  proactively	  shape	  their	  
country’s	   economic	   development,	   employing	   a	   variety	   of	   policy	   tools	   and	  
instruments.26	   Each	   pursued	   specific	   policy	   initiatives	   to	   intentionally	   develop	  
                                                
25	  Ibid.	  p.	  496.	  
26	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  neither	  México	  nor	  Brazil	  was	  a	  great	  example	  of	  the	  
“developmental	  state”.	  They	  were	  what	  Evans	  termed	  “intermediate	  states”	  –	  sharing	  
some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  developmental	  archetypes	  while	  also	  infected	  
with	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  clientelism.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  only	  that	  the	  two	  states	  were	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indigenous	  technological	  competence	  and	  shape	  the	  development	  of	  the	  computer	  
industry	   in	  their	  respective	  country.	  Each	  entered	   into	  bargaining	  and	  negotiating	  
relationships	  with	  the	  transnational	  information	  technology	  industry	  at	  a	  similar	  point	  
in	  time.	  And	  each	  shared	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  same	  large	  computer	  transnationals	  and	  
their	  home	  state	  “sponsors.”	  	  
Finally,	  the	  choice	  of	  states	  to	  compare	  was	  constrained	  by	  practicalities.	  While	  
it	  would	  have	  been	  equally	  valid	  to	  add	  India	  and/or	  Korea	  to	  the	  caseload,	  it	  was	  not	  
practically	   possible	   to	   spend	   adequate	   time	   (and	  money)	   to	   conduct	   the	   needed	  
fieldwork	  in	  more	  than	  two	  countries.	  The	  result	  would	  have	  been	  a	  more	  superficial	  
treatment	   of	   all	   of	   the	   cases,	  which	  would	   in	   turn	   violate	   the	   in-­‐depth	   approach	  
decided	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
Data	  Collection	  and	  Analysis	  
	   Most	  of	  the	  concerted	  research	  effort	  for	  this	  thesis	  took	  place	  in	  London,	  the	  
United	  States,	  México	  and	  Brazil	  from	  1985	  to	  1988.	  	  The	  researcher	  first	  established	  
the	   historical	   context,	   studied	   the	   existing	   conceptual	   frameworks,	   defined	   the	  
underlying	  research	  questions,	  and	  designed	  the	  interview	  guides.	  The	  next	  step	  was	  
to	   identify	   the	  preliminary	   list	  of	   individuals	  and	  organisations	  to	   interview	   in	  the	  
United	  States,	  México	  and	  Brazil.	  This	  list	  grew	  through	  referrals	  from	  interviewees	  
and	   industry	  observers	   in	   country.	   The	   researcher	   then	   spent	   two	  months	   in	   the	  
United	  States,	  six	  months	  in	  México	  and	  three	  months	  in	  Brazil	  conducting	  interviews,	  
accessing	  original	  source	  material	  and	  consulting	  with	  industry	  analysts.	  	  
	   It	  was	  essential	  to	  interview	  a	  cross	  section	  of	  all	  of	  the	  policy	  stakeholders.	  
The	  field	  work	  thus	  consisted	  firstly	  of	  ninety-­‐six	  primary	  field	  interviews	  (and	  many	  
other	  informal	  discussions)	  with	  directors	  of	  transnational	  and	  domestic	  computer	  
manufacturers;	  government	  officials	  representing	  México,	  Brazil	  and	  the	  U.S.;	  trade	  
associations;	  academics,	  journalists	  and	  analysts	  interested	  in	  the	  industry;	  and	  major	  
commercial	  and	  industrial	  users	  of	  computer	  equipment	  and	  services.	  The	  perspective	  
                                                                                                                                    
relatively	  “developmental”	  among	  those	  in	  the	  same	  hemisphere	  at	  the	  time	  and	  that	  they	  
were	  comparable	  on	  this	  dimension.	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of	   these	   users	   is	   particularly	   important	   because	   they	   bore	   the	   economic	   cost	   of	  
restrictive	  policies	  in	  terms	  of	  high	  prices	  and	  older,	  often	  inferior	  technology	  than	  
what	   was	   currently	   available	   in	   the	   international	  market.	   Appendix	   B	   contains	   a	  
reference	  list	  of	  interviewees.	  
	   The	  focus	  interviews	  generally	  lasted	  from	  one	  and	  a	  half	  to	  two	  hours.	  	  The	  
interviews	  were	  not	  recorded;	  instead	  the	  researcher	  took	  contemporaneous	  notes	  
during	   the	   interview.	   For	   the	   industry	   participants	   the	   researcher	   employed	   an	  
interview	  guide	  to	  ensure	  completeness,	  consistency	  and	  comparability	  of	  data.	  The	  
guide	  employed	  for	  these	  interviews	  in	  México	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  C27.	  In	  order	  
to	  facilitate	  candid	  discussion,	  particularly	  in	  interviews	  with	  civil	  servants	  and	  ministry	  
officials,	  the	  researcher	  offered	  anonymity	  to	  the	  interviewees.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  some	  
of	   the	   interview	   quotations	   are	   ascribed	   generically	   rather	   than	   specifically	   and	  
personally.	  
	   While	   in	   México	   and	   Brazil	   the	   researcher	   also	   spent	   considerable	   time	  
reviewing	   primary	   source	   documents	   such	   as	   copies	   of	   legislation,	   government	  
reports,	  company	  reports,	  trade	  association	  papers,	  as	  well	  as	  secondary	  sources,	  e.g.,	  
current	  periodical	  literature.	  
Scope	  
Computer	   electronics	   is	   a	   large,	   diverse	   industrial	   grouping	   that	   includes	  
industries	   as	   different	   as	   the	  manufacture	  of	   process	   control	   equipment	   and	   the	  
coding	  of	  microcomputer	  software.	  	  It	  includes	  every	  stage	  of	  the	  industry	  chain	  from	  
the	   design	   and	   diffusion	   of	   silicon	   chips	   to	   the	   servicing	   of	   end	   user	   computer	  
equipment.	   	   This	   investigation	   focuses	   on	   the	   manufacture	   of	   electronic	   data	  
processing	  equipment	  (computers),	  peripherals	  and	  software	  because	  these	  are	  the	  
areas	   common	   to	   the	   policy	   initiatives	   in	   both	   México	   and	   Brazil.	   	   However,	   in	  
evaluating	  and	  explaining	  the	  cases	  individually,	  the	  research	  examines	  them	  in	  light	  of	  
their	  respective	  policy	  objectives	  and	  scope.	  	  The	  'National	  Informatics	  Policy'	  in	  Brazil	  
                                                
27 The	  guide	  used	  for	  industry	  interviews	  in	  Brazil	  is	  exactly	  analogous.  
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was	   broader	   in	   scope	   than	   México's	   1981	   computer	   industry	   development	  
programme.	  	  Thus,	  the	  industry	  scope	  of	  this	  investigation	  is	  necessarily	  wider	  in	  Brazil	  
than	  in	  México.	  
Computer	  Equipment	  –	  Historical	  Glossary	  
	   In	  1977,	  Ken	  Olsen,	  chairman	  and	  founder	  of	  Digital	  Equipment	  Corporation	  
(DEC),	  was	  famously	  quoted	  as	  saying,	  “There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  anyone	  will	  
want	  a	  computer	  in	  their	  home.”	  Olsen	  seemed	  to	  have	  reason	  to	  feel	  secure;	  DEC	  was	  
a	  leader	  in	  minicomputers	  and	  second	  only	  to	  IBM	  in	  the	  global	  computer	  market	  at	  
the	  time.	  20	  years	  later,	  with	  minicomputers	  squeezed	  from	  below	  by	  much	  cheaper	  
networks	  of	  ever-­‐more-­‐powerful	  personal	  computers,	  DEC	  was	  sold	  to	  Compaq	  –	  a	  
leader	  in	  the	  home	  computer	  market	  at	  the	  time.	  This	  little	  vignette	  is	  a	  good	  reminder	  
of	  how	  rapidly	  the	  industry	  has	  changed.28	  	  
	   This	  research	  project	  focuses	  on	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  the	  period	  from	  1977	  
to	  1990.	  Since	  that	  time,	  the	  astoundingly	  rapid	  development	  of	  integrated	  circuits	  
(chips)	  and	  the	  Internet	  has	  rendered	  whole	  sub-­‐segments	  of	  the	  computer	  industry	  
obsolete.	  But	  these	  sub-­‐segments	  were	  very	  relevant	  in	  the	  period	  under	  study.	  The	  
definitions	  below	  are	  offered	  as	  an	  historical	  aid	  to	  understanding	  the	  industry	  as	  it	  
was	  then.	  	  
Four	   basic	   sub-­‐segments	   of	   computer	   hardware	  were	   relevant	   during	   the	  
period	  under	  study:	  
	   (1)	  Mainframes:	  Powerful,	  large	  centrally-­‐managed	  computers	  used	  primarily	  
by	   large	   corporate	   and	   governmental	   organizations	   for	   bulk	   data	   processing,	  
enterprise	   resource	   planning	   and	   management,	   and	   high	   volume	   transaction	  
processing.	   Several	  manufacturers	   produced	  mainframe	   computers	   from	   the	   late	  
1950s	  through	  the	  1970s.	  The	  group	  of	  manufacturers	  was	  first	  known	  as	  "IBM	  and	  
the	  Seven	  Dwarfs":	  	  IBM,	  Burroughs,	  UNIVAC,	  NCR,	  Control	  Data,	  Honeywell,	  General	  
Electric	  and	  RCA.	  These	  large	  machines	  were	  typically	  leased	  to	  customers;	  not	  sold.	  
                                                
28	  Compaq	  was	  then	  itself	  acquired	  by	  Hewlett-­‐Packard	  in	  2002.	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And	   it	  was	  typical	   for	  manufacturers	  to	  create	  high	  barriers	  to	  switching,	  through	  
extended	   contracts	   and	   proprietary	   systems	   that	   were	   incompatible	   with	   other	  
machines.	  	  
	   (2)	  Superminicomputers:	  A	  minicomputer	  with	  high	  performance	  compared	  to	  
ordinary	  minicomputers.	  This	  term	  was	  applied	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  onward	  to	  the	  
more	   powerful	   32-­‐bit	   machines	   introduced	   around	   that	   time.	   The	   term	   and	   its	  
delineation	  are	  now	  obsolete.	  
	   (3)	  Minicomputers:	  The	  term	  evolved	  in	  the	  1960s	  to	  describe	  smaller	  (than	  
mainframe)	   computers	   that	   became	   possible	   with	   the	   use	   of	  integrated	   circuit	  
and	  core	  memory	  technologies.	  They	  typically	  occupied	  one	  or	  more	  cabinets	  the	  size	  
of	  a	  large	  refrigerator,	  compared	  with	  mainframes	  that	  normally	  would	  fill	  a	  room.	  The	  
first	   successful	   minicomputer	   was	  Digital	   Equipment	   Corporation’s	   12-­‐bit	  PDP-­‐8,	  
though	   the	   minicomputer	   standard	   was	   a	   16-­‐bit	   machine.	   Minicomputers	   were	  
gradually	  replaced	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  by	  lower	  cost	  microprocessor-­‐based	  
hardware	  (microcomputers)	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  network	  technologies.	  With	  these,	  end	  
users	  were	  much	  less	  reliant	  on	  IT	  department	  data	  centers.	  
	   (4)	   Microcomputers:	   Computers	   with	   a	   microprocessor	   as	   the	   central	  
processing	  unit.	  During	  the	  period	  under	  study,	  microcomputers	  were	  typically	  defined	  
as	   having	   a	   word	   length	   (number	   of	   different	   computations	   the	   processor	   can	  
perform)	  of	  4	  to	  16	  bits,	  and	  central	  memory	  of	  not	  more	  than	  64k	  bits.	  After	  the	  1981	  
release	   of	   the	   “IBM	   PC”,	  microcomputers	   came	   to	   be	   known	  more	   as	   “personal	  
computers.”	  They	  have	  since	  grown	  rapidly	  in	  their	  speed	  and	  computing	  power.	  The	  
memory	   in	   today’s	  4-­‐gigabyte	  RAM	  (random	  access	  memory	  –	  or	  core	  processing	  
power)	  personal	  computer	  is	  64,000	  times	  larger	  than	  the	  64k	  microcomputer	  of	  the	  
1980s.	  Instead	  of	  4	  to	  16-­‐bit	  word	  length,	  the	  modern	  PC	  runs	  a	  64-­‐bit	  processor,	  and	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Theoretical	  Context	  
	   There	   is	   an	   abundance	   of	   theoretical	   literature	   concerning	   the	   impact	   of	  
foreign	   direct	   investment	   on	  development	   in	   Latin	  America.	   	  Out	   of	   this	   body	  of	  
literature,	  two	  general	  conflicting	  theoretical	  models	  emerged	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s:	  	  
the	  structural	  dependency	  model	  and	  the	  bargaining	  model.	   	   It	   is	  worth	  exploring	  
these	  models	  here	  for	  two	  reasons:	  	  firstly,	  they	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  context	  with	  
which	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  must	  interact;	  and	  secondly,	  both	  informed	  the	  actions	  
of	   those	   formulating	  computer	  policy	   in	   the	   two	  countries.	  Each	  of	   the	  models	   is	  
considered	  in	  turn	  below,	  either	  side	  of	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  “developmental	  state”	  
construct,	  which	  serves	  as	  a	  conceptual	  bridge	   from	  the	  dependent	  development	  
school	  to	  the	  bargaining	  school.	  	  
The	  Dependency	  Model	  
	   The	  dependency	  model
29
	  was	  articulated	  largely	  by	  Latin	  American	  writers	  and	  
gained	  widespread	  popularity	   in	   the	  1960s	   in	  Latin	  America	  as	  an	  explanation	   for	  
underdevelopment	  in	  these	  countries.	  	  Palma
30
	  distinguished	  three	  approaches	  within	  
the	  dependency	  school.	  	  The	  first,	  associated	  with	  the	  works	  of	  Frank,	  dos	  Santos,	  
Marini,	  Caputo	  and	  Pizarro,	  posits	  dependency	  as	  a	  formal	  theory	  of	  Latin	  American	  
underdevelopment.	  	  This	  approach	  concludes	  that	  development	  is	  impossible	  for	  Latin	  
America	  within	  the	  world	  capitalist	  system.	  	  The	  second,	  associated	  with	  the	  works	  of	  
Furtado	  and	  Sunkel,	  stems	  from	  an	  attempt	  to	  reformulate	  the	  ECLAC	  analysis	  of	  Latin	  
American	  development.	  	  This	  approach	  shares	  the	  first’s	  pessimism	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
possibilities	   of	   capitalist	   development	   in	   Latin	   America,	   but	   concentrates	   upon	  
generating	   policy	   prescriptions	   that	   can	   overcome	   the	   obstacles	   to	   national	  
development.	  	  The	  ‘father’	  of	  the	  third	  approach	  is	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  who	  
argues	  that	  it	  is	  misleading	  to	  look	  at	  dependency	  as	  a	  formal	  theory.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  
                                                
29	  In	  this	  discussion	  of	  dependency,	  the	  author	  closely	  follows	  two	  writers	  in	  particular:	  Gabriel	  
Palma,	   “Dependency:	   	   A	   Formal	   Theory	  of	  Underdevelopment	  or	   a	  Methodology	   for	   the	  
Analysis	  of	  Concrete	  Situations	  of	  Underdevelopment?”,	  World	  Development,	  vol.	  6,	  (1978)	  
pp.	  881-­‐924;	  and	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1979).	  
30	  Ibid.,	  (1978),	  p.	  898.	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concerned	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  concrete	  situations	  of	  dependency.	   	   It	  accepts	   the	  
possibility	   of	   capitalist	   development	   in	   Latin	   America,	   emphasising	   the	   particular	  
subservient	  forms	  that	  it	  adopts	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  advanced	  countries.	   	  
	   Though	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  divergent	  approaches	  within	  the	  dependency	  
school,	  each	  approach	  shares	  common	  roots	  in	  Marxist	  thought	  on	  the	  development	  
of	   capitalism	   in	   so-­‐called	   ‘backward	   nations’,	   and	   therefore	   ultimately	   draws	  
inspiration	  from	  the	  broader	  theoretical	  context	  of	  imperialism.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Imperialism	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   system	   of	   economic	   expansion	   and	   political	  
domination	  whereby	  the	  economically–advanced	  (or	  "centre")	  countries	  exploit	  the	  
resources	  of	  the	  poorer	  (or	  "peripheral")	  countries.	  	  Although	  imperialism	  is	  no	  longer	  
politically	  explicit	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  it	  was	  during	  the	  colonial	  period,	  its	  fundamental	  
features	   are	   said	   to	   remain;	   economic	   development	   has	   not	   followed	   political	  
independence.	  	  The	  economies	  of	  the	  poorer	  countries	  remain	  geared	  to	  serve	  the	  
interests	   of	   the	   centre	   countries	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   indigenous	   population.	  	  
“Foreign	  capital,	  profit	  repatriation,	  adverse	  changes	  in	  the	  terms	  of	  trade	  all	  play	  a	  
role	  in	  confining,	  distorting	  or	  halting	  economic	  development	  and	  industrialisation.”
31
	  	  	  	  
	   Dependency	  analysis	  has	  concentrated	  on	  the	  forms	  of	  articulation	  between	  
‘external	  factors’	  and	  ‘internal	  factors’;	  that	  is,	  between	  the	  general	  determinants	  of	  
the	  capitalist	  system	  and	  the	  specific	  determinants	  of	  the	  individual	  society	  under	  
analysis.	  	  Dependency	  analysis	  therefore	  is	  corollary	  and	  complementary	  to	  the	  theory	  
of	  imperialism.	  	  	  
	   Proponents	   of	   the	   first	   approach	   within	   the	   dependency	   school	   see	  
underdevelopment	   as	   a	   global	   and	   structural	   problem	   with	   roots	   in	   the	   social	  
relationships	   formed	   by	   imperialism	   and	   its	   post–colonial	   effects.	   	   The	   only	  
beneficiaries	  of	   the	  system	   in	   the	  periphery	  are	   the	  ruling	  elite	   linked	   in	   interest,	  
ideology,	  and	  culture	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  centre	  than	  they	  are	  to	  the	  periphery	  in	  
which	  they	  live.	  	  Exclusion	  of	  the	  masses	  from	  both	  mainstream	  political	  and	  economic	  
                                                
31	  Robert	  Sutcliffe,	  quoted	  in	  Palma,	  Ibid.,	  p.	  885.	  
        34 
life,	  and	  the	  disarticulation	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  central	  features	  of	  underdevelopment,	  
along	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  local	  elites	  into	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  	  	  
	   This	   approach	   holds,	   therefore,	   that	   the	   investments	   of	   transnational	  
corporations,	  which	  are	  the	  institutional	  embodiment	  of	  international	  capital,	  do	  not	  
assist	  development;	  rather	  they	  further	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  developed	  countries	  by	  
exploiting	  the	  raw	  materials,	  agriculture,	  and/or	  cheap	  labour	  of	  the	  periphery	  for	  the	  
needs	   of	   the	   centre,	   while	   benefiting	   only	   a	   tiny	   elite	   in	   the	   periphery.	  	  
Underdevelopment	  then,	  is	  not	  just	  a	  condition	  but	  also	  a	  process:	  in	  the	  words	  of	  
Frank,
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  the	  "development	  of	  underdevelopment."	  	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  held	  that	  no	  
Third	  World	  country	  can	  expect	   to	  escape	  economic	  dependence	  and	  develop	  an	  
economy	  that	  ranks	  alongside	  the	  major	  capitalist	   industrial	  powers.	   	  Any	  surplus	  
generated	  is	  expropriated	  or	  siphoned	  off	  to	  the	  centre	  through	  profit	  repatriation	  or	  
the	   consumption	   of	   luxury	   imports	   by	   domestic	   elites,	   for	   example.	   	   	   Because	  
underdevelopment	   is	   thought	   to	  be	   inevitable	  within	   the	  global	  capitalist	   system,	  
Frank	  et	  al.	  hold	  that	  the	  only	  solution	  is	  to	  reduce	  or	  break	  relations	  with	  the	  system	  
through	  socialist	  revolution.	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  second	  approach	  within	  the	  dependency	  school	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  (ECLAC33).	  	  The	  
ECLAC	  School	  attempted	  to	  reformulate	  its	  analysis	  of	  Latin	  American	  development	  in	  
the	  mid-­‐sixties	   following	  the	  apparent	   failure	  of	  ECLAC-­‐inspired	  policies	  of	   import	  
substituting	   industrialisation.	   	   	   At	   this	   time,	   balance	   of	   payments	   problems	  were	  
growing,	   real	  wages	  were	  not	   rising	   to	   stimulate	  demand	  as	  quickly	  as	  expected,	  
income	  distribution	  was	  becoming	  more	  concentrated,	  unemployment	  was	  worsening,	  
and	  industrial	  production	  was	  geared	  increasingly	  toward	  luxury	  goods.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  
retrofit	  theory	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  day,	  the	  ECLAC	  School	  focused	  on	  strategies	  to	  
                                                
32	   Andre	   Gunder	   Frank,	   "The	   Development	   of	   Underdevelopment,"	  Monthly	   Review	   18,	  
(September	  1966).	  
33	  Though,	  at	  the	  time	  this	  approach	  was	  articulated,	  the	  UN	  Commission	  was	  known	  
simply	  as	  ECLA	  –	  minus	  the	  C	  for	  Caribbean.	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remove	  the	  internal	  obstacles	  to	  development	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  possibility	  of	  
industrialisation.	  	  	  
	   The	   ECLAC	   school	   and	   the	   Marxist	   dependencistas	   described	   above	   both	  
postulate	   essentially	   static	   and	   unhistorical	   formal	   theories	  which	   agree	   that	   the	  
principal	  obstacle	  to	  development	  is	  external,	  and	  share	  a	  fundamental	  pessimism	  
about	  the	  prospects	  for	  capitalist	  development	  in	  dependent	  countries.	  	  Both	  have	  
been	  widely	   criticised,	  not	   least	   for	   failing	   to	   take	  enough	  account	  of	   the	   cyclical	  
nature	  of	  capitalist	  development.
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“The	   irony	   was	   that	   while	   both	   groups	   were	   busy	   writing	   and	  
publishing	  different	  versions	  of	  stagnationist	  theories...	  international	  
trade	  was	  picking	  up,	  the	  terms	  of	  trade	  were	  changing	  in	  favour	  of	  
Latin	  American	  exporters	  of	   agricultural	   and	  mineral	  products,	   and	  
some	  countries	  were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  favourable	  situation	  
and	  accelerate	  rapidly	  the	  rhythm	  of	  their	  economic	  development.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Indeed,	   traditional	   dependency	   theory	   expounded	   in	   these	   first	   two	  
approaches	  was	  largely	  discredited	  by	  the	  historical	  failure	  of	  the	  socialism	  that	  most	  
of	  the	  early	  dependency	  writers	  advocated	  in	  some	  form	  or	  another.	  	  Instead,	  positive	  
engagement	  with	  international	  capital	  seemed	  to	  be	  ever	  more	  common	  and	  essential	  
to	  development.	  As	  Strange	  notes:	  	  
“It	   is	  no	  accident	  that	  the	  ‘dependency	  school’	  writers	  of	  the	  1970s	  
have	  lost	  so	  much	  of	  their	  audience.	  Not	  only	  in	  Latin	  America	  (where	  
most	  of	  this	  writing	  was	  focused),	  we	  see	  politicians	  and	  professors	  
who	   were	   almost	   unanimous	   in	   the	   1970s	   in	   castigating	   the	  
multinationals	   as	   agents	   of	   American	   imperialism	   who	   now	  
acknowledge	  them	  as	  potential	  allies	  in	  earning	  the	  foreign	  exchange	  
badly	  needed	  for	  further	  development.”35	  	  
In	   their	   dealings	   with	   multinational	   corporations,	   actual	   historical	   experience	  
suggested	  that	  governments	  of	  third	  world	  nations	  proved	  to	  be	  neither	  helpless	  nor	  
                                                
34	  See	  Palma,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  908.	  
35	  Susan	  Strange,	  “States,	  Firms	  and	  Diplomacy,”	  in	  Jeffry	  A.	  Frieden	  and	  David	  A.	  Lake,	  
International	  Political	  Economy:	  Perspectives	  on	  Global	  Power	  and	  Wealth,	  4th	  edition,	  
Belmont,	  CA:	  Wadsworth/Thomson	  Learning,	  2000,	  p.	  62.	  This	  is	  an	  edited	  text	  of	  an	  
article,	  which	  first	  appeared	  in	  International	  Affairs,	  London,	  68.1	  (January	  1992),	  pp.	  1-­‐15.	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fully	  co-­‐opted	  by	  foreign	  capital,	  and	  local	  capital	  was	  not	  just	  a	  static	  bystander,	  as	  
the	  early	  dependencistas	  would	  have	  us	  believe.	  	  
	   Though	  later	  discredited	  in	  the	  international	  political	  economy	  literature,	  the	  
early	  dependency	  writers	  did	  influence	  policy	  and	  debate,	  particularly	  in	  the	  early	  part	  
of	  the	  period	  addressed	  by	  this	  thesis.	  Philip	  summarises	  well:	  	  
“It	  was	  perhaps	  inaccurate	  to	  describe	  dependency	  as	  a	  theory;	  it	  was	  
rather	  a	  paradigm	  or	  just	  a	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  world…	  By	  way	  of	  
obituary,	  however,	  one	  may	  at	  least	  recognise	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  grand	  
dependency	   theory	   has	   been	   interesting	   and	   instructive	   and	   has	  
influenced	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  differing	  viewpoints.	  Dependency	  was	  a	  
success	  as	  a	  polemic	  but	  a	  failure	  as	  a	  theory.”36	  	  
As	  such,	  traditional	  dependency	  theory	  is	  important	  to	  reference	  here	  because	  its	  
underlying	  worldview	  and	  broad	  influence	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  sectorial	  market	  reserve	  
policies	  adopted	  in	  both	  countries	  studied	  in	  this	  research	  project.	  Market	  reserve	  
proponents	  in	  both	  countries	  saw	  foreign	  involvement	  in	  informatics	  as	  more	  of	  a	  
threat	  than	  an	  aid	  to	  national	  development	  goals.	  	  
The	  third	  approach	  arising	  from	  the	  dependency	  school	  is	  still	  more	  relevant	  
for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  as	  it	  takes	  greater	  account	  of	  the	  specific	  historical	  
relations	  between	  individual	  societies	  and	  the	  international	  capitalist	  system.	  	  	  Indeed,	  
this	  end	  of	  the	  dependency	  school	  spectrum	  agrees	  with	  the	  critique	  outlined	  above:	  
to	  speak	  of	  a	  formal	  theory	  of	  dependency	  or	  of	  Latin	  American	  underdevelopment	  is	  
misleading.	  	  Instead,	  this	  third	  approach	  holds	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  dependency	  is	  better	  
employed	   as	   a	   methodology	   to	   analyse	   the	   concrete	   forms	   in	   which	   dependent	  
relationships	  develop.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Proponents	  of	  this	  approach	  agree	  with	  the	  Marxist	  dependencistas	  and	  the	  
ECLAC	  School	  on	  the	  fundamental	  condition	  of	  dependency	  and	  its	  root	  causes;	  the	  
particular	   development	   of	   dependent	   societies	   is	   conditioned	   by	   the	   general	  
development	  of	  world	  capitalism.	  	  However,	  this	  school	  recognises	  the	  need	  to	  base	  its	  
analysis	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  contemporary	  characteristics	  of	  a	  dynamic	  world	  
capitalist	   system.	   	   	   Unlike	   traditional	   dependency	   theorists,	   proponents	   of	   this	  
                                                
36	  Philip,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  487	  and	  490.	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approach	  recognise	  that	  dependency	  is	  a	  dynamic	  condition.	  	  They	  agree	  that	  certain	  
features	   of	   dependent	   social	   structures	   persist,	   but	   observe	   changes	   in	   the	  
international	  division	  of	  labour.	  	  Further,	  	  	  	  
	  
“As	   foreign	   capital	   has	   increasingly	   been	   directed	   towards	  
manufacturing	   industry	   in	   the	   periphery,	   the	   struggle	   for	  
industrialisation,	   which	   was	   previously	   seen	   as	   an	   anti-­‐imperialist	  
struggle,	  has	  become	   increasingly	   the	  goal	  of	   foreign	  capital.	   	  Thus	  
dependency	  and	  industrialisation	  cease	  to	  be	  contradictory...”
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The	  economies	  of	  several	  peripheral	  states	  have	  moved	  from	  ones	  solely,	  or	  even	  
primarily,	  reliant	  upon	  exports	  of	  primary	  products	  to	  semi–industrialised	  economies	  
whose	   competitive	   advantage	   now	   rests	   on	   their	   supply	   of	   low–wage	   labour	   for	  
routinized	  manufacturing.	  	  Thus,	  a	  development	  of	  sorts	  is	  proceeding.	  	  	  
	   Authors	   such	   as	   Cardoso	   and	   Evans
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   termed	   the	   experiences	   of	   these	  
countries	   a	   special	   instance	   of	   dependency	   and	   called	   the	   process	   "associated–
dependent	  development"	  or	  simply	  "dependent	  development".	  	  In	  these	  countries,	  
development	  is	  still	  externally	  conditioned	  but	  rests	  also	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  
redirect	  the	  global	  rationality	  of	  the	  transnational	  when	  it	  conflicts	  with	  the	  necessities	  
of	   local	   accumulation.	   	   The	   peripheral	   state	   has	   several	   tools	   at	   hand	   to	   help	  
accomplish	  the	  goals	  of	  self–determination	  and	  local	  capital	  accumulation,	  including,	  
but	  not	  limited	  to,	  threats	  of	  nationalisation	  and	  withholding	  of	  import	  licenses.	  	  If	  
used	   properly	   these	   tools	   can	   over	   time	   effect	   substantial	   (though	   incremental)	  
change	  in	  host	  country	  relations	  with	  international	  capital,	  with	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  
benefits	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  accruing	  to	  the	  host	  country.	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  the	  
state	   that	   has	   the	   central	   role	   to	   play	   in	   harnessing	   the	   benefits	   of	   capital	  
accumulation	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  country.	  
                                                
37	  Ibid.	  p.	  909.	  
38	  See	  for	  example	  Evans	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1979);	  and	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso	  and	  Enzo	  Faletto,	  
Dependency	  and	  Development	  in	  Latin	  America,	  (Berkeley:	   	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  
1979).	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   The	  development	  process	   in	  a	  dependent	  country	   is	   thus	  partly	  –	  or	  even	  
significantly	  –	  contingent	  upon	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  "developmental	  state”39	  as	  opposed	  
to	  the	  "soft”	  or	  “predatory”	  state	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  co-­‐opted	  by	  foreign	  capital.	  	  
The	   developmental	   state	   does	   indeed	   forge	   alliances	   with	   international	   capital;	  
however,	  this	  model	  necessarily	  assumes	  divergent	  interests	  between	  the	  state	  and	  
TNCs.	  The	  state	  is	  not	  wholly	  co-­‐opted	  by	  international	  capital.	  	  
	   The	  “dependent	  development”	  school	  of	  thought	  acknowledged	  a	  general	  shift	  
in	   bargaining	   power	   to	   the	   peripheral	   state.	   	   This	   shift	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	  
decentralisation	  of	  the	  North	  (U.S.	  investors	  are	  no	  longer	  the	  dominant	  supply	  of	  
foreign	  capital	  with	  the	  ascendance	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy,	  the	  re–emergence	  of	  
Western	  European	  investors	  and	  more	  recently,	  China’s	  foreign	  business	  interests),	  
and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  institutional	  capacities	  of	  the	  state	  in	  these	  countries	  with	  
the	  concurrent	  growth	  of	  experience	  in	  negotiating	  with	  international	  capital.	  	  	  
	   By	  admitting	  the	  possibility	  of	  successful	  bargaining	  with	  foreign	  capital	  by	  
developing	  states	  (at	  least	  those	  newly	  industrialised	  countries	  such	  as	  México	  and	  
Brazil)	  Evans,	  Cardoso,	  et	  al.	  are	  not	  far	  from	  the	  bargaining	  theorists	  described	  below.	  	  
What	  is	  different	  is	  the	  relative	  importance	  ascribed	  to	  structural	  relationships	  over	  
against	  bargaining	  skills.	  	  According	  to	  the	  dependency	  school,	  the	  outcome	  of	  host	  
country–TNC	  bargaining	  is	  due	  more	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  
system	  and	  the	  host	  country's	  existing	  place	  in	  it,	  rather	  than	  the	  relative	  bargaining	  
skills	  of	  the	  negotiators	  and	  their	  understanding	  of	  competitive	  advantage.	  	  Thus,	  one	  
may	  expect	  only	  very	  slow	  and	  limited	  gains	  from	  host	  country–TNC	  negotiations;	  
while	  the	  bargaining	  theorists	  are	  more	  optimistic	  about	  the	  host	  country's	  chances	  
for	  success.	  	  Still,	  bargain	  theorists	  acknowledge	  host	  country	  difficulties	  in	  striking	  a	  
favourable	  bargain	  in	  certain	  industries	  as	  described	  below.	  	  There	  is,	  thus,	  a	  degree	  of	  
                                                
39	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  developmental	  state.	  The	  concept,	  general	  
features,	  and	  its	  specific	  applications	  to	  this	  comparative	  case	  study	  are	  developed	  more	  
fully	  just	  a	  few	  paragraphs	  below.	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convergence	  between	   the	  “dependent	  development”	  and	  “bargaining”	  schools	  of	  
thought	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  arise	  from	  two	  different	  theoretical	  constructs.	  
The	  Developmental	  State	  	  	  	  
Before	   turning	   to	   a	   detailed	   consideration	   of	   the	   Bargaining	   School,	   it	   is	  
instructive	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  “developmental	  state”	  and	  its	  primary	  features.	  
The	  “developmental	  state”	  is	  a	  core	  concept	  in	  the	  “dependent	  development”	  school	  
of	  thought,	  and	  is	  largely	  assumed	  by	  the	  bargaining	  construct	  expounded	  below.	  As	  
such,	  it	  is	  an	  important	  bridge	  between	  the	  two	  schools	  of	  thought	  about	  host	  state	  –	  
firm	  relations.	  
	   Arising	  from	  comparative	  institutional	  analysis,	  the	  term	  “developmental	  state”	  
was	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  post-­‐war	  Japanese	  state,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  states	  of	  Korea	  and	  
Taiwan,	   individually	  and	  together	  viewed	  as	  archetypal	  developmental	  states.40	   In	  
each	   case,	   the	   state	   played	   an	   intentional,	   activist	   role	   to	   promote	   longer-­‐term	  
development	  objectives.	  Japan’s	  post-­‐war	  economic	  miracle	  could	  not	  be	  explained	  
without	  recognising	  the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  International	  Trade	  and	  
Industry	   (MITI).	  MITI	   was	   prestigious,	   attracting	   the	   best	   and	   the	   brightest	   from	  
Japan’s	  elite	  universities	  who	  had	  passed	  the	  rigorous,	  meritocratic	  civil	  service	  exam.	  
In	   addition	   to	   being	   prestigious	  MITI	  was	   powerful,	   overseeing	   Japan’s	   industrial	  
transformation,	  approving	  investment	  loans	  from	  the	  Japanese	  Development	  Bank,	  
exercising	  authority	  over	  foreign	  currency	  allocations	  for	  industrial	  purposes,	  licenses	  
to	   import	  foreign	  technology,	  tax	   incentives	  and	  competitive	  policy	  –	  all	  shrewdly	  
employed	  to	  induce	  and	  direct	  investment	  in	  priority	  industries.41	  	  	  	  
	   The	  developmental	  state	  acts	  to	  advance	  the	  welfare	  of	  its	  citizens,	  not	  just	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite.	   It	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  country’s	  competition	  for	  
shares	  of	   the	  world’s	  wealth,	  not	   just	   the	  competition	   for	   territory	  and	  power.	   It	  
                                                
40	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995),	  pp.	  47-­‐70.	  Evans	  credits	  Chalmers	  Johnson	  with	  respect	  to	  Japan	  
(MITI	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Miracle:	  The	  Growth	  of	  Industrial	  Policy,	  1925-­‐1975.	  Stanford:	  
Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1982);	  and	  Gordon	  White	  and	  Robert	  Wade	  with	  respect	  to	  
Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  (e.g.,	  “Developmental	  States	  in	  East	  Asia,”	  IDS	  Research	  Report	  #16.	  
London:	  Gatsby	  Charitable	  Foundation,	  1984).	  	  
41	  Ibid.,	  p.	  48.	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embodies	  a	  meritocratic,	   results-­‐focused	  culture.	   It	  nurtures	  and	   leverages	  strong	  
linkages	  with	   civil	   society	   actors,	   particularly	   private	   capital	   –	  while	   avoiding	   the	  
clientelism	  that	  could	  derail	  the	  state’s	  broad	  development	  goals.	  Evans	  emphasises	  
these	  last	  two	  features	  of	  the	  developmental	  state:	  “The	  efficacy	  of	  the	  developmental	  
state	  depends	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  combine	  a	  meritocratic	  bureaucracy	  with	  a	  strong	  sense	  
of	   corporate	   identity,	  with	   a	   dense	   and	   intensive	   set	   of	   links	   between	   state	   and	  
society.”42	   Evans	   characterises	   these	   features	   of	   the	   developmental	   state	   as	  
“embedded	   autonomy.”43	   While	   recognising	   the	   importance	   of	   an	   active	   state	  
exercising	  its	  authority	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  citizens,	  Stopford	  and	  Strange	  agree	  that	  a	  
developmental	   state	   is	  defined	  more	  by	   its	  vision	  and	  skill	   than	  by	   its	  exercise	  of	  
power:	  “A	  strong	  state	  is	  less	  effective	  in	  international	  competition	  than	  the	  shrewd	  
state;	  it	  is	  good	  judgment	  and	  a	  clear	  vision	  of	  priorities	  that	  counts.”44	  	  
	   Synthesizing	  the	  discussion	  thus	  far,	  four	  key	  features	  of	  the	  developmental	  
state	  can	  be	  deduced.	  The	  developmental	  state:	  (i)	  establishes	  a	  vision	  and	  priorities	  
for	  national	  development;	  (ii)	  engages	  directly	  and	  indirectly	  in	  the	  competition	  for	  
shares	  of	  the	  world’s	  wealth	  to	  advance	  the	  welfare	  of	  its	  citizens;	  (iii)	  leverages	  a	  
dense	  and	  varied	  network	  of	  relationships	  with	  civil	  society	  to	  accomplish	  its	  policy	  
aims;	  and	  (iv)	  attracts	  and	  nurtures	  talent	  in	  an	  independent,	  meritocratic,	  results-­‐
focused	  culture.	  To	  these	  four	  must	  be	  added	  an	  essential	  fifth:	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  
state	  must	  yield	  positive	  developmental	  outcomes	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  vision	  and	  
strategy	  the	  state	  adopts.	  Without	  results,	  the	  developmental	  state	  must	  surely	  forfeit	  
its	  claim	  to	  be	  “developmental.”	  	  
                                                
42	  Peter	  B.	  Evans,	  “Predatory,	  Developmental	  and	  Other	  Apparatuses:	  A	  Comparative	  
Political	  Economy	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Third	  World	  State”	  Paper	  presented	  to	  the	  Latin	  
American	  Studies	  Association	  XV	  International	  Congress,	  San	  Juan,	  Puerto	  Rico,	  September	  
21-­‐23,	  1989,	  p.	  2. 
43	  While	  he	  was	  writing	  about	  the	  developmental	  state	  earlier,	  he	  most	  fully	  expounded	  
this	  thesis	  in	  his	  1995	  book	  Embedded	  Autonomy.	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995).	  
44 John	  Stopford	  and	  Susan	  Strange.	  Rival	  States,	  Rival	  Firms:	  Competition	  for	  World	  
Market	  Shares.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991,	  p.	  217. 
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   Evans	  recognises	  a	  spectrum	  from	  the	  developmental	  state	  archetypes	  of	  East	  
Asia	  on	  one	  end,	  to	  self-­‐seeking	  “predatory	  states”	  on	  the	  other.	  He	  describes	  Brazil	  as	  
an	  “intermediate	   state”	  on	   this	   spectrum,	  neither	  hewing	  closely	   to	   the	  post-­‐war	  
Japanese	  developmental	  ideal,	  nor	  to	  the	  predatory	  model	  characterised	  by	  Mobutu’s	  
Zaire.	   Evans	   highlights	   the	   distinct	   lack	   of	   meritocracy	   in	   the	   Brazilian	   state	  
bureaucracy,	   which	   was	   “populated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   connection	   rather	   than	  
competence.”45	  And	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  state’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  private	  
sector	  tended	  to	  be	  characterised	  by	  traditional	  oligarchic	  power.	  The	  Brazilian	  state	  
was	  certainly	  “embedded”,	  but	  lacked	  “autonomy”	  in	  its	  pursuit	  of	  broad	  development	  
goals.	  	  	  
	   México	  was	  no	  further	  along	  the	  developmental	  spectrum	  than	  Brazil	  in	  the	  
1970s	   and	   1980s.46	   For	   a	   start,	  México’s	   ruling	   party,	   the	   Partido	   Revolucionaria	  
Institucional	   (PRI),	  was	  notorious	   for	   its	  clientelistic	   tendencies.	  Nevertheless,	   like	  
Brazil,	  México	  exhibited	  evidence	  both	  of	  developmental	  intention	  and	  results.	  For	  
example,	   both	   states	   exercised	   considerable	   will	   and	   skill	   to	   get	   the	   foreign	  
automakers	  to	  expand	  local	  automobile	  production	  in	  their	  respective	  countries	  in	  the	  
1970s.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   that	   decade	   the	   Mexican	   state	   even	   procured	   an	   initial	  
commitment	  from	  the	  auto	  TNCs	  to	  export	  from	  México.47	  Each	  country	  was	  building	  
skills	  and	  experience	  orienting	  investment	  to	  developmental	  ends.	  
	   The	  clientelism	  and	  lack	  of	  meritocracy	  in	  the	  state	  bureaucracies	  of	  Brazil	  and	  
México	   in	  general	   is	   irrefutable.	  However,	  when	   it	  came	  to	   the	  development	  and	  
implementation	  of	  industrial	  policy	  in	  informatics,	  the	  specific	  situation	  is	  different.	  
Policy	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   in	   this	   new	   sector	   required	   considerable	  
specialist	  knowledge.	  In	  both	  cases,	  highly	  educated	  individuals	  who	  had	  been	  outside	  
the	  state	  political	  machinery	  were	  enlisted	  to	  formulate	  and	  initially	  implement	  the	  
                                                
45	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995),	  p.	  61.	  
46	  Evans	  doesn’t	  discuss	  México	  in	  this	  regard,	  but	  refers	  to	  other	  writers	  who	  have	  noted	  
similarities	  between	  México	  and	  Brazil	  as	  ‘intermediate	  states’.	  
47	  Douglas	  C.	  Bennett	  and	  Kenneth	  Sharpe.	  Transnational	  Corporations	  Versus	  the	  State.	  
Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1985,	  especially	  pp.	  220-­‐224.	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market	  reserves	  in	  computers.	  Chapters	  3	  and	  7	  describe	  the	  particulars	  in	  each	  case.	  
Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  for	  now	  that	  with	  respect	  to	  computers	  state	  policy	  and,	  to	  some	  
degree,	  power,	  was	  placed	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  highly	  knowledgeable	  actors	  who	  were,	  at	  
least	  at	  first,	  relatively	  independent	  of	  political	  and	  industrial	  ties.	  Thus,	  with	  respect	  
to	  the	  specific	  sector	  in	  question,	  the	  states	  of	  Brazil	  and	  México	  exhibited	  more	  of	  the	  
features	  of	  the	  developmental	  state	  archetype,	  without	  approximating	  the	  East	  Asian	  
ideal.	  	  
	   The	   foregoing	  discussion	  of	   the	  developmental	  nature	  of	   the	  host	  country	  
state,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  its	  policymaking	  and	  policy	  enforcing	  roles,	  are	  important	  
foundation	  stones	  for	  this	  comparative	  case	  study.	  It	  assumes	  the	  host	  country	  state	  
will	  engage	  directly	  with	   foreign	  capital	   to	  advance	  specific	  development	  goals.	   It	  
envisages	   a	   positive,	   constructive	   role	   for	   the	   host	   country	   state	   beyond	   simply	  
creating	  a	  favourable	  context	  for	  the	  activities	  of	  firms	  and	  markets.48	  	  It	  recognises	  
the	  complexity	  of	  the	  host	  country	  state	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  its	  competence	  and	  
connectedness.	  It	  establishes	  a	  basis	  for	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  host	  country	  state	  
actors	  and	  policies.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  conceptual	  work	  on	  the	  developmental	  state	  helps	  to	  
unpack	  a	  key	  actor	  in	  the	  bargaining	  “play”,	  and	  so	  makes	  a	  critical	  contribution	  to	  the	  
understanding	  of	  firm	  –	  state	  relations.	  	  However,	  the	  host	  state	  is	  just	  one	  of	  the	  
actors.	  The	  same	  nuanced	  understanding	  is	  needed	  for	  the	  other	  actors:	  the	  TNCs,	  
local	  capital,	  and	  the	  industry	  itself,	  which	  is	  propelled	  along	  by	  its	  own	  dynamic.	  	  	  
The	  Bargaining	  Model	  
	   While	  dependency	  theory	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  imperialism,	  the	  bargaining	  model	  
arose	   ostensibly	   from	   traditional	   economic	   thinking.	   	   In	   its	   general	   terms	   the	  
bargaining	  model	  attained	  widespread	  acceptance	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  In	  1987	  Kobrin	  
called	   it	   "the	   currently	   accepted	   paradigm	   of	   host	   country–TNC	   relations	   in	  
international	  political	  economy."
49
	  	  It	  was	  accepted	  both	  by	  mainstream	  economists	  
                                                
48	  Or	  conversely,	  beyond	  simply	  excluding	  foreign	  capital	  or	  nationalizing	  their	  assets.	  
49	   Stephen	   J.	   Kobrin,	   "Testing	   the	   Bargaining	   Hypothesis	   in	   the	  Manufacturing	   Sector	   in	  
Developing	  Countries",	  International	  Organization,	  v.	  41,	  n.	  4,	  Autumn	  1987,	  p.	  610.	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such	  as	  Kindleberger,	  Vernon	  and	  Bergsten,	  and	  by	  the	  dependency	  theorists	  such	  as	  
Evans	  as	  noted	  above.	  	  	  
	   Recognising	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  of	  host	  countries	  and	  international	  capital,	  
the	  bargaining	  model	  holds	  that	  host	  countries	  can	  harness	  FDI	  and	  direct	  it	  to	  the	  
country's	  advantage.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  holds,	  prolonged	  contact	  with	  foreign	  capital	  actually	  
facilitates	  the	  host	  country's	  ability	  to	  strike	  a	  favourable	  bargain.	  	  Thus,	  the	  bargaining	  
theorists	  argue	  that	  developing	  countries	  can	  maximise	  local	  capital	  accumulation	  
through	  selectively	  encouraging	  and	  orienting	  foreign	  investment.	  
	   The	  assumptions	  of	  the	  bargaining	  model	  are	  fourfold:	  	  (i)	  relations	  between	  
host	  countries	  and	  transnationals	  are	  characterised	  both	  by	  antipathy	  and	  mutuality	  of	  
interest;	   (ii)	   there	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   joint,	   or	   shared,	   gains	   (two	   oligopolists	  
negotiating	  in	  a	  non–zero–sum	  game);	  (iii)	  the	  actual	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  depends	  
on	  the	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  and	  skills	  of	  each;	  and	  (iv)	  there	  has	  been	  a	  shift	  over	  




	   The	  ability	  of	  host	  countries	  to	  influence	  the	  actions	  of	  foreign	  investors	  is	  
thought	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of:	  
(i)	   Host	   country	   ability	   to	   monitor	   investor	   behaviour	   and	   industry	  
behaviour;	  
(ii)	  The	  cost	  of	  duplicating	  or	  forgoing	  what	  the	  investor	  offers;	  	  
(iii)	  Competition	  within	  the	  industry;	  
(iv)	  The	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  foreigner's	  assets	  and	  earnings	  to	  adverse	  
treatment	  by	  the	  host	  country;	  
(v)	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  host	  country	  to	  discount	  the	  international	  political	  
tension	  caused	  by	  investment	  disputes;	  	  
                                                
50	  	  Early	  exponents	  of	  bargain	  theory	  as	  described	  here	  are	  Charles	  Kindleberger,	  Six	  Lectures	  
on	   Direct	   Investment,	   (New	   Haven,	   CT:	   Yale	   University	   Press,	   1969);	   Raymond	   Vernon,	  
Sovereignty	  at	  Bay:	  The	  Multinational	   Spread	  of	  U.S.	   Enterprise,	   (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  
1971);	  and	  Bergsten,	  Horst,	  and	  Moran,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1978).	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(vi)	  The	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  investment	  project.
51
	  
	   Later	  scholarship	  on	  bargaining	  theory	  drew	  the	  important	  distinction	  between	  
the	  potential	  power	  and	  actual	  power	  of	   the	  host	  country	  state.	  While	   the	   list	  of	  
factors	  above	  largely	  determine	  potential	  power,	  actual	  bargaining	  power	  is	  thought	  
to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  the	  relative	  demand	  for	  each	  other's	  resources,	  the	  constraints	  that	  
prevent	  potential	  power	  from	  being	  implemented,	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  either	  party	  to	  
limit	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  other	  directly.	  	  Put	  succinctly,	  actual	  power	  depends	  on	  the	  
ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  the	  host	  government	  to	  exercise	  their	  potential	  bargaining	  
power	  in	  order	  to	  extract	  more	  favourable	  terms	  from	  the	  TNCs.52	  Connecting	  this	  
insight	  to	  the	  prior	  discussion	  of	  the	  developmental	  state,	  one	  sees	  actual	  bargaining	  
power	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  situational	  and	  positional	  assets	  with	  the	  host	  state’s	  level	  
of	  embedded	  autonomy.	  	  
The	  "obsolescing	  bargain”	  –	  the	  shift	  of	  bargaining	  power	  to	  the	  host	  country	  
over	  time	  –	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  and	  is	  accepted	  as	  widely	  
applicable	   to	   extractive	   industries.	   	   The	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   once	   initial	   risks	   are	  
overcome––capital	  is	  sunk,	  technology	  is	  diffused	  and	  the	  project	  begins	  to	  show	  a	  
positive	  return––the	  host	  government	  can	  successfully	  seek	  to	  shift	  the	  negotiated	  
position,	   extracting	   greater	   concessions	   from	   the	   foreign	   investor.	   	   The	   foreign	  
investor's	  bargaining	  chips,	  be	  they	  access	  to	  capital,	  technology	  or	  managerial	  skills,	  
have	  already	  been	  played.	  	  The	  TNC	  resists,	  claiming	  sanctity	  of	  contract,	  while	  the	  
host	  country	  argues	  that	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  original	  bargain	  were	  unfair.	  	  Pragmatically,	  
however,	  these	  arguments	  matter	  very	  little;	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  power	  shift	  remains.	  	  	  
	   While	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  has	  been	  successfully	  applied	  to	  the	  extractive	  
industries,	  its	  applicability	  to	  manufacturing	  industries	  remains	  a	  subject	  of	  debate.53	  	  
                                                
51	  	  Bergsten,	  Horst,	  Moran.	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  369–370.	  
52	  See	  for	  example,	  Shah	  M.	  Tarzi,	  “Third	  World	  Governments	  and	  Multinational	  
Corporations:	  Dynamics	  of	  Host’s	  Bargaining	  Power,”	  International	  Relations,	  10.3	  (May	  
1991),	  pp.	  237-­‐249	  and	  reprinted	  in	  Frieden	  and	  Lake,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  156-­‐166.	  	  	  
53	  In	  addition	  to	  Kobrin’s	  and	  Tarzi’s	  works	  referenced	  above,	  see	  for	  example,	  Edmund	  J.	  
Malesky,	  “Re-­‐Thinking	  the	  Obsolescing	  Bargain:	  Do	  Foreign	  Investors	  Really	  Surrender	  their	  
Influence	  of	  Economic	  Reform	  in	  Transition	  States?”	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Annual	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Manufacturing	  investments	  do	  not,	  in	  general,	  entail	  the	  degree	  of	  risk,	  the	  national	  
salience,	  or	  the	  large	  sunk	  costs	  typical	  in	  extractive	  industries.	  	  Also,	  manufacturing	  
firms	  with	  diversified	  product	  lines	  have	  more	  flexibility	  and	  control	  than	  extractive	  
investors.	  	  	  
More	   pertinent	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   computer	   industry,	   manufacturing	  
investors	  in	  industries	  with	  high	  optimum	  production	  scale	  and	  technological	  intensity	  
would	  seem	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  because	  the	  local	  market	  is	  
unlikely	   to	   be	   large	   enough	   to	   support	   efficient	   manufacturing	   or	   generate	  
competitive	   research	  and	  development	  budgets.	   	   Thus,	  most	  bargaining	   theorists	  
agree	  with	  Bergsten,	  Horst	  and	  Moran	  that:	  
	  
"Where	  technology	  is	  complex,	  rapidly	  changing,	  and	  tightly	  held––
such	  as	  in	  computers––the	  shift	  of	  bargaining	  power	  toward	  developing	  
(and	  other)	  host	  countries	  will	  proceed	  least	  rapidly."
54
	  
In	  his	  statistical	  study	  of	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  in	  manufacturing,	  Stephen	  Kobrin	  
admitted	  that	  his	  results	  were	  largely	  inconclusive,	  but	  felt	  able	  to	  make	  the	  following	  
observations:	  
	  
"The	  results	  indicate	  that	  obsolescence	  is	  possible	  [in	  manufacturing	  
industries]	  and	  that	  shifts	  in	  bargaining	  power	  to	  host	  countries	  are	  
most	   likely	   in	   relatively	   low	   technology	   industries	   that	   are	   not	  
integrated	  globally...	   Shifts	   in	   relative	  bargaining	  power	  depend	  on	  
whether	  the	  rate	  of	  technological	  and	  managerial	  development	  in	  the	  
host	  country	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  rate	  of	  innovation	  in	  the	  industry...	  In	  
contrast	   to	   the	   resource–based	   industries,	   obsolescence	   does	   not	  
appear	  to	  be	  structurally	  inherent	  in	  manufacturing."
55
	  	  	  
Tarzi	   acknowledges	   that	   TNCs	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   regain	   their	   bargaining	  
advantage	   when	   “the	   rate	   of	   change	   in	   technological	   complexity	   of	   the	   foreign	  
investment	  regime	  grows	  faster	  relative	  to	  the	  host	  country’s	  capabilities	  and	  rate	  of	  
                                                                                                                                    
Conference	  of	  the	  International	  Studies	  Association,	  University	  of	  California	  San	  Diego	  –	  
IRPS,	  March	  24,	  2005	  
54	  	  Bergsten,	  Horst,	  &	  Moran,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  380;	  emphasis	  is	  mine.	  Malesky,	  Kobrin	  and	  Tarzi	  all	  
concur.	  
55	  	  Kobrin,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  634,	  636.	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innovations.”56	   	   Tarzi	   goes	   on	   to	   assert	   a	   conclusive	   verdict	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
possibility	  of	  obsolescence	  in	  the	  computer	  electronics	  industry:	  	  
“The	  pace	  and	  complexity	  of	  research	  and	  development	  in	  computers	  
and	   electronics	   is,	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   beyond	   the	   capability	   and	  
geographic	  reach	  of	  any	  of	  the	  host	  governments	  in	  the	  Third	  World.”57	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  foregoing	  theories	  and	  the	  empirical	  work	  that	  accompanies	  
them,	  Brazil's	  early	  success	  in	  bargaining	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  
seems	  all	   the	  more	  surprising,	  while	  México's	  apparent	   failure	  at	   the	   same	  game	  
would	  seem	  predictable.	  	  	  Yet,	  both	  Adler	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil,	  and	  Grieco	  in	  the	  case	  
of	   India,	   argued	   that	   the	   obsolescing	   bargain	   did	   indeed	   apply	   to	   the	   computer	  
industry;	  these	  countries	  had	  altered	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  bargain	  in	  their	  favour.	  	  They	  
argued	  that	  conventional	  bargain	  theory	  is	  in	  fact	  too	  pessimistic;	  host	  countries	  can	  
strike	  a	  favourable	  bargain	  even	  in	  high	  technology	  industries.	  This	  thesis	  will	  directly	  
address	  the	  apparent	  contradiction	  and	  controversy	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  applicability	  of	  
the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  in	  the	  Mexican	  and	  Brazilian	  computer	  industries.	  
Apart	  from	  refinements	  such	  as	  the	  distinction	  between	  actual	  and	  potential	  
bargain	  power,	  and	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  attempts	  to	  prove,	  disprove,	  or	  refine	  the	  
obsolescing	  bargain	  assumption,	  how	  has	  bargain	  theory	  developed	  since	  the	  1970s	  
and	  1980s?	  Four	  scholarly	  recognitions	  and	  insights	  emerge	  from	  a	  survey	  of	  more	  
recent	   international	   political	   economy	   scholarship	   related	   to	   bargain	   theory58:	   (i)	  
bargaining	  has	  become	  an	  accepted	  paradigm	  of	  state	  –	  firm	  relations;	  (ii)	  bargaining	  
complexity	  has	  multiplied,	  challenging	  the	  administrative	  capacity	  of	  state	  and	  firm	  
                                                
56	  Tarzi,	  reprinted	  in	  Frieden	  and	  Lake,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  159.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  p.	  160.	  	  
58	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  specific	  citations	  noted	  below,	  the	  author	  has	  benefited	  from	  
Fieldhouse,	  David.	  “’A	  New	  Imperial	  System’?	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Multinational	  Corporations	  
Reconsidered.”	  From	  Wolfgang	  Mommsen	  and	  Jurgen	  Osterhammel,	  eds.	  Imperialism	  and	  
After,	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1986,	  pp.	  225-­‐240;	  and	  Jeffrey	  A.	  Hart	  and	  Aseem	  Prakash.	  “Strategic	  
Trade	  and	  Investment	  Policies:	  Implications	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  Political	  
Economy,”	  The	  World	  Economy	  20	  (1997),	  pp.	  457	  –	  476.	  Hart	  and	  Parkash	  look	  at	  
technological	  flows	  across	  national	  boundaries,	  noting	  they	  are	  imperfect	  and	  therefore	  
offer	  first-­‐mover	  advantages	  for	  domestic	  firms,	  with	  the	  right	  state	  intervention.	  As	  such	  
they	  are	  more	  optimistic	  about	  effective	  host-­‐country	  bargaining	  in	  high	  technology	  
industries.	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actors;	  (iii)	  a	  general	  shift	  of	  power	  from	  the	  state	  to	  markets	  has	  occurred;	  and	  (iv)	  
attempts	  at	  a	  grand	  theory	  of	  host	  state	  –	  firm	  bargaining	  are	  confounded.	  Each	  of	  
these	  is	  considered	  briefly	  below	  before	  concluding	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  theoretical,	  
conceptual	  context	  for	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Bargaining:	  An	  Accepted	  Paradigm	  
Writers	  may	  disagree	  over	  relative	  bargaining	  power,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  deny	  the	  
premise	  that	  states	  and	  firms	  have	  both	  mutual	  and	  conflicting	  interests	  and	  are	  seen	  
to	  negotiate	  these	  through	  a	  bargaining	  lens.	  Bargaining	  is	  now	  an	  accepted	  paradigm	  
for	  state	  –	  firm	  relations.	  Stopford	  and	  Strange	  recognise	  this	  general	  acceptance:	  	  
“There	   is	   a	   growing	   consensus	   among	   writers	   on	   transnational	  
corporations	  in	  developing	  countries	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  parties	  is	  the	  product	  of	  bargaining,	  whether	  explicit	  or	  implicit.”59	  	  
The	  authors	  cite	  “a	  new	  pragmatism	  in	  the	  mutual	  attitudes	  of	  host	  country	  states	  and	  
TNCs	  replacing	  old	  bitterness,	  bigotry	  and	  mutual	  incomprehension.”60	  	  
This	  shift	   in	  attitude	  and	  pragmatic	  embrace	  of	  a	  bargaining	  relationship	  is	  
driven	  by	  mutual	  dependence.	  The	   role	  of	   the	  state	  has	  shifted,	   from	  one	   that	   is	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  power	  and	  territory	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  nation	  states,	  to	  one	  that	  
is	  now	  competing	  more	  for	  the	  means	  to	  create	  wealth	  within	  their	  territory.	  The	  state	  
needs	  production	  for	  the	  world	  market	  to	  be	  located	  on	  its	  territory,	  regardless	  of	  who	  
is	  organising	  or	  owning	  it.	  TNCs	  can	  be	  an	  engine	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  wealth	  
creation	  if	  they	  can	  be	  attracted	  to	  invest	  and	  appropriately	  incentivised	  to	  drive	  local	  
value-­‐add.	   For	   their	   part,	   TNCs	   too	   are	   competing	   aggressively	   for	  world	  market	  
shares,	  with	  all	   the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  a	  global	   capital	  market	   that	  
rewards	  and	  penalises	  short-­‐term	  performance.	  TNCs	  are	  competing	  for	  new	  markets	  
and	  are	  flexible	  to	  locate	  production	  where	  it	  makes	  business	  sense.	  The	  combination	  
leads	  inevitably	  to	  both	  cooperation	  and	  conflict	  between	  developing	  world	  states	  and	  
transnational	  corporations.	  
	  
                                                
59	  Stopford	  and	  Strange,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  134.	  
60	  Ibid.,	  p.	  5.	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Bargaining:	  Complexity	  Multiplied	  	  	  	  
	   Acknowledging	  the	  de	  facto	  bargaining	  relationship	  between	  states	  and	  firms,	  
scholars	  have	  recognised	  that	  the	  construct	  sounds	  more	  two-­‐dimensional	  than	  it	  
actually	  is	  in	  practice.	  Stopford	  and	  Strange	  posit	  a	  triangular	  bargaining	  challenge:	  
government	  –	  company,	  government	  –	  government,	  and	  company	  –	  company.61	  They	  
argue	  that	  the	  lasting	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  bargain	  struck	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  success	  or	  
failure	  of	  bargaining	  on	  all	  three	  sides	  of	  the	  triangle.	  In	  reality	  there	  are	  a	  multiplicity	  
of	  bargains	  within	  each	  side	  of	  this	  triangle,	  for	  example:	  bargains	  between	  political	  
parties	   supporting	   the	   government;	   bargains	   with	   local	   private	   sector	   business	  
associations;	   bargains	  with	   the	  military,	   etc.	   	  Making	  matters	  more	   complex,	   the	  
changing	   competitive	   structure	   of	   industries	   acts	   on	   the	   bargaining	   landscape	   to	  
constrain	  choices	  by	  firms	  and	  states.	  	  
	   In	   this	   researchers’	   view,	   a	   triangle	   is	   inadequate	   to	   capture	   the	   true	  
complexity	  of	  the	  bargaining	  process	  and	  possible	  outcomes.	  The	  bargaining	  process	  is	  
more	  aptly	  described	  as	  a	  game	  of	  three-­‐dimensional	  chess	  with	  competitive	  moves	  
on	  one	  plane	  affecting	  an	  actor’s	  position	  on	  the	  other	  two.	  As	  if	  that	  weren’t	  complex	  
enough,	  where	  bargaining	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  industries	  that	  are	  globally	  dynamic,	  the	  
spaces	  on	  the	  boards	  and	  the	  pieces	  themselves	  may	  be	  changing	  rapidly	  as	  the	  game	  
is	   being	   played.	   Scholars	   argue	   “national	   policy	   must	   therefore	   be	   crafted	   and	  
implemented	   in	   the	   clear	   knowledge	   of	   the	   international	   structures	   of	   particular	  
industries	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  individual	  firms	  seeking	  market	  access.”62	  This	  seems	  
like	  a	  sensible	  conclusion	  but	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  cases	  studied	  here,	  this	  
foreknowledge	  was	   in	   all	   likelihood	   impossible.	  When	  Brazil	   fashioned	   its	  market	  
reserve,	  policymakers	  could	  not	  possibly	  foresee	  the	  sea	  change	  in	  industry	  structure	  
that	  would	  occur	  inside	  the	  next	  decade:	  one	  the	  spawned	  a	  new	  product	  segment	  
that	  would	  cannibalize	  the	  minicomputer	  industry	  that	  the	  reserve	  was	  designed	  to	  
                                                
61	  Ibid.,	  especially	  pp.	  19-­‐31,	  though	  in	  truth,	  the	  entire	  book	  is	  dedicated	  to	  exploring	  the	  
complexities	  of	  these	  relationships.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  p.	  96.	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protect	  and	  develop;	  one	  where	  microelectronics	  and	  software	  would	  become	  the	  real	  
sources	  of	  technological	  innovation,	  not	  computer	  hardware;	  one	  where	  Intel	  and	  
Microsoft	   (young	   firms	   hardly	   visible	   outside	   the	   USA	   in	   1977)	   would	   come	   to	  
dominate	  critical	  parts	  of	  the	  industry	  and	  set	  new	  global	  technical	  standards.	  	  
The	  more	  realistic	  challenge	  is	  adaptability	  of	  policy,	  not	  foresight.	  States	  have	  
to	  be	  more	  competent	  and	  nimble	  wielding	  instruments	  from	  their	  policy	  toolkit	  to	  
attract	  and	  direct	  foreign	  investment.	  The	  shrewd	  state	  may	  be	  better	  than	  the	  strong,	  
but	  in	  the	  cases	  studied,	  nimble	  would	  have	  been	  better	  than	  shrewd.	  For	  their	  part,	  	  
TNCs	  must	  become	  more	  politically	  sophisticated	  and	  adept	  as	  they	  seek	  to	  strike	  
bargains	  not	  only	  with	  host	  states	  but	  also	  with	  their	  home	  countries	  and	  other	  firms.	  
In	  all	  cases,	  the	  actors’	  political	  and	  administrative	  capacities	  are	  severely	  tested.	  
Bargaining:	  General	  Power	  Shift	  from	  State	  to	  Market	  
	   While	   bargaining	   has	   become	   the	   dominant	  modality	   of	   host	   state	   –	   TNC	  
relations,	  scholars	  have	  identified	  a	  general	  shift	  in	  bargaining	  power	  from	  the	  state	  to	  
the	  market,	  and	  more	  particularly	  to	  the	  transnational	  firms	  that	  serve	  the	  market.	  
Interestingly,	   this	   view	   is	   in	   direct	   opposition	   to	   the	   view	   of	   early	   bargain	   and	  
dependent	  development	  thinking	  that	  power	  generally	  shifted	  to	  the	  state	  over	  time,	  
due	   largely	   to	   the	   growing	   experience	   and	   institutional	   capacities	   of	   the	   state	   to	  
manage	  relations	  with	  TNCs.	  In	  The	  Retreat	  of	  the	  State,	  Susan	  Strange	  elaborates	  the	  
general	  decline	  of	   state	  power	   in	   the	  world	  economy	  and	   the	   reasons	   for	   it.	   The	  
verdict	  is	  summarised	  thus:	  	  
	  
“Where	   states	   were	   once	   the	   masters	   of	   markets,	   now	   it	   is	   the	  
markets	   which,	   on	   many	   crucial	   issues,	   are	   the	   masters	   over	   the	  
governments	  of	  states.”63	  	  
According	  to	  this	  view,	  states	  can	  no	  longer	  direct	  where	  production	  happens;	  they	  
can	   only	   bargain.	   TNCs	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   have	  many	   options	   in	   an	   increasingly	  
                                                
63 Susan	  Strange,	  The	  Retreat	  of	  the	  State:	  The	  Diffusion	  of	  Power	  in	  the	  World	  Economy.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Strange’s	  point	  is	  a	  
general	  one,	  applying	  to	  all	  states,	  not	  just	  those	  in	  developing	  countries.	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globalised	  economy.	   States	   control	   access	   to	   labour	  and	   land,	   two	   factors	  whose	  
importance	  to	  determining	  competitiveness	  has	  fallen	  in	  relation	  to	  technology	  and	  
capital.	  In	  contrast,	  TNCs	  have	  better	  access	  to	  technology	  and	  capital	  than	  developing	  
country	  states.	  	  
Strange	  identifies	  technology	  as	  the	  primary	  driver	  of	  the	  shift	  in	  balance	  of	  
power	  from	  states	  to	  markets	  and	  posits	  three	  related	  premises	  underlying	  the	  power	  
shift:	  (i)	  Politics	  is	  a	  common	  activity	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  sole	  preserve	  of	  states;	  (ii)	  
Power	  over	  outcomes	  is	  often	  exercised	  unintentionally	  by	  all	  who	  buy	  and	  sell	  and	  
deal	  in	  markets;	  and	  (iii)	  Authority	  over	  economic	  transactions	  is	  legitimately	  exercised	  
by	  agents	  other	  than	  the	  state.	  These	  three	  premises	  serve	  to	  limit	  the	  state’s	  power	  
to	  manage	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  the	  state’s	  culpability	  for	  economic	  outcomes.	  
No	   matter	   how	   embedded	   and	   autonomous	   the	   state	   is,	   many	   aspects	   of	   the	  
functioning	  of	  markets	  and	  firms	  now	  lie	  outside	  its	  control.	  	  	  
Bargaining:	  Impossibility	  of	  a	  Grand	  Theory	  
While	  acknowledging	  a	  general	  shift	  in	  bargaining	  power	  to	  the	  TNCs,	  it	  is	  clear	  
from	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  that	  a	  grand	  theory	  of	  host	  state	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  has	  
proved	  elusive.	  The	  general	  assumptions	  and	  factors	  outlined	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  
discussion	  on	  bargain	  theory	  remain	  largely	  in	  tact.	  However,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
multi-­‐dimensional	  bargaining	  process,	  and	  the	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  
have	  confounded	  scholars	  seeking	  to	  articulate	  a	  new	  and	  improved	  Bargain	  Theory	  
that	  accounts	  for	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  variables.	  “Today,	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  factors	  
involved	  in…	  transnational	  bargaining,	  and	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  variables	  at	  play,	  incline	  
us	  to	  deep	  scepticism	  about	  general	  theories.”64	  “All	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  many	  of	  
the	  conventional	  frameworks	  of	  analysis	  fail	  to	  deal	  adequately	  with	  the	  contemporary	  
dynamism	  of	  change.”65	  
                                                
64	  Susan	  Strange,	  “States,	  Firms,	  and	  Diplomacy”,	  International	  Affairs,	  London	  68.1	  
(January	  1992),	  pp.	  1-­‐15	  and	  reproduced	  in	  Frieden	  and	  Lake,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  67.	  
65	  Stopford	  and	  Strange,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  203.	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Attempts	   to	   apply	   statistical	   game	   theory	   clearly	   cannot	   yield	  meaningful	  
insights.	  The	  state	  is	  not,	  in	  reality,	  a	  rational	  actor	  in	  the	  game	  theory	  sense.	  There	  
are	   too	  many	  different,	  conflicting	  agendas	  and	  an	   inevitable	  gap	  between	  policy	  
intention	  and	  implementation.	  In	  truth,	  though	  political	  scientists	  often	  want	  to	  treat	  
TNCs	  and	  their	  managers	  as	  rational	  actors	  that	  too	  is	  a	  mistake.	  TNC	  executives	  may	  
have	  a	  fiduciary	  responsibility	  to	  maximise	  shareholder	  value,	  but	  they	  often	  do	  not	  
act	  in	  value-­‐maximising	  ways.	  TNCs	  are	  complex	  political	  organisations	  in	  much	  the	  
same	  way	  states	  are.	  	  
So	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  widely	  divergent	  outcomes	  are	  observed	  by	  scholars	  
analysing	   empirical	   studies	   of	   host	   country	   –	   TNC	  bargaining.	   “The	  divergence	  of	  
policies	  and	  outcomes	  in	  these	  countries	  [Brazil,	  Kenya	  and	  Malaysia]	  seems	  to	  us	  
especially	   striking	   and	   not	   susceptible	   to	   interpretation	   by	   any	   single	   model	   of	  
bargaining	  power.”66	  
	  
The	  acknowledged	  impossibility	  of	  a	  new	  and	  improved	  unified	  bargain	  theory	  
is	  in	  some	  senses	  a	  welcome	  relief.	  The	  more	  limited	  task	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  document	  
and	  compare	  two	  specific	  historical	  instances	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  with	  
respect	  to	  a	  single	  industry.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  research	  project	  is	  to	  examine	  historical	  
decisions,	  actions	  and	  interactions	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  specific	  policy	  outcomes	  and	  
draw	   clear	   but	   limited	   implications	   for	   existing	   bargain	   theory.	   The	   foregoing	  
discussion	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	  host	  state	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  
limited	   objective	   is	   challenging	   enough.	   It	   requires	   a	   thorough	   interdisciplinary	  
historical	  documentation	  and	  exploration	  of	  (a)	  domestic	  and	  international	  politics	  at	  
both	  macro	  and	  sectorial	  levels;	  (b)	  industry	  structure	  development	  and	  competitive	  
dynamics;	  (c)	  market	  response	  and	  influence;	  and	  (d)	  firm	  level	  strategy,	  success	  and	  
failure.	  As	  such,	  the	  case	  studies	  integrate	  and	  synthesise	  perspectives	  from	  history,	  
politics,	  economics	  and	  business.	  	  Without	  examining	  these	  different	  dimensions	  of	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the	  bargaining	  process,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  understand	  and	  interpret	  the	  who-­‐gets-­‐what	  
outcomes	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  studied.	  	  
	  
Overview	  of	  Findings	  and	  Conclusions	  
	   In	  attempting	   to	  explain	   the	  different	  policy	  choices	  and	  outcomes	   in	   two	  
countries	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  same	  industry,	  it	  has	  been	  necessary	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  
continuing	   interplay	  between	  market	  and	  political	   forces.	   	   In	  so	  doing	   it	  has	  been	  
essential	  to	  carefully	  define	  the	  exogenous	  from	  the	  endogenous	  ‘variables’	  in	  these	  
cases	  of	  TNC-­‐country	  bargaining.	  	  Writers	  from	  different	  disciplines	  have	  tended	  to	  
treat	  either	  policy	  or	  market	  forces	  as	  exogenous.	  Economists	  have	  tended	  to	  regard	  
policy	  as	  an	  exogenous	   factor	  when	   looking	  at	   the	  workings	  of	   the	  market,	  while	  
political	  scientists	  often	  have	  tended	  to	  treat	  the	  market	  as	  exogenous	  in	  their	  analysis	  
of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  	  Neither	  of	  these	  approaches	  satisfactorily	  explains	  the	  
historical	  outcomes	  in	  the	  cases	  studied,	  and	  neither	  can	  help	  to	  anticipate	  future	  
developments	  in	  the	  local	  industries.	  
	   Instead	  it	  has	  been	  necessary	  to	  treat	  both	  sector-­‐specific	  policy	  and	  private	  
investment	  decisions	  as	  endogenous	  variables,	  focusing	  on	  the	  continuing	  interplay	  
between	  the	  two.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  a	  number	  of	  mutual	  adjustments	  
which	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  each	  case:	  	  (i)	  the	  adjustment	  of	  top	  political	  authorities	  to	  
their	  supporters;	  (ii)	  state	  officials	  to	  each	  other	  (including	  top	  authorities);	  and	  (iii)	  
state	   officials	   and	   market	   agents	   (both	   investors	   and	   consumers,	   foreign	   and	  
domestic)	   to	   each	   other.
67
	   	   	   Thus,	   the	   thesis	   explores	   the	   objectives	   of	   each	  
constituent	  group	  in	  this	  process	  as	  well	  as	  the	  devices	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  influence	  
the	  outcome	  of	  the	  process.	  
	   The	  exogenous	  ‘variables’,	  then,	  are	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  international	  industry,	  
the	  macro	  goals	  of	  the	  host	  country	  regime,	  the	  industry’s	  importance	  to	  these	  macro	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goals,	   the	   industry’s	   complexity,	   and	   other	   situational	   factors	   (e.g.,	   the	   historical	  
endowment	  of	  a	  technological	  base,	  potential	  market	  size,	  geographic	  proximity	  to	  
export	  markets,	  etc.).	  
	   The	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  underline	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  complexity	  faced	  by	  
state	  and	  firm	  actors	  in	  the	  bargaining	  process.	  The	  dynamic,	  three-­‐dimensional	  chess	  
metaphor	  is	  indeed	  apt.	  In	  both	  case	  studies	  the	  objectives	  of	  each	  constituent	  group	  
changed	  over	   time,	   and	   investments	  made	  constrained	   future	  policy	   choices;	   the	  
variables	  in	  the	  analysis	  were	  constantly	  changing	  in	  value	  and	  importance.	  	  
The	  specifics	  of	  the	  two	  cases	  demonstrate	  the	  limitations	  of	  a	  general	  bargain	  
theory	  that	  does	  not	  take	  adequate	  account	  of	  host	  country	  politics	  and	  divergent	  
interests	  within	  national	  and	  international	  organisations.	  It	  also	  fails	  to	  pay	  sufficient	  
attention	  to	  industry	  dynamics	  and	  the	  firm-­‐level	  decisions	  of	  the	  local	  investors	  that	  
the	   host	   country	   is	   seeking	   to	   promote.	   In	   the	   cases	   studied,	  many	   of	   the	  most	  
significant	  bargains	  struck	  were	  not	  state-­‐to-­‐firm,	  or	  firm-­‐to-­‐firm,	  or	  state-­‐to-­‐state,	  
along	  the	  sides	  of	  a	  triangular	  bargaining	  model.68	  The	  bargains	  most	  significant	  to	  the	  
ultimate	  who-­‐gets-­‐what	  outcomes	  were	  often	   those	   struck	   inside	   the	   institutions	  
themselves,	  be	  they	  the	  states	  or	  the	  firms.	  The	  bargaining	  “game-­‐within-­‐the	  game”	  
proves	  very	   important	   in	   the	  cases	   studied.	   It	   is	   through	  analysis	  of	   the	  on-­‐going	  
interplay	  of	  policy	  and	  market	  &	   industry	   forces	  over	  more	   than	  a	  decade	   in	   the	  
history	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  that	  the	  variable	  nature	  of	  bargaining	  gains	  and	  losses	  
becomes	  apparent.	  	  
	   The	   cases	   share	   a	   number	   of	   exogenous	   factors	   in	   common:	   	   a	   growing	  
sensitivity	   to	   the	   vital	   importance	   of	   information	   technology	   to	   economic	  
development	   and	   national	   security;	   the	   dynamic	   growth	   of	   the	   microcomputer	  
market;	  the	  growing	  accessibility	  of	  the	  fundamental	  technological	  building	  blocks	  of	  
microcomputers	   in	  an	   increasingly	   fragmented	   international	   industry;	   the	   relative	  
attractiveness	  of	  the	  domestic	  Brazilian	  market,	  and	  of	  the	  Mexican	  market	  as	  an	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export	  base.	  	  The	  confluence	  of	  these	  exogenous	  factors,	  among	  others,	  created	  a	  
window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  alter	  their	  positions	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  international	  industry.	  	  
	   Indeed,	  both	  countries	  successfully	  shifted	  dependency	  further	  back	  in	  the	  
industry	  chain.	  	  This	  is	  significant	  both	  in	  what	  it	  says	  and	  what	  it	  doesn’t	  say.	  	  The	  
situation	  of	  dependency	  can	  be	  altered	  (and	  was	  in	  both	  cases)	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  host	  
country,	  contrary	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  most	  dependencistas	  and	  bargain	  theorists.	  	  
However,	   both	   countries	   remained	   strongly	   dependent	   upon	   the	   international	  
computer	  industry	  and	  that	  dependence	  continued	  to	  condition	  the	  development	  of	  
their	   respective	  computer	   industries	   (and	  many	  other	   industries	  dependent	  upon	  
computer	  electronics)	  on	  into	  the	  future.	  	  	  
	   This	  thesis	  documents	  a	  number	  of	  Mexican	  policy	  achievements	  that	  the	  so-­‐
called	  ‘IBM	  decision’	  of	  1985	  obscured.	  	  The	  Mexican	  computer	  industry	  development	  
programme	  and	   its	   promulgators	   encouraged	   local	   investors	   into	   the	  business	   of	  
assembling	  microcomputers	  and	  peripherals,	  prompted	   initial	   technology	   transfer	  
through	  domestic/foreign	  joint	  ventures,	  and	  helped	  improve	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  
the	  sector	  by	  restricting	  imports	  and	  extracting	  export	  commitments	  from	  TNCs.	  	  The	  
programme	   established	   some	   order	   in	   a	   chaotic	  market	   and	   helped	   to	   generate	  
professional/technical	  employment	  opportunities.	  The	  policy	  initiative	  largely	  failed,	  
however,	  in	  its	  aims	  to	  foster	  national	  investment	  in	  R&D,	  horizontal	  integration	  (i.e.,	  
the	  development	  of	  Mexican	  component	   suppliers)	   and	  create	  Mexican-­‐majority-­‐
owned	  industry	  leaders	  in	  microcomputers	  and	  peripherals.	  	  
	   México’s	  policy	  development,	  successes	  and	  failures	  were	  conditioned	  by	  the	  
complex	   interplay	   between	   market	   and	   political	   forces.	   	   Given	   the	   perceived	  
importance	  of	  the	  industry	  to	  economic	  development,	  computers	  became	  a	  privileged	  
political	   product	   in	   the	   late	   1970s,	   providing	   privileged	   access	   to	   policy-­‐makers.	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  specialised	  nature	  of	  the	  industry	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  small	  
cadre	  of	  elites	  to	  influence	  policy	  formulation.	  	   Indeed,	  the	  opportunity	  expanded	  
quickly	  from	  influence	  to	  responsibility	  for	   implementation.	  México	  may	  not	  have	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been	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  “developmental	  state”,	  but	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  
country’s	   computer	  policy	   in	   the	  early	  days,	  a	  meritocracy	   in	  policy	   responsibility	  
applied,	  if	  only	  because	  no	  one	  else	  understood	  the	  industry.	  	  
But	   sustained	   policy	   success	   was	   elusive.	   Policy-­‐makers	   were	   unable	   to	  
generate	   and	   sustain	   broad	   based	   political	   support	   at	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	  
government.	  	  The	  change	  of	  government	  in	  1982	  swept	  away	  key	  political	  sponsors	  
among	  the	  top	  authorities.	  	  Changing	  economic	  fortunes	  shifted	  macro	  goals	  from	  
nationalist	  industrial	  development	  to	  increasing	  balance	  of	  payments	  surpluses	  and	  
attracting	   foreign	   investment.	   	   The	  ongoing	   interests	  of	   the	   state	  as	  consumer	   of	  
computers	   continued	   to	   override	   state	   preference	   for	   Mexican	   production	   or	  
consideration	   of	   direct	   state	   investment	   in	   the	   industry.	   	   Finally,	   the	   mounting	  
pressure	  of	  the	  TNCs	  and	  the	  increasing	  militancy	  of	  the	  US	  government	  on	  behalf	  of	  
US	  companies	  brought	  about	  explicit	  changes	  to	  stated	  policy.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Mexican	  
private	  investment	  in	  the	  industry	  was	  sparse	  and	  what	  little	  there	  was	  proceeded	  
either	  cautiously	  or	  purely	  opportunistically.	  
	   The	  Brazilian	  case	  shows	  a	  shift	  in	  dependency	  still	  further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  
chain.	  	  However,	  subsequent	  chapters	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  policy	  successes	  are	  
rather	  more	  limited	  and	  temporary	  than	  the	  authors	  reviewed	  above	  have	  suggested	  
previously.	   	   Brazil	   succeeded	   in	   shifting	   its	   dependence	   from	   foreign	   computer	  
hardware	  (micros	  and	  minis)	  to	  foreign	  microelectronics	  and	  software	  for	  a	  longer	  
period	  of	  time.	  	  The	  policy	  was	  successful	  in	  attracting	  the	  capital	  of	  major	  Brazilian	  
investors,	  stimulating	  Brazilian	  employment	  in	  the	  industry,	  limiting	  TNC	  market	  share	  
for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time,	  and	  extracting	  technology	  licensing	  agreements	  from	  
computer	  TNCs.	   	  However,	   innovation	   in	  the	   industry	  continued	  to	  be	   introduced	  
largely	  from	  outside	  the	  country	  and	  the	  market	  demonstrated	  a	  stubborn	  propensity	  
to	  sidestep	  the	  regulatory	  and	  legislative	  strictures	  to	  access	  foreign	  technology.	  
	   Computers	  became	  a	  privileged	  political	  product	  some	  ten	  years	  earlier	   in	  
Brazil	  than	  in	  México.	  	  And	  the	  policy-­‐making	  elites	  had	  considerably	  more	  success	  in	  
generating	   and	   sustaining	   broad	   support	   for	   the	   policy	   from	   1976	   to	   1984.	   	   The	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Brazilian	   state	   took	   the	   lead	   in	   investment	   in	   the	   industry	   and	   then	   organised	  
protected	  concessions	  for	  national	  computer	  makers	  licensing	  foreign	  technology.	  	  The	  
fast	  growing	  market	  protected	  from	  international	  competition	  attracted	  hundreds	  of	  
new	   entrants	   who	   could	   not	   keep	   pace	   with	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   international	  
industry.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  companies	  soon	  were	  actively	  seeking	  not	  just	  technology	  but	  
capital	  from	  computer	  TNCs.	  	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   persistent	   uncompetitiveness	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   informatics	  
industry	  gradually	  drove	  key	  informatics-­‐dependent	  industries	  to	  lobby	  for	  a	  more	  
liberal	  regulatory	  regime.	  	  Their	  voices,	  combined	  with	  those	  of	  the	  TNCs	  and	  the	  US	  
government,	  led	  to	  the	  growing	  de	  facto	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  the	  
latter	  half	  of	   the	  1980s.	   	  Before	  the	  1984	   Informatics	  Law	  expired	   in	  1992,	  policy	  
priorities	   shifted	  away	   from	  protecting	   the	  domestic	  market	   for	  Brazilian	   firms	   to	  
attracting	   foreign	   investment,	   technology	   and	   trade	   with	   the	   aim	   to	   enhance	  
international	  competitiveness.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Hence,	  this	  study	  does	  not	  just	  validate	  and	  document	  a	  shift	  in	  dependency.	  	  
To	  stop	  there	  is	  misleading	  because	  such	  a	  statement	  is	  too	  ‘stagnationist’	  (to	  use	  
Palma’s	  term	  in	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  first	  two	  approaches	  in	  the	  dependency	  school).	  	  In	  
both	  cases,	  the	  forces	  that	  acted	  to	  drive	  the	  shift	  are	  still	  at	  work;	  the	  bargaining	  
game	  is	  not	  over.	  	  Just	  as	  the	  study	  shows	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  dependency	  occurred,	  so	  too	  
does	  it	  show	  that	  the	  shift	  is	  not	  progressive	  and	  one-­‐directional;	  the	  bargaining	  gains	  
won	  by	  México	  and	  Brazil	  were	  not	  secure.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  analysis	  exposes	  a	  reverse	  and	  
complex	  trend	  toward	  greater	  dependency	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  For	  this	  reason	  one	  may	  
not	  employ	  these	  two	  cases	  to	  support	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  in	  high	  technology	  
industries.	  
	   Events	   in	   both	   countries	   since	   the	   primary	   research	   for	   this	   dissertation	  
underline	  a	  central	  point	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Positional	  assets	  and	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  
alone	  cannot	  adequately	  explain	  the	  policies	  and	  their	  results.	  Observers	  and	  analysts,	  
whether	   they	   are	   traditional	   economists	   espousing	   bargain	   theory	   or	   political	  
scientists	   holding	   to	   dependency	   theory,	   tend	   to	   pay	   too	   little	   attention	   to	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entrepreneurial	  and	  managerial	  talent	  as	  determinants	  of	  market	  success.	  Decades	  
after	  the	  reserve	  policies	  were	  adopted	  and	  then	  abandoned,	  a	  few	  domestic	  players	  
in	  both	  markets	  have	  not	  only	  survived,	  but	  have	  thrived	  amidst	  the	  changing	  policy	  
and	   industry	   environments.	   The	  market	   reserve	   enticed	   some	   to	   enter,	   but	   their	  
success	   and	   the	   concurrent	   failure	   of	   so	   many	   others	   can	   only	   be	   explained	   by	  
differences	  in	  corporate	  strategy	  choices	  and	  managerial	  capability.	  	  
Bargain	  theorists	  have	  similarly	  underestimated	  the	  importance	  and	  complex	  
impact	   of	   the	   hyper-­‐dynamism	   of	   the	   industry.	   The	   rapid	   globalisation	   of	   the	  
informatics	  industry	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  economic	  productivity	  across	  sectors	  made	  the	  
market	   reserve	  policy	   ever	  more	  difficult	   and	   costly	   to	  maintain.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  
explosion	   of	   the	   microcomputer	   segment	   and	   the	   disaggregation	   of	   the	   global	  
informatics	  value	  chain	  opened	  up	  opportunities	  for	  domestic	  players	  in	  Brazil	  and	  
México	  to	  source	  essential	  components	  and	  operate	  more	  competitively	  in	  the	  most	  
dynamic	  part	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  very	  dynamism	  that	  opened	  up	  these	  opportunities	  also	  made	  it	  
difficult	   for	   a	   state	   to	   respond	   and	   adapt	   in	   order	   to	   play	   an	   effective	   on-­‐going	  
influential	  role	  that	  Evans	  envisages,69	  nurturing	  and	  cajoling	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
capital	   to	   serve	   a	   defined	   development	   agenda.	   This	   is	   a	   central	   challenge	   for	  
policymakers	  in	  a	  high-­‐tech	  globalised	  world.	  Stopford	  and	  Strange	  emphasise	  the	  
importance	  of	  crafting	  policy	  based	  on	  a	  sound	  understanding	  of	   the	  competitive	  
dynamics	  in	  the	  industry,70	  but	  that	  is	  easier	  said	  than	  done	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  hyper-­‐
dynamic	   informatics	   sector.	   Host	   state	   competence	   and	   even	   prescience	  may	   be	  
essential,	   but	   adaptability	   is	   more	   important.	   The	   concluding	   chapter	   offers	  
observations	  and	  ideas	  about	  more	  flexible	  mechanisms	  a	  developmental	  state	  may	  
use	  to	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	  internationally	  competitive	  high-­‐tech	  sectors.	  	  
	  
                                                
69	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1995.	  Evans	  uses	  the	  term	  “husbandry”	  to	  describe	  this	  role.	  For	  more	  
discussion	  about	  Evans’	  concepts	  of	  state	  roles,	  see	  my	  Afterword	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  Case.	  
70	  Stopford	  and	  Strange,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  96.	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Structure	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
	   From	  this	  introduction	  and	  overview,	  the	  dissertation	  moves	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
four	  chapters	  to	  a	  detailed	  consideration	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil.	  	  Chapter	  2	  outlines	  the	  
general	  ideological,	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  in	  which	  the	  informatics	  policy	  was	  
developed	   and	   implemented.	   Chapter	   3	   then	   documents	   and	   analyses	   the	  
development	   of	   computer	   policy	   in	   Brazil	   and	   the	   country’s	   experience	  with	   the	  
international	  computer	   industry.	   	  Chapter	  4	  contains	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  policy’s	  
impact	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  industry	  to	  ascertain	  what	  bargaining	  gains	  were	  
achieved.	  	  Chapter	  5	  comprises	  an	  Afterword	  that	  summarises	  the	  main	  developments	  
in	  the	  Brazilian	  case	  since	  1990,	  when	  the	  government	  began	  to	  enact	  liberal	  market	  
reforms.	  Chapters	  6,	  7,	  8	  and	  9	  discuss	  in	  the	  case	  of	  México	  in	  parallel	  fashion.	  	  The	  
tenth	  and	  final	  chapter	  summarises	  the	  cases	  side	  by	  side	  and	  then	  offers	  conclusions	  
and	  implications	  for	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  TNC-­‐country	  bargaining	  in	  high	  technology	  
industries.	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CHAPTER	  2	  
INTRODUCING	  THE	  CASE	  OF	  BRAZIL:	  	  
GENERAL	  POLITICAL	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  CONTEXT	  
	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  Case	  
	   In	  1977	  the	  government	  of	  Brazil	  moved	  to	  reserve	  the	  domestic	  minicomputer	  
industry	  to	  Brazilian–owned	  firms.	  	  Subsequently,	  an	  indigenous	  computer	  industry	  
developed	   under	   the	   protective	   rubric	   of	   the	   market	   reserve.	   	   This	   industrial	  
development	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  number	  of	  important	  successes:	  	  a	  remarkable	  
increase	  in	  employment	  in	  the	  sector;	  the	  development	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  scientists	  
and	  technicians	  in	  computers;	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  national	  capability	  in	  minicomputer,	  
microcomputer,	  and	  peripherals	  manufacturing;	  an	   increase	   in	   local	   research	  and	  
development	  efforts	  in	  computers;	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  foreign	  dominance	  of	  the	  end–
user	  market.	  	  In	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s	  these	  policy	  achievements	  were	  cited	  
as	  evidence	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  successful	  bargaining	  by	  Third	  World	  nations	  in	  high	  
technology	  industries.
71	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Over	  time	  the	  policy	  came	  under	  increasing	  pressure	  and	  was	  moderated	  by	  a	  
number	  of	  factors	  and	  events.	  	  These	  included	  the	  economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
failed	  Cruzado	  Plans,	  the	  transition	  to	  civilian	  rule	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  party	  politics,	  the	  
rapid	  pace	  of	  technological	  change,	  the	  increasing	  demands	  of	  the	  local	  market,	  and	  
the	  pressure	  from	  the	  computer	  transnationals	  and	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  general	  ideological,	  political	  and	  
economic	   context	   in	   which	   computer	   industrial	   policy	   was	   formulated.	   This	   is	  
important	   background	   to	   the	   following	   chapter’s	   examination	   of	   the	   factors	   and	  
events	  that	  (i)	  explain	  the	  policy	  decisions	  that	  were	  made	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  industry	  
and	  served	  to	  sustain	  the	  policy	  up	  to	  the	  late	  1980s;	  and	  (ii)	  acted	  to	  alter	  the	  policy	  
                                                
71	  	  Emanuel	  Adler	  and	  Joseph	  Grieco	  both	  affirm	  this.	  	  See	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  and	  Grieco,	  
Op.	  Cit.,	  (1984).	  See	  also	  the	  later	  work	  of	  Peter	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995).	  	  
        61 
and	   its	   prospects	   for	   continued	   success.	   	   Chapter	   4	   analyses	   the	   policy	   and	   the	  
industry	  in	  sufficient	  detail	  to	  ascertain	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  policy	  objectives	  were	  met.	  	  	  
	   This	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  Brazil	  successfully	  capitalised	  on	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
alter	  its	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  international	  computer	  industry;	  dependency	  was	  
indeed	  shifted	  further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  chain.72	  	  The	  success	  achieved	  owes	  in	  large	  
part	   to	   the	   broad	   and	   sustained	   support	   from	   diverse	   influences	   in	   the	   country:	  	  
academic	   elites	  with	   a	   personal	   and	   ideological	   interest	   in	   the	  development	   of	   a	  
national	  computer	  industry;	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industry	  which	  was	  concerned	  
with	  a	  worsening	  balance	  of	  trade;	  the	  military	  which	  was	  concerned	  with	  national	  
security	   and	   technological	   autonomy;	   national	   developmentalists	   in	   the	   National	  
Development	  Bank	  (BNDES);	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  which	  responded	  to	  the	  state's	  
strong	  lead,	  seeing	  a	  profitable	  opportunity	  in	  a	  protected	  market.	  	  	  
	   These	  are	  indeed	  rather	  peculiar	  allies.	  	  The	  military	  is	  not	  a	  natural	  bedfellow	  
with	  nationalist	  academic	  elites,	   for	  example.	   	  However,	   the	   strategic	  nature	  and	  
ubiquitous	  relevance	  of	  the	  industry	  meant	  that	  support	  for	  a	  sectoral	  development	  
policy	  could	  be	  so	  diverse	  both	  in	  its	  sources	  and	  rationales.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  relation	  of	  
technological	   autonomy	   to	  development	   in	   general	  was	  broadly	   accepted	  among	  
power	   elites	   in	   Brazil;	   it	   was	   not	   a	   new	   concept.	   	   These	   diverse	   actors	   shared	   a	  
common	  perception	  of	  Brazil's	  future	  as	  an	  economic	  and	  military	  power	  on	  the	  world	  
stage,	   and	   the	  necessity	  of	   technological	   capability	   to	   that	   status.	   	   This	   "national	  
developmentalism"	  provided	  a	  stable	  foundation	  for	  the	  policy	  initiative	  in	  computers	  
in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  
	   Not	  only	  did	  the	  power	  elites	  share	  a	  common	  perception	  of	  the	  goal,	  Brazil's	  
history	  indicated	  an	  accepted	  means	  to	  the	  desired	  end.	  	  The	  Brazilian	  state	  would	  
need	  to	  fulfil	  the	  familiar	  roles	  of	  lead	  investor,	  cartel–maker,	  and	  regulator	  in	  order	  
for	  the	  indigenous	  industry	  to	  develop.	  	  These	  were	  roles	  the	  state	  had	  played	  in	  many	  
                                                
72	  “Further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  chain”	  means	  that	  dependency	  on	  foreign	  technology	  and	  
supply	  shifted	  from	  computer	  hardware	  equipment	  to	  the	  microelectronic	  components	  
that	  drive	  the	  hardware.	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industries	  identified	  as	  strategic.	  The	  computer	  industry	  was	  no	  exception.	  	  As	  such,	  
the	  market	  reserve	  in	  computers	  was	  not	  a	  new	  and	  daring	  departure	  from	  traditional	  
economic	  policy	  for	  Brazil	  when	  it	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1977.	  	  It	  was	  simply	  a	  new	  area	  in	  
which	  an	  old	  formula	  was	  applied.	  	  
	   While	  these	  factors	  enabled	  the	  country	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
shift	   dependence	   in	   the	   computer	   industry,	   the	   opportunity	   itself	   was	   created	  
primarily	   exogenously.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   worldwide	   computer	  
electronics	  industry	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  worked	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  lower	  the	  
capital	  and	  technological	  barriers	  to	  entry	  into	  the	  sector.	  	  
	   While	  dependency	  was	  altered,	  by	  no	  means	  was	  it	  eliminated.	  	  Indeed,	  some	  
of	  the	  important	  bargaining	  gains	  achieved	  by	  the	  market	  reserve	  were	  temporary.	  	  
The	  market	   reserve	  was	   substantially	   dismantled	   after	   1990	  when	   liberal	  market	  
reforms	  were	  adopted.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  by	  then	  a	  globalised	  industry	  structure	  with	  de	  
facto	  international	  technological	  standards	  controlled	  by	  a	  few	  transnationals	  placed	  
unbearable	  pressure	  on	  the	  protectionist	  policy.	  Thus,	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  serves	  as	  a	  
salient	  reminder	  that	  bargaining	  gains	  are	  not	  secular	  and	  progressive.	  	  Indeed	  they	  
are	  all	  the	  more	  vulnerable	  in	  a	  volatile	  economic,	  political,	  and	  technological	  context.	  	  
The	  computer	  industry	  in	  Brazil	  exists	  in	  precisely	  such	  a	  context.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Ideological,	  Political,	  and	  Economic	  Context	  
	   	  Brazil's	  unique	  historical	  political	  and	  economic	  situation	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  
the	  twentieth	  century	  provided	  fertile	  ground	  in	  which	  a	  nationalist	  computer	  policy	  
could	   develop	   and	   be	   sustained.	   	   The	   following	   pages	   examine	   (i)	   the	   shared	  
perception	  of	  Brazil's	  future	  which	  provided	  the	  goal	  that	  united	  the	  diverse	  power	  
groups	  behind	  the	  computer	  policy,	  (ii)	  the	  historical	  means	  to	  industrial	  development,	  
namely,	  state	  intervention,	  (iii)	  the	  stable	  political	  situation	  after	  1964;	  and	  finally,	  (iv)	  
the	   government's	   industrial	   policies	   and	   the	   post–war	   economic	   growth	   which	  
together	  provided	  favourable	  investment	  conditions	  for	  public	  and	  private	  capital	  alike	  
in	  this	  new	  industry.	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National	  Developmentalism:	  	  The	  Uniting	  Ideology	  
	   "We	  are	  not	   just	   regulating	   the	   computer	   industry;	  we	   are	   constructing	   a	  
country."
73
	  	  This	  statement	  reflects	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  great	  many	  proponents	  of	  the	  
national	  computer	  policy	  in	  Brazil.
74	  	  The	  attempt	  to	  develop	  an	  indigenous	  capability	  
in	  computers	  was	  rooted	  in	  a	  deeply–held	  vision	  of	  Brazil's	  future	  as	  a	  world	  economic	  
(and	  for	  some,	  military)	  power.	  	  The	  country's	  vast	  territory	  and	  rich	  natural	  resources	  
fed	  this	  vision	  and	  together	  with	  the	  Estado	  Novo	  helped	  to	  spawn	  an	  ideology	  of	  
economic	  policy–making	  which	  some	  have	  called	  "National	  Developmentalism."
75
	  
	   This	   national	   developmentalism	   gradually	   became	   institutionalised	   in	   the	  
1940s	   and	   1950s	   during	   this	   period	   of	   strong	   economic	   growth	   through	   import	  
substitution.	  	  It	  was	  reflected	  in,	  and	  propagated	  by	  a	  series	  of	  ambitious	  development	  
plans	  in	  the	  post–war	  period	  which	  included:	  	  the	  SALTE	  Plan	  for	  Health,	  Food	  and	  
Transport	  (1950–54);	  the	  planning	  effort	  of	  the	  Joint	  Brazil–United	  States	  Economic	  
Commission	   (1951–1953);	   the	   establishment	   in	   the	   early	   1950s	   of	   the	   National	  
Development	  Bank	  (BNDES)	  to	  finance	  numerous	   infrastructure	  projects	  and	   later	  
played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  planning	  and	  finance	  of	  the	  national	  effort	  in	  computers;	  
the	   1953–55	   BNDES/ECLAC/United	   Nations	   effort	   at	   systematic	   planning;	   and	  
President	   Juscelino	   Kubitschek's	   National	   Development	   Council,	   Programme	   of	  
Targets,	  and	  special	  incentives	  programmes.	  	  This	  post–war	  series	  of	  development	  
plans	  and	  the	  intense	  discussions	  around	  them	  "spread	  a	  sort	  of	  political	  mystique	  of	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Roberto	  Spolidoro,	  Deputy	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Special	  Secretariat	  for	  
Informatics,	  Brasilia,	  October	  1987.	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  See	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1987,	  pp.	  238ff.	  
75
	   	  See,	   for	  example,	  Albert	  O.	  Hirschman,	  "Ideologies	  of	  Economic	  Development	   in	  Latin	  
America,"	  in	  Hirschman,	  A	  Bias	  for	  Hope:	  	  Essays	  on	  Development	  and	  Latin	  America,	  (New	  
Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1971),	  pp.	  270–311;	  and	  Frank	  Bonilla,	  "A	  National	  Ideology	  for	  
Development	  in	  Brazil,"	  in	  K.H.	  Silvert,	  ed.,	  Expectant	  Peoples:	  	  Nationalist	  Development,	  (New	  
York:	  	  Random	  House,	  1963),	  pp.	  232–264.	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development––what	  came	  to	  be	  called	  desenvolvimentismo––among	  the	  leaders	  of	  
Brazilian	  public	  and	  political	  opinion."
76
	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  quest	  for	  development	  was	  more	  than	  an	  
ambition	  for	  increases	  in	  per	  capita	  income.	  	  	  
	  
"It	  is	  also,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  this	  'conquest	  of	  decision	  centers,'	  
which	  were	  previously	  in	  foreign	  hands,	  and	  a	  new	  ability	  to	  strike	  out	  
on	   one's	   own,	   economically,	   politically	   and	   intellectually.	   	   For	   this	  
reason,	  the	  quest	  for	  development	  is	  also	  a	  quest	  for	  self–discovery	  
and	  self–affirmation	  and	  thus	  comes	  to	  be	  indissolubly	  tied	  to	  a	  new	  




	   National	  developmentalism	  received	  new	  impetus	  after	  the	  coup	  d'	  état	  of	  
1964.	  	  In	  order	  to	  justify	  extended	  military	  rule,	  military	  ideologues	  explicitly	  linked	  
national	   developmentalism	   with	   the	   military's	   own	   national	   security	   doctrine.
78	  	  
However,	   while	   espousing	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   economic	   nationalism,	   the	   military's	  
economic	  policies	  were	  contradictory,	  largely	  encouraging	  the	  integration	  of	  Brazil	  into	  
the	  international	  economy.
79
	  	  This	  fact	  does	  not	  weaken	  the	  argument	  that	  national	  
developmentalism	  influenced	  policy–makers;	  indeed,	  it	  is	  a	  testimony	  to	  the	  vitality	  of	  
this	  ideology	  that	  the	  military's	  departure	  was	  not	  made	  explicit.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  
external	   forces	   threatened	   economic	   prosperity	   and	   the	   country's	   balance	   of	  
payments,	  the	  military	  government	  responded	  with	  policies	  that	  coherently	  reflected	  
the	  ideology	  of	  national	  developmentalism.	  	  The	  response	  to	  the	  oil	  crisis	  in	  the	  early	  
1970s,	  which	  emphasised	  energy	  autonomy	  via	   the	  alcohol	   fuels	  programme	   is	   a	  
classic	  example	  of	  this.	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  Lincoln	  Gordon	  and	  E.	  C.	  Grommers,	  United	  States	  Manufacturing	  Investments	  in	  Brazil:	  	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Brazilian	  Government	  Policies,	  1946–1960,	  (Boston:	  	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  
1962),	  p.	  123.	  
77	  	  Hirschman,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  304.	  	  In	  referring	  to	  the	  "conquest	  of	  decision	  centers,"	  Hirschman	  is	  
using	  Celso	  Furtado's	  phrase.	  	  See	  Celso	  Furtado,	  Formação	  econômica	  do	  Brasil.	  (São	  Paulo:	  
Companhia	  Editora	  Nacional,	  1971).	  
78	   	   See	   Alfred	   Stepan,	   "The	   New	   Professionalism	   of	   Internal	   Warfare	   and	   Military	   Role	  
Expansion,"	  in	  Stepan,	  ed.,	  Authoritarian	  Brazil,	  (New	  Haven:	  	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1973),	  pp.	  
47–65.	  
79
	  	  Peter	  Evans	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  Dependent	  Development,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1979). 
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   Power	   elites	   in	   Brazil	   long	   recognised	   the	   importance	   of	   indigenous	  
technological	  capability	  to	  national	  development.	  	  Technology	  was	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  
the	  prime	  means	  of	   control	  over	   the	   'decision	  centres'	   that	  Brazil	  was	   seeking	   to	  
conquer.	   	   Therefore,	   technological	  autonomy	  became	  an	   intrinsic	  aim	  of	  national	  
developmentalism.	  	  	  
	   Brazil's	   implicit	  and	  explicit	  science	  and	  technology	  policy	  since	  the	  Estado	  
Novo	  reflected	  the	  elites'	  recognition	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  technology	  to	  the	  country's	  
development.
80	  	  Prior	  to	  1962	  there	  was	  little	  science	  and	  technology	  policy	  related	  to	  
the	  commercialisation	  of	  technology.	  	  However,	  shortly	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  
the	  federal	  government	  became	  obsessed	  with	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  nuclear	  
power	  capability.	   	  This	  ambition	   led	   to	   the	  establishment	   in	  1951	  of	   the	  National	  
Research	  Council	  (CNPq),	  which	  remained	  an	  important	  centre	  of	  research	  in	  science	  
and	  technology.	  	  	  
	   In	   1964	   the	  new	  military	   government	   created	   the	   Scientific	   and	   Technical	  
Development	   Fund	   (FUNTEC)	   within	   the	   National	   Development	   Bank	   (BNDES).	  	  
FUNTEC	   was	   to	   engender	   an	   increasing	   national	   supply	   and	   demand	   of	   high	  
technology	  by	  financing	  research	  and	  the	  purchase	  of	  Brazilian	  equipment.	   	  Some	  
years	  later	  FUNTEC	  was	  to	  provide	  initial	  funding	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  country's	  
first	  computer.	  	  	  
	   In	  1968	  the	  government	  explicitly	  recognised	  technological	  development	  as	  a	  
policy	  goal	  in	  its	  Strategic	  Development	  Programme	  1968–70.	  	  This	  programme	  called	  
for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  into	  the	  productive	  system	  through	  
"real"	  technology	  transfer	  and	  through	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Brazilian	  capacity	  to	  
innovate.	  	  	  
	   In	  1971	  the	  first	  National	  Development	  Plan	  (I	  PND)	  was	  published	  identifying	  
the	  development	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  as	  a	  national	  objective.	  	  I	  PND	  instituted	  
the	  Basic	  Plan	  of	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Development	  thereby	  endorsing	  a	  policy	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   Adler,	   Op.	   Cit.,	   (1987)	   pp.	   156–162	   provides	   a	   summary	   chronology	   of	   the	   main	  
developments	  in	  Brazil's	  science	  and	  technology	  policy	  up	  to	  1979.	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pursuing	   technological	   autonomy.	   	   In	   1974	   II	   PND	   reinforced	   the	   importance	   of	  
technology	  to	  Brazil's	  development	  strategy.	  
	   Thus,	   for	  some	  time	   leading	  up	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  when	  Brazil	   launched	   its	  
national	  experiment	   in	  computers,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  official	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  
technological	  autonomy	  as	  both	  a	  means	  to	  achieving	  the	  country's	  development	  
goals,	  and	  as	  a	  development	  objective	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  
State	  Intervention:	  	  The	  Usual	  Approach	  
	   While	  the	  ideology	  of	  national	  developmentalism	  provided	  a	  basic	  rationale	  for	  
the	  policy	  effort	  in	  computers,	  the	  historic	  role	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  informed	  the	  
specific	  approach	  to	  developing	  a	  national	  capability	  in	  this	  industry.	  	  	  
	   Brazil	  had	  a	   long	  history	  of	  state–control	  of	   the	  economy.	   	  "From	  Vargas's	  
initial	   ascent	   to	   power,	   the	   state	   approached	   the	   economy	   with	   an	   attitude	   of	  
conscious	   interventionism."
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  The	  federal	  government	  participated	  directly	   in	  the	  
country's	  economy	  through	  direct	  ownership	  in	  key	  sectors	  such	  as	  railroads,	  shipping,	  
airlines,	  steel,	  petroleum,	  petrochemicals,	  ports,	  electricity,	  telecommunications,	  and	  
mining.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   1987,	   eight	   of	   Brazil's	   twenty	   largest	   companies	  were	   state–
owned.
82	  	  The	  public	  sector	  accounted	  for	  half	  of	  the	  country's	  gross	  national	  product,	  
and	  the	  government	  made	  half	  of	  the	  total	  investment	  in	  the	  state	  of	  São	  Paulo,	  the	  
industrial	  powerhouse	  of	  the	  country.
83
	  	  	  
	   So	  one	  of	  the	  legacies	  of	  the	  Estado	  Novo	  was	  a	  centralised	  political	  machinery	  
that	  was	  increasingly	  disposed	  to	  direct	  intervention	  in	  the	  country's	  economy.	  	  The	  
result	  was	   a	   local	   private	   sector	   that	  was	  dwarfed	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  by	   the	   state	  
conglomerates,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  by	  the	  transnationals.	  	  	  
	   However,	  it	  is	  misleading	  to	  stop	  there.	  	  State	  intervention	  and	  control	  in	  the	  
economy	  was	  not	  just	  a	  50–year–old	  phenomenon	  in	  Brazil.	  	  It	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  
                                                
81	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1979),	  p.	  86.	  
82	  	  Exame,	  "Mehores	  e	  Maiores,"	  September	  1987,	  p.	  82.	  	  "Largest"	  in	  terms	  of	  total	  revenues.	  	  
Eight	  more	  are	  foreign	  owned	  and	  the	  remaining	  four	  are	  owned	  by	  Brazilian	  private	  capital.	  
83	  	  "Brazil:	  	  Tomorrow's	  Italy,"	  The	  Economist,	  January	  17,	  1987,	  p.	  24.	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the	  tradition	  of	  "cartorias"––the	  officially–granted	  charters	  with	  which	  the	  Portuguese	  
controlled	  the	  local	  economy.	  	  The	  coffee	  cartels	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  early	  
example	  of	   this.	   	   	  The	  modern	  Brazilian	  state	  continued	   in	   this	   tradition,	  granting	  
concessions	  in	  public	  utilities,	  and	  later	  in	  computers.	  	  	  
	   The	  government	  intervened	  in	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  
ways	   that	   included	   both	   direct	   ownership	   and	   the	   granting	   of	   concessions.	   	   The	  
government	  proposed	  to	  lead	  investment	  in	  this	  new	  and	  risky	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  
by	  first	   investing	  public	   funds	  via	  the	  BNDES	   in	  a	   'flagship'	  company:	   	  Cobra.	   	  The	  
government	   envisaged	   the	   computer	   flagship	   as	   a	   tri–pe	   company,	   owned	   and	  
operated	  jointly	  by	  the	  government,	  Brazilian	  private	  capital,	  and	  foreign	  capital.
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However,	  the	  government	  was	  unable	  to	  attract	  investment	  from	  any	  of	  the	  major	  
computer	  transnationals	  or	  any	  major	  Brazilian	  capital.	   	  Cobra	  received	  computer	  
technology	  from	  Ferranti––a	  relatively	  small	  British	  electronics	  firm––but	  was	  financed	  
almost	   entirely	   out	   of	   state	   funds.	   	   Several	   years	   later	   the	   government	   granted	  
'concessions'	  to	  five	  national	  minicomputer	  manufacturers,	  prohibiting	  others	  from	  
competing	  in	  this	  growing	  market.	  	  The	  federal	  government	  exercised	  further	  control	  
in	  the	  industry	  via	  a	  plethora	  of	  regulations	  concerning	  foreign	  trade,	  access	  to	  credit,	  
and	  the	  use	  and	  deployment	  of	  computer	  equipment.	  	  	  
The	  Political	  Situation:	  	  Stability	  and	  Nationalist	  Influence	  
	   An	  oft–cited	  aid	  to	  Brazil's	  economic	  miracle	  of	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  
is	  the	  political	  stability	  provided	  by	  military	  rule.	  	  Clearly,	  the	  1964	  coup	  d'	  état	  was	  
welcomed	  by	  business	  interests,	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  alike.	  	  Equally	  clear	  was	  
the	  economic	  growth	  that	  followed	  1964,	  which	  is	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  
section.	  	  	  
	   The	  military	  government	  championed	  the	  goals	  of	  national	  security	  and	  the	  
restoration	   of	   economic	   growth.	   	   National	   security	  was	   to	   be	  maintained	   by	   the	  
                                                
84	  	  See	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1979,	  for	  further	  elaboration	  of	  the	  tripe	  concept,	  especially	  as	  applied	  
in	  the	  petrochemicals	  industry.	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authoritarian,	  repressive,	  and	  (self–styled)	  apolitical	  military	  regime.	  	  Growth	  was	  to	  
be	  powered	  by	  a	  state–led	  economy	  that	  opened	  gradually	  to	  market	  forces.	  	  	  
	   As	  already	  noted,	  the	  successive	  military	  regimes	  championed	  the	  national	  
developmentalist	  cause	  in	  theory;	  but	  were	  often	  internationalist	  in	  practice.	  	  During	  
the	   period	   of	   military	   rule	   from	   1964	   to	   1974	   foreign	   investment	   increased	  
substantially	  and	  the	  foreign	  transnationals	  grabbed	  a	  bigger	  share	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  
economy.85	  But	  so	  long	  as	  political	  repression	  was	  severe,	  nationalist	  dissent	  was	  not	  a	  
factor.	  
	   However,	  in	  1974	  President	  Geisel	  began	  to	  relax	  the	  political	  repression	  and	  
nationalist	  voices	  were	  once	  again	  raised	  to	  highlight	  the	  discontinuity	  between	  the	  
military's	  rhetoric	  and	  practice.	  	  These	  nationalist	  attacks	  were	  directed	  not	  so	  much	  
at	   the	   military	   government;	   but	   rather	   at	   foreign	   capital	   which	   had	   contributed	  
significantly	  to	  the	  recent	  economic	  miracle,	  but	  which	  was	  perceived	  to	  have	  usurped	  
the	  rightful	  place	  of	  local	  private	  capital.	  	  	  
	   So	  the	  political	  context	  engendered	  by	  military	  rule	  was	  characterised	  by	  two	  
factors:	   	   (i)	   political	   stability	   that	   fostered	   a	   favourable	   investment	   climate	   and	  
contributed	  to	  the	  high	  rates	  of	  economic	  growth	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s;	  and	  (ii)	  
increasing	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  to	  keep	  faith	  with	  national	  developmentalism	  
and	  restrain	  the	  foreign	  transnationals.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these	  factors	  meant	  that	  there	  
were	  financial	   resources	  that	  the	  government	  could	   invest	   in	  a	  nascent	  computer	  
industry.	  	  The	  second	  provided	  further	  motivation	  to	  make	  such	  an	  investment	  and	  
limit	  foreign	  capital	  participation.	  
Industrial	  Policy	  and	  the	  Economic	  Situation	  
	  
"After	   the	   second	   world	   war	   the	   industrialization	   changed	   from	   a	  
stopgap	  effort	  into	  a	  determined	  policy	  to	  alter	  drastically	  the	  structure	  
of	   the	   Brazilian	   economy.	   	   The	   basic	   reason	   for	   this	   change	  was	   a	  
realisation	  by	  the	  policy	  makers	  that	  Brazil	  could	  not	  attain	  a	  high	  rate	  
                                                
85	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  more	  than	  doubled	  in	  those	  ten	  years,	  
growing	  from	  0.40%	  in	  1964	  to	  1.09%	  in	  1974	  (Banco	  do	  Brasil	  statistics).	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of	  growth	  in	  the	  future	  by	  relying	  chiefly	  on	  the	  export	  of	  its	  principal	  
primary	  commodities	  whose	  world	  market	  was	  shrinking."
86
	  
	   In	  1950,	  industry	  accounted	  for	  23.5	  percent	  of	  Brazil's	  Gross	  Domestic	  Product	  
(GDP),	  while	  agriculture	  contributed	  26.7	  percent,	  and	  services	  49.8	  percent.	  	  Just	  
twenty	  years	  later	  in	  1970,	  industry	  contributed	  35.4	  percent	  while	  agriculture's	  share	  
dwindled	   to	   11.0	   percent	   (services:	   53.5	   percent).
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   As	   Baer	   asserts,	   the	   rapid	  
industrialization	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   economy	   is	   directly	   attributable	   to	   a	   conscious	  
government	  policy	  of	  import	  substitution	  in	  the	  post–war	  years.	  
	   In	  the	  1950s,	  the	  government	  pursued	  largely	  autarchic	  industrial	  development	  
through	  a	  variety	  of	  measures	  including:	  	  a	  multiple	  exchange	  rate	  system	  designed	  to	  
protect	   certain	   industries	   and	   encourage	   particular	   capital	   goods	   imports,	   credit	  
incentives	  for	  industry,	  fiscal	  incentives	  favouring	  manufacturing	  investment,	  and	  a	  
protectionist	  tariff	  system.	  
	   The	  so–called	  "Law	  of	  Similars"	  which	  was	  devised	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  Century	  was	  
revived	  in	  the	  1950s.	  	  The	  law	  was	  effectively	  a	  tariff	  policy	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  limit	  
the	  importation	  of	  items	  that	  were	  locally	  produced	  in	  sufficient	  quality	  and	  quantity	  
to	  satisfy	  the	  domestic	  market.	   	  Effective	  tariffs	  on	  the	  importation	  of	  such	  goods	  
averaged	  250	  percent.
88
	  	  As	  the	  law	  included	  no	  reference	  to	  price,	  in	  practice	  this	  
tariff	  meant	  that	   imports	  were	  viable	  only	   if	  domestic	  production	  cost	  more	  than	  
three–and–a–half	  times	  as	  much	  as	  the	  foreign	  product.	  	  It	  was	  under	  this	  "Law	  of	  
Similars"	  that	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  computers	  was	  first	  initiated	  in	  the	  mid–1970s.	  
	   The	  government	  introduced	  another	  tariff	  law	  in	  1957	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  
protect	   newly–stimulated	   industries	  with	   tariffs	   ranging	   from	   60	   to	   150	   percent.	  	  
                                                
86	  	  Werner	  Baer,	  Industrialization	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  Brazil,	  (Homewood,	  Illinois:	  	  
Richard	  D.	  Irwin,	  Inc.,	  1965),	  p.	  35.	  
87	  Conjuntura	  Econômica,	  various	   issues,	  cited	   in	  William	  G.	  Tyler,	  The	  Brazilian	   Industrial	  
Economy,	  (Lexington,	  MA:	  	  D.C.	  Heath	  &	  Co.,	  1981),	  p.	  10.	  
88	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  Brazilian	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  Growth	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  Development,	  4th	  Edition.	  (Westport,	  
CT:	  Praeger,	  1995):	  206.	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These	  restrictive	  tariffs	  and	  a	  complex	  bureaucratic	  system	  of	  import	  licensing	  served	  
to	  keep	  demand	  for	  imports	  in	  check	  despite	  a	  grossly	  overvalued	  national	  currency.	  	  	  
	   Interestingly,	   these	   restrictive	  policies	  did	  not	  discriminate	   against	   foreign	  
investors	  per	  se;	  they	  only	  discriminated	   in	  favour	  of	  those	  already	  established	   in	  
Brazil.	  
	  
"The	   operation	   of	   the	   Law	   of	   Similars	   has	   been	   a	   most	   powerful	  
incentive	  for	  foreign	  investors	  to	  move	  from	  importing	  into	  assembly,	  
or	   from	   assembly	   into	   full–fledged	   manufacturing.	   	   The	   essential	  
feature	  of	  this	  incentive	  has	  been	  fear	  of	  outright	  exclusion	  from	  the	  
market,	   rather	   than	   hope	   for	   preferential	   treatment	   in	   relation	   to	  
competitors.	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  mere	  report	  that	  some	  Brazilian	  or	  
competing	   foreign	   firm	   was	   contemplating	   manufacture,	   with	   the	  
implication	  that	  imports	  of	  similar	  goods	  would	  henceforth	  be	  ruled	  
out,	   was	   the	   critical	   factor	   impelling	   U.S.	   companies	   to	   move	   to	  
preserve	  their	  market	  position	  by	  building	  local	  plants."
89
	  
	  	  	  	   While	   these	   policies	   were	   successful	   in	   producing	   high	   rates	   of	   industrial	  
growth	  until	  1962–63,	  they	  also	  produced	  economic	  distortions	  in	  resource	  allocation	  
and	   considerable	   inflation.
90
	  Ultimately,	   these	  autarchic	  policies	   fell	   victim	   to	   the	  
change	  in	  government	  in	  the	  mid–sixties.	  	  After	  the	  coup	  of	  1964,	  the	  new	  military	  
government	  began	  to	  open	  the	  domestic	  economy	  more	  to	  market	  forces,	  sought	  to	  
stimulate	   exports	   through	   a	   variety	   of	  measures,	   and	   reduced	   the	   government's	  
budget	  deficit	  by	  controlling	  spending	  and	  introducing	  tax	  reforms.	  
	   The	   stability	   of	   the	  military	   regime	   and	   its	   economic	   policies	   encouraged	  
capital	  accumulation	  and	  stimulated	  the	  Brazilian	  economy.	   	  During	  the	  period	  of	  
Brazil's	   "economic	  miracle"	   (1968–74)	  GDP	  grew	  at	   an	  average	  annual	   rate	  of	   11	  
                                                
89	  	  Gordon	  and	  Grommers,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1962,	  pp.	  23–24.	  	  Accordingly,	  one	  would	  have	  expected	  
the	  computer	  TNCs	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   local	  production	  of	  minicomputers	   in	  1974	  when	  the	  
Brazilian	  government	  was	   setting	  up	  Cobra.	   	  However,	   the	   Law	  of	   Similars	  had	  not	  been	  
applied	  rigorously	  between	  1964	  and	  1974.	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  seen	  below,	  the	  Law	  was	  back	  in	  
vogue	  by	  the	  mid–seventies	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  oil	  price	  shock.	  
90	  	  Inflation	  grew	  from	  12	  percent	  per	  year	  in	  1950,	  to	  87	  percent	  in	  1964.	  	  Source:	  	  Conjuntura	  
Econômica,	  various	  issues,	  cited	  in	  Tyler	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  3.	  
        71 
percent.	  	  (See	  Table	  2.1)91	  Industrial	  growth	  proceeded	  at	  a	  higher	  rate	  still.	  	  Inflation	  
was	  reduced	  and	  both	  exports	  and	  imports	  were	  stimulated	  during	  this	  period.	  	  	  
TABLE	  2.1	  
The	  Brazilian	  Economy:	  Selected	  Indicators
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1968	  to	  1986	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Annual	  Growth	  %	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Billions	  of	  US	  Dollars-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Year	  	  	  	  GDP	  	  GDP/Capita	  	  	  	  	  Exports	  	  	  Imports	  	  	  BOT	  	  	  External	  	  	  	  	  Int'l	  
	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Debt	  	  	  	  	  Reserves	  
1968	  	  	  	  11.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.3	  
1969	  	  	  	  10.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.7	  
1970	  	  	  	  	  	  8.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.2	  
1971	  	  	  	  13.3	  	  	  	  	  10.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.7	  
1972	  	  	  	  11.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –0.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.2	  
1973	  	  	  	  14.0	  	  	  	  	  10.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  12.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.4	  
1974	  	  	  	  	  	  9.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –4.7	  	  	  	  	  	  17.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.3	  
1975	  	  	  	  	  	  5.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –3.5	  	  	  	  	  	  21.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.0	  
1976	  	  	  	  	  	  9.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –2.3	  	  	  	  	  	  26.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.5	  
1977	  	  	  	  	  	  4.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.1	  	  	  	  	  	  32.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.3	  
1978	  	  	  	  	  	  6.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –1.0	  	  	  	  	  	  43.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.9	  
1979	  	  	  	  	  	  6.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –2.8	  	  	  	  	  	  49.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.7	  
1980	  	  	  	  	  	  7.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –2.8	  	  	  	  	  	  70.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.9	  
1981	  	  	  	  –1.6	  	  	  	  	  –4.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.5	  
1982	  	  	  	  	  	  0.9	  	  	  	  	  –1.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.0	  
1983	  	  	  	  –3.2	  	  	  	  	  –5.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.6	  
1984	  	  	  	  	  	  4.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.9	  	  	  	  	  	  13.1	  	  	  	  	  102.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.0	  
1985	  	  	  	  	  	  7.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.2	  	  	  	  	  	  12.5	  	  	  	  	  102.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.6	  
1986	  	  	  	  	  	  8.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.3	  	  	  	  	  109.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.8	  
	   The	  miracle	  began	  to	  fade	  when	  OPEC	  initiated	  steep	  increases	  in	  the	  price	  of	  
petroleum	  in	  late	  1973.	  	  Heavily	  dependent	  upon	  imported	  oil,	  Brazil's	  international	  
petroleum	  bill	  rose	  from	  US$	  606	  million	  in	  1973	  to	  US$	  2.6	  billion	  in	  1974.
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"The	  terms–of–trade	  shock	  and	  the	  concomitant	  balance–of–payments	  
problems	   presented	   a	   policy	   dilemma	   to	   the	   Brazilian	   authorities,	  
involving	   contraction	   and	   adjustment	   to	   the	   new	   international	  
economic	   situation	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   temporary	   expedients,	  
                                                
91
	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  5.	  
92	  	  Sources:	  	  Conjuntura	  Economia,	  various	  issues	  summarised	  in	  Tyler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  3,	  15;	  
Ministro	  da	  Fazenda,	  Secretaria	  da	  Receita	  Federal,	  Importação	  1986,	  Year	  15,	  Vol.	  1;	  Lloyds	  
Bank,	  Economic	  Report	  on	  Brazil,	  1985	  and	  1986;	  World	  Development	  Indicators,	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  online	  database.	  
93	  	  Conjuntura	  Econômica,	  and	  Boletim	  do	  Banco	  Central,	  various	  issues,	  cited	  in	  Tyler	  Op.	  Cit.,	  
p.	  6.	  
        72 
delaying	  tactics,	  and	  autarchic	  retrenchment	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Because	  of	  
the	  perceived	  risks	  of	  cutting	  the	  on–going	  growth	  process	  through	  




The	  oil	  shock	  gave	  further	  impetus	  to	  Brazil's	  quest	  for	  energy	  self–sufficiency.	  	  
Meanwhile	  however,	  the	  government	  financed	  continued	  economic	  growth	  and	  BOP	  
deficits	  with	   foreign	  debt,	   and	   instituted	   severe	   import	   restraints.	   	   Total	   external	  
indebtedness	  increased	  from	  $US	  12.6	  billion	  in	  1973	  to	  nearly	  $US	  60	  billion	  in	  1980,	  
and	  $US	  103	  billion	  by	  1985.	  	  (See	  Table	  2.1)	  	  By	  1980	  Brazil's	  total	  external	  debt	  was	  
almost	  one–fourth	  of	  the	  country's	  GDP,	  and	  by	  1984	  Brazil's	  debt	  equalled	  one–half	  
GDP.
95
	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  country's	  ability	  to	  finance	  growth	  with	  foreign	  debt	  
postponed	  the	  need	  for	  a	  radical	  adjustment	  to	  new	  international	  economic	  realities.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Brazil's	   increased	   indebtedness	  now	  conditioned	  all	  economic	  
policy	  choices	  and	  decisions.	  	  	  
	   The	  "autarchic	  retrenchment"	  began	  in	  1974	  with	  widespread	  tariff	  increases.	  	  
In	  addition,	  nontariff	  barriers	  were	  raised	  considerably,	  and	  direct	  controls	  over	  public	  
sector	  imports	  were	  tightened.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  list	  of	  forbidden	  imports	  grew.	  	  It	  
became	   impossible	   to	   get	   an	   import	   license	   for	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   finished	  
consumer	  goods.	  
	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  interest	  in	  import	  substitution	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  economic	  
development	  was	  revived.	  	  ISI	  fit	  rather	  nicely	  with	  nationalist	  anger	  about	  import	  
dependence	  and	  a	  growing	  foreign	  debt.	  	  Hence,	  the	  government	  extended	  import	  
substitution	  policies	  to	  intermediate	  and	  capital	  goods.	  	  Investment	  in	  these	  sectors	  
was	  encouraged	  through	  subsidized	  credit	  schemes	  and	  protection	  from	  imports.	  
	   The	  results	  of	  these	  policy	  reactions	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  external	  economic	  
environment	  were:	  	  a	  reduction	  of	  GDP	  growth	  from	  the	  dizzy	  heights	  of	  the	  miracle	  
years,	  but	  nevertheless	  sustained	  at	  a	  healthy	  7	  percent	  per	  year	  (1974–79);	  increased	  
foreign	  debt	  from	  US$	  12.6	  billion	  in	  1973	  to	  US$	  57	  billion	  in	  mid–1980;	  international	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reserves	  little	  changed	  at	  about	  US$	  6	  billion;	  exports	  growing	  from	  US$	  6.2	  billion	  in	  
1973	  to	  US$	  15.2	  billion	  in	  1979;	  but,	  imports	  growing	  even	  faster,	  from	  US$	  6.2	  billion	  
to	  US$	  18.1	  billion	  in	  the	  same	  period;	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  inflation	  from	  20	  percent	  in	  
1973	  to	  55	  percent	  in	  1979.	  	  (See	  Table	  2.1)	  	  The	  closing	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  was	  
successful	  in	  limiting	  manufactured	  imports;	  however,	  the	  successive	  oil	  price	  rises	  
ensured	   the	  dramatic	   increase	   in	   total	   imports.	   	  Meanwhile,	   the	   shift	   back	   to	   ISI	  
constrained	  export	  growth.	  	  The	  reduction	  in	  export	  growth	  rates	  was	  particularly	  
worrisome	  for	  Brazilian	  policy–makers	  given	  the	  burgeoning	  foreign	  debt.	  
	   Hence,	  in	  1979	  with	  the	  transition	  from	  Geisel	  to	  Figuereido,	  (and	  from	  Velloso	  
to	  Delfim	  Netto	  in	  the	  Planning	  Ministry)	  the	  pendulum	  of	  economic	  policy	  swung	  back	  
in	   the	   direction	   of	   liberalisation.	   	   In	   December	   1979	   the	   government	   initiated	  
economic	  policy	  reforms.	  	  The	  centrepiece	  of	  the	  reforms	  was	  a	  maxi-­‐devaluation	  of	  
the	  cruzeiro,	  reducing	  its	  nominal	  value	  by	  30	  percent.	  	  Some	  fiscal	  tax	  credit	  subsidies	  
were	   eliminated	   at	   this	   time	   and	   the	   government	   proposed	   to	   simplify	   the	   tariff	  
system.	  	  The	  implicit	  aims	  of	  the	  policy	  shift	  were	  to	  make	  Brazilian	  industry	  more	  
competitive	  and	  stimulate	  export	  growth.	  
	   The	  new	  government	  was	  successful	  in	  stimulating	  exports,	  but	  needed	  to	  keep	  
devaluing	  the	  cruzeiro	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so.	  	  There	  was	  another	  maxi-­‐devaluation	  of	  the	  
cruzeiro	  in	  February	  1983,	  and	  in	  1984	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  US	  dollar	  was	  raised	  in	  cruzeiro	  
terms	  by	  224	  percent	  compared	  with	  an	  inflation	  rate	  of	  211	  percent	  in	  that	  year.
96	  	  	  
	   The	  devaluations	  of	  the	  cruzeiro	  also	  served	  to	  inhibit	  imports,	  which	  declined	  
from	  a	  high	  of	  $US	  23	  billion	  in	  1980	  to	  $US	  13	  billion	  in	  1985.	  	  However,	  the	  major	  
reasons	  for	  the	  decline	  in	  imports	  were	  the	  severe	  recession	  experienced	  in	  1981–83	  
and	   the	   continuing	   import	   restrictions	   on	  most	   items.	   	   In	   the	   face	   of	   high	  world	  
interest	  rates,	  economic	  recession,	  and	  the	  Mexican	  debt	  crisis,	  which	  halted	  the	  flow	  
of	  foreign	  funds	  to	  Latin	  America,	  Brazil	  approached	  the	  IMF	  in	  December	  1982	  for	  the	  
first	  time.	  	  The	  government	  agreed	  to	  an	  austerity	  programme	  in	  exchange	  for	  debt	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rescheduling	  and	  fresh	  loans	  to	  balance	  the	  external	  accounts.	  	  However,	  Brazil	  failed	  
to	  meet	  the	  agreed	  inflation	  targets	  and	  IMF	  funds	  were	  frozen	  from	  May	  1983	  to	  
March	  1984.	  	  In	  November	  1984	  Brazil	  initiated	  new	  negotiations	  with	  creditor	  banks,	  
and	   under	   pressure	   from	   the	   IMF	   and	  World	   Bank,	   simultaneously	   lifted	   import	  
restrictions	  on	  several	  thousand	  items.	  	  Firms	  were	  allowed	  to	  increase	  imports	  by	  20	  
percent	   during	   1985	   under	   the	   quotas	   set	   by	   the	   central	   bank's	   foreign	   trade	  
department.	  	  	  
	   Viewing	   the	   development	   of	   Brazil's	   market	   reserve	   in	   computers	   in	   the	  
context	  of	  the	  foregoing	  wider	  discussion	  of	  economic	  policy	  and	  performance,	  notice	  
first	  that	  the	  initiative	  to	  develop	  a	  national	  computer	  manufacturing	  capability	  came	  
in	  the	  early	  1970s	  when	  the	  economic	  miracle	  was	  at	  its	  most	  inspirational.	  	  The	  high	  
rates	   of	   GDP	   and	   export	   growth,	   and	   the	   accumulation	   of	   investment	   resources	  
presaged	  a	  bright	  future	  and	  provided	  a	  strong	  investment	  climate	  for	  an	  aggressive	  
science	  and	  technology	  policy.	  	  It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  government	  committed	  
investment	  resources	  via	  the	  BNDES	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  national	  minicomputer	  
industry.	  
	   Later,	  the	  oil	  price	  shock	  intensified	  pressure	  for	  energy	  independence	  and	  
import	  substitution.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  autarchic	  policies	  that	  had	  fallen	  out	  of	  favour	  during	  
the	  miracle	  years	  were	  now	  more	  acceptable.	  	  This	  provided	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  
reserve	  the	  computer	  market	  to	  Brazilian	  companies	  with	  a	  favourable	  political	  and	  
economic	  climate	  in	  which	  to	  institutionalise	  protection	  for	  the	  nascent	  industry.	  	  This	  
happened	  in	  1977	  when	  the	  minicomputer	  market	  was	  in	  fact	  reserved.	  
	   During	  the	  recession	  of	  1981–83	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy	  was	  expanded	  and	  
strengthened,	  fitting	  well	  with	  the	  need	  to	  restrict	  imports	  at	  this	  time.	  	  Interestingly,	  
even	  under	  pressure	  from	  foreign	  lending	  institutions	  to	  liberalize	  foreign	  trade	  during	  
1983–84,	  the	  policy	  survived	  and	  was	  even	  codified	  in	  law.	  	  Yet	  the	  Finance	  Minister	  at	  
the	  time	  insisted	  the	  market	  reserve	  be	  limited	  in	  its	  duration	  to	  eight	  years	  (until	  
1992).	  	  It	  is	  thought	  that	  this	  limiting	  clause,	  written	  into	  the	  law	  itself,	  was	  necessary	  
to	  justify	  the	  reserve	  to	  foreign	  creditors	  at	  a	  delicate	  time	  in	  negotiations.	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   However,	  one	  cannot	  predict	  the	  level	  of	  support	  for	  a	  protective	  computer	  
policy	   simply	   be	   analysing	   the	   macroeconomic	   context	   of	   the	   day.	   	   A	   good	  
understanding	   of	   Brazilian	   industrial	   policy	   must	   recognise	   the	   high	   degree	   of	  
autonomy	   and	   discretion	   that	   middle–level	   civil	   servants	   exercised	   over	   policy	  
decisions.	   	   The	   bureaucratic	   nature	   of	   the	   state	   apparatus	   and	   the	   depth	   and	  
complexity	   of	   the	   state's	   involvement	   in,	   and	   regulation	   of,	   industry	  means	   that	  
practical	  policy	  decisions	  were	  often	  taken	  by	  the	  implementers	  of	  policy.	  	  	  	  
	   While	  the	  foregoing	  discussion	  has	  given	  us	  a	  broad	  context	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  
the	  Brazilian	  computer	  policy,	  it	  remains	  incumbent	  to	  examine	  the	  "micro–politics"	  
surrounding	  the	  policy	  and	  the	  industry.	  	  Tyler	  implies	  the	  need	  for	  such	  an	  analysis:	  
	  
"Consumption	  goods	  receive	  the	  heaviest	  tariff	  protection,	  followed	  by	  
intermediate	  goods	  and	  then	  finally	  capital	  goods.	  	  Beyond	  this	  basic	  
characteristic...	  there	  is	  no	  readily	  identifiable	  rationale	  in	  the	  structure	  
of	   protection.	   	   No	   factor	   of	   production	   can	   be	   identified	   as	   being	  
favored.	   	   It	  almost	  appears	  as	  though	  the	  structure	  of	  protection	  is	  
random,	   worked	   out	   haphazardly	   through	   producer	   access	   and	  
influence	  in	  the	  decision–making	  process	  over	  time.	  	  Once	  imbedded,	  
protective	  instruments	  take	  on	  an	  inertia	  of	  their	  own,	  making	  it	  very	  
difficult	  to	  remove	  them	  despite	  changing	  circumstances."
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   Having	  established	  a	  general	  context	  then,	  the	  next	  chapter	  moves	  to	  a	  more	  
detailed	   and	   specific	   consideration	   of	   the	   factors	   and	   events	   that	   led	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  policy.	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CHAPTER	  3	  
EVOLUTION	  OF	  BRAZIL’S	  INFORMATICS	  POLICY	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  evolution	  of	  Brazil’s	  informatics	  
policy,	  paying	  close	  attention	   to	   the	   factors	  and	  events	   that	   (i)	  explain	   the	  policy	  
decisions	  that	  were	  made	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  industry	  and	  served	  to	  sustain	  the	  policy	  
up	  to	  the	  late	  1980s;	  and	  (ii)	  acted	  to	  alter	  the	  policy	  and	  its	  prospects	  for	  continued	  
success.	  	  
	  
Genesis	  of	  the	  Policy:	  	  The	  Sixties	  and	  Seventies
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   In	   1960	   the	   first	   digital	   computer	   was	   installed	   in	   Brazil	   at	   the	   Pontifical	  
Catholic	  University	  (Pontifica	  Universidade	  Católica	  or	  PUC)	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro.	  	  This	  
first–generation	   computer,	   the	   B–205,	   was	   based	   on	   valve	   technology	   and	  
manufactured	   by	   Burroughs	   Corporation	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   	   A	   consortium	  
comprising	  the	  Ministry	  of	  War,	  the	  National	  Research	  Council,	  the	  National	  Nuclear	  
Energy	  Commission,	  the	  National	  Steel	  Company,	  and	  the	  university	  itself	  paid	  the	  
price	  tag	  of	  $400,000.	  	  For	  its	  contribution	  each	  member	  of	  the	  consortium	  had	  the	  
right	  to	  utilise	  the	  equipment	  on	  a	  time–sharing	  basis	  for	  a	  period	  of	  eight	  years.
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   The	  importation	  was	  not	  without	  its	  difficulties.	  	  The	  purchase	  first	  needed	  the	  
approval	  of	  the	  National	  Economic	  Council,	  the	  Group	  of	  Studies	  and	  Application	  of	  
Electronic	  Computers,	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  Brazil.	  	  The	  process	  took	  a	  total	  of	  eighteen	  
months	  before	  the	  large	  mainframe	  computer	  arrived	  in	  Rio	  in	  April	  1960.	  
	   The	   installation	   of	   this	   computer	   was	   seen	   to	   be	   an	   event	   of	   national	  
importance.	  	  President	  Kubitschek	  personally	  inaugurated	  the	  computer	  while	  Cardinal	  
                                                
98
	  	  In	  tracing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  policy	  up	  to	  the	  1980s	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  the	  work	  of	  
several	  other	  researchers,	  especially:	  	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987);	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1983);	  Evans,	  Op.	  
Cit.,	  (1986)	  pp.	  791–808;	  and	  Silvia	  Helena,	  Rastro	  de	  Cobra.	  Caio	  Domingues	  &	  Associados	  
Publicidade	  Ltda.,	  1984.	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Montini	  of	  Rome	  (later	  Pope	  Paul	  VI),	  who	  flew	  to	  Brazil	  especially	  for	  the	  occasion,	  
inaugurated	  the	  newly	  formed	  Centre	  for	  Data	  Processing	  at	  the	  university.	  	  	  
The	  national	  importance	  and	  profile	  ascribed	  to	  the	  event	  by	  the	  country's	  
leadership	  is	  significant.	  	  It	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  importance	  Brazil	  assigned	  to	  high	  
technology	  in	  general	  and	  computers	  in	  particular.	  	  This	  national	  profile	  proved	  vital	  to	  
the	  later	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry.	  
	   The	  involvement	  of	  the	  country's	  higher	  education	  institutions	  was	  likewise	  no	  
coincidence;	  changes	  in	  these	  institutions	  provided	  fertile	  ground	  in	  which	  a	  national	  
computer	  industry	  was	  later	  to	  flourish.	  
Cobra:	  	  The	  Industrial	  Focus	  
	   In	  1961	  a	  group	  of	  four	  engineers	  at	  the	  Instituto	  Tecnológico	  de	  Aeronáutica	  
constructed	  a	  primitive	  digital	  computer	  prototype	  as	  a	  senior	  class	  project.	  	  This	  is	  the	  
first	   known	   attempt	   to	   build	   a	   Brazilian	   computer.	   	   Funding	   from	   the	   National	  
Research	  Council	   (CNPq)	  and	  a	  number	  of	  Brazilian	  companies	  enabled	  the	  young	  
engineers	  to	  test	  the	  computer	  prototype	  for	  a	  period	  of	  60	  days.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  a	  
number	  of	  other	  Brazilian	  colleges	  and	  universities	  began	  to	  develop	  programmes	  in	  
electronic	  engineering.	  	  	  
	   While	  Brazilian	  academia	  began	  to	  train	  data	  processing	  engineers,	  the	  central	  
government	   and	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   both	   private	   and	   state	   enterprises	   were	  
becoming	  more	  involved	  in––and	  dependent	  upon––data	  processing	  activities.	  	  Their	  
demand	  for	  data	  processing	  engineers	  soon	  outstripped	  the	  academic	  institutions'	  
ability	  to	  supply	  them.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   For	  now,	  Brazil	  had	  entered	  the	  computer	  age,	  but	  primarily	  as	  an	  importing	  
consumer.	  IBM	  and	  Burroughs	  had	  established	  operations	  in	  Brazil	  in	  1917	  and	  1924	  
respectively.	   	   But	   until	   the	   early	   1970s	   these	   operations	   existed	   primarily	   for	  
marketing	  and	  service.	  	  These	  companies	  had	  manufacturing	  plants	  in	  Brazil,	  but	  with	  
respect	   to	   computers	   they	   were	   only	   producing	   some	   supplies	   and	   assembling	  
peripheral	  equipment	  locally.	  	  Until	  the	  1970s	  all	  of	  Brazil's	  computers	  were,	  like	  its	  
first,	  manufactured	  elsewhere	  and	  imported.	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  no	  local	  capital	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involvement	  in	  the	  industry	  whatsoever,	  and	  no	  specific	  government	  policy	  relating	  to	  
the	  industry.	  
Hence,	  the	  growing	  numbers	  of	  engineering	  graduates	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  data	  
processing	  faced	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  creative	  opportunities.	  	  	  They	  could	  remain	  in	  
academia	  and	  with	  limited	  funds	  continue	  research	  in	  electronic	  engineering	  or	  build	  
prototypes	   of	   computers.	   	   They	   could	   operate	   data	   processing	   machinery	   for	  
government,	  or	  enterprise.	  	  Or	  they	  could	  sell	  data	  processing	  equipment	  that	  was	  
designed	  and	  manufactured	  elsewhere	  for	  one	  of	  a	  few	  computer	  transnationals.	  	  	  
	   The	   introduction	   of	   electronics	   into	   the	   coursework	   of	   Brazilian	   higher	  
education	   together	   with	   the	   centralized	   design	   and	  manufacture	   strategy	   of	   the	  
computer	  transnationals	  was	  generating	  a	  group	  of	  "frustrated	  nationalist	  technicians	  
with	  strong	  personal	  and	  ideological	  interests	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  [integrated]	  local	  
computer	   industry."
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  Without	   the	   availability	   of	  willing	   venture	   capital,	   a	   local	  
computer	   industry	   could	   only	   arise	  with	   strong	   government	   protection.	   	   As	   seen	  
further	  below,	  several	  of	  these	  engineers	  gained	  positions	  in	  the	  central	  government	  
bureaucracy	  and	  were	  able	  to	  exercise	  decisive	  influence	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
national	  computer	  policy.	  	  
Later	  in	  the	  sixties,	  the	  "frustrated	  technicians"	  were	  to	  gain	  important	  allies	  to	  
their	  cause.	  	  In	  the	  mid–1960s	  the	  Brazilian	  navy	  began	  to	  realise	  the	  importance	  of	  
computer	  electronics	  to	  modern	  naval	  vessels.	  	  Officials	  in	  the	  navy	  grew	  concerned	  
about	  their	  dependence	  upon	  electronic	  equipment	  that	  could	  only	  be	  produced	  and	  
maintained	  by	  foreign	  companies.	  	  Thus,	  for	  military	  reasons,	  the	  cause	  for	  developing	  
a	  national	  computer	  capability	  gained	  an	  important	  ally.	  	  	  
	   The	  navy's	  champion	  for	  this	  cause	  was	  Commander	  José	  Luis	  Guaranys	  Rego,	  
an	   electrical	   engineer	   who	   had	   studied	   at	   the	   Digital	   Systems	   Laboratory	   in	   the	  
Polytechnic	  School	  at	  the	  USP.	  	  Guaranys	  was	  appointed	  Director	  of	  Naval	  Electronics	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in	  the	  late	  sixties.	  	  "Guaranys	  believed	  in	  a	  national	  [computer]	  industry"	  and	  was	  
highly	  regarded	  by	  the	  engineering	  academics.
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   At	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  decade	  the	  Brazilian	  navy	  purchased	  a	  series	  of	  six	  frigates	  
from	  England.	   	   These	  modern	   vessels	  were	   in	   fact	   little	  more	   than	   platforms	   for	  
computerized	  equipment.	  	  Guaranys	  thus	  had	  a	  contemporary	  illustration	  with	  which	  
to	  justify	  his	  cause	  with	  his	  superiors.	  	  	  
	   In	  February	  1971,	  at	  the	  initiative	  of	  Guaranys	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  navy,	  a	  special	  
working	  group	  (Grupo	  Especial	  de	  Trabalho	  or	  GTE)	  was	  established	  in	  conjunction	  
with	   the	  Planning	  Ministry,	  which	  had	   identified	  electronics	  as	  a	  priority	  area	   for	  
national	  technological	  development.	  	  While	  the	  GTE	  was	  established	  jointly,	  the	  initial	  
objective	  of	  the	  group	  reflected	  the	  overriding	  concern	  of	  the	  navy:	  	  "to	  promote	  the	  




	   The	  working	  group	  was	   formalised	  and	  established	  by	  presidential	  Decree	  
68.267	  as	  GTE/FUNTEC	  111.	   	  The	  group	  was	  capitalised	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  
Scientific	  and	  Technical	  Development	  Fund	  (FUNTEC)	  with	  the	  navy	  contributing	  3	  
million	  cruzeiros	  and	  the	  National	  Economic	  Development	  Bank	  (BNDES)	  contributing	  
7	  million.	  	  Guaranys	  naturally	  represented	  the	  navy,	  while	  the	  BNDES	  was	  represented	  
by	   Ricardo	   Adolfo	   de	   Campos	   Saur	   who	   was	   to	   continue	   a	   prime	   mover	   in	   the	  




	   In	  April	  1971	  the	  navy	  opted	  to	  purchase	  the	  FM	  1600	  computer	  for	  the	  new	  
vessels	   from	  the	  British	  manufacturer	  Ferranti.	   	   In	   the	   following	  month,	   the	  navy	  
received	  a	  proposal	  from	  E.E.	  Equipamentos	  Eletrônicos––a	  small	  private	  Brazilian	  
company	  which	  had	  supplied	  a	  limited	  amount	  of	  electronic	  equipment	  to	  the	  navy	  in	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103	  Guaranys,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  never	  saw	  the	  fruits	  of	  his	  labours.	   	  He	  died	  suddenly	  in	  
September	  1973.	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the	  past.	  	  This	  proposal	  was	  entitled	  "An	  Integrated	  Plan	  for	  National	  Computer	  Design	  
and	   for	   the	   Support	   of	   Naval	   Digital	   Systems."
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   The	   proposal	   was	   that	   E.E.	  
manufacture	  the	  FM	  1600	  under	  license	  from	  Ferranti.	  	  In	  addition,	  it	  proposed	  the	  
creation	  of	  a	  simulation	  centre	  for	  the	  navy,	  the	  provision	  of	  maintenance	  services	  and	  
training	   in	   manufacturing	   and	   maintenance,	   and	   vendor	   contracts	   for	   providing	  
Ferranti	  software	  and	  parts.	  	  Although	  the	  proposal	  was	  not	  approved	  at	  the	  time,	  a	  
tri–pe	  arrangement	  between	  Ferranti,	  E.E.,	  and	  the	  BNDES	  was	  established	  three	  years	  
later.	  
	   In	   1972	   GTE/FUNTEC	   111	   unveiled	   the	   "First	   Basic	   Plan	   for	   Scientific	   and	  
Technological	  Development	  (1973–74)."	  	  The	  plan	  envisaged	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  
national	  minicomputer	  industry	  based	  upon	  the	  association	  of	  the	  government	  with	  
local	  and	  foreign	  firms;	  a	  tri–pe	  company	  was	  to	  be	  the	  vehicle	  for	  technology	  transfer.	  	  	  	  
The	  tri–pe	  arrangement	  had	  worked	  well	  in	  the	  petrochemicals	  industry	  and	  was	  thus	  
seen	  to	  be	  the	  way	  forward	  in	  this	  industry	  where	  transference	  of	  foreign	  technology	  
and	  capital	  was	  required.	  	  The	  plan	  also	  envisaged	  the	  development	  of	  a	  domestic	  
minicomputer	  prototype.	  
	   Pursuant	  to	  establishing	  a	  tri–pe	  company,	  Saur	  travelled	  abroad	  in	  early	  1972	  
to	  visit	   foreign	  computer	  companies	   to	  assess	  alternatives	   to	  Ferranti.	   	  He	  visited	  
Varian,	  Hewlett–Packard,	  Digital	  Equipment	  Corporation,	  IBM,	  AEG–Telefunken,	  CII,	  
Philips,	  Fujitsu,	  and	  Ferranti	  and	  found	  that	  all	  except	  IBM	  and	  Philips	  were	  initially	  
receptive	   to	   conditions	   of	   technology	   transfer	   and	  minority	   equity	   participation.	  	  
Ultimately,	  however,	  AEG	  was	  not	  interested,	  H–P	  couldn't	  abide	  a	  minority	  position,	  
and	  DEC	  was	  reluctant	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  technology	  transfer.	  	  Underlying	  this,	  these	  
firms	  were	  primarily	  preoccupied	  with	  their	  burgeoning	  home	  markets	  for	  computers,	  
and	   secondarily	  with	  exporting	   abroad.	   	   They	  had	   little	  motivation	   to	   share	   their	  
technology	  in	  a	  venture	  that	  they	  did	  not	  control.	  	  Thus,	  only	  Varian,	  CII,	  Fujitsu,	  and	  
Ferranti	  made	  proposals.	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   The	  search	  for	  a	  local	  partner	  was	  no	  less	  difficult.	  	  Local	  capitalists	  were	  not	  
yet	   convinced	   of	   the	   government's	   resolve	   to	   invest	   the	   necessary	   resources	   to	  
develop	  a	  national	   industry.	   	  Apart	   from	  tiny	  E.E.,	   there	  were	  few	  options.	   	  So,	   in	  
March	  1972	  the	  company	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  national	  partner	  in	  the	  tri–pe	  venture.	  	  
E.E.	  joined	  the	  working	  group	  in	  searching	  for	  and	  selecting	  a	  foreign	  partner.	  	  	  
	   Having	  purchased	  Ferranti	  equipment	  already,	  the	  navy	  was	  insistent	  that	  the	  
English	  company	  be	  chosen.	  	  The	  BNDES,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  a	  different	  agenda.	  	  
The	   Bank's	   view	   was	   that	   the	   first	   Brazilian	   computer	   company	   should	   be	   a	  
manufacturer	   of	   general–use	   computers;	   Ferranti's	   computers	   were	   of	   limited	  
application.	  	  	  
	   Toward	  the	  end	  of	  1972	  the	  conflict	  within	  the	  working	  group	  came	  to	  a	  head	  
when	  the	  BNDES	  representatives	  issued	  a	  paper	  signed	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  BNDES	  
Marcos	  Vianna,	  the	  Secretary–General	  of	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  Henrique	  Flanzer,	  the	  
Assistant	  Secretary–General	  of	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  José	  Pelucio	  Ferreira,	  and	  by	  
Ricardo	  Saur.	  	  The	  report	  recommended	  an	  association	  not	  with	  Ferranti,	  but	  with	  the	  
Japanese	   company	   Fujitsu,	   which,	   the	   BNDES	   claimed,	   had	   submitted	   the	   best	  
proposal	  to	  the	  working	  group.	  
	   A	  solution	  was	  ultimately	  reached	  when	  the	  Planning	  Minister	  Joao	  Paulo	  dos	  
Reis	  Velloso	  suggested	  that	  two	  tri–pe	  companies	  be	  established:	  one	  with	  Ferranti	  
and	  one	  with	  Fujitsu.	  	  In	  April	  1973	  the	  Ministry	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  holding	  
company,	  Eletronica	  Digital	  Brasileira	   (EDB)	  whose	  shares	  would	  be	  held	  by	   state	  
enterprises	  including	  the	  BNDES,	  Petrobras,	  and	  Telebras.	  	  EDB	  would	  then	  hold	  two	  
companies.	  	  The	  first	  was	  to	  be	  called	  Digibras,	  held	  equally	  by	  the	  BNDES,	  E.E.,	  and	  
Ferranti,	   and	   would	   serve	   primarily	   the	  military	   market.	   	   The	   second	   was	   to	   be	  
organised	   in	   the	   same	   way	   with	   Fujitsu	   as	   the	   foreign	   partner	   and	   would	   serve	  
primarily	  the	  commercial	  market.	  
	   Ironically,	  however,	  the	  second	  company	  in	  association	  with	  Fujitsu	  was	  never	  
established.	  	  Instead,	  the	  first	  company	  was	  to	  serve	  both	  the	  requisite	  military	  needs	  
and	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  BNDES	  for	  a	  general–applications	  minicomputer.	  	  In	  July	  1974	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the	   holding	   company	   EDB	   assumed	   the	   name	   of	   its	   subsidiary	   Digibras,	   and	   the	  
Brazilian	  computer	  flagship	  company	  was	  dubbed	  Cobra	  SA.	  	  Later	  that	  year	  Cobra	  
produced	  the	  first	  Brazilian–assembled	  minicomputer,	  the	  Argus	  700,	  using	  Ferranti	  
technology	  which	  was	  the	  process	  control	  system	  required	  by	  the	  Brazilian	  navy.	  
	   Meanwhile,	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   second	   goal	   of	   the	   working	   group––the	  
development	  of	  a	  domestic	  minicomputer	  prototype––GTE/FUNTEC	  111	  signed	  an	  
agreement	  with	  the	  USP,	  PUC	  and	  E.E.	  in	  July	  1972.	  	  The	  project	  was	  called	  G–10	  ('G'	  
after	  Guaranys)	  and	  had	  as	  its	  aim	  the	  development	  of	  a	  minicomputer	  within	  two	  
years.	  	  The	  Digital	  Systems	  Laboratory	  in	  the	  Polytechnic	  School	  at	  USP	  was	  to	  develop	  
the	  hardware,	  and	  PUC	  the	  software	  for	  the	  computer.	  
	   The	  G–10	  project	   focused	  the	  energy	  of	  some	  two	  hundred	  engineers	  and	  
enlisted	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Federal	  Service	  for	  Data	  Processing	  (Serpro)	  which	  had	  
been	  created	  in	  1970	  to	  serve	  the	  Treasury	  Department's	  data	  processing	  needs.
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  As	  
the	  government's	  data	  processing	  needs	  grew,	  Serpro	  could	  not	  keep	  up.	  	  It	  needed	  to	  
import	   more	   and	   more	   equipment,	   but	   the	   agency's	   U.S.	   suppliers	   were	   too	  
preoccupied	  with	   the	   exploding	   American	  market	   to	   respond	   quickly	   to	   Serpro's	  
orders.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   Serpro	   engineers	   began	   to	   do	   a	   small	   amount	   of	   hardware	  
development	  and	  adaptation	  themselves.	  	  Two	  such	  'developments'	  were	  the	  STV–
1600	  terminal	  unit,	  and	  a	  keyboard	  concentrator.	  	  Serpro's	  contributions,	  together	  
with	  a	  computer	  terminal	  developed	  at	  the	  Federal	  University	  of	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  (UFRJ)	  
produced	  the	  G–11	  minicomputer	  as	  successor	  to	  the	  G–10.	  	  	  
	   Hence,	   the	   marriage	   of	   the	   navy's	   concern	   for	   national	   security	   and	   the	  
BNDES's	  concern	  for	  technological	  development,	  together	  with	  strong	  support	  from	  
the	  nation's	  universities,	  Ferranti,	  and	  E.E.,	  bore	  fruit	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Cobra	  and	  the	  G–
10/11	  minicomputers.	   	  Once	  established,	  Cobra	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  national	  
efforts	  at	  computer	  development.	  	  The	  G–10	  and	  G–11	  were	  transferred	  to	  Cobra	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which	  then	  employed	  many	  of	  those	  who	  worked	  on	  these	  projects	  at	  USP,	  PUC,	  and	  
UFRJ.	  	  	  
	   In	   1975,	   GTE/FUNTEC	   111	   was	   disbanded,	   and	   Digibras,	   Cobra's	   holding	  
company,	  assumed	  responsibility	  for	  the	  national	  computer	  project.	  	  Digibras	  became	  
"an	  industrial	  promotion	  agency	  to	  approve	  projects	  and	  set	  up	  research	  centres	  and	  
companies	  to	  develop	  the	  sector."
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   One	  of	   the	   first	   initiatives	  of	  Digibras	   in	   its	   new	   role	  was	   to	   seek	   another	  
foreign	   supplier	   of	   technology	   so	   that	   Cobra	   could	   commercialise	   a	   general–use	  
business	  computer.	  	  After	  attempts	  to	  draw	  in	  Data	  General	  (after	  DEC,	  the	  largest	  
manufacturer	  of	  minicomputers),	  Fujitsu,	  and	  Nixdorf	  failed	  (see	  later),	  Digibras	  found	  
a	  small	  American	  company,	  Sycor,	  that	  was	  willing	  to	  supply	  Cobra	  with	  minicomputer	  
technology	  in	  exchange	  for	  freer	  access	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  market.	  	  In	  1976	  an	  agreement	  
was	   signed	   between	   the	   two	   companies,	  which	   resulted	   in	   the	   Cobra	   400	   series	  
minicomputer	  for	  business	  and	  accounting	  applications.	  	  	  
	   Cobra	  continued	  to	  supply	  computer	  equipment	  to	  the	  military	  and	  sold	  also	  to	  
some	  government	  institutions	  such	  as	  Digibras	  and	  Embratel.	  	  However,	  the	  company	  
was	  unable	  to	  penetrate	  the	  growing	  private	  commercial	  market,	  which	  continued	  the	  
exclusive	  domain	  of	  TNC	  imports.	  	  The	  company's	  problems	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  
cumbersome	  management	  structure	  (which	  reflected	  the	  diverse	  ownership	  structure	  
of	  the	  company),	  and	  a	  chronic	  lack	  of	  capital.	  	  Cobra,	  as	  a	  result,	  was	  a	  commercial	  
disaster	  requiring	  continuous	  infusions	  of	  capital	  from	  the	  joint–venture	  partners	  just	  
to	  keep	  it	  afloat.	  	  The	  capital	  requirements	  soon	  outstripped	  the	  resources	  of	  tiny	  E.E.	  
whose	  share	  in	  Cobra	  dwindled	  to	  5	  percent	  within	  a	  year.
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  Ferranti	  continued	  to	  
contribute,	  but	  Digibras	  was	  wary	  of	  allowing	  the	  foreign	  company's	  share	  of	  Cobra	  to	  
grow.	  	  Hence,	  up	  to	  mid–1977,	  the	  BNDES	  supplied	  the	  majority	  of	  Cobra's	  capital	  
needs.	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   In	  mid–1977	  a	  consortium	  of	  eleven	  banks	  including	  the	  two	  largest	  private	  
banks,	  Bradesco	  and	  Itau,	  acquired	  39	  percent	  of	  Cobra's	  stock.	  	  The	  banks'	  interest	  in	  
Cobra	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  their	  growing	  needs	  for	  electronic	  automation	  and	  a	  desire	  
to	   hedge	   against	   the	   likelihood	   of	   increased	   restrictions	   on	   imports	   of	   computer	  
equipment	  from	  abroad.	  	  Their	  investment	  in	  the	  national	  industry	  in	  this	  way	  was	  
highly	  significant.	  	  The	  capital	  injection	  helped	  to	  save	  Cobra	  from	  financial	  ruin	  and	  
allowed	  the	  company	  to	  develop	  the	  next	  line	  of	  minicomputers,	  the	  500	  series,	  which	  
were	   the	   first	   computers	   to	  be	  designed	   totally	   in	  Brazil,	  using	  92	  percent	   locally	  
developed	  components.
108	  	  	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  financial	  
stake	  in	  the	  industry,	  Brazilian	  private	  capital	  was	  developing	  a	  vital	  interest	  in	  the	  
institution	  and	  preservation	  of	  a	  market	   reserve.	   	   It	   is	   their	   interest	   that,	   in	   large	  
measure,	  was	  to	  sustain	  the	  market	  reserve	  into	  the	  eighties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
CAPRE:	  	  The	  Political	  Vehicle	  
	   While	  Cobra	  became	  the	  industrial	  focus	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  
computer	  electronics	  capability,	  an	  agency	  was	  established	  in	  the	  central	  government,	  
which	  was	  to	  become	  the	  political	  vehicle	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  
policy.	   	   During	   the	   late	   sixties	   and	   early	   seventies	   the	   demand	   for	   computer	  
equipment	   and	   data	   processing	   services	   in	   Brazil	   grew	   rapidly,	   not	   least	   in	   the	  
government	  bureaucracy	   itself.	   	  While	   this	  growth	  did	  not	   translate	   into	  an	  overt	  
concern	   about	   computer	   imports	   until	   1974/75,	   there	   was	   a	   perceived	   need	   to	  
regulate	  and	  rationalise	  the	  use	  of	  computers	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  much	  earlier.	  	  
This	  perception,	  together	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  to	  give	  incentive	  to	  
the	  growing	  national	  capabilities	  in	  science	  and	  technology,	  led	  to	  the	  creation,	  by	  
Presidential	   Decree	   70.370,	   of	   CAPRE––the	   Commission	   for	   the	   Coordination	   of	  
Electronic	  Data	  Processing	  Activities––on	  April	  5,	  1972.	  
	   CAPRE	  was	  established	  in	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  with	  a	  mandate	  to:	  	  (1)	  take	  
and	   maintain	   a	   census	   of	   existing	   data	   processing	   equipment	   in	   the	   federal	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government;	  (2)	  rationalise	  computer	  purchases	  by	  the	  state;	  (3)	  finance	  federal	  data	  
processing	   activities;	   and	   (4)	   set	   up	   training	   programmes	   for	   data	   processing	  
personnel.
109	  	  At	  this	  time	  CAPRE	  had	  no	  mandate	  to	  regulate	  imports	  or	  the	  activities	  
of	  foreign	  computer	  firms	  in	  Brazil.	  	  The	  agency	  was	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  computers	  
in	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  impulse	  the	  local	  industry	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  
training	  programmes,	  not	  import	  restrictions.	  	  	  
	   CAPRE's	  early	  organisation	  structure	  reflected	  these	  original	  objectives.	  	  The	  
agency's	  decision–making	  council	  comprised	  representatives	  from	  the	  armed	  forces,	  
the	  BNDES,	  the	  Finance	  Ministry,	  the	  Brazilian	  Institute	  of	  Geography	  and	  Statistics	  
(IBGE),	  and	  the	  Modernisation	  and	  Administrative	  Reform	  Secretary.	  	  The	  interest	  of	  
these	   constituents	   in	   computers	   is	   plain.	   	   The	   armed	   forces	   (apart	   from	   their	  
ubiquitous	  presence	  in	  government	  at	  this	  time	  anyway)	  and	  the	  BNDES	  were	  pursuing	  
the	  same	  goals	  as	  they	  did	  in	  the	  special	  working	  group.	  	  The	  Finance	  Ministry	  was	  
included	  as	  the	  funder	  of	  CAPRE's	  initiatives	  and	  was	  looking	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
national	  industry	  that	  could	  substitute	  eventually	  for	  some	  imports.	  	  The	  IBGE	  was	  a	  
large	  user	  of	  data	  processing	  equipment	  and	   services	   in	   its	   role	  as	   the	  keeper	  of	  
statistics,	   and	   was	   also	   to	   assist	   with	   the	   census	   of	   computer	   equipment	   in	   the	  
government.	  	  Finally,	  the	  Modernisation	  and	  Administrative	  Reform	  Secretary	  was	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  the	  rational	  use	  of	  computer	  equipment	  in	  government	  to	  
assist	  it	  in	  its	  normative	  function.	  	  	  
	   While	   the	  constituents	  of	  CAPRE's	  council	  give	  us	  some	  hint	  as	   to	  the	  real	  
agenda	  of	  the	  agency,	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  its	  ambitions	  lies	  in	  its	  situation	  in	  the	  
Planning	  Ministry	  and	  its	  Executive	  Secretary,	  Ricardo	  Saur	  who	  had	  represented	  the	  
BNDES	  in	  GTE/FUNTEC	  111.	  	  While	  the	  agency	  fulfilled	  its	  role	  as	  census–taker	  and	  
regulator	  of	  computers	  in	  government,	  its	  early	  actions	  were	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  
promoting	  the	  local	  industry	  and	  seeking	  thereby	  to	  limit	  imports.	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   In	  January	  1973	  CAPRE	  established	  a	  Permanent	  Working	  Group	  comprising	  
representatives	  from	  the	  BNDES,	  CNPq,	  the	  Studies	  and	  Projects	  Financing	  Agency	  
(FINEP),	   and	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Education,	  which	  was	   tasked	   to	   promote	   a	  National	  
Programme	   of	   Data	   Processing	   Centres.	   	   These	   were	   to	   be	   national	   centres	   for	  
research	   and	   education	   in	   data	   processing	   technology.	   	   Their	   objectives	   were	  
described	  as	  achieving	  economies	  of	  scale,	  extending	  the	  life	  of	  computer	  equipment,	  
promoting	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  industry,	  assisting	  the	  process	  of	  technology	  
transfer,	  and	  limiting	  imports.
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  Later	  that	  year	  CAPRE,	  together	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Industry	  and	  Commerce,	  created	  a	  National	  Programme	  for	  Computer	  Training,	  which	  
was	  to	  assist	  the	  development	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  trained	  resources	  in	  this	  area.	  	  	  
The	  spiralling	  costs	  of	  oil	  imports	  after	  the	  OPEC	  price	  raises	  heralded	  the	  end	  
to	  Brazil's	  economic	  miracle	  in	  1974	  and	  indicated	  a	  need	  for	  limiting	  imports.	  	  The	  
new	  Geisel	  government	  established	  restrictions	  on	  the	  imports	  of	  consumer	  goods	  by	  
federal	  agencies	  in	  that	  year.	  	  	  The	  growing	  trade	  deficit	  in	  computers	  compelled	  the	  
federal	  government	  to	  look	  for	  ways	  to	  explicitly	  restrict	  imports	  in	  this	  area	  as	  well.	  	  
Between	  1969	  and	  1974	  computer	  imports	  had	  grown	  600%.	  	  By	  1974	  they	  were	  the	  
third	   most	   important	   product	   after	   airplanes	   and	   tractors	   among	   manufactured	  
imports,	  accounting	  for	  $100	  million	  in	  foreign	  exchange	  costs.
111	  	  	  	  	  
	   Already	  existent	  in	  a	  regulatory	  role	  within	  the	  federal	  government,	  CAPRE	  
received	  new	  powers,	  which	  allowed	  the	  agency	  to	  act	  to	   limit	  computer	   imports	  
directly	  by	  increasing	  tariffs.	  	  	  In	  December	  1975,	  CAPRE	  was	  invested	  with	  the	  power	  
to	   review	   and	   decide	   on	   all	   proposed	   imports	   of	   data	   processing	   equipment	   via	  
Resolution	  104	  of	  the	  National	  Foreign	  Trade	  Council	  (CONCEX).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   CAPRE's	  political	  fortunes	  grew	  further	  in	  1976	  when	  it	  was	  restructured	  by	  
Presidential	   Decree	   77.118	   and	   given	   direction	   to	   develop	   a	   national	   informatics	  
                                                
110	  	  CAPRE,	  Boletim	  Técnico,	  No.	  105.	  
111	   	   Clélia	   Piragibe,	   "A	   Industria	   de	   Computadores:	   	   Intervenção	   do	   Estado	   e	   Padrão	   de	  
Competição",	  (Tese	  de	  Mestrado	  Economia	  Industrial,	  1983)	  cited	  in	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1986)	  p.	  
794.	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policy.	  	  The	  agency's	  new	  council	  was	  headed	  by	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Planning	  
Ministry	  and	  consisted	  of	  the	  president	  of	  CNPq,	  representatives	  of	  the	  military,	  and	  
the	  ministries	  of	  Finance,	  Education,	  Industry	  &	  Commerce,	  and	  Communications.	  	  The	  
replacement	  of	  the	  IBGE	  and	  Modernisation	  and	  Administrative	  Reform	  Secretary	  by	  
CNPq,	  and	  the	  ministries	  of	  Education,	  Industry	  &	  Commerce,	  and	  Communications	  
reflected	  the	  change	  in	  CAPRE's	  mandate	  from	  one	  of	  regulating	  the	  use	  of	  computers	  
to	  one	  of	  developing	  an	  integrated	  national	  computer	  industry.	  
	   More	  significant	  to	  the	  day–to–day	  policies	  and	  activities	  of	  the	  agency	  were	  
the	  executive	  secretariat	  (still	  headed	  by	  Saur)	  and	  its	  consultative	  commission	  of	  
scientists	  and	  engineers.	   	  Herein	   lay	  the	  "frustrated	  technicians"
112	  or	  "ideological	  
guerrillas"
113	  who	  worked	  with	  Saur	  to	  develop	  and	  promote	  the	  cause	  of	  a	  national	  
computer	  industry.
114
	  	  The	  executive	  secretariat	  exercised	  considerable	  freedom	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  policy	  initiatives.	  	  In	  CAPRE,	  Saur	  and	  his	  group	  had	  a	  strong	  political	  
vehicle	   for	   the	   development	   and	   protection	   of	   the	   nascent	   domestic	   computer	  
industry.	  	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  pausing	  in	  the	  story	  here	  to	  note	  that	  while	  Brazil	  at	  this	  time	  was	  
hardly	  a	  model	  of	  the	  meritocratic	  developmental	  state	  in	  the	  East	  Asian	  mould,	  there	  
was	  a	  meritocracy	  of	  sorts	  at	  work	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  management	  of	  informatics	  
industrial	   policy.	   Owing	   more	   to	   their	   technical	   competence	   than	   to	   political	  
patronage,	  Saur	  and	  the	  other	  ‘técnicos’	  in	  CAPRE	  were	  given	  authority	  over	  national	  
policy	  and	  its	  implementation.	  At	  this	  time	  in	  history,	  there	  were	  few	  others	  in	  the	  
Brazilian	   state	   apparatus	   that	  were	  deemed	   competent	   and	   confident	   enough	   to	  
manage	  it.	  
                                                
112	  	  Evans'	  term,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1986)	  p.	  792.	  
113	  	  Adler's	  term,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987).	  
114	  	  Ibid.	  Adler	  identifies	  the	  main	  actors	  as	  Saur,	  Ivan	  da	  Costa	  Marques	  who	  later	  became	  
chief	  executive	  at	  Cobra,	  Mario	  Ripper	  who	  was	  one	  of	  the	  four	  engineers	  who	  developed	  the	  
computer	  prototype	  in	  1961	  and	  later	  became	  executive	  director	  of	  Serpro,	  Arthur	  Pereira	  
Nunes	   who	   played	   a	   leading	   role	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   ABICOMP,	   the	   computer	  
manufacturers'	  association	  and	  lobby	  group,	  and	  Claudio	  Zamitti	  Mammana,	  a	  physicist	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  São	  Paolo	  and	  later	  President	  of	  ABICOMP.	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   In	   its	   endeavour	   CAPRE	   received	   the	   implicit	   support	   of	   President	   Geisel.	  	  
Geisel's	  Second	  National	  Development	  Plan	  included	  the	  "basic	  electronics	  industry"	  as	  
one	  to	  be	  emphasized.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Second	  Basic	  Plan	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  
Science	  and	  Technology	  sanctioned	  the	  creation	  of	  a	   local	  minicomputer	   industry	  
controlled	  by	  local	  capital.
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   1976	  and	  1977	  were	  pivotal	  years	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  national	  computer	  
policy.	  	  In	  these	  years	  the	  policy	  direction	  faced	  its	  first	  strong	  test	  by	  the	  computer	  
transnationals	   led	   by	   IBM	   and	   Data	   General.	   	   	   By	   1976,	   the	   large	   computer	  
transnationals	   were	   beginning	   to	   take	   notice	   of	   what	   was	   happening	   in	   Brazil.	  	  
Responding	   to	   the	   import	   restrictions	   and	   the	   calls	   for	   a	   national	   minicomputer	  
industry,	  IBM	  pursued	  a	  high–profile	  and	  high–risk	  strategy.	  	  IBM	  attempted	  to	  pre-­‐
empt	  the	  minicomputer	  plan	  by	  producing	  its	  System	  32	  minicomputer	  at	  its	  Sumare	  
plant	   in	   the	   state	   of	   São	   Paulo	   in	   1976.	   	   The	   company	   launched	   an	   aggressive	  
marketing	  campaign,	  announcing	  the	  impending	  availability	  of	  the	  new	  system.	  	  The	  
campaign	  succeeded	  in	  generating	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  marketplace	  as	  IBM	  
collected	  some	  400	  statements	  of	  interest	  from	  local	  business.
116
	  	  IBM	  executives	  met	  
with	  the	  Planning	  Minister	  Velloso	  and	  President	  Geisel	  himself,	  attempting	  to	  ensure	  
approval	  of	  their	  project.	  
	   IBM's	  actions	  were	  largely	  dictated	  from	  World	  Headquarters	  in	  New	  York.	  	  The	  
company	   had	   a	   policy	   that	   forbade	   joint	   ventures	   of	   any	   kind	   at	   that	   time,	   and	  
regarded	   the	   unconditional	   transfer	   of	   technology	   as	   anathema.	   	  Moreover,	   the	  
company	  believed	  that	  its	  contribution	  to	  Brazil's	  exports	  during	  this	  time	  of	  rising	  
import	  bills	  would	  ultimately	  swing	  the	  policy	  decision	  in	  its	  direction.	  
	   However,	  IBM's	  challenge	  was	  too	  little	  and	  too	  late.	  	  The	  government's	  official	  
policy	  thrust	  in	  this	  area	  had	  been	  the	  pursuit	  of	  tri–pe,	  from	  the	  initial	  search	  by	  
GTE/FUNTEC	  111	  to	  the	  Basic	  Plan	  for	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Development	  issued	  
                                                
115	  	  Helena,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  20.	  	  Other	  areas	  for	  "rapid	  progress"	  were	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  space	  
research.	  
116	  	  Ibid.,	  	  p.	  50.	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by	  the	  Planning	  Ministry.	  	  The	  unofficial	  policy	  objective	  of	  CAPRE	  was	  nothing	  short	  of	  
unconditional	  technology	  licensing.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  CAPRE	  had	  developed	  considerable	  
political	  momentum	  and	  had	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  the	  support	  of	  Planning	  Minister	  
Velloso.	  	  IBM	  was	  not	  even	  offering	  tri–pe;	  simply	  local	  production.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  IBM	  
was	  ordered	  to	  shut	  down	  its	  minicomputer	  production	  line	  in	  Sumare	  and	  export	  the	  
minis	  it	  had	  already	  produced	  and	  promised	  to	  an	  expectant	  market.	  
	   CAPRE	  responded	  to	  IBM's	  challenge	  in	  July	  1976	  with	  Council	  Decision	  01,	  
which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  reserving	  the	  minicomputer	  market	  to	  national	  companies.	  	  
At	   this	   time	  CAPRE	  also	  assumed	  control	  of	  state	  purchases	  of	  software	  and	  data	  
processing	   services,	   thus	   effectively	   regulating	   a	   market	   in	   which	   the	   agency	  
controlled	  the	  purchases	  of	  the	  largest	  buyer.	  	  CAPRE's	  effective	  power	  and	  influence	  
was	  growing.	  	  	  
	   In	   May	   1977,	   a	   second	   TNC	   challenge	   came	   from	   the	   second	   largest	  
minicomputer	  manufacturer	  in	  the	  world,	  Data	  General.	  	  DG	  had	  established	  a	  wholly–
owned	  sales	  subsidiary	  in	  São	  Paolo	  in	  1975	  through	  which	  it	  planned	  to	  market	  its	  
US–built	  minicomputers.	  	  However,	  all	  of	  the	  purchase	  requests	  received	  by	  the	  sales	  
subsidiary	  were	  still	  awaiting	  import	  license	  from	  CAPRE	  by	  May	  1977.	  	  Furthermore,	  
DG	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Cobra	  to	  license	  technology	  for	  a	  business	  
computer.	  	  But	  DG	  refused	  to	  accept	  Brazil's	  condition	  that	  patents,	  blueprints,	  etc.	  be	  
transferred	  to	  Cobra	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  license	  period,	  so	  Cobra	  opted	  to	  license	  from	  
the	   obscure	   Sycor,	   Inc.	   of	   Michigan.	   	   Adding	   insult	   to	   injury,	   Sycor	   was	   granted	  
exemptions	  from	  the	  same	  import	  licensing	  restrictions	  to	  which	  the	  other	  TNCs	  were	  
subject.	  	  	  
	   Data	  General's	  Manager	  of	  Finance	  and	  Public	  Affairs,	  J.B.	  Stroup,	   issued	  a	  
formal	  complaint	  of	  discriminatory	  trade	  practice	  against	  Brazil	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Special	  
Trade	   Representative,	   Robert	   Strauss.
117	   	   The	   complaint	   cited	   four	   effects	   of	   the	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  The	  Data	  General	  case,	  together	  with	  the	  full	  text	  of	  the	  letter	  from	  J.B.	  Stroup	  of	  DG	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the	  Special	  Trade	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Brazilian	  policy:	  	  (1)	  U.S.	  companies	  are	  unable	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  promising	  market;	  
(2)	  there	  will	  be	  a	  loss	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  exports	  to	  Brazil	  are	  prohibited;	  (3)	  
if	  Brazil	  succeeds	   it	  will	  encourage	  other	  countries	  to	  pursue	  similar	  policies,	   thus	  
exacerbating	  the	  effects;	  and	  (4)	  a	  U.S.	  company	  (Sycor)	  was	  being	  favoured	  over	  
other	   U.S.	   companies.	   	   The	   complaint	   concluded	   by	   offering	   four	   "Options	   to	  
Consider:"	  
	  
"(1)	   Bilaterally	   request	   that	   Brazil	   eliminate	   tariff	   and	   non–tariff	  
barriers	  on	  U.S.	  minicomputers	  in	  exchange	  for	  shelving	  retaliatory	  U.S.	  
barriers	  on	  Brazilian	  imports	  into	  the	  U.S.	  
(2)	   Bilaterally	   request	   that	   Brazil	   eliminate	   technology	   transfer	  
requirements	   for	   granting	   manufacturing	   licenses	   to	   U.S.	   firms	   in	  
exchange	  for	  granting	  U.S.	  approval	  for	  such	  manufacturing	  licenses.	  
(3)	   Establish	   U.S.	   regulations	   prohibiting	   ownership	   transfer	   of	  
computer	  technology	  (hardware	  and	  software)	  to	  any	  wholly–owned	  
foreign	  firm,	  but	  permitting	  manufacturing	  licenses.	  	  	  
(4)	   Establish	   U.S.	   regulations	   prohibiting	   foreign	   government	  
agreements	  with	  U.S.	  firms	  providing	  them	  exclusive	  exemption	  from	  
import	  quotas	  or	  licenses."	  
	   The	  complaint	  seemed	  to	  have	  little	  or	  no	  impact	  in	  Washington.	  	  The	  only	  
recorded	  reaction	  from	  the	  Special	  Trade	  Representative	  came	  almost	  two	  years	  later	  
in	  1979	  when	  Strauss	  asked	  the	  Brazilian	  Embassy	  in	  Washington	  to	  inform	  him	  about	  
computer	  import	  restrictions	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
"The	  matter	  was	  further	  discussed	  at	  the	  November	  1979	  meeting	  of	  
the	  Consultative	  Subgroup	  for	  Brazil–US	  Trade.	  	  According	  to	  Relatorio	  
Reservado	  (Number	  683,	  p.	  1)	  the	  Brazilian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  informed	  
SRT	  [sic]	  that	  import	  control	  was	  only	  a	  provisional	  measure	  in	  view	  of	  
Brazilian	  balance	  of	  payment	  difficulties."118	  
In	  Brazil,	  the	  complaint	  had	  no	  effect	  other	  than	  to	  harden	  public	  opinion	  and	  against	  
the	  computer	  TNCs,	  and	  increase	  ministerial	  and	  CAPRE	  resolve	  to	  push	  ahead	  with	  
the	  national	  computer	  policy.	  	  
	   In	  January	  1977	  Brazil's	  Economic	  Development	  Council	  (CDE)	  published	  five	  
criteria	  for	  issuing	  fiscal	  incentives	  to	  companies	  in	  the	  computer	  industry:	  	  (1)	  degree	  
of	   national	   content/components;	   (2)	   export	   potential;	   (3)	   extent	   of	   technology	  
                                                
118	  	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1983),	  p.	  134.	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transfer;	   (4)	  viability	  of	  companies	  already	   in	   the	  market;	  and	  (5)	  Brazilian	  capital	  
majority.
119	  	  
	   In	  June	  1977,	  CAPRE	  published	  Decision	  01/77	  announcing	  that	  there	  would	  be	  
a	  competition	  for	  government–granted	  minicomputer	  concessions.	  	  Firms,	  both	  local	  
and	  foreign,	  were	  invited	  to	  submit	  proposals	  that	  would	  then	  be	  judged	  by	  CAPRE,	  
deciding	  who	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  produce	  minicomputers	  in	  Brazil.	  CAPRE	  was	  to	  
make	  its	  choice	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  five	  criteria,	  which	  reflected	  the	  criteria	  published	  by	  




(1)	   Utilization	   of	   local	   technical	   resources	   to	   design	   and	   develop	  
computer	   products.	   	   Technology	   transfer	   agreements	   with	   foreign	  
firms	  were	  allowed	  but	  the	  recipient	  firms	  should	  display	  the	  capacity	  
to	  learn	  and	  not	  become	  dependent	  on	  the	  supplying	  firm.	  
(2)	  Degree	  of	  incorporation	  of	  locally–manufactured	  components;	  
(3)	   Firms'	  market	   shares;	   it	   was	   important	   to	   avoid	   any	  monopoly	  
situation	  developing	  in	  the	  industry.	  
(4)	  Local	  ownership;	  
(5)	  Net	  foreign	  trade	  balance.	  
By	  now,	  both	   foreign	  and	   local	   firms	  were	  convinced	  of	   the	  government's	  
seriousness	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  local	  computer	  industry.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  competition	  attracted	  a	  good	  number	  of	  proposals.	  	  (See	  Table	  3.1)	  	  Seven	  local	  
firms	  submitted	  independent	  proposals,	  two	  submitted	  proposals	  for	  joint	  ventures	  
with	  small	  foreign	  firms,	  and	  seven	  computer	  transnationals	  proposed	  projects	  with	  
their	  own	  technology.	  	  In	  fact,	  several	  of	  the	  major	  computer	  transnationals	  submitted	  
a	  number	  of	  different	  proposals.
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119	  	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987)	  p.	  251.	  
120	  	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1983)	  and	  Helena,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  51.	  
121	  	  Helena,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  64.	  	  In	  fact,	  Burroughs	  executives	  told	  me	  that	  they	  alone	  submitted	  
seven	  projects	  some	  of	  which	  considered	  the	  possibility	  of	  joint–venture	  with	  a	  partner	  of	  the	  
government's	  choice.	  	  Tri–pe,	  once	  sought	  by	  the	  government,	  was	  here	  explicitly	  rejected	  by	  
CAPRE.	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TABLE	  3.1	  
Projects	  Submitted	  to	  CAPRE
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Proposing	  Company	   	   	   Ownership	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Technology	  
	  
Sharp/Inepar/Dataserv	  (SID)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Brazilian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Logabax(France)	  
Edisa	   	   	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Fujitsu	  (Japan)	  
Labo	  Eletronica	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Nixdorf	  (Germany)	  
Hidroservice/Mello	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  J.C.	  Mello	  (Brazil)	  
Elebra	   	   	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Honeywell	  (USA)	  
Ifema	   	   	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Ifema	  (Brazil)	  
Protondata/Isdra	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Philips	  (Holland)	  
Docas	  de	  Santos	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  NEC	  (Japan)	  
Maico	   	   	   	   	   Brazilian	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Basic	  Four	  (USA)	  
IBM	   	   	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  IBM	  (USA)	  
Burroughs	   	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Burroughs	  (USA)	  
Hewlett–Packard	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  H-­‐P	  (US)	  
NCR	   	   	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  NCR	  (USA)	  
Olivetti	  	   	   	   	   Italian	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Olivetti	  (Italy)	  
Four	  Phase	   	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Four	  Phase	  (USA)	  
TRW	   	   	   	   	   American	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  TRW	  (USA)	  
	  
	   Toward	  the	  end	  of	  1977	  CAPRE	  issued	  its	  decision.	  	  The	  agency	  rejected	  all	  of	  
the	  offers	  of	  the	  transnationals,	  opting	  instead	  for	  three	  locally–owned	  companies	  
which	  were	   to	   license	   technology	   from	   small	   foreign	   concerns:	   	   SID	   Informática,	  
licensing	  technology	  from	  Logabax	  of	  France;	  Edisa,	  licensing	  from	  Fujitsu	  of	  Japan;	  
and	  Labo,	  licensing	  from	  Nixdorf	  of	  Germany.	  	  The	  country's	  minicomputer	  industry	  
was	  thus	  entrusted	  to	  Cobra,	  the	  state–owned	  flagship	  company	  which	  was	  licensing	  
from	  Sycor,	  and	  these	  three	  private	  Brazilian	  concerns.	  	  A	  year	  later,	  a	  fifth	  company	  
received	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  state–allocated	  minicomputer	  pie:	  	  SISCO,	  a	  company	  linked	  to	  
one	  of	  Brazil's	  largest	  engineering	  consulting	  firms	  (Hidroservice)	  and	  the	  empire	  of	  
Henry	  Maksoud.	  	  (See	  Table	  3.2)	  
	   The	  licensing	  agreements	  were	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  principles.	  	  The	  Brazilian	  
firm	  was	  allowed	  to	  buy	  the	  technology	  of	  the	  foreign	  company	  only	  once,	  having	  to	  
                                                
122	  	  Helena,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1980),	  p.	  98,	  quoted	  in	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  252.	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develop	  subsequent	  models	  on	  its	  own,	  and	  technology	  transfer	  must	  be	  completed	  




Authorized	  Minicomputer	  Manufacturers,	  1977
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Company	   	   Model	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Technology	   Description	  
	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source	  
Cobra	   	   	   Cobra–400	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sycor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   64KB	  CPU	  oriented	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   banking	  transactions	  
	  
	   	   	   Cobra–500	   	  Cobra	   	  	   512K	  CPU	  expandable	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   to	  1MB	  
	  
SID	   	   	   SID–500	   	  Logabax	   64KB	  CPU	  similar	  to	  	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   DEC	  PDP	  11/34	  
	  
Edisa	   	   	   ED–300	   	  Fujitsu	  	  	   64KB	  CPU	  similar	  to	  	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   IBM	  System	  3	  
	  
Labo	   	   	   Labo–8034	   	  Nixdorf	   256KB	  CPU	  similar	  to	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Nixdorf	  8870–1	  
	  
Sisco	   	   	   SCC–5000	   	  Sisco	   	   64KB	  CPU	  similar	  to	  	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   DEC	  PDP	  8	  
	  
	   	   	   MB–800	   	  Sisco	   	   256KB	  CPU	  similar	  to	  	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   DG	  Nova	  3	  
	  	  
	   A	  number	  of	  factors	  explain	  CAPRE’s	  ultimate	  decision	  to	  exclude	  the	  large	  
TNCs.	  	  Most	  certainly	  those	  in	  CAPRE	  itself	  were	  determined	  to	  keep	  the	  large	  TNCs	  
out	  of	  the	  market.	  	  However,	  without	  support	  at	  ministerial	  level,	  the	  técnicos	  could	  
not	  have	  their	  way.	  	  As	  has	  been	  already	  noted,	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  continued	  to	  
give	   support	   to	   CAPRE	   but	   tended	   to	   favour	   tri–pe,	   which	   had	   worked	   in	  
petrochemicals.	  	  The	  other	  government	  ministers	  also	  preferred	  joint–ventures	  with	  
TNCs,	   expressing	   some	   worry	   that	   the	   national	   proposals	   were	   based	   more	   on	  
enthusiasm	  than	  ability	  to	  deliver.
125	  	  However,	  IBM's	  heavy–handed	  approach	  and	  the	  
                                                
123	  	  See	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1983)	  pp.	  140ff.	  
124	  	  Source:	  	  Marc	  Burbridge,	  "Betting	  on	  Brazil",	  Datamation,	  May	  1981.	  
125	  	  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  264.	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publicity	  surrounding	  the	  Data	  General	  trade	  complaint	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  the	  
government	   to	   do	   anything	   that	   looked	   like	   a	   concession	   to	   the	   large	   TNCs.	  	  
Furthermore,	   the	  consortium	  of	  eleven	  banks	   that	  had	   just	   invested	  considerable	  
resources	  in	  Cobra	  were	  not	  keen	  to	  see	  the	  company	  overrun	  by	  foreign	  competition.	  	  
Finally,	  at	   this	   time	  President	  Carter	  condemned	  Brazil's	  human	  rights	  record	  and	  
subsequently	  abrogated	  the	  military	  cooperation	  treaty	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  
This	  hardened	  the	  Brazilian	  military	  in	  its	  drive	  for	  independence	  from	  foreign,	  or	  at	  
least,	  U.S.	  suppliers.	   	  The	  military	  thus	  lent	  its	  support	  to	  a	  decision	  excluding	  the	  
computer	   giants.	   	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   ministers	   agreed	   that	   CAPRE	   should	   use	   the	  
conditions	  laid	  down	  by	  the	  CDE,	  which	  included	  considerations	  of	  ownership	  and	  
technology	  transfer.	  
	   For	  their	  part	  the	  TNCs	  believed	  that	  their	  superior	  export	  prospects	  would	  
outweigh	  questions	  of	  ownership	  and	  technology	  transfer.	  	  In	  this,	  the	  TNCs	  greatly	  
misread	  the	  factors	  motivating	  policy	  at	  that	  time.	   	  They	  went	  much	  deeper	  than	  
simply	  considerations	  of	  balance	  of	  payments.	  CAPRE	  was	  genuinely	  concerned	  to	  
break	  the	  large	  foreign	  computer	  companies'	  stranglehold	  on	  the	  market.	   	  Clearly	  
considerations	   of	   local	   ownership	   and	   absorption	   of	   technology	   were	   of	   greater	  
importance	  to	  CAPRE	  than	  obtaining	  the	  latest	  technology,	  largest	  scale	  of	  investment,	  
exports,	  or	  even	  supplying	  the	  immediate	  needs	  of	  the	  market.	  	  In	  order	  to	  make	  room	  
in	  the	  market	  for	  the	  local	  firms,	  it	  was	  imperative	  that	  the	  large	  TNCs	  in	  general,	  and	  
IBM	  in	  particular,	  be	  cut	  down	  to	  size.	  	  	  In	  the	  end,	  CAPRE	  was	  able	  to	  reject	  all	  of	  the	  
TNC	  proposals	   claiming	   that	   they	  were	   judged	   fairly	   according	   to	   the	  established	  
criteria.	  	  	  
	   IBM	  and	  the	  other	  TNCs	  reacted	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  closing	  market	  in	  the	  way	  
one	  would	  expect.	   	  They	  proposed	  to	   invest	   in	   local	  production	   in	  order	  to	  get	   in	  
before	  the	  door	  shut.	  	  However,	  this	  attempt	  was	  five	  years	  too	  late.	  	  By	  1977,	  the	  
minimum	  that	  the	  government	  would	  accept	  was	  joint	  venture	  with	  the	  foreign	  firm	  
holding	  a	  minority	  interest.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  tri–pe	  in	  this	  industry	  had	  been	  present	  since	  
1972	  when	  Saur	  began	  his	  search	  for	  a	  foreign	  partner.	  	  Had	  the	  foreign	  computer	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firms	  chosen	  to	  invest	  in	  local	  production	  prior	  to	  1972,	  they	  likely	  would	  have	  pre–
empted	  the	  market	  reserve,	  which,	  in	  1977,	  excluded	  them.	  	  In	  the	  1977	  decision,	  the	  
Brazilian	   government	   not	   only	   excluded	   wholly–owned	   TNC	   participation,	   it	   also	  
rejected	  tri–pe––the	  original	  strategy.	  	  In	  allowing	  foreign	  participation	  only	  through	  
tightly	  controlled	  licensing	  arrangements,	  the	  government	  had	  effectively	  limited	  the	  
TNCs	  more	  strictly	  than	  originally	  proposed	  in	  GTE/FUNTEC	  111.	  
	   It	   must	   be	   emphasized,	   therefore,	   that	   Brazil's	   computer	   policy	   as	  
implemented	   in	   1977,	   differed	   from	   the	   usual	   import	   substituting	   policies	  
implemented	  under	  the	  Law	  of	  Similars.	  	  The	  Law	  of	  Similars	  protects	  both	  foreign	  and	  
domestically–owned	  producers	  as	  long	  as	  they	  produce	  on	  Brazilian	  soil.	  	  However,	  the	  
initiative	  in	  computers	  sought	  specifically	  to	  exclude	  the	  foreign–owned	  producers	  
entirely	  from	  certain	  segments	  of	  the	  market,	  whether	  they	  were	  proposing	  to	  import	  
or	  produce	  locally.	  	  	  	  	  
	   However,	  pressure	  on	  the	  new	  Brazilian	  policy	  and	  its	  young	  beneficiaries	  did	  
not	  abate.	  	  IBM	  decided	  to	  focus	  its	  efforts	  in	  Brazil	  on	  the	  manufacture	  of	  a	  line	  of	  
small	  mainframe	  computers,	  its	  System	  4331,	  which	  was	  close	  enough	  in	  price	  to	  the	  
minicomputers	  to	  eat	  into	  their	  market.	   	  Though	  this	  proposal	  too	  was	  eventually	  
rebuffed,	  IBM	  stuck	  with	  this	  basic	  strategy	  in	  Brazil	  and	  had	  considerable	  success	  with	  
it,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  later.	  
Changing	  of	  the	  Guard:	  	  From	  CAPRE	  to	  SEI	  
Events	   within	   the	   Brazilian	   government	   also	   cooperated	   at	   this	   time	   to	  
institutionally	  insulate	  the	  new	  policy	  from	  attack.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1978	  the	  military	  had	  
selected	  General	   Figueiredo	   to	   succeed	  Geisel.	   	   Figueiredo	  was	   then	  head	  of	   the	  
National	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (SNI).	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  change	  of	  the	  administration,	  a	  
special	   working	   group	   was	   formed	   to	   reconsider	   Brazil's	   policy	   with	   respect	   to	  
computer	  electronics.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  intelligence	  community	  dominated	  this	  
group.	  	  The	  group	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  power	  that	  the	  civilians	  in	  CAPRE	  had	  over	  
policy	  in	  this	  area	  that	  was	  deemed	  of	  great	  importance	  to	  national	  security.	  	  So,	  when	  
        96 
Figueiredo	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1979,	  CAPRE	  was	  abolished	  and	  replaced	  by	  the	  Special	  
Secretariat	  for	  Informatics	  (Secretaria	  Especial	  de	  Informática	  or	  SEI).	  	  	  
SEI	  was	  to	  report	  directly	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  President	  
rather	  than	  through	  the	  Planning	  Ministry	  as	  CAPRE	  had	  done.	  	  Those	  appointed	  to	  
direct	  SEI	  were	  people	  with	  strong	  military	  and	  intelligence	  links.
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  They	  were	  not	  
"frustrated	   technicians"	  with	   a	   cause.	   They	  were	   rather	   less	   technical,	   but	  more	  
interested	   in	  controlling	  the	  development	  of	   the	   industry	   for	   the	  sake	  of	  national	  
security.	  	  Moreover,	  SEI's	  position	  under	  the	  Security	  Council	  gave	  the	  agency	  almost	  
dictatorial	  power	  over	  the	  industry.	  	  In	  practice,	  SEI	  would	  decide	  policy	  and	  could	  
implement	   it	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  one	  man:	   	  Conrado	  Venturini,	  who	  headed	  the	  
Security	  Council.	  	  Some	  have	  speculated	  that	  had	  regulatory	  control	  over	  the	  industry	  
remained	   in	   the	   Planning	   Ministry,	   the	   new	   minister	   Delfim	   Neto	   would	   have	  
dismantled	  the	  policy.
127	  	  Instead,	  under	  the	  Security	  Council,	  SEI	  was	  politically	  well–
insulated	  and	  proceeded	  to	  expand	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  	  
	  
Policy	  Expansion	  and	  Pressure:	  	  1980	  to	  1984	  
	   SEI	  received	  an	  expanded	  mandate	  to	  stimulate	  and	  regulate	  all	  activities	  in	  the	  
field	  of	  informatics,	  including	  microelectronics,	  software,	  components,	  data	  processing	  
services,	  and	   later	   teleinformatics,	  process	  control	   systems,	  and	   transborder	  data	  
flows.	  	  From	  1980	  to	  1984	  SEI	  exercised	  its	  great	  power,	  issuing	  a	  series	  of	  decrees	  and	  
normative	  acts	  that	  expanded	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  As	  the	  microchip	  grew	  
in	  its	  pervasiveness,	  so	  too	  it	  seemed,	  did	  SEI's	  regulations,	  which	  were	  beginning	  to	  
encompass	  almost	  anything	  electronic.	  
	   SEI's	  Normative	  Act	  001/80	  established	  criteria	  for	  informatics	  imports,	  which	  
included	  the	  unavailability	  of	  locally–produced	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  In	  practice	  
                                                
126	  	  The	  first	  three	  secretaries	  of	  SEI	  were	  Octavio	  Gennari,	  Joubert	  Brizida,	  and	  Edison	  Dytz.	  	  
Only	  seven	  out	  of	  40	  CAPRE	  staff	  were	  kept	  on,	  albeit	  in	  weak	  positions.	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   Peter	   Evans	  makes	   this	   point	   and	   the	  opinion	   is	   shared	  by	  many	   connected	  with	   the	  
industry	  in	  Brazil	  (author	  interviews).	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1986)	  p.	  796.	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this	  meant	  that	  a	  prospective	  importer	  must	  submit	  a	  detailed	  proposal	  to	  SEI.	  	  SEI	  
would	   then	   issue	  a	   request	   for	  proposal	   to	  domestic	  manufacturers	   (or	  potential	  
manufacturers).	  	  If	  a	  domestic	  manufacturer	  claimed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  desired	  
equipment	   or	   service	   the	   import	   request	   would	   be	   turned	   down.	   	   There	   were,	  
however,	   loopholes	   in	   the	   Act	   allowing	   imports	   for	   'priority	   sectors'	   and	   'state	  
agencies.'
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  SEI	  also	  required	  that	  all	  computer	  equipment	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  
agency,	  and	  that	  all	  federal	  government	  purchases	  be	  subject	  to	  SEI's	  approval.	  	  	  
	   Within	  a	  year	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  CAPRE	  to	  SEI,	   IBM	  decided	  to	  test	  the	  
policy,	  once	  again	  proposing	  to	  manufacture	  its	  4331	  mainframe	  computer	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
This	  time	  the	  company	  was	  successful,	  but	  SEI	  extracted	  important	  concessions	  prior	  
to	  granting	  approval.	  	  SEI	  restricted	  the	  minimum	  memory	  of	  the	  system	  so	  that	  it	  
couldn't	   be	   down–graded	   to	   compete	   directly	   with	   Brazilian–produced	  
minicomputers.	  	  SEI	  also	  required	  85	  percent	  local	  content,	  limited	  the	  number	  to	  be	  
sold	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  to	  242	  units	  in	  four	  years,	  and	  required	  that	  IBM	  export	  
three	  machines	  for	  every	  two	  sold	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  market.	  	  SEI	  also	  approved	  an	  IBM	  
plan	  to	  produce	  magnetic	  disks	  for	  export.	  
	   The	  approval	  caused	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  initial	  alarm	  among	  the	  ex–CAPRE	  group	  
that	  had	  previously	  rejected	  IBM's	  proposal.	  	  They	  were	  worried	  that	  IBM	  had	  just	  
bought	  its	  way	  in	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  exports.	  	  SEI's	  rationale,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  
that	   the	   4331	   with	   memory	   restrictions	   would	   address	   a	   market	   segment	   not	  
addressed	  by	  the	  local	  producers.	  	  The	  deal	  also	  yielded	  clear	  balance	  of	  payments	  
benefits.	  
	   Two	   other	   TNCs	   also	   received	   approval	   for	   local	   manufacture	   that	   year.	  	  
Burroughs	  was	  granted	  permission	  to	  produce	  the	  B6900	  locally,	  in	  large	  measure	  to	  
provide	  competition	  for	  IBM.	  	  Hewlett–Packard	  managed	  to	  convince	  SEI	  to	  approve	  
the	  local	  manufacture	  of	  the	  H–P	  85	  desktop	  microcomputers,	  which	  were	  destined	  
specifically	   for	   scientific	   and	   research	   applications.	   	   These	   applications	   were	   not	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  SEI,	  "Ato	  Normativo,"	  001/80,	  March	  1980,	  mimeo.	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specifically	  reserved	  to	  Brazilian	  companies.	  	  In	  return,	  the	  company	  agreed	  to	  export	  
three	  units	  for	  every	  one	  sold	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  
	   Perhaps	  SEI's	  most	  controversial	  decision	  was	  Normative	  Act	  16	  which,	  among	  
other	   things,	   listed	   the	  products	   falling	  within	   the	  market	   reserve,	   and	   therefore	  
within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  SEI.	   	  The	  controversy	  arose	  partly	  because	  the	   list	  was	  a	  
considerable	  expansion	  of	  what	  had	  been	  assumed	  previously.	  	  The	  reserve	  now	  was	  
to	  include	  much	  more	  than	  simply	  data	  processing	  equipment.	  	  It	  included	  electronic	  
biomedical	  instruments,	  and	  electronic	  measurement	  and	  testing	  equipment;	  in	  short,	  
almost	  anything	  with	  a	  microchip.	  	  The	  reserve	  thus	  began	  to	  affect	  new	  user	  groups	  
(importers)	  and	  manufacturing	  sectors.	  
	   SEI	  also	  targeted	  two	  areas	  that	  had	  been	  hitherto	  neglected	  in	  the	  regulations,	  
but	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  computer	  technology:	  	  software	  and	  microelectronics.	  	  SEI	  
established	  a	  Software	  Registry	  and	  required	  the	  registration	  of	  all	  software	  marketed	  
in	  the	  country,	  whether	  produced	  abroad	  or	  domestically.	  	  Furthermore,	  SEI	  approved	  
only	  those	  microcomputer	  projects	  that	  used	  locally–produced	  software.	  
	   On	   March	   6,	   1981,	   by	   Decree	   85.790,	   SEI	   established	   a	   Microelectronics	  
Consulting	   Group	   and	   moved	   to	   extend	   the	   market	   reserve	   to	   areas	   of	   the	  
microelectronics	  industry.	  	  Here	  SEI	  correctly	  targeted	  the	  roots	  of	  dependence	  in	  
computer	  electronics.	   	  Microelectronic	  components	  are	   the	   fundamental	  building	  
blocks	  of	  all	  modern	  electronic	  machines	  and	  devices.	  	  Mastery	  of	  this	  area	  is	  essential	  
to	   any	   real	   technological	   autonomy.	   	   Without	   an	   indigenous	   microelectronics	  
capability,	  Brazil	  would	  remain	  dependent	  and	  passive	  with	  respect	  to	  technological	  
change.	  	  However,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  semiconductor	  industry	  was	  both	  highly	  
expensive	  and	  risky.	  
	   A	   brief	   look	   at	   Brazil's	   situation	   with	   regard	   to	   microelectronics	   in	   1981	  
demonstrates	  the	  ambitious	  nature	  of	  SEI's	  plan.	  	  Most	  integrated	  circuits	  (ICs)	  were	  
being	  imported,	  though	  some	  discrete	  devices	  and	  some	  ICs	  were	  manufactured	  in	  
Brazil,	  primarily	  for	  consumer	  electronics.	  	  There	  were	  virtually	  no	  diffusion	  operations	  
in	   the	   country,	   only	   the	   assembly	   of	   imported	   chips.	   There	   were	   thirteen	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semiconductor	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  country	  at	  that	  time;	  but	  only	  one	  (Transit)	  was	  
nationally–owned.	   	   Transit	   was	   soon	   to	   close	   its	   doors	   due	   to	   financial	   and	  
technological	   problems	   in	   an	   increasingly	   cut–throat	   international	   business.	   	   The	  
Brazilian	  market	  required	  many	  different	  types	  of	  components;	  however	  the	  sales	  
volume	  of	  each	  type	  was	  not	  large	  enough	  to	  justify	  their	  local	  production.	  	  	  
	   In	   May	   1984	   an	   Informatics	   Technological	   Centre	   was	   established	   at	   the	  
University	  of	  Campinas	  (Unicamp)	  near	  São	  Paolo	  with	  a	  $US	  10	  million	  annual	  budget.	  	  
SEI	  then	  selected	  two	  of	  the	  best-­‐financed	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms,	  Itautec	  (Banco	  
Itau)	  and	  Elebra	  (Docas	  de	  Santos),	  to	  establish	  semiconductor	  diffusion	  plants	  nearby.	  	  
SID	  (Bradesco)	  was	  a	  third	  player	  in	  this	  vital	  industry,	  acquiring	  an	  old–style	  front–end	  
chip	  diffusion	  plant	  from	  Philco.	   	  SEI	  offered	  incentives	  to	  help	  the	  three	  Brazilian	  
companies.	  	  Manufacturers	  purchasing	  integrated	  circuits	  diffused	  in	  Brazil	  by	  these	  
companies	  would	  receive	  tax	  credits	  worth	  twice	  the	  value	  of	  the	  purchased	  ICs.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Itautec	  and	  Elebra	  attempted	  to	  purchase	  technology	  from	  a	  number	  of	  US	  
firms	  that	  dominated	  the	  international	  industry	  at	  the	  time.	  	  However,	  the	  US	  firms	  
refused	  to	  sell,	  so	  the	  Brazilian	  firms	  were	  forced	  to	  go	  to	  Europe	  for	  technology.	  	  
Meanwhile,	  SEI	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  TNCs	  with	  microelectronics	  operations	   in	   the	  
country.	  	  The	  agency	  denied	  import	  licenses	  to	  these	  TNCs,	  preventing	  modernisation	  
of	   processes	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   new	   products.	   	   Several	   TNCs	   closed	   their	  
operations	   and	   left	   behind	  Texas	   Instruments,	   Fairchild	   Electronics,	   Siemens,	   and	  
Philips,	  which	  continued	  to	  limp	  along	  with	  what	  they	  had.	  	  	  
	   The	  foray	  into	  microelectronics	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  most	  ambitious	  venture	  of	  
the	  national	  policy,	  and	  it	  saw	  very	  limited	  success.	  	  The	  three	  national	  companies	  did	  
not	  have	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  invest	  in	  diffusion	  operations.	  	  Hence,	  they	  concentrated	  
on	  IC	  design,	  process,	  assembly	  and	  test	  for	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  devices.	  	  As	  will	  be	  
seen	  later,	  due	  to	  economic	  problems,	  the	  microelectronics	  plan	  was	  ultimately	  to	  fall	  
largely	  dormant.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Now	  ousted	  from	  the	  civil	  service	  many	  of	  the	  CAPRE	  technicians	  moved	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  industry	  they	  helped	  create.	  	  After	  some	  initial	  concern,	  the	  market	  
        100 
reserve	  was	  now	  seen	  to	  be	  secure	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  SEI	  and	  many	  more	  local	  groups	  
moved	  to	  get	  a	  stake	  in	  this	  growing	  and	  well–protected	  industry.	  	  In	  1978,	  the	  local	  
industry	  participants	  banded	  together	  at	  the	  direction	  of	  Ricardo	  Saur	  who	  became	  
the	   Executive	   Director,
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   to	   form	   a	   nationalist	   computer	   manufacturers'	   trade	  
association	  and	  lobby	  group	  called	  ABICOMP	  (Brazilian	  Association	  for	  the	  Computer	  
and	  Peripheral	  Equipment	  Industries).	  	  ABICOMP's	  by–laws	  precluded	  membership	  by	  
foreign–owned	  firms	  and	  became	  an	  important	  advocate	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  Brazilian	  
capital	  in	  this	  industry.	  
In	  1979	  several	  important	  Brazilian	  financial	  conglomerates	  increased	  their	  
stake	  in	  the	  national	  computer	  industry.	  	  	  These	  firms	  recognized	  both	  the	  increasing	  
importance	   of	   computer	   electronics	   to	   their	   base	   business,	   and	   an	   attractive	  
(protected)	  business	  opportunity.	  	  The	  two	  largest	  private	  banks	  in	  Brazil,	  Bradesco	  
and	  Itau,	  already	  with	  a	  stake	  in	  Cobra,	  invested	  further	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  Bradesco	  took	  
a	   30%	   stake	   in	   SID	   and	   Itau	   financed	   a	   new	  wholly–owned	   subsidiary	   company:	  	  
Itautec.	  	  (Others	  included	  Unibanco	  with	  Labo,	  and	  Iochpe	  with	  Edisa.)	  	  Meanwhile,	  
one	  of	  the	  oldest	  and	  best	  established	  industrial	  concerns	  in	  Brazil,	  Docas	  de	  Santos,	  
also	  entered	  the	  industry,	  acquiring	  a	  majority	  stake	  in	  Elebra.	  	  	  
	   The	  participation	  of	  these	  well–established	  firms	  lent	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  political	  
clout	  and	  business	  credibility	  to	  the	  young	  industry.	  	  The	  banks	  also	  provided	  a	  captive	  
market	  for	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dynamic	  sectors	  of	  the	  industry	  in	  the	  early	  1980s:	  banking	  
automation.	   The	   apparent	   early	   success	   of	   the	  market	   reserve	   and	   the	   Brazilian	  
computer	  industry	  owes	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  growth	  in	  this	  segment	  of	  the	  
market	  –	  a	  fact	  that	  will	  be	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  federal	  government,	  personified	  by	  the	  "frustrated	  technicians"	  of	  CAPRE,	  
the	  industrial	  developmentalists	  of	  the	  BNDES,	  and	  the	  security–conscious	  military	  and	  
intelligence	  communities	  had,	  up	  to	  this	  point,	  given	  impetus	  to	  the	  national	  computer	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  Ricardo	  Saur	  was	  the	  Executive	  Director	  (non–elected),	  Mario	  Ripper	  a	  Director,	  and	  Arthur	  
Pereira	  Nunes	  Executive	  Secretary	  of	  the	  association.	  	  All	  were	  active	  members	  of	  'the	  group'	  
since	  the	  earliest	  days	  of	  the	  country's	  computer	  effort.	  
        101 
industry,	  rebuffing	  the	  pressures	  of	  the	  large	  computer	  transnationals	  while	  enticing	  
local	  private	  capital	  to	   invest	   in	  the	   industry.	   	  Now	  that	  several	  significant	  private	  
business	   groups	   (and	   an	   ever–increasing	   number	   of	   smaller	   capitalists	   and	  
opportunists)	  had	  invested	  considerable	  resources	  in	  the	  industry,	  private	  capital	  had	  
a	  vital	  interest	  in	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  The	  very	  livelihood	  of	  these	  
companies	  depended	  upon	  it.	  	  A	  significant	  section	  of	  Brazilian	  private	  capital	  was	  by	  
the	  early	  eighties	  no	  longer	  a	  reluctant	  participant	  or	  passive	  partner	  in	  a	  government	  
industrial	  experiment;	  it	  was	  an	  active	  proponent	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  informatics.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Meanwhile,	   the	   explosion	   of	   the	  market	   for	  microcomputers	   and	   banking	  
automation	  ensured	  the	  phenomenal	  success	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  companies	  
and	  the	  apparent	  success	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  By	  1984	  the	  Brazilian	  companies	  had	  snatched	  
nearly	  50%	  of	  the	  annual	  sales	  of	  computers	   in	  the	  country.
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   (See	  Chapter	  4	  to	  
follow.)	  	  Pro–reservists	  had	  much	  to	  cheer	  about.	  
	   But	  they	  weren't	  cheering	  about	  the	  minicomputer	  industry	  where	  the	  policy	  
was	  initially	  targeted.	  	  Here	  the	  market	  was	  squeezed	  from	  below	  by	  much	  cheaper	  
and	  ever	  more	  powerful	  microcomputers,	  and	  from	  above	  by	  IBM's	  small	  mainframes.	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   Brazilian	   minicomputer	   companies	   had	   not	   yet	   mastered	   the	  
technology	  licensed	  in	  1977	  (which	  was	  not	  even	  state–of–the–art	  at	  the	  time)	  when	  
the	   developed	   world	   jumped	   another	   technological	   step	   ahead.	   	   The	   “super–
minicomputer”	  had	  arrived.	  Specifically,	  none	  of	  the	  local	  mini	  manufacturers	  had	  
mastered	  the	  32–bit	  architectures	  that	  were	  introduced	  internationally	  in	  the	  early	  
1970s.	   	  Worse	   still,	   these	  Brazilian	  companies	  were	   losing	  money.	   	  All	   five	  of	   the	  
original	  minicomputer	  manufacturers	  lost	  money	  in	  1981	  and	  all	  but	  SID,	  which	  relied	  
on	  banking	  automation,	  continued	  to	  lose	  money	  up	  to	  1984.
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   SEI	  targeted	  the	  supermini	  as	  the	  next	  area	  to	  reserve,	  and	  received	  proposals	  
from	  eight	  Brazilian	  companies.	  	  Cobra,	  SID,	  and	  Labo	  each	  proposed	  to	  develop	  a	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  SEI.	  "Panorama	  do	  Setor	  de	  Informática",	  Boletim	  Informativo,	  v.	  7,	  no.	  16	  (August	  1987).	  
131	  	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  "As	  100	  Maiores"	  v.	  7,	  no.	  51	  (August	  1982	  and	  subsequent	  August	  issues	  
to	  1985)	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supermini	  with	  local	  technology.	  	  Edisa,	  Elebra,	  Itautec,	  Sisco,	  and	  ABC	  Sistemas	  each	  
proposed	  to	  license	  foreign	  technology	  to	  produce	  a	  supermini	  computer.	  	  These	  five	  
companies	  proposed	  to	  effect	  complete	  technology	  transfer	  and	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  
local	  content	  in	  their	  computers.	  	  	  	  	  
TABLE	  3.3	  
1984	  Supermini	  Technology	  License	  Agreements
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Company	   	   Model	  	   Technology	   	  	   Year	  tech.	  avail.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Source	   	   	  in	  int'l.	  market	  
ABC–Bull	   	   DPS	  6/96	   	  Honeywell	   	   	   1980	  
	  
Cobra	   	   	   MV–4000	   	  Data	  General	   	   	   1982	  
	   	   	   MV–5000	   	   	   	   	   1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Edisa	   	   	   HP–3000/48	   Hewlett	  Packard	   	   1983	  
	   	   	   HP–3000/68	   	   	   	   	   1983	  
	  
Elebra	   	   	   VAX	  11/750	   Digital	  Equipment	   	   1980	  
	  
Itautec	  	   	   F–4000/200	   Formation	   	   	   1980	  
	  
Labo	   	   	   8890/72	   Nixdorf	   	   	   1981	  
	  
Sisco	   	   	   4460	   	   IPL	   	   	   	   1982	  
	  
	   This	  new	  class	  of	  computers	  presented	  government	  regulators	  with	  a	  problem.	  	  
One	  of	   the	   fundamental	  principles	  of	   the	  market	   reserve	  was	   that	   technology	  be	  
licensed	  only	  once	  to	  avoid	  on–going	  dependence.	  	  A	  new	  round	  of	  licensing	  to	  obtain	  
the	  desired	  32–bit	  technology	  thus	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tacit	  admission	  of	  policy	  failure,	  
giving	   ammunition	   to	   the	   opponents	   of	   the	   market	   reserve.	   	   However,	   market	  
pressures	   were	   beginning	   to	   mount.	   	   The	   Brazilian	   users	   were	   growing	   more	  
sophisticated	  and	  less	  patient.	  	  The	  installed	  base	  of	  IBM's	  4341	  small	  mainframes	  that	  
were	   much	   more	   expensive	   than	   the	   minicomputers	   on	   the	   market,	   more	   than	  
doubled	  between	  1982	  and	  1984.
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  Source:	  	  Paulo	  Tigre,	  Industria	  Brasileira	  de	  Computadoras:	  	  Perspectivas	  ate	  os	  Anos	  90,	  
(Rio	  de	  Janeiro:	  	  Editora	  Campus,	  1987),	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  93.	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  Secretaria	  Especial	  de	  Informática,	  Boletim	  Informativo	  14	  (September	  1985).	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SEI	  at	  first	  favoured	  the	  three	  local	  technology	  proposals.	  But	  SEI	  worried	  that	  
the	  new	  computers	  would	  be	  slow	  in	  coming	  and	  would	  not	  meet	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  
market	  or	  the	  challenge	  from	  the	  small	  mainframes.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1984,	  SEI	  
authorized	  a	  new	  round	  of	  technology	  licensing,	  approving	  all	  five	  foreign	  technology	  
projects.	   	   The	   other	   three	   companies	   had	   no	   hope	   of	   competing	  with	   their	   own	  
technology	   and	   therefore	   suspended	   their	   efforts	   and	   sought	   foreign	   technology	  
suppliers.	  
	   SEI	  justified	  its	  decision	  saying	  that	  the	  supermini	  was	  a	  new	  class	  of	  computer	  
and	   they	  were	   simply	  moving	   the	  market	   reserve	   "up"	   from	  micros	   and	  minis	   to	  
include	  superminis.	  	  On	  this	  basis,	  the	  principle	  of	  one–time	  technology	  purchase	  was	  
not	  violated.	  	  Supermini	  technology	  was	  to	  be	  purchased	  only	  once	  and	  completely	  
transferred.	  	  	  
	   The	  supermini	  round	  of	  licensing	  highlights	  a	  problem	  that	  continued	  to	  haunt	  
the	  Brazilian	  reservists.	  	  Technology	  is	  not	  a	  commodity	  that	  can	  be	  purchased	  and	  
owned.	   	   Rather,	   technology	   is	   a	  way	   of	   doing	   things.	   	   For	   technology	   to	   be	   fully	  
transferred	  on	  a	  once–for–all–time	  basis,	  the	  technology	  must	  be	  assimilated	  to	  the	  
extent	  that	  the	  local	  firm	  can	  keep	  pace	  with	  technological	  change	  in	  the	  field.	  	  As	  the	  
necessity	  for	  supermini	  licensing	  shows,	  Brazilian	  industry	  was	  not	  able	  to	  do	  that.	  	  As	  
the	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  national	  firms	  put	  it,	  "The	  effort	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  technology	  
is	  at	  least	  as	  great	  as	  the	  effort	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place."134	  
	   Without	  doubt,	  the	  new	  round	  of	   licensing	  was	  an	  admission	  of	  continued	  
dependence	   upon	   international	   technology.	   	   However,	   it	   is	   a	   testimony	   to	   the	  
government's	   steadfast	   commitment	   to	   the	  market	   reserve	   –	   and	   a	   real	   shift	   in	  
bargaining	  positions	  at	  the	  time	  –	  that	  the	  major	  minicomputer	  companies	  agreed	  to	  
license	  their	  technology	  to	  Brazilian	  producers	  this	  time.	  	  DEC	  licensed	  its	  VAX	  11/750	  
technology	  to	  Elebra,	  Hewlett–Packard	   licensed	  to	  Edisa,	  and	  Data	  General	   finally	  
licensed	  to	  Cobra.	  	  These	  very	  same	  companies	  had	  refused	  to	  license	  in	  1977.	  
                                                
134	  Author	  interview,	  October	  1987.	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The	  Legal	  Codification	  of	  the	  Reserve	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
In	  1984	  twenty	  years	  of	  military	  rule	  in	  Brazil	  were	  coming	  to	  an	  end.	  	  A	  civilian	  
government	  was	  to	  be	  elected	  at	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year,	  and	  take	  office	  in	  early	  1985.	  	  
Pro–reservists	  recognized	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy	  here.	  	  A	  
change	  to	  democratic	  civilian	  rule	  brought	  with	  it	  political	  uncertainty	  and	  greater	  
vulnerability.	  	  	  The	  secure	  political	  insulation	  surrounding	  SEI	  and	  its	  policy	  might	  yield	  
to	  outside	  pressure	  with	  a	  change	  to	  civilian	  rule.	  	  So	  as	  early	  as	  autumn	  1982	  the	  pro–
reservists,	  most	  notably	  ABICOMP	  (pushed	  by	  Saur	  and	  'the	  group')	  with	  the	  support	  
of	  the	  military,	  began	  to	  push	  for	  the	  codified	  legal	  recognition	  of	  the	  informatics	  
policy	  before	  the	  shift	  to	  democratic	  civilian	  rule.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   Powerful	  forces	  were	  arrayed	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  issue.	  	  The	  pro–reservists	  
included	  the	  military,	  the	  local	  computer	  industry	  represented	  by	  ABICOMP,	  several	  
powerful	   financial	   and	   industrial	   groups	  who	   now	  had	   a	   direct	   stake	   in	   the	   local	  
industry,	  academics,	  and	  nationalist	  politicians.	  	  The	  computer	  TNCs	  were	  naturally	  
against	   the	   proposed	   law.	   	  Many	   industrial	   and	   commercial	   users	   of	   informatics	  
equipment	  and	  services	  were	  also	  opposed.	  	  These	  users	  were	  bearing	  the	  economic	  
costs	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  prices	  and	  inferior	  technology	  (see	  
later	  elaboration	  of	  this	  point).	  	  Although	  these	  economic	  costs	  were	  high	  in	  some	  
cases,	  the	  users	  were	  still	  diffuse	  and	  not	  well	  organized.	  	  In	  Congress	  itself,	  Senator	  
Roberto	  Campos	  was	  the	  most	  visible	  opposition	  to	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  outspoken	  senator	  
saw	   the	   informatics	  bill	   as	   “simply	   an	  outburst	  of	   nationalism;	   a	   reaction	   to	  past	  
foreign	  dominance	  and	   IMF	  humiliation.	  “135	  Campos	  presented	  a	  Bill	   to	  Congress	  
calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  SEI	  and	  the	  market	  reserve,	  replacing	  them	  with	  a	  tariff	  system	  
and	  joint	  ventures	  regulated	  under	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  and	  Commerce.	  	  Though	  
                                                
135	  Author	  interview,	  October	  1987.	  
        105 
Campos	  made	   good	   use	   of	   the	   press	   to	   publicize	   his	   free–market	   views,	   he	  was	  
politically	  alone	  in	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  law	  in	  the	  Congress.	  	  	  
	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  dangerous	  opposition	  to	  the	  market	  reserve	  consisted	  of	  the	  
regional	   development	   groups,	  most	  notably	   SUFRAMA	  which	  was	   responsible	   for	  
regulating	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Zone	  in	  Manaus.	  	  Based	  in	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Zone	  was	  Brazil's	  
consumer	   electronics	   industry,	   which	   benefitted	   from	   subsidies	   and	   duty–free	  
imports,	  all	  in	  the	  name	  of	  regional	  development.	  	  SUFRAMA	  did	  not	  want	  the	  long	  
arm	  of	  SEI	  to	  extend	  to	  this	  area	  of	  the	  electronics	  industrial	  complex.	  	  Thus,	  SUFRAMA	  
had	  a	  history	  of	  antagonism	  to	  the	  policy	  in	  general	  and	  to	  SEI	  in	  particular.	   	  SEI's	  
Normative	  Act	  16,	  caused	  particular	  concern	  in	  SUFRAMA,	  but	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1983	  the	  
two	  organisations	  reached	  an	  agreement	  that	  ensured	  the	  continuance	  of	  electronics	  
manufacture	  and	  trade	  in	  Manaus.	  	  In	  the	  end,	  SUFRAMA's	  influence	  was	  marshalled	  
primarily	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  its	  own	  turf	  and	  to	  limit	  SEI’s	  jurisdiction.	  	  In	  these	  
modest	  objectives	  it	  succeeded.	  
After	  nearly	  two	  years	  of	  public	  debate,	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy	  had	  
become	   a	   very	   high	   profile	   national	   issue.	   	   	   It	   took	   on	   symbolic	   significance	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  ways.	   	  National	  sovereignty,	  and	  prestige	  in	  the	  world	  community	  as	  a	  
technological	  force	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  at	  stake.	  	  On	  September	  20,	  1984,	  the	  government	  
introduced	  a	  bill	   that	  was	  all	   that	   the	  pro–reservists	  had	  hoped	   for	  and	  Congress	  
passed	  it	  with	  Campos	  casting	  the	  only	  opposing	  vote.	  	  In	  October	  1984,	  President	  
Figueiredo	  signed	  the	  bill	  into	  law,	  vetoing	  several	  articles	  having	  to	  do	  primarily	  with	  
government	  investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  programmes.	  
Although	   the	   pro–reservists	   were	   delighted	   with	   the	   outcome,	   the	   legal	  
codification	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  double–edged	  sword.	  	  Necessary	  
though	   it	   was	   to	   ensure	   the	   continuity	   of	   the	   policy,	   the	   law	   also	   considerably	  
circumscribed	  SEI's	  discretionary	  power.	  	  This	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  coincidental	  effect	  of	  
the	   law.	   	  Many	   in	   Congress	  were	   suspicious	   of	   SEI's	   power	   over	   this	   area	   of	   the	  
economy.	   	   Congress	   wanted	   SEI	   to	   be	   more	   transparent	   and	   accountable	   in	   its	  
decisions.	  	  One	  sub-­‐secretary	  in	  SEI	  during	  this	  time	  noted	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  Informatics	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Law	  their	  decisions	  were	  made	  "informally	  with	  the	  consent	  of	   the	   'community.'"	  	  




The	  Policy	  Shifts:	  	  Post–1984	  
	   Though	  the	  informatics	  policy	  had	  widespread	  political	  legitimacy	  in	  Congress,	  
the	  most	  vociferous	  support	  for	  the	  nationalist	  policy	  came	  from	  the	  left	  wing	  of	  the	  
senior	   coalition	   partner	   PMDB	   (Party	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   Democratic	   Movement).	  	  
However,	  this	  left	  wing	  was	  under	  pressure	  after	  the	  party	  swept	  to	  power	  in	  1985.	  	  
	   The	  PMDB	  (previously	  the	  MDB)	  was	  a	  left–of–centre	  umbrella	  organisation	  for	  
all	  those	  seeking	  a	  return	  to	  democracy	  by	  legal	  means.	  	  The	  PMDB's	  coalition	  partner	  
was	  the	  Liberal	  Front	  Party	  (PFL),	  which	  was	  formed	  in	  1984	  by	  moderate	  and	  rightist	  
members	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Social	  Party	  (PDS).	  	  In	  August	  1984	  the	  PMDB	  and	  the	  PFL	  
formed	   an	   uneasy	   coalition	   to	   elect	   Tancredo	   Neves	   as	   president.	   	   After	   Neves'	  
premature	  death	  just	  a	  few	  months	  after	  winning	  the	  election,	  his	  vice	  president	  and	  
coalition	  partner,	   José	  Sarney	   (PFL),	  assumed	  the	  presidential	  mantle	  and	  tension	  
among	  the	  coalition	  partners	  mounted.	  	  The	  tension	  was	  compounded	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  PMDB	  itself	  was	  undergoing	  an	  identity	  crisis.	   	  As	  a	  loose	  coalition	  spanning	  a	  
rather	   broad	   political	   spectrum,	   the	   PMDB	   was	   under	   constant	   threat	   of	   a	   split	  
between	   the	   party's	   left	   (the	   "progressives")	   and	   the	   party's	   right	   (the	  
"conservatives").	  	  The	  "progressives"	  in	  the	  party	  grew	  more	  and	  more	  disillusioned	  as	  
the	  government	  was	  seen	  to	  grant	  too	  many	  concessions	  to	  the	  more	  conservative	  
minority	  partners	  in	  Sarney's	  PFL.	  	  
	   Sarney	  hoped	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  November	  1986	  elections	  would	  allow	  him	  
to	  appoint	  more	  PFL	  conservatives	  to	  his	  cabinet	  to	  balance	  PMDB	  influence.	  	  Sarney's	  
aim	  was	  to	  divide	  the	  ruling	  PMDB	  and	  forge	  a	  centre–right	  administration	  in	  which	  his	  
influence	  would	  be	  increased.
137	  	  The	  president	  was	  unable	  to	  achieve	  his	  goal.	  The	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Ricardo	  Maciel,	  who	  was	  SEI	  Sub-­‐secretary	  for	  Strategic	  Activities	  
before	  shifting	  to	  SID	  Informática,	  October	  1987.	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PMDB	  was	  indeed	  deeply	  divided,	  but	  rather	  than	  pledging	  support	  to	  Sarney,	  the	  
conservatives	  acknowledged	  the	  leadership	  of	  Ulysses	  Guimaraes,	  the	  PMDB	  party	  
leader.	  	  Sarney’s	  main	  political	  constituents	  remained	  confined	  to	  the	  military	  and	  
some	  loyal	  friends	  in	  private	  business.
138	  	  
	   In	  March	  of	  1985	  the	  new	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  &	  Technology	  was	  formed	  to	  
which	  SEI	  would	  now	  report.	  	  Renato	  Archer,	  a	  close	  personal	  friend	  of	  Guimaraes––
the	  powerful	  leader	  of	  the	  nationalist	  PMBD––was	  appointed	  to	  head	  the	  ministry.	  	  
Archer,	  himself	  a	  vocal	  nationalist,	  was	  strongly	  committed	  to	  the	  market	  reserve	  as	  it	  
was	   being	   applied.	   	   Colonel	   Edison	   Dytz,	   who	   was	   considered	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
nationalist	  of	  SEI's	  secretaries,	  finished	  his	  term	  of	  office	  in	  1985	  and	  was	  succeeded	  
by	   José	   Doria	   Porta	   who	   was	   considered	   less	   of	   an	   ideologue	   and	   more	   of	   a	  
pragmatist.	  	  With	  the	  departure	  of	  Dytz	  went	  the	  last	  of	  those	  in	  SEI	  with	  strong	  links	  
with	  the	  military	  and	  intelligence	  communities.	  
	   CONIN,	  the	  National	  Council	  on	  Informatics	  and	  Automation	  comprising	  sixteen	  
government	  ministers	  and	  eight	  representatives	  of	  different	  sectors	  of	  society,	  was	  
established	   by	   the	   Law	   to	   set	   policy.	   	   Thus,	   SEI	   was	   to	   be	   constrained	   to	   the	  
implementation	  of	  policy	  reviewed	  and	  approved	  by	  CONIN.	  
	   In	  the	  elections	  of	  November	  1986,	  the	  PMDB	  won	  a	  landslide	  victory,	  helped	  
in	   large	   part	   by	   the	   astounding	   (though	   temporary	   and	   eventually	   disastrous)	  
economic	  prosperity	  engendered	  by	  the	  government's	  "Plano	  Cruzado"	  earlier	  in	  the	  
year.	  	  The	  PMDB	  gained	  303	  of	  the	  559	  seats	  in	  the	  constituent	  assembly	  (which	  was	  
to	  draft	  the	  New	  Republic's	  constitution),	  and	  22	  of	  the	  23	  state	  governorships.
139	  	  
However,	  the	  Left	  Wing	  of	  the	  PMDB	  did	  not	  fare	  well	  in	  the	  elections.
140	  	  In	  particular,	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  Mattias	  Machline,	  head	  of	  the	  Sharp	  electronics	  group	  which	  owned	  SID	  Informática	  was	  
known	  to	  be	  a	  close	  personal	  friend	  of	  Sarney	  and	  was	  thought	  to	  exercise	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  
influence	  over	  the	  president.	  (Author	  interviews).	  
139	  	  Latin	  American	  Newsletters	  Regional	  Reports:	  	  Brazil,	  February	  12,	  1987.	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  Ibid.,	  March	  19,	  1987.	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several	   strong	   proponents	   of	   the	   1984	   law	   either	   lost,	   or	   resigned	   their	   seats	   in	  
Congress	  in	  the	  November	  1986	  elections.
141	  	  	  	  
	   After	  the	  elections	  and	  the	  failed	  Cruzado	  Plan,	  tension	  between	  the	  PFL	  and	  
the	  PMDB	  was	  unbearable.	  	  After	  the	  PMDB's	  victory,	  the	  PFL	  was	  no	  longer	  needed	  
and	  disassociated	  itself	  from	  the	  PMDB.	  	  The	  PMDB	  itself	  remained	  deeply	  divided	  and	  
was	  held	  together	  only	  by	  the	  politically	  deft	  Guimaraes.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  president	  of	  
the	  New	  Republic	  was	  increasingly	  politically	  impotent.	  	  	  
	   The	   implications	   for	   the	   informatics	   policy	   at	   this	   time	  were,	   if	   anything,	  
detrimental.	   	   The	   policy	   had	   fewer	   champions	   in	   a	  more	   pragmatic	   Congress.	   	   It	  
continued	  to	  enjoy	  broad,	  but	  not	  fervent,	  support	  there.	  	  Debates	  relevant	  to	  the	  
policy	  were	  focused	  now	  in	  the	  constituent	  assembly	  as	  policy	  proponents	  attempted	  
to	  "constitutionalize"	  aspects	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  president	  remained	  uncommitted	  to	  
the	  policy,	  except	  in	  public.	  
	   CONIN,	  the	  council	  that	  was	  established	  by	  the	  1984	  law	  to	  set	  informatics	  
policy,	  was	  pratically	  incapable	  of	  policy–making.	  	  With	  sixteen	  government	  ministers	  
and	  eight	  others	  representing	  diverse	  interests,	  CONIN	  was	  too	  large	  and	  unwieldy.	  	  
Moreover,	   one	   of	   the	   sixteen	   ministers,	   Antonio	   Carlos	   Magalhaes	   (Minister	   of	  
Communication)	  was	  diametrically	  opposed	  to	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  	  The	  meetings	  of	  
CONIN	  were	  often	  characterized	  by	  vitriolic	  disagreement	  between	  Magalhaes	  and	  the	  
Minister	   of	   Science	   and	   Technology	   Renato	   Archer.	   	   	   Hence,	   CONIN	   was	   largely	  
paralyzed	  leaving	  the	  real	  policy–making	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  SEI	  with	  the	  ministerial	  
support	  of	  Archer.	  	  Some	  maintained	  that	  CONIN	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  ineffective	  so	  
that	  SEI	  could	  get	  on	  with	  the	  job	  it	  had	  been	  doing	  since	  1979.	  
	   Gradually,	  SEI	  began	  to	  change	  the	  way	  that	  policy	  was	  implemented.	  	  Author	  
interviews	  with	  computer	  TNCs	  and	  computer	  importers	  in	  late	  1987	  revealed	  that	  SEI	  
had	  become	  more	  "reasonable	  and	  open."	  	  	  The	  transnationals	  reported	  having	  less	  of	  
an	   adversary	   relationship	   with	   SEI	   and	   noted	   that	   the	   secretariat	   even	   offered	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  Included	  here	  are	  Odilon	  Salmoria	  (Santa	  Catalina),	  Darci	  Passos	  (São	  Paulo),	  Bete	  Mendes	  
(São	  Paulo),	  and	  Jose	  Eudes	  (Rio	  de	  Janeiro).	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suggestions	  as	   to	  how	  the	  TNCs	  might	   invest	   in	   the	  Brazilian	   informatics	   industry	  
without	  violating	  the	  law.	  	  	  
In	  1986	  IBM	  again	  tested	  the	  new	  regulatory	  environment.	  	  IBM	  and	  the	  large	  
Brazilian	  steel	  group,	  Gerdau,	  proposed	  a	  joint	  venture	  to	  form	  GSI,	  a	  data	  processing	  
services	  company.	  	  To	  the	  surprise	  of	  many,	  SEI	  approved	  the	  joint	  venture.	  	  Hard–
liners	  were	  shocked	  and	  outraged	  at	  what	  they	  took	  to	  be	  a	  flagrant	  violation	  of	  the	  
fundamental	  spirit	  of	  the	  law:	  	  namely,	  that	  if	  joint	  ventures	  were	  allowed,	  the	  foreign	  
partner	   must	   not	   also	   be	   the	   technology	   supplier.	   	   The	   Brazilian	   Association	   of	  
Informatics	  Services	  Companies	  (ASSESPRO)	  made	  formal	  objection	  to	  the	  decision,	  
alleging	  that	  the	  joint	  venture	  violated	  Article	  12,	  Section	  II	  of	  the	  National	  Informatics	  
Law	  that	  stipulated	  "the	  lawful	  and	  actual	  exercise	  of	  the	  power	  to	  develop,	  generate,	  
acquire,	  and	  transfer	  and	  vary	  product	  and	  production	  process	  technology"	  must	  be	  
under	  national	  control.
142
	  	  ASSESPRO	  argued:	  
	  
"As	  is	  notorious,	  GSI	  was	  formed	  starting	  from	  IBM	  bureau	  of	  services.	  	  
Clients,	   contracts	   and	   personnel	   of	   the	   said	   bureau	   have	   been	  
transferred	   to	   it;	   also	   to	   it	   were	   transferred,	   reportedly	   at	  market	  
value,	  IBM	  computers,	  programs,	  systems,	  and	  installations.	  	  The	  major	  
income	  of	  GSI	  is	  related	  to	  data	  processing	  services,	  carried	  out	  in	  IBM	  
computers,	  with	  IBM	  supporting	  and	  applying	  programs.	  	  And	  further:	  	  
GSI	  technical	  staff,	  in	  almost	  its	  totality,	  came	  from	  IBM,	  having	  been	  
essentially	  trained	  for	  applying	  IBM	  tools	  and	  products,	  in	  the	  rendition	  
of	   its	   services.	   	   Thus,	  what	   significance	  does	   the	   clause	   [art.	   12,	   II)	  




	   SEI	  justified	  its	  decision	  saying	  that	  the	  joint	  venture	  was	  not	  in	  manufacturing,	  
but	  in	  services	  that	  were	  not	  strictly	  covered	  by	  the	  law.	  	  Moreover,	  IBM	  had	  simply	  
sold	  its	  service	  operation	  to	  Gerdau––people	  and	  computers––retaining	  the	  rights	  to	  a	  
share	  of	  the	  profits.	  	  So,	  it	  was	  argued,	  there	  was	  to	  be	  no	  on–going	  technological	  
dependence.	   	   GSI	  was	   free	   to	   purchase	   or	   develop	   other	   computers	   in	  which	   to	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  Law	  7232/84,	  Article	  12,	  Section	  II.	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  ASSESPRO,	  reprinted	  in	  Arujo	  e	  Policastro	  Avogados,	  "Informatics	  Joint	  Ventures,"	  São	  
Paolo,	  December	  23,	  1986,	  p.	  20,	  mimeo.	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perform	  its	  data	  processing	  services.	  	  However,	  the	  deal	  was	  so	  widely	  publicized	  that	  
even	  if	  it	  abided	  by	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  law,	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  precedent–setting	  victory	  for	  
those	  against	  the	  reserve.	  
	  	  	  	  	   	  The	  IBM–Gerdau	  case	  points	  to	  another	  way	  in	  which	  the	  legal	  codification	  of	  
the	  policy	  could	  work	  contrary	  to	  its	  intended	  purpose.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  
law,	  the	  TNCs	  were	  fighting	  an	  adversary	  that	  was	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down,	  always	  moving	  
and	  changing.	  	  Codified	  in	  written	  law,	  the	  policy	  was	  more	  vulnerable.	  	  The	  TNCs	  were	  
actively	  scrutinising	  the	  law	  with	  legal	  advisors	  in	  order	  to	  discover	  loopholes	  through	  
which	  they	  could	  enter	  the	  hitherto	  forbidden	  Brazilian	  market.	  	  	  
	   With	   rather	   less	   publicity,	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1986	   SEI	   also	   approved	   IBM	  
proposals:	   (i)	   to	   invest	   $70	  million	   in	   new	   facilities	   for	   producing	   very	   large	   disk	  
storage	  equipment	  thereby	  expanding	  its	  product	  line	  in	  that	  area;	  (ii)	  to	  produce	  
enhanced	   models	   of	   its	   small	   mainframe	   model	   4381;	   and	   (iii)	   to	   initiate	   local	  
production	  of	  its	  large	  mainframe	  model	  3090.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  IBM–Gerdau	  joint	  venture	  was	  soon	  followed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  others	  that	  
were	  less	  controversial,	  but	  nonetheless	  indicative	  of	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  policy	  was	  
applied.	   	  Hewlett–Packard	   entered	   into	   a	   complex	   arrangement	  with	   Iochpe,	   the	  
regional	  banking	  group,	  to	  form	  a	  mini,	  and	  super–minicomputer	  manufacturer	  called	  
Tesis.	  	  Tesis	  was	  formed	  using	  the	  physical	  assets	  (plant	  and	  people)	  of	  H–P	  do	  Brasil	  
whose	  operations	  had	  been	  emasculated	  by	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  H–P	  circumvented	  
the	  rule	  limiting	  foreign	  ownership	  by	  purchasing	  debentures	  of	  the	  newly	  formed	  
company,	  which	  amounted	  to	  50%	  of	  the	  company's	  initial	  capital.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  all	  
of	  the	  equity	  capital,	  and	  therefore	  "ownership",	  of	  Tesis	  was	  controlled	  by	  Iochpe;	  
but	  H–P	  held	  the	  company's	  debt	  capital.	  	  The	  net	  effect	  was	  that	  H–P	  and	  Iochpe	  each	  
had	  a	  50%	  stake	  in	  Tesis.	  	  H–P's	  debentures	  were	  convertible	  into	  shares,	  but	  H–P	  
undertook	  not	  to	  convert	  them	  contrary	  to	  law	  applying	  at	  the	  time	  of	  conversion.	  	  In	  
this	  way,	  H–P	  had	  a	  secure	  stake	  in	  the	  local	  industry	  now,	  and	  one	  that	  could	  be	  
extended	   to	   whole	   ownership	   as	   and	   when	   the	   market	   reserve	   was	   lifted.	  	  
Interestingly,	   this	  arrangement	  was	  worked	  out	   in	  consultation	  with	  SEI,	  and	  was	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something	  that	  would	  not	  have	  been	  approved	  by	  SEI	  prior	  to	  1986,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  
representatives	  from	  H–P.
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Another	  notable	  example	  of	  foreign	  participation	  was	  Olivetti's	  entry	  into	  the	  
Brazilian	  market	  with	  a	  new	  company	  called	  Tenpo.	  	  With	  a	  historically	  strong	  position	  
in	  office	  equipment	  in	  Brazil,	  Olivetti	  had	  for	  some	  years	  been	  looking	  for	  a	  way	  into	  
the	  booming	  microcomputer	  market.	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  do	  this,	  according	  to	  Article	  12	  
of	  the	  Law,	  was	  to	  set	  up	  a	  Brazilian–owned	  operation.	  	  So,	  in	  July	  1987,	  Tenpo	  was	  
established	  with	  70%	  equity	  held	  by	  the	  directors,	  employees	  and	  dealers	  of	  Olivetti	  
do	  Brasil	  (all	  permanently	  domiciled	  in	  Brazil),	  and	  30%	  by	  Fides,	  a	  Swiss	  investment	  
bank.	   	   Pro–reservists,	  worried	   that	   Tenpo	  would	   be	   just	   a	   'front'	   company	   using	  
Olivetti	  technology,	  protested	  the	  decision,	  but	  without	  success.	  
	   SEI's	  approval	  of	  these	  ventures	  indicates	  more	  than	  just	  a	  softening	  of	  the	  
market	  reserve	  and	  the	  cleverness	  of	  the	  TNCs'	  legal	  advisors.	  	  The	  approvals	  are	  a	  
reflection	  of	  SEI's	  greater	  political	  vulnerability	  after	  democratisation	  and	  its	  increased	  
sensitivity	  to	  the	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  in	  the	  market.	  	  The	  joint–venture	  partners	  of	  
the	  TNCs	  (for	  example,	  Gerdau	  and	  Iochpe)	  in	  turn	  had	  become	  important	  national	  
political	  allies	  of	  the	  TNCs.	  	  
	   As	  seen	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  U.S.	  government	  pressure	  
during	  1985–87	  also	  played	  a	  part	  in	  the	  approval	  of	  these	  investment	  proposals	  in	  
particular,	  and	  in	  the	  way	  policy	  was	  implemented	  in	  general.	  	  
U.S.	  Government	  Opposition	  to	  the	  Policy	  
	   In	  spite	  of	   the	   letter	   from	  Data	  General	   to	  President	  Carter's	  special	   trade	  
representative	   in	  1977,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  remained	  passive	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
Brazilian	   market	   reserve	   in	   informatics	   until	   1982.	   	   In	   December	   1982,	   during	  
President	   Ronald	   Reagan's	   first	   visit	   to	   Brazil	   and	   shortly	   after	   the	   debate	   over	  
legislating	  the	  market	  reserve	  began,	  a	  few	  task	  groups	  were	  set	  up	  with	  officials	  and	  
businessmen	   from	   both	   countries.	   	   In	   one	   of	   these	   meetings	   the	   question	   of	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  1987,	  and	  Tesis,	  
August	  1987.	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informatics	   policy	   was	   formally	   placed	   under	   discussion.	   	   The	   report	   from	   the	  
American	  side	  stated	  the	  "market	  restrictions	  and	  reserves	  cause	  frustration	  at	  best	  
and	  retaliation	  at	  worst.	  	  The	  reciprocity	  policy	  that	  has	  been	  popular	  in	  Congress	  in	  
recent	  years	  is	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  these	  restrictions	  in	  many	  countries."
145	  	  As	  the	  
debate	  over	  the	  proposed	  legislation	  continued	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  Congress	  in	  1983	  and	  
1984,	  representatives	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  frequently	  criticized	  the	  policy.	  
Suddenly	  on	  September	  7,	  1985––Brazilian	   independence	  day––	  President	  
Reagan	  announced	  an	  investigation	  into	  Brazil's	  market	  reserve	  in	  computers	  under	  
Section	  301	  of	  the	  Trade	  Act
146	  which	  gave	  him	  power	  to	  impose	  retaliatory	  sanctions	  
against	  Brazil	  if	  the	  investigation	  showed	  unfair	  trade	  practices.	  This	  investigation	  was	  
launched	  not	  so	  much	  out	  of	  concern	  for	  U.S.	  computer	  companies	  harmed	  by	  the	  
market	   reserve;	   rather	   it	   was	   announced	   in	   order	   to	   placate	   an	   increasingly	  
protectionist	   U.S.	   Congress	   concerned	   about	   the	   burgeoning	   American	   trade	  
imbalance.	  In	  fact,	  the	  TNCs	  that	  had	  already	  invested	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  market	  did	  not	  
know	  about	  the	  announcement	  in	  advance	  and	  were,	  at	  best,	  ambivalent	  about	  it	  in	  
the	  climate	  of	  increased	  flexibility	  with	  SEI.	  They	  remembered	  that	  previous	  heavy-­‐
handed	  attempts	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  policy	  in	  the	  1970s	  had	  backfired.147	  	  	  	  
This	  Section	  301	  was	  an	  historical	  marker	  for	  several	  reasons:	  
(1)	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  be	  self–initiated.	  
	   From	  1974,	  when	  Congress,	  passed	  the	  Trade	  Act	  to	  1985,	  the	  office	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
Trade	   Representative	   (USTR)	   had	   received	   forty-­‐eight	   trade	   complaints	   filed	   by	  
American	   firms	   and	   trade	   associations.	   	   In	   1979,	   Section	   301	   was	   strengthened,	  
allowing	  the	  executive	  branch	  to	  initiate	  investigations	  without	  waiting	  for	  a	  specific	  
trade	  complaint	  from	  the	  affected	  industry.	  	  The	  Section	  301	  investigation	  into	  the	  
Brazilian	  market	  reserve,	  along	  with	  two	  other	  investigations	  announced	  at	  the	  same	  
                                                
145	  	  Quoted	  in	  Edson	  Fregni,	  "Toward	  an	  International	  Service	  and	  Information	  Economy:	  	  A	  
New	  Challenge	  for	  the	  Third	  World,"	  February	  1987,	  p.	  10.	  mimeo.	  
146	  	  Reagan's	  announcement	  came	  in	  his	  weekly	  radio	  address	  to	  the	  nation	  on	  that	  day.	  
147	  Author	  interviews	  with	  TNCs	  in	  Brazil,	  August	  –	  October	  1987,	  corroborated	  by	  
Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995)	  p.	  374.	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time,	  was	  the	  first	  that	  did	  not	  specifically	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  affected	  
industry.
148	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  autumn	  of	  1985	  the	  U.S.	  Congress	  was	  set	  to	  pass	  a	  protectionist	  trade	  
bill:	  	  the	  Textile	  and	  Apparel	  Trade	  Enforcement	  Act	  of	  1985.	  	  The	  trade	  deficit	  was	  
growing	  seemingly	  out	  of	  control,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  losing	  its	  international	  
competitiveness––even	  in	  traditionally	  strong	  sectors	  such	  as	  agriculture,	  services,	  and	  
high	   technology.	   	   The	  administration	  had	   just	  allowed	   the	   free	  entry	  of	   footwear	  
imports	  into	  the	  U.S.	  despite	  earlier	  findings	  by	  the	  International	  Trade	  Commission	  
that	  foreign	  footwear	  imports	  were	  damaging	  U.S.	  producers.	  	  This	  action	  provoked	  
bilateral	  condemnation	  in	  Congress,	  which	  labelled	  the	  administration	  "soft	  on	  trade."	  	  	  
	   Reagan	   desperately	   wanted	   to	   avert	   protectionist	   legislation;	   he	   was	  
ideologically	   and	   publicly	   committed	   to	   free	   trade.	   	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   show	   an	  
aggressive,	  proactive	  stance	  on	  trade	  issues	  and	  placate	  a	  protectionist	  Congress,	  the	  
administration	  scrambled	  to	  issue	  several	  trade	  complaints	  against	  surplus	  countries.	  	  
Brazil	  was	  one	  of	   those	   singled	  out	   for	   its	  policy	   in	   computers.	   	   The	  others	  were	  
against	  Korea	  for	  restricting	  entry	  of	  U.S.	  insurance	  firms,	  and	  Japan	  for	  restricting	  
imports	  of	  U.S.	  tobacco	  goods.	  	  These	  three	  investigations	  joined	  the	  existing	  cases	  
against	  the	  EEC	  for	  subsidizing	  canned	  fruit,	  and	  against	  Japan	  for	  restricting	  leather	  
goods	  imports.	  
	  
"The	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  the	  sectors	  chosen	  as	  targets	  for	  the	  Section	  
301	  actions	  in	  September	  1985...	  were	  not	  just	  sinners	  against	  the	  free	  
trade	  regime;	  they	  were	  successful	  rivals	  or	  potential	  rivals,	  guilty	  of	  
using	   neomercantilist	   techniques	   to	   improve	   their	   position	   in	   the	  
hierarchy	  of	  nations	  relative	  to	  that	  of	  'fair'	  players	  such	  as	  the	  United	  
States."
149	  	  
	   The	   decision	   to	   initiate	   the	   Section	   301	   against	   Brazil	   was	   made	   by	   the	  
Economic	  Policy	  Council	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1985,	  without	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  study	  into	  the	  
                                                
148	   	   Office	   of	   USTR,	   "Section	   301	   Table	   of	   Cases,"	   October	   1986;	   cited	   in	   Peter	   Evans,	  
"Declining	  Hegemony	  and	  Assertive	  Industrialization:	  	  U.S.–Brazil	  Conflicts	  in	  the	  Computer	  
Industry,"	  International	  Organization,	  Vol.	  43,	  No.	  2,	  (Spring	  1989),	  p.	  217.	  
149	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1989),	  p.	  221.	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case	  and	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  U.S.	  computer	  firms	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  market	  
reserve.	   	   The	  major	   TNCs	   seem	   to	   have	   been	   informed	   of	   the	   decision	   (but	   not	  
consulted)	  prior	  to	  its	  announcement
150
	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Consul	  General	  in	  São	  Paulo	  was	  
assigned	  the	  task	  of	  putting	  the	  case	  together	  after	  the	  announcement.
151	  	  
(2)	  Brazil's	  market	  reserve	  was	  not	  what	  the	  301	  was	  designed	  to	  address.	  	  	  
	   When	  the	  301	  against	  Brazil	  was	  announced,	  the	  prime	  complaint	  with	  the	  
market	  reserve	  was	  restrictions	  on	  U.S.	  exports	  of	  computers	  and	  related	  products	  to	  
Brazil.	  	  This	  was	  condemned	  in	  general	  terms	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  free	  
trade,	  and	  in	  specific	  terms	  as	  damaging	  to	  American	  employment	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  	  
	   Section	  301	  of	  the	  1974	  Trade	  Act	  was	  designed	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  defend	  the	  
international	  trade	  interests	  of	  U.S.	  companies.	  	  It	  had	  been	  most	  frequently	  used	  to	  
impose	  tariffs	  on	  products	  that	  were	  being	  "dumped"	  at	  an	  unfair	  price	  on	  the	  U.S.	  
market.	   	   The	   case	   of	   Japanese	   semiconductors	   was	   a	   classic	   example	   of	   this.
152	  	  
However,	  Brazil	  doesn't	  export	  computer	  equipment	  to	  the	  U.S.	  	  The	  market	  reserve	  is	  
not	  per	  se,	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice;	  it	  merely	  precludes	  U.S.	  companies	  from	  supplying	  
certain	  computer	  products	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  market,	  or	  investing	  in	  certain	  sectors	  of	  
the	  Brazilian	   industry.	   	  The	  market	   reserve	  may	  have	  been	  an	  “unfair	   investment	  
practice,”	  but	  it	  wasn’t	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice.	  	  	  
	   The	  law	  allows	  for	  the	  President	  to	  retaliate	  if	  the	  dispute	  cannot	  be	  resolved	  
any	  other	  way.	  	  But	  in	  this	  case,	  "appropriate	  retaliation"	  was	  a	  problem.	  	  There	  was	  
little	  point	  in	  slapping	  duties	  on	  imports	  of	  Brazilian	  computers;	  the	  only	  computers	  
entering	  the	  U.S.	  from	  Brazil	  were	  manufactured	  by	  U.S.	  transnationals.	  	  Likewise,	  
there	  was	   no	   point	   in	   refusing	   Brazilian	   computer	   companies	   entry	   into	   the	  U.S.	  
computer	  industry;	  none	  were	  in	  a	  position	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  Reagan	  would	  have	  
                                                
150	  Evans,	  Ibid.,	  p.	  217.	  
151	  	  Unless	  otherwise	  noted,	  information	  concerning	  the	  Section	  301	  and	  subsequent	  bilateral	  
negotiations	  comes	  from	  a	  series	  of	  author	  interviews	  with	  U.S.	  Consul	  General	  in	  São	  Paolo,	  
Stephen	  Daachi,	  in	  September	  and	  October	  1987.	  	  
152	   	   The	   U.S.	   semiconductor	   industry	   complained	   that	   Japanese–made	   chips	   were	   being	  
marketed	  in	  the	  U.S.	  at	  below	  cost.	  	  After	  an	  investigation	  under	  Section	  301,	  the	  Reagan	  
administration	  announced	  import	  tariffs	  on	  Japanese	  semiconductors.	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difficulty	  slapping	  an	  embargo	  on	  other	  Brazilian	  products	  such	  as	  orange	  juice;	  such	  a	  
high	  profile	  abrogation	  of	  GATT	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  defend.	  	  	  
	   At	   the	   end	   of	   1985	   the	   U.S.	   Consul	   General	   in	   São	   Paolo	   submitted	   his	  
comprehensive	   report	   on	   the	   Brazilian	   computer	   policy	   and	   its	   impact	   on	   U.S.	  
companies.	   	   The	   report	   argued	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   complaint	   was	   one	   of	  
investment,	   not	   trade.	   	   However,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   continued	   to	   face	  
domestic	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  trade	  issue.	  	  Hence,	  in	  May	  1986,	  the	  Economic	  
Policy	  Council	  decided	  that	  the	  market	  reserve	  constituted	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice	  and	  
that	  retaliation––of	  some	  kind	  yet	  to	  be	  determined––was	  justified.	  	  	  
(3)	  This	  301	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  to	  be	  taken	  against	  a	  developing	  country.	  	  	  
	   This	   added	   a	   rather	   different	   political	   dimension	   to	   the	   investigation	   and	  
subsequent	   dialogue.	   	   The	   largest,	   most	   advanced	   economy	   in	   the	   world	   was	  
threatening	  to	  retaliate	  against	  a	  country	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  economic	  ruin	  under	  the	  
weight	  of	  more	  than	  $100	  billion	  foreign	  debt.	  	  Moreover,	  this	  fragile	  economy	  was	  
being	  steered	  by	  an	  equally	  fragile	  new	  democratically–elected	  civil	  government.	  
	   As	  a	  foreign	  policy	  initiative,	  the	  Section	  301	  against	  Brazil	  was	  thus	  potentially	  
disastrous.	  	  The	  United	  States	  "attacked	  its	  most	  important	  South	  American	  ally	  in	  the	  
midst	  of	  a	  delicate	  political	  transition	  on	  the	  most	  politically	  sensitive	  industrial	  issue	  
possible..."
153
	  As	  Evans	  rightly	  asserts,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  very	  nearly	  allowed	  
domestic	  political	  pressures	  to	  dictate	  a	  highly	  reckless	  foreign	  policy.	  	  These	  issues	  
came	  into	  play	  in	  the	  bilateral	  talks	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  as	  is	  detailed	  further	  
below.	  
	   What	   was	   clear	   to	   the	   protectionists	   in	   Congress	   and	   the	   Department	   of	  
Commerce	  was	  that	  Brazil––this	  fledgling	  developing	  economy––was	  running	  a	  $5	  
billion	  trade	  surplus	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Conflict	  had	  already	  been	  experienced	  
with	  regard	  to	  Brazilian	  steel	  exports	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  among	  other	  items.	  	  Hence,	  Brazil	  
was	  considered	  an	   ideal	  candidate	  for	  venting	  U.S.	   frustrations	  over	  the	  country's	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  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1989),	  p.	  223.	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declining	  terms	  of	  trade.	  	  The	  message	  that	  the	  301	  was	  to	  send	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  
no	   longer	  willing,	   or	   able,	   to	   bear	   the	   costs	   of	   asymmetric	   trade	   and	   investment	  
conditions,	  even	  with	  its	  newly	  industrialized	  partners.	  
(4)	  The	  301	  did	  not	  receive	  support	  from	  the	  major	  computer	  TNCs.	  	  
	   As	  we	  have	  seen	  already,	  the	  301	  complaint	  against	  Brazil	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  
Reagan	  administration	  in	  response	  to	  domestic	  political	  pressure,	  not	  primarily	  out	  of	  
concern	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  U.S.	  companies.	  	  Indeed,	  what	  is	  remarkable	  is	  the	  distinct	  
lack	  of	  support	  for	  the	  301	  by	  the	  companies	  involved.	  	  Even	  after	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  
301,	  not	  a	  single	  U.S.	  firm	  responded	  to	  the	  USTR's	  request	  for	  written	  submissions.
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   IBM,	  in	  particular,	  had	  carved	  out	  a	  growing	  and	  very	  profitable	  business	  for	  
itself	   at	   the	   top	   of	   the	   market	   in	   mainframe	   computers.	   	   Having	   been	   hurt	   by	  
nationalist	  sentiments	  several	  times	  already,	  IBM	  did	  not	  want	  the	  boat	  rocked	  now.	  	  
The	  company	  made	  its	  concerns	  known	  to	  the	  USTR	  during	  the	  bilateral	  discussions	  
with	  the	  Brazilian	  government.	  	  Burroughs	  (redubbed	  Unisys	  after	  its	  1986	  merger	  
with	  Sperry)	  and	  H–P	  also	  had	  positions	  in	  the	  market	  and	  weren't	  particularly	  keen	  
for	  more	  controversy	  over	  the	  policy.	  
	   Most	  telling	  is	  Data	  General,	  the	  company	  that	  pleaded	  unsuccessfully	  with	  the	  
USTR	   in	   1977	   to	   act	   against	   Brazil's	  market	   reserve.	   	   DG	   had	   finally	   entered	   the	  
Brazilian	  market	  in	  1984	  via	  a	  joint	  venture	  arrangement	  with	  Cobra.	  	  Now	  that	  the	  
U.S.	   government	   was	   acting	   ostensibly	   on	   its	   behalf,	   DG	   did	   not	   respond	  
enthusiastically.	  	  The	  company,	  like	  IBM,	  Burroughs	  and	  H–P,	  had	  established	  itself	  in	  
the	  market	  and	  could	  do	  without	  the	  unsolicited	  'help'	  from	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  	  
	   While	  the	  major	  TNCs	  with	  investments	   in	  Brazil	  would	  have	  been	  happier	  
without	  U.S.	  government	  intervention,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  them	  from	  the	  
new	  or	  potential	  investors/exporters.	  	  A	  leading	  U.S.	  producer	  of	  microcomputers	  and	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  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1989),	  p.	  217.	  	  Two	  industry	  associations	  (the	  Computer	  and	  Business	  
Equipment	  Manufacturers	  Association	  and	  the	  American	  Electronics	  Association)	  submitted	  
brief	   letters	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	  members.	   	   Neither	   of	   the	   letters	   urged	   retaliation.	   	   Both	  
advocated	  negotiation	  for	  incremental	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  policy	  is	  implemented.	  
        117 
a	   leading	   U.S.	   producer	   of	   software	   were	   later	   to	   solicit	   the	   assistance	   of	   their	  
government	  in	  gaining	  access	  into,	  and	  concessions	  from,	  Brazil.	  
	   The	  United	  States	  and	  Brazil	  entered	  into	  bilateral	  negotiations,	  meeting	  half	  a	  
dozen	   times	   from	  December	   1985	   to	  December	   1986.
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   The	   first	   two	  meetings	  
yielded	  nothing.	  	  The	  U.S.	  side	  stressed	  free	  market	  economic	  principles	  while	  the	  
Brazilian	   side,	   represented	   by	   SEI,	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   computers	   to	   the	  
country's	  development	  efforts.	  	  	  
	   The	   temperature	   of	   the	   debate	  was	   raised	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   1986	  when	   it	  
became	  known	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Economic	  Policy	  Council	  had	  decided	  that	  the	  market	  
reserve	  was	  indeed	  an	  unfair	  trade	  practice	  warranting	  retaliation.	  	  Nationalist	  Senator	  
Severo	   Gomes	   (PMDB–São	   Paolo),	   one	   of	   the	   most	   ardent	   supporters	   of	   the	  
informatics	   policy	   and	   one	   of	   the	   strongest	   voices	   in	   Congress,	   responded	   by	  
threatening	  counter–retaliation.	  	  Gomes	  introduced	  legislation	  (which,	  in	  the	  end,	  was	  
never	  even	  voted	  on)	  that	  would	  prevent	  U.S.	  TNCs	  from	  remitting	  profits,	  registering	  
patents,	  exercising	  mineral	  exploration	  rights,	  and	  selling	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  the	  
Brazilian	  government.	  
	   At	  this	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  became	  involved,	  trying	  to	  smooth	  over	  
a	   growing	   foreign	   policy	   problem	   prior	   to	   President	   Sarney's	   impending	   visit	   to	  
Washington	  later	  that	  year.	  	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Schultz	  seized	  the	  initiative	  
and	  contacted	  the	  Brazilian	  Foreign	  Minister	  directly	  concerning	  the	  matter.
156	  	  The	  
Brazilian	  delegation	  to	  the	  next	  bilateral	  meeting	  in	  July	  was	  headed	  by	  a	  diplomat	  
from	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry,	  rather	  than	  by	  SEI.	  	  From	  this	  point,	  the	  dispute	  essentially	  
shifted	  from	  a	  clash	  of	  economic	  and	  development	  ideologies,	  to	  a	  matter	  of	  foreign	  
policy	   concern.
157	   	   The	  debate	   thus	   shifted	   to	   a	   ground	  where	   there	  was	   greater	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  (i)	  US–Brazil	  Trade	  Subgroup,	  December	  1985;	  (ii)	  special	  meeting	  in	  Caracas,	  February	  
1986,	  between	  the	  Deputy	  USTR	  and	  SEI;	  (iii)	  special	  meeting	  in	  Paris,	  July	  1986,	  between	  
USTR	  and	  Foreign	  Ministry	  representatives;	   (iv)	   special	  meeting	   in	  Paris,	  August	  1986;	   (v)	  
special	  meeting	   in	   Rio	   de	   Janeiro,	   September	   1986;	   and	   (vi)	   special	  meeting	   in	   Brussels,	  
December	  1986.	  
156	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Gazeta	  Mercantil,	  "Itamaraty	  aguarda	  Schultz,"	  May	  1,	  1986.	  
157	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1989)	  makes	  this	  point.	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possibility	  of	  mutual	  agreement.	  	  The	  more	  conciliatory	  tone
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  that	  followed	  suited	  
the	  transnational	  companies	  with	  investments	  in	  Brazil.	  	  	  
	   The	  negotiations	  began	  to	  progress	  with	  each	  side	  taking	  a	  softer	  line.	  	  For	  its	  
part,	   the	  U.S.	   administration	  backed	   away	   from	   its	   call	   for	   an	   end	   to	   the	  market	  
reserve.	   	   It	   emphasized,	   instead,	   the	   need	   for	   transparency,	   timeliness,	   and	  
predictability	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  reserve	  law	  with	  respect	  to	  import	  licenses	  
and	  investment	  decisions.	  	  In	  taking	  this	  line,	  the	  USTR	  was	  reflecting	  the	  overriding	  
concerns	  of	  the	  TNCs	  operating	  in	  Brazil.	  	  The	  USTR	  also	  took	  up	  a	  TNC	  concern	  about	  
copyright	  protection	  for	  software,	  the	  latest	  target	  for	  market	  reserve	  legislation	  by	  
SEI.	   	   The	   software	   bill	   proposed	   to	   restrict	   the	   importation	   of	   software	   when	   a	  
"national	   equivalent"	   was	   available.	   	   The	   TNCs	   wanted	   the	   new	   law	   at	   least	   to	  
recognise	   the	   intellectual	  property	   rights	  of	   software	  developers	   in	  order	   to	   limit	  
piracy.	  	  	  	  
	   Meanwhile,	   the	   TNCs	   were	   managing	   to	   exploit	   the	   situation	   by	   striking	  
individual	   deals	  with	   a	   seemingly	  more	  pliable	   SEI.	   	   Just	   prior	   to	   Sarney's	   visit	   to	  
Washington	  IBM	  received	  approval	  for	  its	  disk	  storage	  plant	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  its	  
mainframe	  product	  line.	  	  Just	  after	  Sarney's	  return,	  SEI	  granted	  approval	  for	  IBM's	  joint	  
venture	  with	  Gerdau.	  	  SEI	  also	  agreed	  to	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  import	  restrictions	  at	  this	  
time.	  	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  SEI	  approved	  Hewlett–Packard's	  joint	  venture	  with	  Iochpe.	  	  A	  
year	  later,	  SEI	  approved	  a	  proposal	  by	  Texas	  Instruments	  to	  invest	  US$130	  million	  to	  
establish	  a	  chip	  diffusion	  plant	  and	  expand	  its	  product	  line	  in	  Brazil.	  	  This	  decision	  by	  
SEI	  was	  a	  retreat	  from	  its	  previous	  war	  of	  attrition	  against	  the	  foreign	  semiconductor	  
firms.	  	  Clearly	  it	  may	  have	  been	  motivated	  in	  part	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  domestic	  firms	  
to	  develop	  their	  semiconductor	  manufacturing	  facilities.	  	  But	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  
U.S.	  government	  pressure	  played	  a	  significant	  role.	  	  Senior	  management	  at	  TI	  in	  Brazil	  
                                                
158	  	  Schultz	  sent	  his	  deputy,	  John	  Whitehead,	  to	  Brazil	  in	  late	  May	  1986.	  	  Whitehead	  tried	  to	  
calm	  Brazil's	  fears	  of	  U.S.	  protectionism	  and	  interference	  in	  Brazil.	  	  See,	  for	  example,	  Jornal	  da	  
Tarde,	  "EUA	  garantem	  respeitam	  a	  soberania	  do	  Brasil,"	  São	  Paolo,	  May	  28,	  1986.	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commented	  that	  the	  "timing	  was	  right"	  for	  the	  proposal	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  the	  
bilateral	  discussions	  going	  on	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Brazilian	  governments.
159	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   For	  domestic	  public	  and	  congressional	  consumption,	  the	  U.S.	  administration	  
continued	   to	   threaten	   retaliation	   without	   specifying	   its	   nature,	   imposing	   public	  
deadlines	  for	  progress	  in	  the	  bilateral	  talks.	  	  This	  public	  sabre–rattling	  continued	  to	  
cause	  a	  great	  deal	  of	   ill–feeling	  toward	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  TNCs	   in	  Brazil
160
	  
making	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  Sarney	  to	  make	  any	  public	  concessions	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  	  
The	  victory	  for	  the	  democrats	  in	  the	  U.S.	  congressional	  elections	  of	  November	  1986	  
increased	  the	  implicit	  threat	  of	  retaliation	  and	  U.S.	  protectionism.
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  Several	  deadlines	  
passed	   without	   retaliation	   as	   the	   Brazilian	   negotiators	   asked	   privately	   for	  
postponement	   on	   the	   account	   of	   upcoming	   elections	   (November	   1986),	   debt	  
negotiations,	  or	  later,	  constitution	  debates.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	   the	   Brazilian	   executive	   agreed	   to	   accept	   copyright	   protection	   on	  
software	  and	  wrote	  this	  into	  a	  software	  bill	  that	  was	  to	  be	  debated	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  
Congress.	  	  The	  USTR,	  Clayton	  Yeutter,	  saw	  this	  agreement	  as	  a	  concession	  that	  he	  
could	  sell	  at	  home	  and	  agreed	  to	  table	  the	  investigation	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  	  Effectively	  
unable	  to	  retaliate,	  Yeutter	  was	  searching	  for	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  ill–conceived	  301.	  
However,	   the	  fragile	  truce	  was	  upended	  by	  subsequent	  events.	   	   	  With	  the	  
software	  bill	  still	  pending	  in	  Congress,	  SEI	  refused	  to	  allow	  Microsoft––a	  leading	  U.S.	  
software	  company––to	  license	  its	  microcomputer	  software,	  MS–DOS,	  for	  sale	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
SEI	   based	   its	   decision	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   Scopus,	   a	   locally–owned	   company,	   had	  
                                                
159	  Author	  interviews	  with	  TI	  in	  October	  1987.	  	  Interviews	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Consul	  General	  in	  São	  
Paolo	  confirmed	  that	  the	  TI	  proposal	  was	  discussed	  in	  detail	  during	  the	  bilateral	  talks.	  
160	  	  See	  articles	  appearing	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  business	  press	  at	  the	  time,	  including	  Exame,	  "O	  
Desafio	  Americano,"	  and	  "Ultimos	  retoques	  no	  projeto	  de	  software,"	  May	  28,	  1986,	  pp.	  24–28,	  
30–31;	   Istoe,	   "Rotas	  de	  Conflito,"	  December	  31,	  1986,	  pp.	  54–58;	  and	   Istoe,	   "Choque	  na	  
Reserva,"	  May	  27,	  1987,	  pp.	  60–62.	  
161	  	  The	  effects	  of	  Brazil's	  elections	  at	  that	  time	  are	  discussed	  further	  below.	  
        120 
developed	  a	  "functional	  equivalent"	  called	  SISNE.	  	  This	  infuriated	  Microsoft	  as	  SISNE	  
was	  known	  to	  include	  some	  code	  that	  had	  been	  copied	  from	  MS–DOS.
162	  	  	  
	   Meanwhile,	  Apple	  was	  hoping	  to	  gain	  entrance	  into	  the	  Brazilian	  market	  with	  
its	  MacIntosh	  microcomputer,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  different	  from	  any	  other	  
micro	   produced	   in	   the	   country.	   	   However,	   a	   national	   company,	   Unitron,	   had	  
successfully	   "cloned"	   the	  MacIntosh	  and	  began	   to	  market	   the	  computer	   in	  Brazil.	  	  
Apple	  was	  worried	  that	  SEI	  would	  approve	  the	  "pirate	  MAC"	  and	  thereby	  preclude	  
Apple	  from	  entering	  the	  market.
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   Microsoft	   and	   Apple	   took	   their	   cases	   to	   the	  U.S.	   Congress	   and	   the	   press.	  	  
Congress	  again	  accused	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  of	  being	  soft	  on	  trade	  and	  the	  
administration	  reluctantly	  re–opened	  the	  case.	  	  On	  November	  13,	  1987	  the	  White	  
House	  announced	   that	   it	  would	   indeed	  retaliate	  against	  Brazil.	   	  President	  Reagan	  
moved	  to	  impose	  100%	  tariffs	  on	  66	  Brazilian	  import	  items	  (including	  vehicles,	  aircraft,	  
footwear,	  orange	  juice,	  iron,	  steel,	  and	  refined	  petroleum	  products)	  and	  placed	  an	  
embargo	   on	   Brazilian	   computer	   imports.	   	   The	   tariffs,	   worth	   $105	   million,	   were	  
imposed	  to	  offset	  the	  estimated	  lost	  business	  for	  U.S.	  companies.
164
	  	  One	  U.S.	  trade	  
official	  put	  it	  this	  way:	  	  "This	  response	  is	  the	  only	  way	  we	  can	  show	  the	  Brazilians	  that	  
we	  are	  not	  just	  a	  paper	  tiger."
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   Finance	  Minister	  Bresser	  Pereira	   responded	  publicly	   to	   the	  announcement	  
threatening	  to	  suspend	  imports	  of	  U.S.	  sulphur,	  fertilisers	  and	  wheat	  worth	  US$105	  
million.
166	  	  Meanwhile,	  however,	  the	  Sarney	  government	  managed	  to	  get	  the	  software	  
bill	  passed	  through	  Congress	  after	  much	  debate	  with	  the	  requisite	  copyright	  clause.	  	  
                                                
162	  	  For	  some	  time	  Scopus	  maintained	  that	  SISNE	  was	  original	  and	  any	  similarity	  was	  purely	  
coincidental.	  	  Later,	  faced	  with	  overwhelming	  evidence,	  Scopus	  admitted	  that	  parts	  of	  MS–
DOS	  had	  indeed	  been	  copied.	  	  See	  Veja,	  "Plagio	  de	  bits:	  	  Scopus	  admite	  copia	  de	  programa	  
americano,"	  July	  29,	  1987,	  p.	  100.	  
163	  	  See	  O	  Globo,	  "Apple	  quer	  impedir	  donos	  da	  Unitron	  de	  irem	  aos	  EUA,"	  July	  16,	  1987.	  
164	  	  See	  "Government	  Seeks	  to	  Avert	  U.S.	  Sanctions,"	  in	  Latin	  American	  Newsletters	  Regional	  
Reports:	  	  Brazil,	  January	  7,	  1988,	  p.	  6.	  
165	   	  Quoted	   in	   the	  San	   José	  Mercury,	   (San	   José,	  California)	   "Software	  Dispute	  Heats	  Up",	  
November	  14,	  1987.	  
166	  	  Latin	  American	  Newsletters,	  Op.	  Cit.	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SEI	  ruled	  that	  Microsoft's	  MS–DOS	  version	  3.3	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  licensed;	  the	  earlier	  
versions	   were	   the	   ones	   excluded.167	   	   And	   SEI	   withheld	   approval	   for	   the	   Unitron	  
machine	  pending	  the	  independent	  development	  of	  more	  system	  software.	  	  In	  so	  doing	  
the	  Brazilian	  government	  managed	  to	  do	  just	  enough	  to	  draw	  the	  sting	  from	  the	  main	  
complaints	  against	  it.	  	  In	  February	  1988	  the	  U.S.	  plans	  for	  retaliation	  were	  suspended.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   As	  Evans
168	  argues,	  the	  301	  was	  originally	  initiated	  out	  of	  domestic	  political	  
concern	  by	  a	  'declining	  hegemon.'	  	  In	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  301,	  the	  U.S.	  state	  acted	  
quite	  independently	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  U.S.	  TNCs,	  contradicting	  the	  classic	  dependency	  
theory,	  which	  explains	  core	  state	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  TNC	  interest.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  
case	  progressed,	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  TNCs	  increasingly	  set	  the	  agenda.	  Leaving	  aside	  
the	  domestic	  publicity	  campaign,	  which	  appealed	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  content	  but	  
rather	  on	  symbol,	  there	  was	  no	  other	  effective	  constituency	  for	  this	  foreign	  economic	  
policy	   initiative	   than	   the	   TNCs.	   	   Hence	   they	   were	   able	   to	   shift	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  
negotiations	  from	  the	  market	  reserve	   itself,	  to	  the	  expedition	  of	  copyright	   import	  
licenses,	  the	  protection	  of	  software,	  and	  their	  own	  specific	  investment	  plans.	  
	   However,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   distinguish	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   TNCs	   already	  
participating	  in	  Brazil,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  companies	  wishing	  to	  enter.
169
	  	  The	  TNCs	  with	  
vested	  interests	  (IBM,	  Burroughs,	  H–P)	  had	  formed	  alliances	  and	  managed	  to	  strike	  
independent	  deals	  with	  the	  Brazilian	  government.	  	  They	  were	  anxious	  that	  the	  301	  did	  
not	  upset	  what	  they	  already	  had	  achieved.	  	  The	  TNCs	  without	  vested	  interests	  (Apple,	  
Microsoft),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   had	   nothing	   to	   lose	   and	   everything	   to	   gain	   by	  
mobilising	  the	  support	  of	  their	  government.	  	  In	  late	  1987	  these	  companies,	  capitalising	  
                                                
167	  This	  was	  an	  elegant	  sidestep.	  The	  fact	  is	  there	  was	  very	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  
new	  and	  old	  versions	  of	  the	  operating	  software.	  
168	  	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1989).	  
169	  	  There	  are	  two	  other	  groups	  of	  TNCs	  worth	  noting:	  	  (i)	  the	  large	  users	  of	  informatics	  in	  
Brazil	  (discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section)	  who	  were	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  trade	  complaint	  but	  did	  not	  
actively	  seek	  to	  influence	  the	  negotiations,	  and	  (ii)	  TNCs	  in	  Brazil	  operating	  in	  fine	  chemicals,	  
and	  biotechnology	  which	  were	  potential	  targets	  for	  market	  reserve.	  	  These	  TNCs	  were	  hopeful	  
that	   the	   U.S.	   government	   could	   apply	   sufficient	   pressure	   to	   make	   an	   extension	   of	   the	  
informatics	  policy	  to	  other	  industries	  politically	  unacceptable	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  in	  Brazilian	  
government.	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on	   the	   protectionist	   mood	   in	   Congress,	   were	   able	   to	   provoke	   a	   reluctant	  
administration	  to	  defend	  their	  cause.	  
	   In	   the	  end	  however,	   the	   interests	  of	   the	   'vested	  TNCs'	   coincided	  with	   the	  
broader	  foreign	  policy	  concerns	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  prevent	  the	  further	  pursuit	  of	  the	  trade	  
case	  despite	  the	  emergence	  of	  this	  focused	  private	  constituency	  for	  the	  301.	  	  But	  what	  
was	  the	  net	  effect	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  actions	  in	  1985–87?	  	  	  
	   The	  effect	  of	   the	  pressure	   from	  the	  U.S.	  government	  on	  Brazilian	  policy	   is	  
ambiguous.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  it	  served	  to	  polarize	  the	  situation	  further,	  consolidating	  
nationalist	  sentiment	  and	  increasing	  the	  Brazilian	  resolve	  to	  resist	  outside	  pressure.	  	  
This	   anti–U.S.	   and	   anti–TNC	   sentiment	   later	   became	   embodied	   in	   the	   new	  
constitution.	   	   Organisations	   such	   as	   ABICOMP	   and	   the	   Movement	   for	   Brazilian	  
Informatics	  (MBI),	  together	  with	  Senator	  Gomes	  and	  like–minded	  nationalists	  with	  
seats	   in	   the	   constituent	   assembly,	   used	   the	   trade	   dispute	   to	   gain	   support	   for	   a	  
constitution	  whose	  clauses	  concerning	  foreign	  investment	  are	  drawn	  largely	  from	  the	  
Informatics	  Law	  and	  are	  highly	  nationalistic.	  	  	  As	  one	  Brazilian	  computer	  businessman	  
put	  it,	  	  "Clayton	  Yeutter	  has	  been	  the	  best	  ally	  to	  the	  market	  reserve	  we	  could	  have	  
had."	   	   More	   immediately,	   it	   put	   conservative	   President	   Sarney	   in	   a	   "no–win"	  
predicament.	  	  In	  a	  June	  17,	  1987	  press	  conference,	  Sarney	  expressed	  an	  ideological	  
disdain	  for	  the	  market	  reserve	  strategy	  in	  general.	  Sarney	  proclaimed	  that	  the	  country	  
must	  "import	  technology,	  raise	  imports	  [sic]	  and	  slot	  into	  a	  world	  economy	  which	  is	  
increasingly	  interdependent."	  	  The	  president	  was	  quick	  to	  make	  an	  exception	  for	  the	  
computer	  industry	  saying	  that	  the	  informatics	  law	  had	  "proved	  useful	  for	  a	  time."
170	  	  
Hence,	  though	  he	  may	  have	  quietly	  sought	  to	  emasculate	  the	  policy	  under	  different	  
circumstances,	  the	  president	  could	  not	  back	  away	  from	  it	  under	  such	  public	  pressure.	  	  	  
	   Likewise,	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   original	   official	   objectives,	   the	   301	   achieved	   very	  
little.
171
	  	  The	  interests	  that	  the	  301	  sought	  to	  defend	  were	  those	  of	  the	  U.S.	  computer	  
                                                
170	  	  Latin	  American	  Newsletters	  Regional	  Reports:	  	  Brazil,	  July	  9,	  1987.	  
171	  	  Even	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  unofficial	  objective	  to	  placate	  a	  protectionist	  congress	  and	  appear	  
'tough	  on	  trade,'	   the	  results	  cannot	  be	  termed	  satisfactory.	   	  Many	   in	  Congress,	  and	  even	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firms	  that	  were	  prevented	  by	  the	  market	  reserve	  from	  exporting	  to	  Brazil.	  	  Yet	  after	  
three	  years	  of	  investigation	  and	  negotiation,	  Brazil's	  market	  reserve	  was	  still	  firmly	  
entrenched	  both	  in	  law	  and	  in	  practice.	  
	   However,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  pressure	  did	  increase	  the	  
perceived	   cost	   of	   a	   negative	   response	   from	   SEI	   to	   a	   "reasonable"	   U.S.	   company	  
investment	   proposal.	   	   	   Representatives	   of	   SEI	   commented	   that	   due	   to	   the	   high	  
international	   profile	   of	   the	   policy,	   they	   had	   to	  work	   harder	   to	   justify	   a	   negative	  
response	   to	  proposals	   for	   imports	   or	   foreign	   investment.
172	   	   Specifically,	   the	  U.S.	  
government	  pressure	  apparently	  aided	  several	  TNCs	  to	  strike	  favourable	  deals	  with	  
SEI.	  	  IBM's	  success	  with	  its	  four	  proposals,
173
	  and	  SEI's	  approval	  of	  H–P's	  joint	  venture	  
with	  Iochpe,	  Microsoft's	  licensing	  agreement	  for	  MS–DOS	  3.3,	  and	  Texas	  Instrument's	  
proposal	   to	   invest	   in	   expanded	   and	   modernised	   semiconductor	   facilities	   are	   all	  
examples	  of	  these.	  
Pressure	  from	  the	  Market	  
	   Unlike	   México,	   whose	   computer	   decree	   explicitly	   aimed	   to	   achieve	   an	  
internationally	  competitive	  supply	  to	  the	  domestic	  market	  from	  the	  beginning,	  Brazil's	  
policy	  did	  not	  include	  a	  specific	  and	  immediate	  concern	  for	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  
local	  market.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   development	   of	   domestic	   computer	   capability	   was	   of	  
necessity	  to	  take	  place	  on	  the	  broad	  shoulders	  of	  the	  domestic	  market	  that	  would	  
bear	  the	  associated	  economic	  cost	  in	  the	  early	  years.	  (See	  Figure	  3.1)	  
                                                                                                                                    
several	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  USTR	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  were	  unhappy	  with	  the	  
decision	   to	   suspend	   retaliation	   against	   Brazil.	   	   They	   held	   that	   Brazil's	   concessions	   were	  
superficial	  and	  insufficient.	  
172	  	  Author	  interviews	  with	  senior	  representatives	  of	  SEI,	  October	  1987.	  
173	  	  Gerdau	  extended	  local	  production	  of	  its	  small	  (4381)	  and	  large	  (3090)	  mainframes,	  and	  its	  
new	  disk	  plant.	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FIGURE	  3.1	  
















	   This	  economic	  cost	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  price	  of	  Brazilian–made	  microcomputers.	  	  
As	  Table	  3.4	  illustrates,	  the	  price	  of	  a	  standard	  IBM–compatible	  PC	  in	  Brazil	  was	  three	  
times	  the	  U.S.	  price.	  	  Prices	  for	  computer	  equipment	  in	  Brazil	  remained	  high	  for	  a	  
number	  of	  reasons	  including:	  (i)	  taxes	  and	  duties	  on	  imported	  components;	  (ii)	  the	  
high	  cost	  of	  capital;	  (iii)	  high	  inventory	  costs	  due	  to	  the	  unreliability	  of	  supply	  and	  high	  
interest	  rates;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  lack	  of	  scale	  economies.	  
Domestic	  Cost	  
Units	  Produced	  (Cumulative);	  Time–––––> 
Cost	  per	  Unit	  
International	  Cost 
        125 
TABLE	  3.4	  
Prices	  in	  US	  Dollars	  (1987)
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(1)	  "PC–XT"	  with	  640	  kB	  RAM;	  1	  floppy	  drive;	  1	  10	  mB	  fixed	  drive;	  220	  cps	  dot	  matrix	  
printer.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   Brazil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   USA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Contraband	  
Range	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3,500–6,500	  	  	  	  	  1,200–2,500	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,600–3,000	  
Average	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  5,850	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1,850	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2,460	  
	  
(2)	  "PC–AT"	  with	  1	  mB	  RAM;	  1	  floppy	  drive;	  1	  20	  mB	  fixed	  drive;	  220	  cps	  dot	  
matrix	  printer.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   Brazil	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   USA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Contraband	  
Range	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5,950–10,000	  	  	  	  2,300–3,500	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2,600–5,000	  
Average	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   9,160	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2,900	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3,860	  
	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  higher	  prices,	  the	  market	  had	  to	  wait	  a	  considerable	  time	  before	  
technology	  that	  was	  available	  on	  the	  international	  market	  became	  available	  in	  Brazil.	  	  
This	   so–called	   "technology	   gap"	   averaged	   one	   to	   two	   years	   for	   standard	  
microcomputer	  equipment.
175	  	  For	  more	  sophisticated	  equipment,	  the	  gap	  was	  much	  
longer.	  	  The	  products	  of	  the	  superminicomputer	  licensing	  agreements	  signed	  in	  1984	  
(Table	  3.3)	  had	  already	  been	  available	  internationally	  for	  two	  to	  five	  years	  prior	  to	  
their	  introduction	  in	  Brazil.	  
	   These	  economic	  costs	  borne	  by	  the	  market	  since	  1977	  engendered	  two	  notable	  
responses	   by	   users	   who	   grew	   in	   their	   sophistication.	   	   The	   first	   was	   a	   growing	  
propensity	  to	  resort	  to	  illegal	  imports.	  	  The	  second	  was	  an	  intensified	  effort	  to	  lobby	  
for	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  	  
	   The	  price	  differential	  and	  technology	  gap	  noted	  above,	  together	  with	  SEI's	  ban	  
on	  the	  importation	  of	  many	  parts	  and	  components,	  and	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  
informatics	   equipment	   to	   every	   sector	   of	   the	   country's	   economy,	   resulted	   in	   a	  
computer	  contraband	  trade	  of	   large	  proportions.	   	   It	   is	  estimated	  that	  contraband	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   Schlochauer	  Associados,	  Consultoria	  e	  Representações	   Ltda.,	  O	  mercado	  brasileiro	  de	  
microcomputadores	  profissionais	  (1980–1990),	  São	  Paolo,	  October	  1987.	  
175	  	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  74.	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microcomputers	  accounted	  for	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  country's	  installed	  base	  in	  1987.	  	  The	  
contraband	  trade	  in	  peripheral	  equipment	  and	  components	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  even	  
worse.	   	  (See	  Tables	  3.5	  and	  3.6)	   	  Altogether,	  the	  contraband	  trade	  in	  professional	  
electronic	  equipment	  and	  software	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  worth	  some	  US$	  300	  million	  per	  




The	  Contraband	  'Top	  Ten'	  
	   Product	   	   	   	   	   	   Units	  Apprehended	  
	   Integrated	  Circuits	   	   	   	   	   	   11,913	  
	   Diskettes	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1,910	  
	   Memory	  Chips	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	  1,279	  
	   Disk	  Units	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  223	  
	   Printers	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  216	  
	   Microcomputers	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  180	  
	   Teclado	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  126	  
	   Video	  Display	  Units	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  
	   Winchester	  Hard	  Disks	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  
	   Magnetic	  disk	  heads	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  
	  
TABLE	  3.6	  
Contraband	  vs	  Market	  Price	  (Cruzados)	  for	  Selected	  Items	  
Product	   	   	   	  	  	  Contraband	  Price	   	   Market	  Price	  
Winchester	  disks	  (20	  MB)	   	   28,000	  	   	   	  	  	  125,000	  
Memory	  chips	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   60	  to	  250	   	   120	  to	  500	  
Printers	   	   	   	   40,000	  	   	   	  	  	  	  70,000	  
	  
	   The	  second	  market	  response	  to	  the	  policy––political	  action––was	  forcefully	  
demonstrated	  when	  SEI	  attempted	  to	  expand	  the	  market	  reserve	  into	  the	  area	  of	  
automobile	   electronics	   in	   the	   early	   eighties.	   	   Autolatina	   responded	   adamantly,	  
claiming	  that	  there	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  competitive	  domestic	  supply	  to	  meet	  their	  needs.	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  This	  data	  together	  with	  the	  data	  for	  Tables	  3.6	  and	  3.7	  come	  from	  a	  review	  in	  Exame,	  "A	  
porta	  aberta	  do	  contrabando,"	   July	  8,	  1987,	  pp.	  60–64.	   	  Data	   sources	   include	   the	  Policia	  
Federal,	   the	   Secretaria	   da	   Receita	   Federal,	   SEI,	   the	   Society	   for	   Computer	   and	   Subsidiary	  
Equipment	  Users	  (Sucesu),	  and	  original	  research	  by	  the	  author	  of	  the	  article.	  	  The	  findings	  
were	  confirmed	  by	  my	  own	  interviews	  with	  major	  corporate	  users	  of	  computer	  equipment,	  all	  
of	  whom	  were	  very	  familiar	  with	  the	  contraband	  trade.	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Therefore,	   it	   was	   argued,	   Brazil's	   automobile	   exports	  would	   be	   jeopardized.	   	   SEI	  
subsequently	  backed	  away	  from	  this	  proposed	  extension	  of	  the	  reserve.	  	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	  an	  important	  economic	  fact	  had	  been	  highlighted.	  	  Informatics	  
was	   becoming	   vital	   to	   the	   competitive	   functioning	   of	  most	   industries.	   	   A	   lack	   of	  
competitiveness	  in	  informatics	  had	  consequences	  for	  the	  entire	  economy,	  not	  just	  for	  
the	  sector	  itself.	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  fact	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  architects	  and	  proponents	  of	  
the	  market	  reserve.	  	  It	  was	  this	  fact	  that	  was	  the	  very	  motivation	  of	  the	  national	  effort	  
in	  informatics.	  	  However,	  while	  few	  Brazilians	  in	  the	  eighties	  questioned	  the	  goal	  of	  
technological	  autonomy,	  the	  costs	  associated	  with,	  and	  growing	  uncertainty	  of,	  its	  
achievement	  were	  brought	  into	  full	  relief	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  a	  fragile	  domestic	  
economy.	  
	   After	  the	  Informatics	  Law	  was	  passed	  in	  1984	  and	  CONIN	  was	  established	  with	  
policy–making	  power	  and	  authority	  over	  SEI,	  the	  users	  had	  a	  stronger	  political	  voice	  
through	  which	  to	  make	  known	  their	  concerns.	  	  One	  of	  the	  eight	  non–ministerial	  seats	  
on	  CONIN	  belonged	  to	  FIESP,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Industries	  of	  the	  State	  of	  São	  Paolo.	  	  
FIESP	  was	  recognised	  as	  the	  most	  influential	  institutional	  political	  voice	  for	  private	  
capital	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Created	  in	  1931,	  FIESP	  represented	  112	  trade	  associations	  in	  
the	   state	   of	   São	   Paolo	   which	   generated	   one–half	   of	   Brazil's	   GDP.	   	   FIESP	   thus	  
represented	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  companies	  in	  its	  role	  as	  industrial	  advocate.	  	  	  
	   In	  late	  1987	  FIESP	  submitted	  a	  paper	  to	  CONIN	  that	  reflected	  the	  concerns	  of	  
its	  members.	  	  The	  paper,	  entitled	  "General	  Considerations	  about	  the	  Development	  of	  
Industry,	  Technology,	  and	  the	  Market	  Reserve,"
177	  adopted	  a	  very	  pragmatic	  tone.	  	  It	  is	  
an	  indication	  of	  the	  deeply–rooted	  support	  for	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy	  that	  
FIESP	  did	  not	  attack	  it	  explicitly.	  	  Instead,	  the	  paper	  began	  with	  an	  expression	  of	  FIESP	  
'support'	   for	   the	   national	   informatics	   policy,	   but	   went	   on	   to	   question	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  The	  paper	  itemised	  six	  areas	  of	  concern:	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  FIESP,	  "Considerações	  gerais	  sobre	  o	  desenvolvimento	  da	  industria,	  tecnologia,	  e	  reserva	  
de	  mercado,"	  mimeo;	  my	  translation	  where	  quoted.	  
        128 
	   (i)	  Firstly,	  SEI's	  control	  over	  imports	  and	  the	  slow,	  bureaucratic	  nature	  of	  the	  
import	   licensing	   process	   was	   questioned.	   	   FIESP	   claimed	   that	   the	   need	   for	   prior	  
permission	  from	  SEI	  for	  imports	  was	  a	  "great	  obstacle	  to	  the	  development	  of	  Brazilian	  
industry."
178
	   	   FIESP	   called	   for	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   number	   of	   items	   under	   SEI's	  
authority,	  asking	  that	  they	  be	  placed	  under	  normal	  CACEX	  control	  where	  requests	  for	  
import	  were	  processed	  more	  "efficiently."	  
	   (ii)	   Secondly,	   FIESP	   called	   both	   for	   greater	   fiscal	   support	   for	   national	  
microelectronics	   companies,	   and	   the	   liberalization	   of	   the	   industry.	   	   Arguing	   that	  
microelectronics	  is	  the	  technological	  heart	  of	  the	  sector,	  FIESP	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  
national	  industry	  had	  access	  to	  the	  latest	  technology.	  	  FIESP	  therefore	  wanted	  the	  
national	  microelectronics	   firms	   to	  exercise	   free	   choice	   in	   the	  purchase	  of	   foreign	  
technology.	  
	   (iii)	  The	  paper	  also	  took	  up	  the	  cause	  of	  joint	  ventures.	  	  FIESP	  criticised	  SEI	  for	  
its	   paternal	   approach	   to	   joint	   ventures.	   Arguing	   that	   the	   law	   did	   not	   specifically	  
prohibit	  joint	  ventures,	  FIESP	  maintained	  that	  the	  national	  companies	  were	  mature	  
enough	  to	  decide	  what	  was	  a	  favourable	  joint	  venture	  agreement.	  	  In	  particular,	  SEI's	  
exclusion	   of	   joint	   ventures	   involving	   the	   foreign	   technology	   supplier	   came	   under	  
attack:	  	  "It	  is	  obvious	  the	  national	  entrepreneur	  associating	  himself	  with	  foreign	  capital	  
will	  look	  for,	  above	  all,	  a	  partner	  [with]	  the	  latest	  technology."
179
	  
	   (iv)	  Fourthly,	  FIESP	  called	  for	  the	  restructuring	  of	  CONIN.	  	  Consisting	  of	  sixteen	  
government	  ministers	  and	  eight	  others,	  and	  meeting	  only	  twice	  a	  year,	  the	  council	  was	  
ill–suited	   to	  making	   policy	   decisions.	   	   FIESP	  wanted	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   permanent	  
commission	  that	  could	  do	  the	  ongoing	  work	  in	  preparation	  for	  bimonthly	  meetings	  of	  
the	  council	  to	  take	  decisions.	  
	   (v)	  Linked	  to	   (iv)	  above	  was	  the	  recommendation	  to	  reorganise	  SEI.	   	  FIESP	  
wanted	  SEI's	  power	  more	  tightly	  circumscribed.	  Furthermore,	  FIESP	  was	  concerned	  
that	  SEI's	  decisions	  and	  the	  criteria	  for	  them	  were	  transparent	  to	  all	  concerned.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  2. 
179
	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  4.	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   (vi)	  Finally,	  the	  paper	  addressed	  the	  subject	  of	  foreign	  technology	  purchasing.	  	  
FIESP	  noted	  the	  basic	  objective	  of	  a	  national	  technological	  capability.	  	  FIESP	  continued,	  
"Autonomy,	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  auto–sufficiency,	  which	  
cannot	   be	   attained	   by	   our	   country	   or	   by	   any	   other."	   	   The	   argument	   was	   that	  
informatics	  was	  a	  means	  to	  development,	  and	  	  
	  
"to	  reject	  or	  make	  difficult	  the	  access	  to	  foreign	  technology	  does	  not	  
get	   us	   anywhere.	   	   To	   the	   contrary,	   it	   can	   condemn	   Brazil	   to	  
technological	  retardation	  incompatible	  with	  the	  necessities	  of	  industry	  
in	  general...	  We	  suggest	  a	  movement	  in	  the	  present	  attitude	  of	  SEI––
which	  approves	  the	  acquisition	  of	  technology	  only	  in	  exceptional	  cases	  




	   FIESP's	  concerns	  were	  thus	  to	  limit	  SEI's	  power,	  increase	  its	  own	  influence	  over	  
the	  policy,	  facilitate	  the	  speedier	  processing	  of	  import	  requests,	  and	  allow	  the	  use	  of	  
foreign	   technology	   to	   aid	   Brazilian	   industry.	   	   The	   computer	   TNCs,	   the	   national	  
computer	  firms	  unable	  to	  support	  the	  ongoing	  research	  and	  development	  costs,	  and	  
the	  Brazilian	  computer	  market	  now	  had	  a	  powerful	  and	  focused	  advocate	  for	  their	  
interests.	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  Ibid.,	  p.	  5.	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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLICY AND ITS IMPACT 
The	  Policy	  
	   This	  section	  summarises	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  policy––its	  objectives,	  strategy,	  
and	  measures––as	  a	  basis	  for	  evaluating	  the	  success	  of	  its	  impact	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  It	  




	   The	  basic	  objectives	  of	  Brazil's	  informatics	  policy	  remained	  constant	  from	  its	  




(1)	  To	  control	  the	  process	  of	  informatisation	  in	  the	  country.	  
(2)	  To	  develop	  Brazilian	  capability	  in	  information	  technology	  which	  will	  
ensure	   the	   designing,	   development	   and	   production	   of	   electronic	  
equipment	  and	  software	  in	  Brazil.	  
(3)	   To	   create	   jobs	   in	   general,	   and	   job	   opportunities	   for	   Brazilian	  
engineers	  and	  technicians	  in	  particular.	  
(4)	  To	  limit	  the	  market	  share	  of	  computer	  TNCs	  in	  general––and	  IBM	  in	  
particular––	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   a	   leading	   position	   for	   national	  
companies	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  	  
(5)	  To	  achieve	  a	  favourable	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  computer	  products	  and	  
services.	  
(6)	  To	  create	  openings	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  parts	  and	  components	  
industry	  in	  informatics.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   The	  policy	  was	  based	  upon	  several	  underlying	  concepts	  and	  assumptions.	  	  First	  
was	  the	  assumed	  vital	  importance	  of	  information	  technology	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
the	  country.	  	  The	  importance	  ascribed	  to	  informatics	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  technocratic	  
vision	   that	   sees	   technology	   as	   the	   solution	   to	   problems.	   	   The	   last	   chapter	  
demonstrated	  how	  deeply	  rooted	  that	  vision	  was.	  
                                                
181	  	  SEI	  has	  been	  examined	  in	  some	  detail	  already,	  along	  with	  some	  of	  the	  specific	  political	  
pressures	  on	  Congress	  and	  CONIN.	  	  The	  objective	  here	  is	  merely	  to	  capture	  any	  remaining	  
salient	  points,	  which	  have	  gone	  hitherto	  unmentioned.	  
182
	  	  Compiled	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  National	  Informatics	  Law,	  author	  interviews,	  and	  secondary	  
sources	  regarding	  the	  early	  period	  (Helena,	  Tigre,	  Adler).	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   Secondly,	  the	  market	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  national	  asset	  that	  is	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  
country's	  strategic	  purposes.	  	  The	  state's	  role	  then	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  access	  to	  the	  
internal	  market	  is	  in	  strict	  accordance	  with	  national	  objectives	  (which	  in	  this	  case	  were	  
quite	  different	  than	  simply	  supplying	  the	  immediate	  demands	  of	  the	  market	  itself).	  	  
Thus	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  consumer	  were	  subordinated	  to	  the	  collective	  interest	  as	  
defined	  by	  the	  state.	  
	   The	   potential	   size	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   informatics	   market	   gave	   the	   state	  
considerable	   bargaining	   leverage	  with	   respect	   to	   foreign	   capital.	   	   The	   potentially	  
enormous	   domestic	   market	   is	   what	   sustained	   TNC	   interest	   in	   Brazil	   despite	   the	  
antagonistic	  policy.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  this	  case	  differs	  markedly	  from	  TNC	  interest	  in	  an	  
export	  base	  such	  as	  in	  South	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  or	  México.	  
	   Third	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  technology	  is	  not	  transferable	  because	  its	  essence	  
is	  learning-­‐by-­‐doing.	  	  One	  of	  the	  strongest	  proponents	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  put	  it	  this	  
way:	  
"Technology	   can	   only	   evolve	   in	   the	   process	   of	   doing	   things,	   and	  
integrated	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  
thing	   as	   technology	   transfer.	   	   So–called	   technology	   transfer	  
agreements	   don't	   really	   transfer	   anything,	   and	   only	   increase	   the	  
dependence.	  	  When	  we	  import	  a	  new	  product	  or	  even	  set	  up	  a	  new	  
plant	  transferred	  from	  abroad,	  we	  are	  only	  purchasing	  the	  results	  of	  
foreign	  technology,	  not	  its	  essence."
183
	  
	   Brazil's	  strategy	  for	  achieving	   its	  goals	  had	  two	  fundamental	  features:	   	  the	  
national	  market	  would	  be	  reserved	  to	  national	  companies;	  and	  the	  national	  companies	  
could	  only	  purchase	   foreign	   technology	  once.	   	  This	   second	   tenet	  was	   included	   to	  
prevent	  continued	  technological	  dependence	  via	  on–going	  licensing	  agreements.	  
	   The	  Informatics	  Law,	  passed	  by	  the	  Congress	  in	  October	  1984	  defined	  the	  main	  
points	  of	  the	  policy	  as	  follows:	  
	  
(i)	  	  The	  Congress	  will	  permanently	  supervise	  the	  policy	  and	  will	  revise	  
every	  three	  years	  the	  National	  Informatics	  Plan	  (PLANIN).	  (Articles	  1	  
and	  7)	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  Fregni,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  4.	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(ii)	   The	   National	   Council	   on	   Informatics	   and	   Automation	   (CONIN)	  
chaired	   by	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Republic,	   and	   in	   which	   sit	   sixteen	  
ministers	  and	  eight	  representatives	  of	  significant	  sectors	  of	  society,	  will	  
decide	  on	  all	  questions	  not	  clearly	  defined	  in	  the	  law.	  (Articles	  6	  &	  7)	  
	  
(iii)	  The	  Special	  Secretariat	  for	   Informatics	  (SEI),	  an	  organism	  of	  the	  
Executive	  branch,	  will	  be	  responsible	  for	  supervising	  and	  controlling	  
the	  information	  industries.	  	  (Article	  8)	  
	  
(iv)	  	  SEI	  will	  control	  imports	  of	  informatics	  	  goods	  and	  services	  for	  a	  
period	  of	  eight	  years	  until	  October	  1992.	  	  (Articles	  4	  &	  8)	  
	  
(v)	  Any	  company	  wishing	  to	  manufacture	  or	  market	  goods	  belonging	  to	  
the	   informatics	   sector	   must	   submit	   a	   project	   for	   approval	   by	   SEI.	  	  
(Article	  8)	  
	  
(vi)	  When	  considering	  projects	   for	  approval,	  SEI	  will	  give	  priority	  to	  
national	  companies	  and	  national	  technology.	  	  Approval	  is	  automatic	  
whenever	  both	  cases	  apply.	  	  	  (Article	  9)	  
	  
(vii)	  If	  no	  national	  projects	  are	  available,	  national	  companies	  will	  be	  
allowed	  to	  use	  foreign	  projects	  and	  technology.	  	  	  (Article	  9)	  
	  
(viii)	  When	  no	  national	  company	  is	   in	  a	  position	  to	  supply	  a	  certain	  
product	  deemed	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  national	  economy,	  then	  a	  foreign	  
company	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  manufacture	  it	  in	  Brazil.	  	  (Article	  22)	  
	  
(ix)	   A	   Brazilian	   company	   is	   defined	   as	   one	   that	   fulfils	   both	   of	   the	  
following	  requirements:	  	  (Article	  12)	  
	  	  	  	  	  1.	  	  All	  the	  voting	  shares	  and	  at	  least	  70%	  of	  the	  total	  shares	  must	  
belong	  to	  Brazilian	  permanent	  residents.	  
	  	  	  	  	  2.	   	   The	   company	   must	   have	   full	   technological	   and	   managerial	  
autonomy.	  
	  
(x)	  These	  rules	  apply	  to	  all	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  the	  informatics	  sector,	  
including	  any	  product	  using	  digital	  technology,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  integrated	  
circuits	  and	  software.	  	  (Article	  3)	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  these	  regulations,	  the	  policy	  includes	  a	  variety	  of	  fiscal	  incentives	  
for	   the	   sector	   in	   the	   areas	   of	   research	   and	   development,	   human	   resource	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development,	  capitalisation	  of	  the	  national	  company,	  production,	  exports,	  software,	  
and	  microelectronics.	   	   Tax	   deductions	   of	   up	   to	   200	   percent	   of	   expenditure	  were	  
granted	  for	  research	  and	  development,	  the	  formation	  of	  human	  resources	  (training),	  
and	   microelectronics	   components	   produced	   by	   national	   firms.	   	   Accelerated	  
depreciation	  was	  also	  allowed	  as	  an	  incentive	  for	  capital	  expenditure	  in	  R	  &	  D	  and	  
production.	  
	   As	  the	  policy	  was	  designed	  and	  implemented,	  the	  market	  reserve	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  moving	  window	  in	  time	  (see	  Table	  4.1).	  	  In	  1977	  microcomputers	  could	  only	  be	  
produced	   with	   Brazilian	   technology	   by	   Brazilian	   firms.	   	   Minicomputers	   could	  
incorporate	   foreign	   technology,	   but	   had	   to	   be	   produced	   by	   Brazilian	   firms.	  	  
Mainframes	  were	  completely	  free	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  technology	  and	  capital.	  	  In	  
1984,	  the	  reserved	  market	  was	   'moved	  up'	  to	   include	  superminicomputers.	   	  After	  
1984,	   low–end	  minicomputers	  could	   incorporate	  only	  domestic	   technology,	  while	  
superminis	  could	  (and	  all	   in	   fact	  did)	   include	  foreign	  technology.	   	  With	  respect	  to	  
capital,	  the	  reserve	  in	  superminis	  was	  not	  complete.	  	  Both	  ABC	  Sistemas	  (Honeywell)	  
and	  Tesis	  (Hewlett–Packard)	  were	  joint	  ventures,	  though	  the	  majority	  of	  equity	  capital	  
was	  in	  national	  hands.	  
TABLE	  4.1	  
Implementation	  of	  the	  Market	  Reserve,	  1977	  &	  1984	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  1977	   	   	   	   	  	  1984	  
Product	  Segment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Capital	  	  	  Technology	   	  	  	  	  	  	   Capital	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Technology	  
Mainframes	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Free	   	  Free	   	   	  	  	  	   Free	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Free	  
Superminis	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NA	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Local/JV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  License	  
Minicomputers	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Local	   	  License	   	   Local	   	   Local	  
Microcomputers	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Local	   	  Local	   	   	  	  	  	   Local	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Local	  
	  
Impact	  of	  the	  Policy	  
	   This	  section	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  guidelines,	  beginning	  with	  an	  
overview	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   computer	   industry	   and	   its	   market.	   	   First	   the	   product	  
segments	  are	  defined,	  and	  then	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  market––its	  size	  and	  growth––
and	   the	  major	  customer	  groups	  are	  outlined.	   	  This	   is	   followed	  by	  a	  more	  specific	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evaluation	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   computer	   policy	   guidelines	  with	   respect	   to	   their	  
original	  objectives	  outlined	  above.	  
Product	  Segments	  
	   In	  broad	   terms,	   the	  computer	  electronics	  complex	  comprises	  a	  number	  of	  
product	   segments,	   including:	   	   computer	   hardware	   (mainframe,	  mini,	   and	  micro);	  
peripherals	   (video	  display	  units,	  bank	  terminals,	  point–of–sale	   terminals,	  printers,	  
magnetic	  storage	  devices,	  modems,	  etc.);	  software;	  microelectronics;	  data	  processing	  
services;	  and	  computer	  maintenance.	  	  	  
	   For	  the	  purpose	  of	  regulating	  the	  industry,	  SEI	  defined	  six	  classes	  of	  computers:	  
	  
Class	  1:	  	  microcomputers	  
Class	  2:	  	  minicomputers	  
Class	  3:	  	  small	  mainframes	  and	  superminicomputers	  
Class	  4:	  	  medium	  mainframes	  
Class	  5:	  	  large	  mainframes	  
Class	  6:	  	  very	  large	  mainframes	  
	   As	   previously	   noted,	   the	   Brazilian	   policy	   effort	   focused	   initially	   on	   the	  
minicomputer	  in	  the	  mid–seventies	  and	  was	  extended	  to	  include	  microcomputers	  and	  
peripherals.	   	   Later,	   in	   the	   eighties,	   the	   policy	   was	   extended	   further	   to	   cover	  
microelectronics	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  software,	  services,	  and	  maintenance.	  
	   Rather	  than	  attempting	  to	  cover	  each	  of	  these	  segments	  comprehensively,	  this	  
analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  areas	  that	  were	  of	  consistent	  importance	  to	  the	  policy–makers	  
from	  the	  beginning:	  	  namely,	  computer	  hardware	  and	  peripheral	  equipment.	  
Market	  Size	  
	   The	  Brazilian	  market	  for	  data	  processing	  equipment	  totalled	  $4	  billion	  in	  1986,	  
making	   it	   the	  eighth	   largest	  national	  market	   in	   the	  world.
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  While	  Brazil	   indeed	  
represented	  a	  substantial	  market,	  it	  comprised	  less	  than	  three	  percent	  of	  the	  world	  
market	  and	  less	  than	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  U.S.	  market.	  	  (See	  Table	  4.2)	  	  Moreover,	  due	  
                                                
184	  	  Informatica	  Hoje,	  March	  31,	  1987,	  p.	  20	  estimated	  $3.2	  billion;	  however	  official	  estimates	  
vary	  between	  $2.4	  billion	  and	  $4	  billion,	  depending	  primarily	  on	  whether	  and	  how	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  contraband	  market.	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to	  the	  inflated	  prices	  for	  microcomputers	  and	  peripherals,	  the	  market	  size	  in	  dollar	  
terms	  was	  somewhat	  exaggerated	  relative	  to	  the	  world	  market.	  
TABLE	  4.2	  
1986	  Computer	  Market	  Size	  (US$	  Millions)
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   Brazil	   	   World	  
Mainframes	   	   	   	   	   	   $1,100	  	   $35,125	  
Minicomputers	   	   	   	   	   $	  	  	  500	  	   $21,375	  
Microcomputers	   	   	   	   	   $	  	  	  500	  	   $24,125	  
Peripherals	   	   	   	   	   	   $	  	  	  750	  	   $59,750	  
Software	   	   	   	   	   	   $	  	  	  200	  	   $16,625	  
Maintenance	  &	  Services	   	   	   	   $1,000	  	   $44,250	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   =======	   =======	  
TOTAL	   	   	   	   	   	   $4,050	  	   $201,250	  
	  
Market	  Growth	  
	   The	  Brazilian	  market	  for	  data	  processing	  equipment	  grew,	  in	  value	  terms,	  at	  a	  
compound	  annual	  rate	  of	  16%	  from	  1979	  to	  1986.	  	  Growth	  slowed	  in	  1983	  and	  again	  
in	  1987	  due	  to	  crises	  in	  the	  country's	  economy	  in	  those	  years.	  
TABLE	  4.3	  
Evolution	  of	  Data	  Processing	  Equipment	  Sales	  in	  Brazil
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1979–1986	  (Millions	  of	  U.S.	  Dollars)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1979	  	  	   1980	  	  	  	  1981	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  CAGR	  
Total	  	  	  	  	  830	  	  	  	  	  	  	  860	  	  	  	  	  1040	  	  	  	  1508	  	  	  	  1487	  	  	  	  1728	  	  	  	  2115	  	  	  	  2375	  	  	  	  	  16.2%	  
	  
	   Market	  growth	  was	  fuelled	  primarily	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  microcomputer	  sales.	  	  
The	   relative	   importance	  of	  minicomputers	  declined	   from	  1979	   to	  1985	  while	   the	  
market	  for	  microcomputers	  experienced	  explosive	  growth.	  	  By	  1985	  the	  value	  of	  sales	  
of	  micros	  (at	  a	  much	  cheaper	  unit	  price)	  was	  almost	  three	  times	  the	  value	  of	  mini	  
sales.	  	  (See	  Table	  4.4)	  
                                                
185	  	  Sources:	  	  Datamation,	  SEI,	  ABINEE,	  ABES,	  Company	  Reports,	  author’s	  estimates.	  The	  black	  
market	  accounts	  for	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  micro	  and	  peripheral	  markets.	  
186	  	  Source:	  	  SEI,	  Panorama	  do	  Setor	  de	  Informática,	  Boletim	  Informativo,	  v.	  7,	  n.	  16,	  August	  
1987,	  p.	  8.	  Figures	  exclude	  black	  market.	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TABLE	  4.4	  
Sales	  of	  Minis	  and	  Micros
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  (Millions	  of	  Current	  Cruzeiros)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  1980	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1981	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  	  
Minis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   6,085	  	  	  	  11,350	  	  	  32,813	  	  	  	  40,698	  	  	  166,139	  	  	  	  	  502,214	  
Micros	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   1,360	  	  	  	  	  	  4,448	  	  	  20,268	  	  	  	  56,108	  	  	  247,341	  	  	  1,423,755	  
Micros/Minis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  .22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.38	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.83	  
	  
	   The	  growth	  in	  installed	  base	  also	  reflects	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  
segment.	   	  As	  shown	  in	  Table	  4.5,	   the	   installed	  base	  of	  micros	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  
annual	  rate	  of	  nearly	  68	  percent	  while	  minis	  grew	  at	  47	  percent	  from	  1977	  to	  1984.	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  larger	  mainframe	  segments	  also	  sustained	  healthy	  growth	  of	  21	  and	  
31	  percent	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  	  It	  was	  the	  smaller	  mainframes	  that	  were	  worst	  hit	  
during	  this	  period.	  	  This	  segment	  was	  squeezed	  between	  much	  cheaper,	  more	  flexible,	  
and	  comparably	  powerful	  machines	  below,	  and	  much	  more	  powerful	  machines	  above.	  	  	  
TABLE	  4.5	  
Growth	  of	  Installed	  Base	  by	  Class,	  1977	  to	  1984
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   Class	   	   	   	   Average	  Annual	  Growth	  (%)	  
	   	  	  	  	  1	   	   	   	   	   	   67.8	  
	   	  	  	  	  2	   	   	   	   	   	   46.6	  
	   	  	  	  	  3	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  9.3	  
	   	  	  	  	  4	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  3.3	  
	   	  	  	  	  5	   	   	   	   	   	   31.4	  
	   	  	  	  	  6	   	   	   	   	   	   21.3	  
	   Total	   	   	   	   	   	   58.6	  
	  
Market	  Segments	  
	   Financial	   services	   companies	   were	   the	   largest	   users	   of	   data	   processing	  
equipment	  in	  Brazil.	  	  These	  were	  followed	  by	  data	  processing	  bureaux,	  of	  which	  the	  
largest	  were	  government–owned	  and	  operated.	  	  Together	  these	  two	  market	  segments	  
                                                
187	  	  SEI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  68.	  
188	  	  SEI,	  Boletim	  Informativo,	  14	  (September	  1985),	  p.	  11.	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accounted	  for	  over	  a	  third	  of	  the	  installed	  microcomputers,	  nearly	  half	  of	  mainframes,	  
and	  80	  percent	  of	  minis	  and	  superminicomputers.	  	  (See	  Table	  4.6)	  
TABLE	  4.6	  
Market	  Segments'	  Shares	  of	  Installed	  Base,	  1987	  (%)
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Segment	   	  	  	  	  	  Mainframes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Minis/Supers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  PCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8–bit	  Micros	  
Finance	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	   	   	  	  	  	  	  66	   	  	  	   	  	  19	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  
Data	  Processing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	   	   	  	  	  	  	  14	   	  	  	   	  	  17	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  
	  
	   Table	  4.7	  shows	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  importance	  played	  by	  the	  financial	  sector.	  	  
The	  strong	  increase	  in	  this	  segment's	  share	  of	  the	  market	  in	  1982	  reflects	  the	  banks'	  
increased	  expenditure	  on	  banking	  automation	  equipment	  supplied	  by	  the	  national	  
industry.	   	   By	   1985,	   however,	   the	  banks	  were	   slowing	  down	   their	   expenditure	  on	  
automation	  and	  their	  share	  declined	  slightly.	  	  The	  growing	  importance	  of	  the	  industrial	  
segment	   reflects	   the	   increase	   in	   demand	   for	   process	   control	   and	   automation	  
equipment	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ongoing	  demand	  for	  more	  traditional	  electronic	  equipment.	  	  	  
TABLE	  4.7	  
Market	  Segments'	  Shares	  of	  Annual	  Sales	  (%)
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Segment	   	   1980	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1981	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  
Finance	   	   20.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28.0	  
Industry	   	   26.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32.5	  
Commerce	   	   34.5*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37.9*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18.3	  
Services	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.7	  
Government	   	   17.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.5	  
	  
Notes:	  	  *	  includes	  services;	  all	  data	  excludes	  purchases	  of	  equipment	  from	  TNCs.	  
	  
	   On	  the	  surface,	  the	  government's	  share	  seems	  relatively	  small	  at	  12.5	  percent.	  	  
However,	  one	  must	  bear	  in	  mind	  two	  points	  that	  conspire	  to	  keep	  the	  figure	  low.	  	  
Firstly,	  the	  figure	  excludes	  state–owned	  financial	  institutions.	  	  If	  these	  are	  included,	  
                                                
189	  	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  "500	  Maiores	  Usuarios	  de	  Informatica,"	  11.107	  (April	  1987),	  p.	  23.	  	  After	  
data	   processing	   bureaus,	   the	   next	   four	   segments	   were	   chemicals	   &	   pharmaceuticals,	  
commercial	  firms	  (retail	  outlets,	  distribution),	  civil	  construction,	  and	  public	  services.	  
190	  	  SEI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  44.	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the	   government's	   share	   in	   1985	   rises	   to	   nearly	   a	   quarter	   of	   the	   total	  market.
191	  
Secondly,	   the	  figures	  reflect	  only	  purchases	  from	  national	   firms,	   leaving	  aside	  the	  
mainframe	  market.	  	  The	  government	  and	  its	  enterprises	  are	  the	  prime	  users	  of	  these	  
large,	  expensive	  machines.	  	  All	  things	  considered,	  the	  government––federal,	  state,	  and	  
municipal––is	  the	  largest	  customer	  group	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	  
	  
	   This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  Brazil's	  policy	  successes	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  computer	  
electronics	  complex	  are	  more	  limited	  than	  the	  authors	  reviewed	  in	  the	  introductory	  
chapter	  have	  suggested.	  	  The	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  "success"	  is	  the	  development	  of	  
the	   industry	   with	   respect	   to	   each	   of	   the	   six	   policy	   objectives	   (elaborated	   in	   the	  
previous	  section)	  that	  remained	  fundamentally	  in	  tact	  from	  the	  mid–1970s	  through	  
the	  1980s.	  
1.	  To	  Control	  the	  Process	  of	  Informatization	  
	   Advances	   in	   information	   technology	   underlie	   the	   development	   of	   all	  
technological	   innovation.	   Information	  technology	  is	  clearly	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
enablers	  of	  increased	  economic	  productivity	  and	  therefore	  growth.	  The	  "process	  of	  
informatization,"	  can	  be	  described	  as	  the	  process	  by	  which	  information	  technology	  is	  
developed	  and	  used,	  transforming	  the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  social	  structures	  of	  
society.
192	  	  This	  first	  policy	  objective,	  thus,	  is	  a	  general	  and	  very	  ambitious	  goal	  that	  is	  
critical	   to	   the	   development	   goals	   of	   the	   country	   as	   a	   whole.	   It’s	   a	   goal	   that	  
encompasses	   the	   five	   that	   follow,	   and	   is	   especially	   linked	   to	   the	   second	   goal––
technological	   autonomy––a	  prerequisite	   to	   any	   real	   ‘control’	   over	   the	   process	   of	  
informatization.	  	  As	  such	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  a	  rigorous	  discussion	  of	  this	  very	  general	  
policy	  goal,	  preferring	  to	  focus	  instead	  on	  the	  specifics	  further	  below.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  
overriding	  policy	  objective,	  it	  warrants	  some	  discussion	  here.	  
                                                
191	  	  Ibid.,	  23.9	  percent	  of	  total,	  to	  be	  exact.	  
192	  	  Adapted	  from	  Simon	  Nora	  and	  Alain	  Minc,	  The	  Computerization	  of	  Society:	  	  A	  Report	  to	  
the	  President	  of	  France,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  	  MIT	  Press,	  1980).	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   Technological	  innovations	  introduced	  into	  Brazil	  up	  to	  the	  early	  seventies	  had	  
originated	  largely	  from	  abroad.	  	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  increasing	  concern	  that	  a	  few	  
foreign	  companies	  led	  by	  IBM	  would	  control	  this	  strategic	  industrial	  sector.	  	  Thus,	  from	  
the	  beginnings	  of	  an	  informatics	  policy	  in	  the	  1960s,	  there	  was	  an	  awareness	  in	  Brazil	  
among	   those	   in	   a	   position	   to	   influence	   policy	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   computer	  
technology	  to	  national	  independence.	  	  Firstly,	  that	  awareness	  prompted	  the	  military	  
to	  seek	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  technological	  capability	  in	  a	  sector	  that	  was	  deemed	  vital	  
to	   national	   security.	   	   Later,	   as	   more	   and	   more	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy	   became	  
dependent	   upon	   computer	   technology,	   the	   need	   to	   control	   this	   process	   of	  
informatization	  (or	  "computerization")	  was	  felt	  by	  a	  large	  cross–section	  of	  Brazilian	  
policy–makers.	  	  	  
	   Control	   over	   the	   process	   of	   informatization	   thus	   became	   associated	   with	  
sovereignty	  and	  Brazil’s	  development	  goals.	  	  As	  explained	  earlier,	  the	  historic	  means	  to	  
achieving	  development	  in	  Brazil	  had	  been	  through	  state	  direction	  and	  control.	  	  The	  
computer	  industry	  was	  approached	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   By	  virtue	  of	  the	  strong	  regulatory	  powers	  exercised	  by	  SEI	  (and	  CAPRE	  before	  
it),	  and	  the	  legislative	  interest	  of	  Congress	  in	  this	  sector	  of	  the	  economy,	  the	  Brazilian	  
state	  made	  a	  valiant	  attempt	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  the	  informatization	  process	  in	  
the	  country.	  	  The	  state	  exercised	  considerable	  skill	  in	  creating	  a	  greenhouse	  for	  local	  
capital	  to	  invest,	  obtain	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  computer	  industry	  and	  develop	  technological	  
capacities	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s.	   However,	   the	   state	   was	   not	   able	   to	   legislate	  
technological	   autonomy.	   Indeed,	   as	   will	   be	   discussed	  more	   fully	   later,	   the	   rapid	  
development	   of	   the	   globalized	   industry	   structure	   with	   international	   technology	  
standards	  controlled	  by	  a	  few	  TNCs	  like	  IBM,	  Microsoft	  and	  Intel,	  put	  the	  ‘control	  over	  
the	  informatization	  process’	  increasingly	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  policymakers.	  	  	  	  
2.	  Technological	  Autonomy	  
	   The	  second	  goal	  was	  the	  prime	  focus	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  From	  the	  early	  days,	  policy	  
makers	  aimed	  to	  develop	  a	  Brazilian	  capability	  in	  information	  technology	  that	  would	  
ensure	  the	  design,	  development	  and	  production	  of	  electronic	  equipment	  and	  software	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in	  Brazil.	  	  Explaining	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  market	  reserve,	  Colonel	  Dytz,	  one	  of	  the	  
architects	  of	  the	  policy	  and	  later	  head	  of	  SEI,	  put	  it	  simply:	  “Local	  companies	  will	  not	  
develop	  their	  own	  products	  as	  long	  as	  copying	  foreign	  products	  is	  much	  easier.”193	  In	  
short,	  the	  overarching	  goal	  was	  technological	  autonomy.	  	  	  
	   Technological	   autonomy	   is	   sometimes	   confused	   with	   technological	   self–
sufficiency.	   	   It	   is	   crucial	   not	   to	  make	   the	   same	  mistake	   here.	   	   Self–sufficiency	   in	  
computer	  electronics	  is	  a	  recognised	  impossibility;	  not	  just	  for	  Brazil,	  but	  for	  most	  if	  
not	  all	  countries.	  	  Autonomy,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  connotes	  an	  independence	  of	  choice	  
and	   a	   freedom	   of	   control.	   	   Technological	   autonomy	   thus	   requires	   a	   level	   of	  
technological	   competence	   that	   facilitates	   control	   over	   the	   areas	   and	   degrees	   of	  
technological	  interdependence.	  	  	  
	   Measures	  of	  technological	  autonomy	  include	  the	  establishment	  of	  national	  
informatics	   firms	   that	   are	   in	   fact	   designing,	   developing,	   and	  producing	   electronic	  
equipment	   in	   Brazil.	   	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   a	   credible	   Brazilian	   capability	   in	  
information	  technology	  developed	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy.	  	  	  
	   The	  most	  striking	  example	  of	  this	  fact	  was	  Cobra’s	  independent	  development	  
of	  SOX	  –	  a	  legally	  legitimate	  clone	  of	  UNIX,	  the	  leading	  computer	  operating	  system,	  
together	  with	  corresponding	  software	  applications	  and	  utilities.	  The	  Brazilian	  state	  
flagship	  company	  dedicated	  $20	  million	  and	  50	  software	  engineers	  for	  six	  years	  to	  
build	  and	  test	  SOX,	  which	  was	  internationally	  recognised	  and	  certified	  in	  1989.	  As	  a	  
demonstration	  of	  technological	  autonomy	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time,	  SOX	  is	  a	  powerful	  
example.	  As	  a	  commercial	  product,	  it	  was	  a	  failure	  that	  was	  abandoned	  shortly	  after	  it	  
was	  certified.	  Itautec’s	  banking	  automation	  products	  are	  a	  commercially	  successful	  
example	  of	  technological	  autonomy,	  however.	  	  
	   Table	   3.8	   shows	   the	   phenomenal	   growth	   in	   the	   number	   of	   national	   firms	  
established	  in	  the	  industry	  after	  1977.	  	  As	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  firms	  
                                                
193	  Author	  interview	  with	  Colonel	  Edison	  Dytz,	  Secretary	  General,	  SEI,	  October	  1987.	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participating	  in	  the	  industry,	  national	  firms	  increased	  from	  less	  than	  10	  percent	  in	  
1977	  to	  90	  percent	  in	  1986.	  	  	  
	   More	  importantly,	  these	  national	  firms	  have	  not	  been	  simple	  marketers	  of	  
foreign–designed	   and	   foreign–made	   equipment	   either.	   	   In	   video	   display	   units,	  
microcomputers,	  and	  minicomputers,	  these	  firms	  achieved	  nationalisation	  indices	  of	  
between	  85	  percent	  and	  98	  percent.	  	  (In	  printers	  the	  nationalisation	  indices	  have	  been	  




Selected	  Performance	  Indicators	  of	  Brazilian	  Informatics	  Firms
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  1977	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1980	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  
1.	  Number	  of	  Firms	  Registered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  310	  
	  	  	  	  Percent	  of	  Total	  (%)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	   	  <10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  
	  
2.	  Expenditure	  in	  R&D	  (US$	  m)	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  154	  
	  	  	  	  R&D	  Expenditure/Sales	  (%)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.1	  
	  	  	  	  R&D	  Expenditure/Employee	  (US$)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4,130	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4,260	  	  	  	  	  	  3,850	  
	  
3.	  Employees	  in	  R&D	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,200	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2,045	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4,900	  
	  	  	  	  R&D	  Employees/Total	  (%)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12.2	  
	  
	   Table	   4.8	   also	   shows	   the	   increase	   in	   expenditure	   on	   research	   and	  
development,	  which	  is	  an	  important	  means	  to	  technological	  autonomy.	  	  The	  Brazilian	  
firms	  spent	  just	  over	  10	  percent	  of	  total	  sales	  on	  research	  and	  development,	  which	  is	  
comparable	  to	  the	  levels	  spent	  in	  the	  OECD	  countries.	  	  
	   However,	  there	  are	  some	  disturbing	  implications	  from	  the	  statistics	  in	  Table	  
4.8.	   	  Firstly,	   the	   total	  expenditure	  on	  R&D	  of	  US$154	   in	  1986	   is	  a	  very	  small	   sum	  
indeed,	  especially	  considering	  that	  the	  amount	  is	  spread	  across	  some	  310	  firms.	  	  IBM	  
alone	  spent	  more	  than	  thirty	  times	  that	  amount	  on	  R&D	  worldwide	  in	  1986.	  	  The	  rapid	  
pace	   of	   technological	   change	   dictates	   a	   massive	   investment	   in	   research	   and	  
development	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  international	  industry.	  	  For	  this	  investment	  to	  be	  
                                                
194
ABICOMP/SBC,	  A	  Política	  Nacional	  de	  Informática,	  a	  Industria	  Nacional	  e	  o	  Desenvolvimento	  
Tecnológico,	  May	  1984,	  referenced	  in	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  pp.	  72–73.	  
195	  	  Source:	  	  Piragibe,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  Figure	  VI.	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economically	  viable,	  a	  large	  sales	  volume	  over	  which	  to	  amortize	  the	  investment	  is	  
required.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  export	  success	  by	  the	  national	  industry	  (see	  later)	  means	  that	  
the	  national	  companies	  are	  limited	  to	  the	  domestic	  market––a	  market	  too	  small	  to	  
support	  the	  investment	  necessary	  to	  support	  significant	  investment	  in	  R&D.	  	  And	  so	  
the	  vicious	  cycle	  continued.	  	  	  
	   Secondly,	  both	   the	  R&D	  spending	  per	  employee	  and	  R&D	  employees	  as	  a	  
percent	   of	   total	   have	   decreased	   from	   1983	   to	   1986.	   	   This	   reflects	   the	   increased	  
economic	  pressure	  on	  the	  national	  firms	  in	  1986	  with	  the	  general	  slowdown	  in	  the	  
market.	  	  In	  times	  of	  economic	  hardship,	  investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  is	  
more	  easily	  sacrificed	  than	  in	  areas	  necessary	  for	  near-­‐term	  survival	  and	  success.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Technological	   autonomy	   requires	   the	   capability	   to	  assimilate	  as	  well	   as	   to	  
adapt,	  extend,	  and	   improve	  upon	   imported	  technology.	   	  Without	  doubt,	  Brazilian	  
companies	  have	  adapted,	  extended,	  and	   in	  some	  cases,	   improved	  upon	   imported	  
technology.	   	   In	   the	   area	  of	   banking	   automation	   the	   industry	   can	  be	   said	   to	  have	  
demonstrated	  credible	  innovation.	  	  	  
	   However,	  Brazil	  was	  not	  able	  to	  'assimilate'	  foreign	  technology	  rapidly	  enough	  
to	   meet	   the	   requirements	   of	   its	   own	   market,	   let	   alone	   the	   export	   market.	   	   A	  
technology	  gap	  of	  between	  one	  and	  five	  years	  remained	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  	  In	  
minicomputer	  technology,	  Brazil	  opted	  for	  a	  second	  round	  of	  technology	  licenses	  to	  
catch	  up	  to	  where	  the	  international	  market	  had	  been	  already	  for	  some	  time.	  	  Even	  in	  
microcomputers,	   Brazilian	   companies	   continued	   to	   supply	   their	   market	   with	  
equipment	  that	  cost	  three	  times	  as	  much	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  international	  market.	  	  (See	  
Table	  2.5,	  previous	  chapter).	  	  	  
	   As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  national	  manufacturers	  to	  satisfy	  domestic	  
demand,	  the	  market	  made	  concerted	  efforts	  to	  sidestep	  the	  restrictive	  government	  
regulations.	  	  These	  efforts	  were	  reflected	  in	  the	  large	  and	  rapidly	  growing	  contraband	  
trade	  in	  professional	  electronic	  equipment	  and	  software.	  
	   While	  satisfying	  market	  demand	  in	  terms	  of	  levels	  of	  technology,	  supply,	  and	  
price	  was	  never	  an	  explicit	  policy	  objective,	  the	  inability	  to	  satisfy	  the	  market	  inhibited	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the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  technological	  autonomy,	  national	  market	  share,	  
and	  trade	  balance.	  
	   Furthermore,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  technology	  of	  the	  computer	  exists	  in	  the	  
design	   and	   diffusion	   of	   the	   integrated	   circuits	   and	   the	   operating	   software,	   Brazil	  
remained	  largely	  dependent	  upon	  the	  international	  supply	  of	  technology.	  	  The	  engine	  
of	   high	   tech	   innovation	   in	   the	   industry	   was	   still	   largely	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   foreign	  
companies.	  
3.	  Increased	  Employment	  
	   That	  the	  third	  objective	  listed	  above––the	  creation	  of	  employment,	  particularly	  
for	  Brazilian	  engineers	  and	  technicians––has	  been	  achieved	  is	  beyond	  question.	  	  Even	  
though	  much	  of	  this	  growth	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  explosion	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  
market	  since	  1981,	  it	  can	  be	  convincingly	  argued	  that	  national	  employment	  would	  not	  
have	  grown	  so	  much	  had	  the	  market	  reserve	  not	  existed.	  	  It	  was	  government	  policy	  
that	  put	  Brazilian	  firms	  in	  a	  position	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  rapid	  growth	  in	  this	  new	  
market.	  
	   In	   terms	   of	   generating	   employment,	   the	   market	   reserve	   policy	   was	   an	  
undisputable	  success,	  even	  though	  the	  transnationals	  reduced	  their	  payroll	  by	  nearly	  
40%.	  	  The	  Brazilian	  companies	  added	  employees	  faster	  than	  their	  sales	  grew	  from	  
1981	  to	  1986,	  and	  employed	  almost	  five	  times	  as	  many	  people	  as	  the	  TNCs	  in	  1986.	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TABLE	  4.9	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  1981	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  
	  	  	  
National	  	  	  	  	   	  	  8,800	  	  	  	  	  12,584	  	  	  	  	  15,734	  	  	  	  	  21,840	  	  	  	  	  27,739	  	  	  	  	  34,586	  	  	  
TNCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12,200	  	  	  	  	  11,797	  	  	  	  	  10,010	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9,684	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7,382	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7,425	  	  	  
Total	  	  	  	  	  	  	   21,000	  	  	  	  	  24,381	  	  	  	  	  25,744	  	  	  	  	  31,524	  	  	  	  	  35,121	  	  	  	  	  42,011	  	  	  
	  
	   A	  specific	  goal	  of	  the	  CAPRE	  technicians	  was	  to	  generate	  employment	  at	  the	  
graduate	  level	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  production	  and	  development.	  	  At	  this	  the	  policy	  has	  also	  
had	  success.	  Table	  4.10	  supports	  Colonel	  Dytz’	  assertion	  that	  “Brazilian	  companies	  put	  
college	  graduates	  into	  R&D,	  whereas	  the	  multinationals	  put	  them	  into	  sales.”197	  
TABLE	  4.10	  
Graduate	  Level	  Employment	  by	  Activity
198
	  
Number	  of	  Employees	  per	  US$100	  Million	  Sales	  
	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  1981	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Activity	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   Nat.	  	  	  	  	  	  TNC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Nat.	  	  	  	  	  	  TNC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Production	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  75	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   112	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Development	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   225	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   189	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sales	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	  84	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   141	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Maintenance*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  64	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  33	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Administration	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   122	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   115	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Total**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   561	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  381	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   632	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  298	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
*per	  $100	  million	  of	  installed	  base	  
**excluding	  maintenance	  
	   The	  only	  qualification	  one	  can	  make	  with	  regard	  to	  employment	  is	  a	  question	  
about	  its	  longevity.	   	  With	  economic	  trouble	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  industry,	  
Brazil	  was	  set	  to	  experience	  a	  decline	  in	  employment	  in	  the	  sector	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  
4.	  Limit	  TNC	  Market	  Shares	  	  	  
	   The	  fourth	  objective	  was	  to	  limit	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  TNCs	  in	  general––and	  
IBM	  in	  particular––in	  order	  to	  ensure	  a	  leading	  position	  for	  national	  companies	  in	  the	  
                                                
196
	  	  SEI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  14.	  
197	  Author	  interview	  with	  Colonel	  Edison	  Dytz,	  Secretary	  General,	  SEI,	  October	  1987.	  
198
	  	  Ibid.	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domestic	  market.	  	  The	  market	  reserve,	  by	  definition,	  accomplished	  this.	  	  The	  market	  
shares	  of	  the	  TNCs	  taken	  as	  a	  whole	  necessarily	  decreased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reserve	  in	  
the	  micro	  and	  minicomputer	  markets.	  	  TNCs'	  share	  of	  the	  equipment	  market	  fell	  from	  
77	  percent	  in	  1979	  to	  45	  percent	  in	  1986,	  their	  addressed	  market	  limited	  to	  the	  large	  
computer	  segment.	  	  (See	  Table	  4.11)	  	  
TABLE	  4.11	  
Evolution	  of	  Data	  Processing	  Equipment	  Sales	  in	  Brazil
199
	  
1979–1986	  (Millions	  of	  U.S.	  Dollars)	  
	  
	   1979	  	  	  1980	  	  	  1981	  	  	  1982	  	  	  1983	  	  	  1984	  	  	  1985	  	  	  1986	  	  	  CAGR	  
National	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  190	  	  	  	  	  280	  	  	  	  	  370	  	  	  	  	  558	  	  	  	  	  687	  	  	  	  	  847	  	  	  1082	  	  	  	  1315	  	  	  	  31.8%	  
TNCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  640	  	  	  	  	  580	  	  	  	  	  670	  	  	  	  	  950	  	  	  	  	  800	  	  	  	  	  881	  	  	  1033	  	  	  	  1060	  	  	  	  	  	  7.5%	  
Total	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  830	  	  	  	  	  860	  	  	  1040	  	  	  1508	  	  	  1487	  	  	  1728	  	  	  2115	  	  	  	  2375	  	  	  	  16.2%	  
TNC	  SHARE	  	  	  	   	  	  	  77%	  	  	  	  67%	  	  	  	  64%	  	  	  	  63%	  	  	  54%	  	  	  	  51%	  	  	  	  	  49%	  	  	  	  	  45%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   In	   turn,	   several	   important	   national	   informatics	   firms	   developed	   since	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	   	  Table	  4.12	   lists	  these	  major	  groups	  and	  their	  
involvement	  in	  different	  segments	  of	  the	  electronics	  industrial	  complex.	  
	   The	  policy	  also	  had	  success	  in	  decreasing	  IBM's	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  	  From	  
1981	  to	  1986,	  when	  the	  market	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  annual	  rate	  of	  16	  percent,	  IBM's	  
sales	  grew	  at	  four	  percent	  per	  annum.	  	  IBM's	  relative	  share	  of	  the	  market––that	  is	  the	  
company's	  share	  as	  a	  multiple	  of	  the	  share	  of	  its	  nearest	  competitor––was	  reduced	  
from	  5.5	  to	  3.5	  in	  the	  same	  period.	  	  (Refer	  to	  Table	  4.13)	  
                                                
199	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  8.	  
        146 
TABLE	  4.12	  
Principle	  National	  Informatics	  Groups,	  1987
200
	  
Parent	  	  	  	  Computers	  	  Components	  	  Peripherals	  	  	  Telecom	  	  	  	  Consumer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Electronics	  
Sharp	  	  	  	  	  	  SID	  Infor–	  	  	  	  	  	  SID	  Micro–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Digilab*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  SID	  Tel–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Sharp	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  matica	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  eletronica	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ecom/NEC	  	  	  
	  
Docas	  de	  	  Elebra	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Elebra	  Mic–	  	  	  	  	  	  Elebra	  In–	  	  	  	  Elebra	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  
Santos	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  roeletronica	  	  	  	  	  	  formatica	  	  	  	  Telecom	  
	  
Itau	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Itautec	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Itaucom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Itautec	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Itautec	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  
	  
Acrescimo	  	  Polymax	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Eletrodigi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  E.E.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  
	  
ABC	  Sis–	  	  	  ABC	  Bull*	  	  	  	  	  	  ABC–Xtal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ABC	  Tele–	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  
temas	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  informatica	  
	  
Gradiente	  	  	  	  Digiplay	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Gradiente	  
	  
	   Yet	   a	   relative	   market	   share	   of	   3.5	   remains	   impressive.	   IBM	   continued	   to	  
dominate	   the	  Brazilian	   computer	   industry	   in	   terms	  of	  both	   sales	   and	  profitability	  
despite	   the	   market	   reserve	   that	   relegated	   the	   company	   to	   the	   slower–growing	  
mainframe	  segment	  of	  the	  market.	  	  IBM	  and	  Unisys	  together	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  
US$	  1	  billion	  in	  total	  sales.	  	  Even	  discounting	  IBM’s	  and	  Unisys’	  combined	  exports	  of	  
US$145	  million	  in	  1986,	  together	  these	  two	  TNCs	  were	  larger	  than	  the	  next	  twelve	  
national	  companies	  combined.	  	  The	  policy	  succeeded	  in	  limiting	  the	  TNCs'	  shares,	  but	  
it	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  securing	  a	  leading	  position	  in	  the	  industry	  for	  the	  national	  firms.	  
	   Interestingly,	  the	  TNCs	  held	  on	  to	  their	  share	  of	  the	  government	  business	  more	  
effectively.	  	  In	  1986,	  TNC	  equipment	  accounted	  for	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  installed	  base	  of	  
computer	  equipment	  in	  government	  (value	  terms),	  down	  just	  five	  percentage	  points	  
from	   1983.
201
	   	   This	   not	   only	   reflects	   the	   government	   demand	   for	   mainframe	  
computers.	  	  It	  also	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  government	  agencies	  and	  enterprises	  
                                                
200
	  	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  66.	  *	  denotes	  joint	  venture	  with	  a	  foreign	  firm.	  
201
	  	  Piragibe,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  Figure	  IX. 
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(most	  notably	  the	  military)	  were	  able	  to	  circumvent	  the	  market	  reserve	  for	  items	  and	  
services	  of	  "strategic	  necessity."	  
	   The	  most	  successful	  Brazilian	  companies	  were	  partly	  owned	  by	  banking	  groups	  
that	  provided	  them	  with	  captive	  markets	  for	  banking	  automation	  equipment.	  	  (See	  
Table	  4.13)	  	  The	  commercial	  difficulties	  experienced	  by	  the	  state	  flagship,	  Cobra,	  were	  
noted	   previously.	   Table	   4.13	   shows	   that	   Cobra	   was	   the	   only	   major	   player	   to	  
experience	  a	  decline	  in	  sales	  from	  1981	  to	  1986.	  
TABLE	  4.13	  
Manufacturers	  of	  Computers	  and	  Peripherals	  (US$	  Millions)
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   1986	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  1981	  
Company	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Ownership	  	  	  	  Rank	  	  	   Sales	  	  	  	  	  ROS~	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Rank	  	  	  	  Sales	  
IBM	  Brasil	  	  	  	  	   Foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  1	  	  	  	  	  	   812	  	  	  	   	  	  18.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  671	  
Unisys	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  2	  	  	  	  	   235	  	  	  	   	  	  	  NA	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	   	  162*	  
Itautec**	  	  	  	  	  	   Corp/Finan	  	  	  	  	  	   	  3	  	  	  	  	  	   147	  	  	  	   	  	  11.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  
SID**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Corp/Finan	  	  	  	  	  	   	  4	  	  	  	  	  	   116	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  4.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  
Cobra	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   State/Finan	  	  	  	  	   	  5	  	  	  	  	  	   110	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  2.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	   	  121	  	  
Elebra**	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Corp/Finan	  	  	  	  	  	   	  6	  	  	  	  	  	   103	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  2.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  
Scopus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Owner/Mgr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  73	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  4.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  
Microtec	  	  	  	  	  	   Owner/Mgr	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  43	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  6.3	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  
Labo	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Mgr/Finan	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  9	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  42	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  8.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  
Sisco	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Mgr/Corp	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  41	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  0.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  22	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  
	  
~ROS	  =	  Percent	  return–on–sales	  (net	  profit/total	  sales)	  in	  1986.	  
*Unisys	  1981	  sales	  are	  the	  total	  of	  Burroughs	  and	  Sperry.	  
**Sales	  of	  Itautec,	  SID,	  and	  Elebra	  comprise	  computers,	  peripherals,	  and	  components.	  
Providers	  of	  data	  processing	  services	  have	  been	  excluded.	  
	   The	  Brazilian	  computer	  industry	  became	  increasingly	  fragmented	  as	  many	  firms	  
entered	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  The	  average	  Brazilian	  computer	  
firm	  sold	  less	  than	  US$	  5	  million	  worth	  of	  equipment	  in	  1985.	  	  The	  five	  largest	  national	  
firms,	   which	   accounted	   for	   nearly	   90	   percent	   of	   the	   national	   market	   in	   1979,	  
accounted	   for	   less	   than	  half	   of	   the	  market	   in	   1985.	   	   (See	   Table	   4.14)	   	  While	   the	  
increased	  competition	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  good	  thing,	  in	  fact	  it	  did	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  the	  
                                                
202	  	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  "150	  Maiores	  Empresas	  de	  Informatica,"	  v.	  12,	  n.	  111,	  August	  1987;	  and	  
Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  "50	  Maiores	  no	  Brasil,"	  v.	  7,	  (December	  1981).	  	  Brazilian	  currency	  converted	  to	  
US	  dollars	  using	  average	  annual	  exchange	  rates	  published	  in	  Lloyds	  Bank,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1986.	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national	   firms,	   which	   lacked	   sufficient	   size	   to	   capitalise	   on	   the	   substantial	   scale	  
economies	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  industry.	  
TABLE	  4.14	  
Industry	  Concentration	  (Brazilian	  Companies	  Only)
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   1979	  	  	  	  	  1980	  	  	  	  	  	  1981	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  1985	  
5	  Largest	  	  	  	  	  	  	   88.8%	  	  	  	  65.8%	  	  	  53.6%	  	  	  51.1%	  	  	  46.4%	  	  	  47.4%	  	  	  45.8%	  
10	  Largest	  	  	  	  	  	   98.0%	  	  	  	  83.2%	  	  	  77.5%	  	  	  73.1%	  	  	  65.8%	  	  	  67.5%	  	  	  64.7%	  
	   In	  1987,	   the	  Brazilian	   companies	  experienced	   significant	   losses	  due	   to	   the	  
downturn	  in	  the	  country's	  economy,	  the	  resultant	  slowdown	  of	  the	  domestic	  market,	  
the	  increase	  in	  finance	  costs,	  and	  the	  companies'	  high	  levels	  of	  indebtedness.	  	  Itautec	  
was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  Brazilian	  companies	  to	  make	  a	  profit	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1987	  
thanks	  to	  a	  large	  export	  order.	  
TABLE	  4.15	  
Performance	  of	  Selected	  National	  Companies
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January	  to	  June	  1987	  (Cz$	  Millions)	  
	  
	   Company	   	   	  	  	  Total	  Sales	  	   	   Losses	  
	   SID	  Informatica	   	   777.9	   	   563.7	  
	   Scopus	  	   	   	   636.3	   	   392.0	  
	   Datamec	   	   	   605.7	   	   280.9	  
	   Edisa	   	   	   	   479.9	   	   232.4	  
	   Labo	   	   	   	   533.7	   	   207.5	  
	   Racimec	   	   	   341.2	   	   	  	  78.5	  
	   This	  highlights	  the	  economic	  vulnerability	  of	  these	  companies	  individually,	  and	  
the	  national	  industry	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  The	  companies	  simply	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  invest	  in	  
R&D	  or	  expand	  their	  distribution	  channels.	  	  As	  one	  SEI	  official	  put	  it,	  if	  the	  industry	  did	  
not	  continue	  to	  grow	  at	  30–35	  percent	  per	  year,	  	  
	  
"the	  market	  reserve	  will	  be	  impotent	  in	  avoiding	  the	  slow	  asphyxiation	  
of	   national	   manufacturers	   due	   to	   the	   economic	   crisis	   and,	   when	  
                                                
203	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  30.	  
204	  	  "Um	  primeiro	  semestre	  pintado	  do	  vermelho,"	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  v.	  12,	  n.	  113,	  (October	  
1987),	  p.	  28.	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protection	  by	  law	  ends	  in	  1992,	  the	  local	   industry	  will	  not	  have	  the	  




	   The	   banks	   had	   to	  move	   again	   to	   save	   the	   national	   industry	   by	   buying	   up	  
companies	  and	  forcing	  consolidation	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  In	  1989	  Bradesco	  (via	  Digilab)	  
bought	  70	  percent	  of	  Scopus,	  and	  Unibanco	  bought	  Labo	  and	  Medidata.	  	  Meanwhile,	  
Citibank	   increased	   its	   equity	   share	   in	   Elebra	   to	   22	   percent.	   	   SEI	   welcomed	   this	  
consolidation,	  seeing	  it	  as	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  the	  local	  industry	  could	  survive	  and	  
compete	  with	  the	  TNCs.	  
	   In	   summary,	   the	   informatics	   policy	   in	   general,	   and	   the	  market	   reserve	   in	  
particular,	  succeeded	  in	  limiting	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  IBM	  and	  the	  TNCs.	  	  This	  created	  
space	  for	  a	   large	  number	  of	  Brazilian	   firms	  to	  stake	  out	  a	  position	   in	  the	  growing	  
market.	  	  In	  particular,	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  economic	  groups	  developed	  more	  or	  less	  
integrated	  operations	   in	   the	   sector.	   	  However,	   the	  national	   firms	  were	  unable	   to	  
challenge	  IBM's	  overall	  leadership	  in	  the	  market,	  either	  in	  sales	  or	  profitability.	  Their	  
lack	   of	   scale	   and	   dependence	   on	   imported	   components	   made	   national	   groups	  
vulnerable	  competitors.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  late	  1980s’	  market	  slowdown	  forced	  a	  growing	  
number	  of	  national	  companies	  to	  shut	  down	  or	  sell	  out	  to	  larger	  conglomerates	  led	  by	  
the	  private	  financial	  institutions.	  	  	  
5.	  Balance	  of	  Trade	  
	   Fifthly,	  the	  policy	  sought	  to	  achieve	  a	  favourable	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector.	  	  
At	  first	  sight,	  SEI's	  figures	  seem	  to	  indicate	  some	  success	  with	  this	  objective	  while	  the	  
reserve	  policy	  was	  in	  force.	  	  Within	  the	  industry	  itself	  there	  was	  a	  rough	  balance	  of	  
trade	  in	  1986.	  	  Imports	  of	  components	  and	  capital	  equipment	  amounted	  to	  US$253	  
million	  while	  exports	  totalled	  $246	  million.
206	  	  	  
	  
                                                
205	  	  Frederico	  Monteiro	  of	  SEI,	  quoted	  in	  Latin	  American	  Newsletters	  Regional	  Reports:	  	  Brazil,	  
"Harder	  Times	  for	  the	  Computer	  Sector,"	  p.	  7.	  
206	  	  Import	  figures	  from	  SEI	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  11;	  exports	  from	  Cacex	  and	  reported	  in	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  
September	  1987,	  p.	  56.	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TABLE	  4.16	  
Imports	  (Millions	  of	  US	  Dollars)
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  1981	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  
National	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  81	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  
TNCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  223	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  179	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  178	  
Total	  Imports	  	  	  	  304	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  258	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  228	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  277	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  270	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  253	  
	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  accomplishment	  of	  the	  policy,	  reflecting	  not	  only	  the	  stringent	  
import	  restrictions,	  but	  also	  the	  partial	  success	  of	  national	  component	  suppliers.	  	  	  
	   However,	  when	  the	  informatics	  imports	  by	  firms	  and	  organizations	  outside	  the	  
industry	  are	  added	  to	  account	  for	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector	  as	  a	  whole,	  a	  different	  
picture	  emerges.	  In	  1987,	  total	  imports	  were	  approximately	  $1	  billion,	  compared	  to	  
exports	  of	  $246	  million.
	  208
	  	  	  
TABLE	  4.17	  
External	  Trade	  in	  Informatics	  (US$	  Millions)
209
	  
	   Year	   	   Exports	   	   Imports	   Balance	  
	   1977	   	   164.7	   	   	   101.6	   	   	  	  	  	  63.1	  
	   1978	   	   188.7	   	   	   144.1	   	   	  	  	  	  44.6	  
	   1979	   	   219.7	   	   	   258.9	   	   -­‐	  	  	  39.2	  
	   1980	   	   358.1	   	   	   258.9	   	   	  	  	  	  99.2	  
	   1981	   	   379.1	   	   	   304.0	   	   	  	  	  	  75.1	  
	   1982	   	   337.1	   	   	   504.9	   	   -­‐	  167.8	  
	   1983	   	   275.2	   	   	   440.1	   	   -­‐	  164.9	  
	   1984	   	   310.2	   	   	   605.2	   	   -­‐	  295.0	  
	   1985	   	   322.5	   	   	   	  	  n/a	   	   	  	  	  	  	  n/a	  
	   1986	   	   245.8	   	   	   672.0	   	   -­‐	  426.2	  
	  	  	  
	   If	   illegal	   imports	   were	   included	   in	   the	   trade	   figures,	   the	   balance	   would	  
deteriorate	   by	   another	   US$	   300	   million.	   	   Because	   of	   the	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	  
contraband	  trade	  and	  its	  magnitude,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  total	  balance	  of	  trade	  
for	  the	  sector	  in	  fact	  worsened	  during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	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  SEI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987),	  p.	  11.	  
208	  	  Gazeta	  Mercantil,	  August	  12,	  1987,	  p.	  14.	  
209	  	  Cacex,	  Informacao	  Semanal,	  (Banco	  do	  Brasil)	  January	  1,	  1987,	  n.	  1029,	  p.	  11.	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   Failure	  to	  achieve	  a	  balance	  in	  this	  sector	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  shortcomings	  on	  
both	  sides	  of	  the	  foreign	  trade	  equation.	  	  Continued	  reliance	  on	  the	  import	  of	  high–
technology	  components	  and	  capital	  equipment	  related	  to	  the	  industry	  weighed	  down	  
the	  debit	  side	  of	  the	  equation.	  	  	  The	  inability	  of	  the	  national	  companies	  to	  produce	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  internationally	  competitive	  computer	  and	  related	  products	  inhibited	  
efforts	  to	  export	  and	  encouraged	  illegal	  imports.	  	  
	   Pro–reservists	  attributed	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  problem	  to	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  
operating	  in	  Brazil.	  	  They	  argued	  that	  the	  TNCs'	  import–to–sales	  ratios	  are	  higher	  than	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1981	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  
National	  	  	  	  	  	  	   21.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5.7	  
TNCs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   33.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21.9	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16.8	  
	   However,	  this	  merely	  begs	  the	  question.	  	  If	  the	  necessary	  components	  and	  
capital	  equipment	  had	  been	  available	  in	  Brazil,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  approve	  the	  
imports	   requested.	   	   Comparing	   imports	   to	   exports,	   the	   national	   companies	  
contributed	  most	  to	  the	  deficit,	  importing	  $75	  million	  and	  exporting	  only	  $5	  million	  in	  
1986.	  	  The	  TNCs	  imported	  $178	  million,	  but	  exported	  $245	  million.
211
	  
	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   TNCs	   were	   producing	   the	   highest	   value–added,	   most	  
technologically–complex	  products	  explains	  their	  higher	  import	  requirements	  as	  much	  
as	  their	  common	  practice	  of	  international	  sourcing.	  	  The	  policy	  was	  successful	  insofar	  
as	   it	  could	  be	  with	  regard	  to	  TNC	  imports.	   	  As	   local	  suppliers	  were	  able,	  the	  TNCs	  
sourced	  components	  locally	  as	  they	  were	  required	  to	  do.	  
6.	  Parts	  and	  Components	  Industry	  
	   The	  market	  criticised	  SEI	  most	  vigorously	  for	  its	  restrictions	  on	  the	  import	  of	  
components.	  	  The	  national	  informatics	  policy,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  intended	  for	  an	  
                                                
210	  	  SEI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987)	  p.	  11.	  
211	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  11;	  and	  Dados	  e	  Ideias,	  September	  1987,	  p.	  56.  
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integrated	  and	  complete	  computer	  electronics	  industry	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  country.	  	  In	  
order	   to	   do	   this,	   it	   was	   deemed	   necessary	   to	   limit	   the	   importation	   of	   parts	   and	  
components.	  	  One	  result	  of	  these	  tough	  import	  restrictions	  is	  the	  high	  nationalisation	  
index	  in	  nationally	  produced	  micros	  and	  minicomputers.	  	  	  
	   In	  spite	  of	  these	  high	  nationalisation	  indices,	  the	  development	  of	  supporting	  
industries	   in	   Brazil	   was	   slower	   and	   more	   limited	   than	   hoped.	   	   The	   technology–
intensive	  components,	  such	  as	  ICs,	  microprocessors,	  magnetic	  disk	  heads,	  memory	  
chips,	  diodes,	  and	  high	  impact	  printer	  elements	  were	  still	  supplied	  largely	  by	  imports.	  	  
The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   simply	   that	   the	   market	   remained	   too	   small	   to	   allow	   the	  
investment	  required	  to	  develop	  these	  components.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Some	  suppliers	  developed	  for	  the	  lower	  technology	  items,	  in	  many	  cases	  with	  
the	  considerable	  help	  of	  IBM,	  Unisys,	  and	  Hewlett–Packard,	  the	  largest	  TNC	  computer	  
operations	   in	   the	  country.	   	  These	  companies	  established	   international	  purchasing	  
offices	  via	  which	  the	  Brazilian	  subsidiary	  could	  export	  components	  to	  TNC	  operations	  
in	  other	  geographic	  markets.	  	  	  
	   But	   the	  strategic	  area	   that	  SEI	   targeted	   in	  1981––microelectronics––was	  a	  
bitter	  disappointment.	   	  To	  begin	  with	  SEI	  could	  not	  adequately	   fund	  the	  effort	   in	  
microelectronics	  that	  was	  envisaged.	  	  A	  commitment	  in	  1984	  of	  US$70	  million	  over	  
five	  years	  was	  promised	  to	  incentivise	  the	  industry.	   	  However,	   it	  required	  US$100	  
million	  to	  establish	  a	  modern	  diffusion	  operation	  for	  a	  limited	  line	  of	  semiconductors.	  
	   	  The	  three	  national	  firms	  for	  which	  the	  market	  was	  reserved,	  found	  themselves	  
unable	  to	  commit	  the	  necessary	  resources	  either.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  supply	  
only	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  components	  to	  the	  less	  demanding	  consumer	  electronics	  
industry	   (SID,	   the	   industry	   leader,	   was	   the	   captive	   supplier	   of	   Sharp	   Consumer	  
Electronics,	  its	  parent	  company).	  	  	  
	   Thus,	  by	  1986,	  the	  local	  industry	  had	  not	  changed	  a	  great	  deal	  from	  1981	  when	  
the	  area	  was	  targeted.	  	  There	  were	  then	  three	  nationally–owned	  firms	  competing,	  
instead	  of	  one,	  and	  their	  share	  of	  the	  market	  had	  increased	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  reserve.	  	  
However,	  the	  majority	  of	  ICs	  were	  still	  imported.	  	  And	  the	  only	  significant	  investment	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in	  diffusion	  was	  coming	  from	  Texas	  Instruments.	  	  As	  the	  national	  firms	  struggled	  to	  
stay	   alive	   in	   the	   equipment	  market,	   and	   TI	   strengthened	   its	   Brazilian	   operations	  
considerably,	   it	  was	   unlikely	   that	   the	   objective	   of	   a	   nationally–owned	   integrated	  
semiconductor	  industry	  would	  be	  realised.	  
TABLE	  4.19	  
The	  Microelectronics	  Industry,	  1986
212
	  
	   	   Supplier	   	   	   US$	  Millions	  
	   	   Imports	   	   	   	   180	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  illegal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	   40	  	  
	   	   Domestic	   	   	   	   120	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  SID	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	   40	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  Itautec	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	   20	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  TI	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	   20	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  Elebra	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  7	  
	   	   	  	  	  	  –	  Others*	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	   33	  
	   	   TOTAL	  	   	   	   	   300	  
	  
*Others	  were	  primarily	  TNCs:	  Fairchild,	  Siemens,	  and	  Philips.	  
	   	  
	   Despite	  these	  qualifications,	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  policy	  in	  this	  area	  
were	  impressive.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  policy	  engendered:	  an	  increase	  in	  expenditure	  on	  
research	  and	  development;	  an	  increase	  in	  technological	  ability,	  especially	  in	  banking	  
automation;	   the	   development	   of	   a	   critical	  mass	   of	   technicians	   and	   engineers;	   an	  
increase	  in	  employment;	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  number	  of	  strong	  national	  firms	  in	  
the	  sector.	  
	   The	  consistency	  of	  the	  policy	  over	  such	  a	  long	  period	  contributed	  significantly	  
to	   its	   success	   in	   attracting	   the	   capital	   of	  major	   Brazilian	   investors	   (including	   the	  
country's	   two	   largest	   private	   banks),	   and	   in	   extracting	   technology	   licensing	  
agreements	  for	  superminicomputers	  from	  computer	  TNCs	  that	  had	  refused	  to	  license	  
seven	  years	  earlier	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  market	  reserve	  would	  soon	  crumble.	  
                                                
212	   	   Based	   on	   author	   interviews	  with	   participants	   in	   the	   industry	   during	   September	   and	  
October	  1987.	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   But	  one	  cannot	  credibly	  assert	  that	  Brazil's	  successes	  validate	  the	  strongest	  
version	  of	  bargain	  theory.	  Nor	  can	  argue	  that	  Brazil's	  policy	  failures	  invalidate	  it.	  	  The	  
situation	  is	  not	  static,	  it	  is	  extremely	  dynamic;	  and	  the	  bargaining	  game	  is	  never	  over.	  
Bargaining	  gains	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  were	  not	  progressive	  and	  one-­‐directional.	  
	   The	  market	  reserve,	  combined	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  as	  a	  
requisite	  piece	  of	  office	  equipment,	  created	  a	  profitable,	  expanding	  opportunity	  for	  
Brazilian	  capital.	  	  Because	  the	  basic	  technology	  of	  the	  microcomputer––the	  "chip"––
was	  available	  on	   the	   international	  market	  as	  a	   commodity,	   the	   technological	  and	  
capital	   barriers	   to	   entry	   in	   the	   business	  were	   relatively	   low.	   	   As	   a	   result	   literally	  
hundreds	  of	  companies	  began	  producing	  microcomputers	  and	  their	  peripherals	  for	  the	  
Brazilian	  market.	  	  This	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  industry	  was	  sustainable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  
market	  continued	  to	  grow	  exponentially,	  which	  it	  did	  until	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Cruzado	  
Plans	  and	  the	  resultant	  economic	  recession	  in	  1986–87.	  	  Because	  even	  the	  largest	  of	  
these	   companies	   lacked	   the	   scale	   economies	   necessary	   to	   produce	  micros	   at	   an	  
internationally	  competitive	  price,	  a	  shift	  to	  the	  export	  market	  was	  impossible.	  	  This	  
situation,	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  price	  war,	  resulted	   in	  many	  of	  these	  companies	  being	  
forced	  out	  of	  business	  while	  even	   the	  most	   robustly	   financed	  Brazilian	   computer	  
companies	  such	  as	  SID	  Informática	  began	  to	  record	  staggering	  losses.	  
	   Brazil's	  declaration	  of	  a	  moratorium	  on	  debt	  repayment	  in	  early	  1987	  added	  to	  
the	  industry's	  woes.	  	  Imports	  of	  vital	  components	  were	  subject	  to	  severe	  delay	  thus	  
bringing	  production,	  in	  many	  cases,	  to	  a	  standstill.	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  domestic	  industry	  
heavily	  in	  debt	  and	  facing	  an	  uphill	  battle	  for	  survival.	  
	   The	  result	  was	  even	  less	  capital	  to	  invest	  in	  research	  and	  development	  or	  larger	  
production	  facilities.	   	  Meanwhile,	  technological	  developments	   in	  the	   international	  
industry	  marched	  relentlessly	  ahead.	  	  The	  survivors	  in	  the	  local	  market	  would	  be	  the	  
few	  that	  (a)	  carved	  out	  a	  competitive	  niche,	  most	  likely	  in	  banking	  automation;	  (b)	  
combined	   strong	   financial	   backing	   with	   foreign	   technology	   agreements;	   or	   (c)	  
opportunists	  pirating	  technology	  (euphemistically	  called	  'reverse	  engineering')	  at	  the	  
low	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  	  The	  medium–sized	  national	  companies	  investing	  in	  the	  full	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design	  and	  production	  cycle	  would	  go	  out	  of	  business	  if	  they	  did	  not	  merge	  with	  other	  
firms.	  	  	  	  
	   With	  the	  crisis	  in	  the	  industry	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  developmentalist	  ideology	  also	  
suffered	  and	  began	  to	  yield	  to	  survivalist	  pragmatism.	  	  Local	  capital	  sought	  foreign	  
finance	  and	  technology	  anew	  and	  the	  government	  adopted	  a	  more	  lenient	  stance	  with	  
regard	  to	  foreign	  involvement	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  Witness	  the	  technology	  agreements	  
between	  IBM	  and	  SID,	  DEC	  and	  Elebra,	  IBM	  and	  Itautec,	  and	  the	  financial	  backing	  of	  
Elebra	  and	  SID	  by	  Citicorp	  (the	  former	  in	  a	  debt–for–equity	  swap).	  	  The	  approval	  by	  
the	  government	  of	  Texas	  Instrument's	  investment	  plans	  for	  a	  new	  microelectronics	  
plant,	  after	  reserving	  this	  sector	  to	  three	  Brazilian	  firms	  was	  further	  evidence	  of	  a	  shift	  
in	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  to	  foreign	  capital.	  
	   In	  sum	  one	  can	  say	  that	  Brazil	  succeeded	  in	  shifting	  its	  dependence	  somewhat	  
from	  foreign	  computer	  hardware	  to	  foreign	  microelectronics	  and	  software.	  	  This	  shift	  
brought	   with	   it	   both	   new	   opportunities	   and	   constraints.	   	   These	   sectors	   of	   the	  
electronics	   complex	  were	   certainly	   less	   dependent	   upon	   sophisticated	  marketing	  
capability.	  	  However,	  they	  were	  even	  more	  technology–	  and	  capital–intensive	  than	  the	  
end–user	  equipment	  segments.	  	  Moreover,	  Brazil	  had	  tried	  for	  several	  years	  with	  very	  
limited	  success	  to	  develop	  capability	  in	  these	  areas	  that	  more	  and	  more	  embody	  the	  
"high-­‐technology"	   in	   the	   equipment.	   	  Nevertheless,	   dependence	  was	   successfully	  
shifted	  further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  chain.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Summary	  Conclusions	  
	   Following	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  observations	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  informatics	  
policy	  in	  Brazil.	  	  These	  observations	  pertain	  to:	  	  (i)	  factors	  or	  events	  that	  initially	  led	  to	  
the	  formulation	  of	  the	  market	  reserve;	  (ii)	  factors	  or	  events	  that	  helped	  to	  sustain	  the	  
policy	  and	  aid	  its	  success;	  and	  (iii)	  factors	  or	  events	  that	  conspired	  to	  alter	  the	  policy.	  	  
The	  order	  in	  which	  the	  summary	  points	  are	  made	  does	  not	  necessarily	  reflect	  priority	  
or	  prior	  cause.	  
	  
        156 
I.	  	  Genesis	  of	  Policy	  
1.	  	  Lack	  of	  computer	  TNC	  responsiveness.	  
	   The	  lack	  of	  responsiveness	  of	  computer	  transnationals	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
Brazilian	  computer	  and	  labour	  markets	  contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  policy,	  
which	  was	  eventually	   to	  exclude	   these	  TNCs	   from	   large	   segments	  of	   the	  national	  
computer	   market.	   	   This	   lack	   of	   responsiveness	   was	   due	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	  
including:	   (i)	   the	   traditional	   strategy	   of	   centralized	   research,	   development	   and	  
manufacturing;	  (ii)	  the	  practice	  of	  selling	  technologically	  obsolete	  products	  in	  frontier	  
markets	  to	  extend	  product	  life	  span	  and	  generate	  large	  positive	  cash	  flows;	  (iii)	  the	  
preoccupation	  with	  the	  exploding	  markets	  for	  data	  processing	  equipment	  and	  services	  
in	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  the	  computer	  
companies	   were	   relatively	   new,	   and	   did	   not	   possess	   extensive	   networks	   of	  
international	  subsidiaries.	  As	  such,	  they	  had	  not	  even	  begun	  to	  develop	  the	  kind	  of	  
‘statesmanlike’	  skills	  that	  may	  have	  helped	  them	  foresee	  what	  was	  coming.	  
2.	  	  Growing	  numbers	  of	  Brazilian	  data	  processing	  engineers.	  
	   The	  modernization	  of	  Brazilian	  higher	  education	  led	  to	  a	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  
number	  of	  graduates	  with	  training	  in	  data	  processing	  engineering.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  
centralized	  manufacturing	   and	   R	   &	   D	   strategies	   of	   the	   TNCs	   noted	   above,	   these	  
engineering	   graduates	   had	   a	   strong	   interest	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	   national	  
computer	  industry.	  	  Partly	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  highly	  technical	  nature	  of	  this	  emerging	  
industry,	   some	   of	   these	   same	   "frustrated	   nationalist	   technicians"	   came	   to	   have	  
considerable	  regulatory	  power	  in	  the	  government.	  
3.	  	  The	  Navy's	  concern	  about	  technological	  dependence.	  
	   The	  Navy's	   realization	  of	   its	   own	  dependence	  on	   foreign	   technology	   after	  
purchasing	  the	  sophisticated	  British	  frigates	  meant	  that	  those	  calling	  for	  a	  national	  
computer	  industry	  now	  had	  a	  powerful	  ally.	  	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  Navy	  pursued	  greater	  
technological	  autonomy	  by	  developing	  its	  own	  group	  of	  electronic	  technicians	  and	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Carter's	   abrogation	  of	   the	  military	   cooperation	   treaty	   strengthened	   the	  military's	  
resolve	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  technological	  independence.	  
4.	  	  Modernization	  of	  Brazil's	  state	  bureaucracy.	  
	   The	  modernization	  of	   the	  Brazilian	  state	  bureaucracy	   increased	  the	  state's	  
appetite	  for	  data	  processing	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  The	  corresponding	  trade	  deficit	  
in	  computers	  led	  to	  the	  eventual	  imposition	  of	  import	  controls.	  
5.	  	  The	  energy	  crisis	  of	  1973–74.	  
	   Certainly	   the	   OPEC	   price	   rises	   of	   1973–74	   served	   to	   concentrate	   the	  
government's	  efforts	  to	  limit	  imports.	  	  The	  burgeoning	  trade	  deficit	  in	  informatics	  was	  
one	  such	  area	  the	  government	  needed	  to	  control.	  	  Whereas	  the	  modernization	  of	  the	  
state	  bureaucracy	  contributed	   indirectly	   to	   the	   imposition	  of	   import	  controls,	   the	  
energy	  crisis	  gave	  the	  necessary	  final	  push.	  
6.	  	  Brazil's	  historical	  predisposition	  to	  isolationism	  and	  concessionist	  protection.	  
	   Underlying	  all	  of	  the	  above	  was	  Brazil's	  historical	  predisposition	  to	  isolationism	  
and	  its	  tradition	  of	  conceding	  protection	  to	  industry.	  	  The	  Brazilian	  industrialist	  was	  
historically	  concessionist	  rather	  than	  entrepreneurial,	  and	  the	  state	  played	  an	  active	  
role	  as	  "partitioner"	  of	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  local	  markets.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
large	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  cultural	  links	  with	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  
world	  have	  encouraged	  Brazil	  to	  pursue	  a	  computer	  industry,	  among	  others,	  on	  its	  
own.	  
Efficacy	  of	  Policy	  
The	  following	  discussion	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  policy	  highlights	  the	  
importance	   of	   market	   and	   industry	   developments,	   as	   well	   as	   domestic	   political	  
considerations.	  
1.	  	  Entrepreneurial	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  international	  computer	  industry.	  
	   The	  entrepreneurial	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  in	  
the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  was	  important	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  there	  
were	  many	  small	  companies	  that	  were	  potential	  sources	  of	  technology	  even	  if	  the	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major	  computer	  transnationals	  would	  not	  license	  technology	  to	  Brazilian	  companies	  
when	  the	  reserve	  was	  first	  enacted.	  
2.	  	  Availability	  of	  integrated	  circuits	  and	  software	  on	  the	  international	  market.	  
	   Critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  microcomputer	  manufacturers	  was	  the	  
international	  commodity	  market	  for	  integrated	  circuits.	  	  ICs	  are	  the	  fundamental	  basis	  
of	  microcomputer	  technology.	   	  Because	  they	  were	  (and	  are)	  mass–produced	  by	  a	  
number	  of	  highly	  competitive	  semiconductor	  manufacturers	  that	  are	  not,	  for	  the	  most	  
part	  forward–integrated,	  integrated	  circuits	  were	  available	  on	  a	  commodity	  basis.
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Hence,	   the	   technological	   barriers	   to	   entry	   into	   the	  microcomputer	   industry	  were	  
significantly	  reduced;	  microcomputer	  "manufacturing"	  was	  in	  fact	  more	  accurately	  
described	  as	  "assembling".	  	  The	  availability	  of	  basic	  software	  (i.e.	  MS–DOS	  and	  UNIX)	  
also	  served	  to	  lower	  the	  barriers	  to	  entry	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market.	   	  By	  using	  
internationally	  standard	  operating	  systems	  developed	  outside	  the	  country,	  Brazilian	  
computer–makers	  were	  able	  to	  introduce	  products	  for	  which	  there	  already	  existed	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  applications	  software.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  avoided	  the	  enormous	  capital	  
investment	  necessary	  to	  develop	  the	  software	  themselves.	  	  The	  companies	  that	  chose	  
to	  invest	  in	  the	  development	  of	  operating	  software	  (Scopus	  developed	  SISNE,	  the	  MS–
DOS	  equivalent,	  and	  Cobra	  developed	  SOX,	  a	  UNIX	  equivalent)	  did	  so	  at	  great	  loss,	  
especially	  since	  MS–DOS	  and	  UNIX	  were	  later	  accepted	  in	  Brazil.	  
	   While	   this	   situation	   facilitated	   the	   rapid	   entry	   and	   growth	   of	   Brazilian	  
microcomputer	  companies,	  the	  Brazilian	  industry	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  foreign–
produced	   chips	   and	   software.	   In	   this	   sense	   “control	   of	   informatization”	   and	  
technological	  autonomy	  remained	  out	  of	  reach.	  
3.	  	  Explosion	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  market	  in	  Brazil.	  
	   Closely	   linked	   to	   (2)	   above	   was	   the	   explosion	   of	   the	   Brazilian	  market	   for	  
microcomputers.	  	  The	  extraordinary	  growth	  of	  this	  market	  and	  the	  low	  barriers	  to	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  IBM	  sought	  (unsuccessfully)	  to	  raise	  the	  technological	  barrier	  to	  entry	  in	  microcomputers	  
by	  incorporating	  proprietary	  chips––that	  is,	  chips	  designed	  and	  made	  by	  IBM––in	  its	  later	  line	  
of	  microcomputers,	  Personal	  System	  2.	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entry	  for	  local	  firms	  meant	  that	  hundreds	  of	  firms	  were	  able	  to	  enter	  and	  (initially)	  
profit	  from	  this	  business.	  
4.	  	  Potential	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  market	  for	  informatics.	  
	   The	  enormous	  potential	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  market	  for	  informatics,	  confirmed	  by	  
the	  demand	  for	  microcomputers,	  was	  a	  vital	  lever	  for	  the	  Brazilian	  policy–makers.	  	  The	  
market	  potential	  sustained	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  computer	  transnationals	  despite	  an	  
adverse	  regulatory	  environment.	  	  Computer	  TNCs	  that	  refused	  to	  license	  technology	  
when	  the	  market	  reserve	  was	  implemented	  in	  1977	  did	  in	  fact	  license	  technology	  in	  
1984.	  	  	  The	  government	  thus	  effectively	  used	  the	  potential	  of	  its	  market	  to	  increase	  its	  
bargaining	  power,	  controlling	  the	  terms	  by	  which	  foreign	  firms	  may	  participate	  in	  the	  
growing	  Brazilian	  market.	  	  
5.	  	  Importance	  of	  informatics	  to	  financial	  services.	  
	   The	  importance	  of	   informatics	  to	  the	  financial	  services	  industry	  provided	  a	  
large	  captive	  market	  for	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms	  and	  encouraged	  the	  banks'	  direct	  
investment	   in	   the	  Brazilian	   informatics	   industry.	   	   The	  banks	   thereby	   financed	   the	  
growth	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms	  in	  two	  ways:	  	  as	  major	  customers	  and	  major	  
investors.	  	  	  The	  most	  successful	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms,	  Itautec,	  SID	  and	  Digilab	  owe	  
much	  of	  their	  success	  to	  this	  fact.	  
6.	  	  National	  profile	  of	  the	  policy.	  
	   The	  resilience	  of	  the	  policy	  was	  attributable	  in	  part	  to	  its	  great	  public	  visibility.	  	  
From	  the	  inauguration	  of	  the	  first	  computer	  in	  1960,	  to	  the	  launching	  of	  Cobra,	  to	  the	  
disputes	  with	  Data	  General	  and	  IBM,	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  proposed	  informatics	  law,	  
to	   the	  Section	  301,	  developments	   in	   the	   industry	  became	  national	   "events."	   	  The	  
policy	  was	  successfully	  linked	  to	  wider	  concerns	  for	  national	  sovereignty.	  	  The	  policy	  
was	  thus	  an	  issue	  of	  national	  importance.	  	  The	  country's	  leaders,	  therefore,	  could	  not	  
publicly	   back	   down	   from	   the	   nationalist	   policy	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s	  
without	  sustaining	  significant	  political	  damage.	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Changes	  in	  Policy	  
The	   following	   discussion	   of	   factors	   that	   acted	   to	   alter	   the	   policy	   course	  
highlights	   the	   large	  number	  of	   new	  bargains	   that	  were	   struck	  during	   this	   period,	  
bargains:	  within	  the	  state	  itself,	  state-­‐TNC,	  state-­‐state	  (US),	  firm	  (local	  sector)-­‐	  state,	  
and	  firm-­‐firm.	  	  
1.	  	  Transition	  to	  civilian	  government.	  
	   The	  transition	  from	  military	  rule	  to	  civilian	  government	  affected	  the	  informatics	  
policy	  in	  two	  important	  ways:	  	  (i)	  the	  policy	  and	  its	  implementers	  (SEI)	  were	  no	  longer	  
insulated	   from	  political	   pressure	   inside	   the	  National	   Security	  Council;	   and	   (ii)	   the	  
codification	  removed	  some	  of	  SEI's	  discretionary	  power	  and	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  
TNCs	  to	  identify	  and	  then	  exploit	  loopholes	  in	  the	  law.	  
2.	  	  Changes	  in	  party	  politics.	  
	   Leftists	  in	  the	  majority	  PMDB	  lost	  ground	  to	  more	  conservative	  voices	  in	  the	  
party	  and	  in	  government.	  	  Some	  observers	  interpreted	  this	  as	  a	  natural	  result	  of	  the	  
former	  opposition	  party	  coming	  to	  power,	  (i.e.,	  there	  was	  now	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  
status	  quo).	  	  In	  particular,	  several	  strong	  proponents	  of	  the	  1984	  law	  no	  longer	  had	  
seats	  in	  Congress	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  	  
3.	  	  U.S.	  government	  pressure.	  
	   Although	  the	  effect	  of	  American	  government	  pressure	  on	  Brazilian	  policy	  was	  
ambiguous,	   it	   clearly	   raised	   the	   political	   stakes	   involved	   in	   pursuing	   the	   market	  
reserve.	  	  	  The	  series	  of	  joint	  business	  arrangements	  involving	  U.S.	  and	  Brazilian	  firms	  in	  
the	  industry,	  and	  the	  approval	  of	  TI's	  microelectronics	  plant,	  are,	  in	  some	  measure,	  
attributable	  to	  this	  political	  pressure.	  
4.	  	  Economic	  crisis	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Cruzado	  Plan.	  
	   After	  a	  decade	  of	  extraordinary	  growth,	  the	  market	  for	  informatics	  equipment	  
and	  services	  slowed	  in	  1987.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  of	  the	  smaller	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms	  
went	  out	   of	   business,	  while	  most	   of	   the	   larger	   ones	   incurred	   severe	   losses.	   	   The	  
remaining	   firms	  were	  without	  capital	   to	   fund	  new	  product	  development,	  or	  even	  
purchase	  spare	  parts	  and	  supplies	   from	  abroad.	   	   In	  order	  to	  survive,	  many	  of	   the	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Brazilian	  firms	  began	  to	  look	  for	  joint–venture	  partners	  based	  outside	  of	  Brazil.	  	  The	  
economic	  crisis	  thereby	  increased	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  foreign	  capital	  and	  led	  to	  a	  
greater	  number	  of	  joint–ventures	  in	  the	  industry.	  
5.	  	  Fragmentation	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  computer	  industry.	  
	   With	  the	  favourable	  regulatory	  environment	  and	  low	  barriers	  to	  entry	  at	  the	  
dynamic	  low–end	  of	  the	  computer	  market,	  several	  hundred	  Brazilian	  firms	  competed	  
for	  a	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  	  This	  fact	  was	  touted	  by	  pro–reservists	  as	  evidence	  of	  policy	  
success.	  	  However,	  this	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  industry	  carried	  attendant	  costs.	  	  	  Even	  
the	  largest	  of	  the	  firms	  was	  undercapitalized	  and	  unable	  to	  benefit	  sufficiently	  from	  
economies	  of	  scale	  and	   learning	  curve	  effects	  so	  as	  to	  be	  cost–competitive	   in	  the	  
international	  marketplace.	  	  The	  local	  firms	  were	  thus	  economically	  vulnerable	  and	  the	  
Brazilian	  users	  had	  to	  bear	  these	  costs	  in	  the	  form	  of	  higher	  prices.	  	  	  The	  result	  was	  
greater	  market	  pressure	  for	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  
6.	  	  Increasing	  sophistication	  and	  militancy	  of	  the	  users.	  
	   As	  the	  industry	  developed	  in	  Brazil	  so	  too	  did	  the	  sophistication	  of	  users	  who	  
increasingly	  demanded	  better	  products	   at	   lower	  prices.	   	   The	  growing	  problem	  of	  
contraband	  in	  the	  1980s	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  user	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  local	  industry.	  	  
Although	   the	  users	  were	  not	  particularly	  well	   organized	   as	   a	  political	   force,	   their	  
dissatisfaction	  was	  made	  known	  through	  FIESP	  and	  SEI	  began	  to	  pay	  more	  heed	  to	  the	  
needs	  of	  the	  market.	  
7.	  	  Expansion	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  
	   The	   expansion	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  market	   reserve	   to	   include	   all	   kinds	   of	  
electronic	  equipment	  and	  services	  mobilized	  opposition	  to	  the	  policy.	  	  In	  particular,	  
the	   inclusion	   of	   automobile	   electronics	   in	   the	   reserved	   area	   greatly	   angered	   the	  
automobile	  industry.	  	  This	  particular	  "user–group"	  became	  a	  powerful	  adversary	  to	  the	  
policy	  and	  succeeded	  in	  forcing	  a	  retreat	  in	  the	  policy's	  scope.	  	  	  
8.	  	  Alliances	  of	  foreign	  and	  local	  capital.	  
	   The	  increasing	  number	  of	  joint	  ventures	  between	  foreign	  and	  local	  capital	  in	  
this	   sector	   resulted	   from	   the	   factors	   noted	   above	   and,	   in	   turn,	   served	   to	   further	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moderate	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy.	  The	  local	  partners,	  out	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  
joint	  ventures,	  became	  important	  political	  allies	  to	  foreign	  capital	  as	  well	  as	  business	  
allies.	  	  	  Gerdau	  and	  Iochpe	  	  (joint	  venture	  partners	  with	  IBM	  and	  Hewlett–Packard	  
respectively)	  were	  two	  cases	  in	  point.	  	  Foreign	  capital,	  once	  established	  in	  the	  market	  
through	   joint–venture,	   had	   a	   better	   platform	   from	   which	   to	   negotiate	   with	   the	  
government.	  
	  
	   Stepping	  back	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  interplay	  of	  politics	  and	  industry	  from	  
1970	  to	  1990,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  global	  industry	  structure’s	  development	  
constrained	  the	  effective	  policy	  choices	  available	  to	  those	  who	  sought	  to	  develop	  a	  
national	  informatics	  industry.	  The	  protective	  rubric	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  provided	  
a	  critical	  umbrella	  under	  which	  national	  players	  could	  invest	  and	  grow.	  But	  by	  the	  
late	  1980s,	  a	  globalized	  information	  technology	  industry	  was	  taking	  shape.	  Its	  
industry	  structure	  included	  hundreds	  if	  not	  thousands	  of	  companies	  all	  over	  the	  
world	  investing	  in	  research	  and	  development	  and	  creating	  software	  applications	  for	  
a	  handful	  of	  emerging	  global	  technology	  platforms	  (IBM,	  MS-­‐DOS	  and	  later	  
Windows,	  UNIX	  and	  Intel).	  Such	  an	  international	  industry	  structure	  placed	  
enormous	  pressure	  on	  Brazil’s	  protectionist	  policy.	  Its	  domestic	  market,	  though	  
impressive,	  was	  not	  nearly	  large	  enough	  to	  sustain	  national	  players	  at	  a	  sufficiently	  
large	  scale	  to	  compete	  on	  either	  cost	  or	  technology.	  Over	  time,	  protecting	  the	  
national	  informatics	  industry	  entailed	  enormous	  costs	  to	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  	  
	   All	  that	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  a	  laissez	  faire	  policy	  was	  either	  the	  inevitable	  or	  
best	  choice,	  however.	  This	  research	  project	  has	  documented	  significant	  enduring	  
bargaining	  gains	  enabled	  by	  a	  policy	  that	  was	  credibly	  sustained	  for	  more	  than	  a	  
decade.	  These	  include	  the	  shift	  in	  dependency	  from	  computer	  hardware	  to	  
components,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  large	  cadre	  of	  industry	  professionals,	  the	  
growth	  of	  national	  microcomputer	  manufacturers,	  the	  competitive	  presence	  of	  a	  
few	  new	  entrants	  in	  defensible	  niches	  like	  banking	  automation,	  and	  the	  decision	  of	  
leading	  TNCs	  including	  IBM	  to	  license	  technology	  to	  national	  players.	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   The	  challenge	  highlighted	  by	  Brazil’s	  bold	  policy	  initiative	  in	  informatics	  is	  
the	  ability	  of	  state	  actors	  –	  particularly	  those	  in	  an	  increasingly	  pluralistic	  political	  
context	  –	  to	  manage	  complexity	  and	  rapid	  change.	  The	  sheer	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  a	  
complex	  industry	  made	  it	  almost	  impossible	  for	  policymakers	  to	  effectively	  manage	  
and	  adapt	  policy	  to	  an	  ever-­‐changing	  industry	  landscape	  and	  set	  of	  market	  needs	  
and	  opportunities.	  	  The	  task	  was	  exceedingly	  difficult	  even	  when	  the	  politics	  
favoured	  centralised	  management	  of	  the	  industry.	  As	  political	  sponsorship	  eroded	  
and	  decision-­‐making	  decentralized,	  the	  task	  proved	  impossible.	  	  	  




SUMMARY	  OF	  DEVELOPMENTS	  IN	  THE	  BRAZILIAN	  CASE	  SINCE	  1990	  
This	  chapter	  contains	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  developments	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  case	  since	  
1990,	  paying	  closest	  attention	  to	  the	  transition	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  from	  the	  14	  year-­‐old	  
market	  reserve	  policy	  to	  a	  more	  liberal	  open	  market	  in	  informatics.	  It	  looks	  first	  at	  the	  
changes	   in	  the	  policy,	  second	  at	  the	  development	  of	  the	   industry,	  and	  finishes	  by	  
offering	  observations	  about	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy	  and	  implications	  
for	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining.	  
Policy	  Development:	  From	  Protection	  to	  Promotion	  
The	  Informatics	  Law	  passed	  in	  1984	  was	  scheduled	  to	  expire	  in	  October	  1992.	  
Elected	  as	  President	  in	  March	  1990,	  Fernando	  Collor	  de	  Mello	  was	  predisposed	  to	  
accelerate	  the	  dismantling	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy.	  Collor	  campaigned	  and	  was	  
elected	   on	   promises	   of	   free-­‐market	   reforms.	   Development	   policy	   shifted	   from	  
protecting	   the	   large	   domestic	   market	   for	   Brazilian	   firms,	   to	   attracting	   foreign	  
investment,	   technology	   and	   trade	   with	   the	   aim	   to	   enhance	   international	  
competitiveness.	  	  
	   Consistent	  with	  these	  aims,	  Congress	  passed	  a	  new	  Informatics	  Law	  in	  October	  
1991	  to	  replace	  the	  earlier	  version,	  effective	  October	  1992.	  The	  new	  law:	  
♦ Dissolved	  SEI	  and	  created	  the	  Department	  of	  Informatics	  and	  Automation	  Policy	  
(DEPIN	  –	  Departamento	  de	  Política	  de	  Informática	  e	  Automação)	  to	  dismantle	  
the	  old	  policies	  and	  oversee	  the	  new;	  
♦ Sought	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  informatics	  in	  Brazil	  by	  stimulating	  competition	  
between	  imported	  and	  locally-­‐made	  products;	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♦ Abolished	  the	  age-­‐old	  Law	  of	  Similars	  –	  foundational	  to	  the	  import	  substitution	  
development	  policy	  –	  and	  aimed	  to	  liberalize	  imports	  after	  October	  1992;	  
♦ Dismantled	  local	  content	  regulations;	  
♦ Eliminated	  restrictions	  on	  production	  in	  informatics,	  removing	  obligations	  to	  
apply	  for	  a	  government	  license	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  industry;	  
♦ Granted	  permission	  for	  technological	  joint	  ventures	  between	  local	  and	  foreign	  
companies;	  
♦ Required	   companies	   to	   invest	   5%	   of	   gross	   revenues	   in	   R&D	   activities.	   This	  
included	   2%	   involving	   cooperation	   with	   universities,	   research	   institutes	   or	  
programs	  identified	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  as	  priorities.	  
	   A	  debate	  ensued	  over	  the	  appropriate	  tariff	  levels	  for	  imported	  components	  
and	   finished	  products.	  This	   conflict	  not	  only	  pitted	   the	  TNCs	  against	   the	  Brazilian	  
producers	  who	  wanted	  some	  on-­‐going	  protection	  against	  imports.	  The	  TNCs	  had	  an	  
ally	   in	   the	   local	   distributors	  who	  wanted	   low	   tariffs	   to	  make	   it	   easier	   to	   sell	   the	  
imported	  products.	  	  
The	  prevalence	  of	  contraband	  products	  and	  activities	  influenced	  the	  debate	  
about	  tariff	   levels.	   It	  was	  estimated	  that	  contraband	  accounted	  for	  50-­‐70%	  of	  the	  
installed	  base	  of	  equipment214	  at	  this	  time.	  Lower	  tariffs	  would	  reduce	  demand	  for	  
contraband	  products	  and	  gradually	  squeeze	  them	  out	  of	  the	  market.	  	  
ABICOMP,	  the	  powerful	  industry	  trade	  association,	  shifted	  its	  advocacy	  from	  
promoting	  the	  interests	  of	  Brazilian	  firms	  to	  promoting	  production	  in	  Brazil	  regardless	  
of	  ownership.	  Accordingly,	  ABICOMP	  admitted	  foreign	  players	  that	  were	  producing	  in	  
                                                
214	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2002)	  p.	  144.	  This	  percentage	  is	  consistent	  with	  author	  
interviews	  with	  industry	  players	  in	  1987.	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Brazil.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1992,	  ABICOMP	  –	  including	  the	  newly	  admitted	  TNC	  members	  
like	  IBM	  and	  HP	  –	  presented	  a	  tariff	  policy	  proposal	  to	  the	  government.	  After	  some	  
negotiation,	  the	  government	  agreed	  a	  schedule	  that	  incorporated	  somewhat	  lower	  
tariffs	  than	  ABICOMP’s	  proposal.	  	  
Table	  5.1	  
Import	  Tariffs	  Adopted	  May	  1992215	  
Class	  of	  Imports	   Before	  7/92	   10/92	  –	  7/93	   7/93	  –12/94	  
Final	  goods	   50%	   40%	   35%	  
Printed	  circuit	  boards	  (assembled)	   50%	   35%	   30%	  
Modules,	  subassemblies	   35-­‐50%	   25-­‐30%	   20-­‐30%	  
Semiconductors	   40%	   20%	   15%	  
Boards	  (disassembled)	   30%	   20%	   15%	  
Critical	  inputs	  (e.g.,	  chips)	   30-­‐50%	   0	   0	  
	  
The	   discussion	   and	   adoption	   of	   the	   import	   tariffs	   illustrate	   the	   three-­‐fold	  
dilemma	  faced	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  transition	  period	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  
1990s:	   (1)	   How	   could	   they	   meet	   the	   need	   for	   international	   compatibility	   and	  
competitiveness;	  while	  (2)	  not	  looking	  like	  a	  servant	  of	  foreign	  capital	  and	  foreign	  
government	  pressure;	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  (3)	  providing	  some	  level	  of	  protection	  
for	   those	   firms	   that	   had	   made	   investments	   under	   the	   old	   rules	   and	   developed	  
indigenous	  products	   and	   technological	   capability?	  Attempts	   to	   triage	   these	   three	  
objectives	  resulted	  in	  a	  complex	  mix	  of	  tariffs	  and	  national	  and	  local	  taxes	  to	  enable	  
                                                
215	  Source:	  Paulo	  Bastos	  Tigre,	  “Brazil’s	  IT	  Sector:	  The	  Profile	  in	  1992”	  (paper	  presented	  at	  
“The	  Future	  of	  Information	  Technology	  in	  Brazil”	  conference,	  University	  of	  California,	  
Berkeley,	  January	  1993)	  and	  cited	  by	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2002)	  p.	  151.	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the	  state	  to	  offer	  exemptions	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  local	  production,	  local	  content	  
and	  R&D	  investment.	  	  
The	  liberalizing	  agenda	  introduced	  by	  Collor	  in	  1990	  largely	  continued	  with	  
respect	  to	  informatics	  throughout	  the	  ensuing	  decades.	  President	  Fernando	  Cardoso	  
signed	  a	  new	   Informatics	   Law	   in	   January	  2001	  with	  a	  primary	   focus	  on	  attracting	  
foreign	  investment	  and	  promoting	  exports.	  It	  included	  some	  fiscal	  incentives	  and	  a	  
requirement	  to	  invest	  in	  local	  R&D	  much	  like	  the	  Law	  that	  preceded	  it.	  	  
In	  the	  last	  decade,	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  has	  demonstrated	  greater	  commitment	  
to	  national	   innovation.	  While	   largely	   respecting	   the	   liberal	  market	   reforms	  of	   his	  
predecessors,	  the	  government	  of	  President	  Lula	  da	  Silva	  (2003	  –	  2010)	  has	  pursued	  a	  
more	  activist	  state	  policy	  in	  this	  area,	  implementing	  a	  number	  of	  policies	  seeking	  to	  
strengthen	  national	  technological	  capabilities	  and	  accelerate	  innovation.	  President	  
Lula’s	  central	   industrial	  policy	  statement	   in	   this	   regard	  was	  the	  Política	   Industrial,	  
Tecnológica	  e	  de	  Comércio	  Exterior	  (Policy	  for	  Industry,	  Technology	  and	  Foreign	  Trade	  
or	   PICTE).	   PICTE	   identified	   sectors	   that	   were	   key	   to	   innovation	   (e.g.,	   software,	  
semiconductors,	  renewable	  energy,	  biotechnology	  and	  pharmaceuticals),	  improved	  
the	  institutional	  and	  regulatory	  environment	  and	  provided	  financial	  support	  	  (e.g.,	  
subsidies	   and	   tax	   incentives)	   and	   investment	   for	   industrial	   modernization	   and	  
technological	  development.	  Early	  success	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  automotive	  sector	  where	  
flex	  fuel	  engine	  technology	  was	  led	  by	  local	  developments	  in	  bio-­‐fuels	  and	  alternative	  
energy-­‐related	  innovations.	  However,	  progress	  in	  informatics	  is	  less	  apparent.	  
It	  is	  still	  early	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  Lula’s	  initiatives	  –	  and	  well	  beyond	  the	  
scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  both	  interesting	  and	  encouraging	  to	  see	  the	  
state	  recognise	  the	  critical	  importance	  of	  innovation	  to	  economic	  development	  in	  a	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globalized	   economy	   and	   to	   proactively	   implement	   an	   integrated	   set	   of	  measures	  
designed	  to	  create	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  innovation	  and	  technological	  development.216	  
Post-­‐Reserve	  Industry	  Development	  
While	   the	   new	   law	  dismantling	   the	   key	   tenets	   of	   the	  market	   reserve	  was	  
passed	  in	  1991,	  some	  observers	  note	  that	  its	  implementation	  was	  halting,217	  adding	  to	  
the	  uncertainty	  faced	  by	  industry	  players	  and	  would-­‐be	  investors.	  To	  make	  matters	  
worse,	  the	  country	  was	  beset	  by	  hyperinflation,	  burgeoning	  foreign	  debt	  and	  a	  severe	  
recession	   in	   the	   early	   1990s.	   These	   factors	   conditioned	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
Brazilian	  informatics	  industry	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  assumptions	  that	  lay	  behind	  the	  move	  to	  abolish	  the	  market	  reserve	  
was	  a	  large,	  latent	  demand	  for	  internationally	  competitive	  information	  technology.	  
Yet,	  the	  initial	  result	  of	  liberalization	  was	  not	  a	  big	  surge	  in	  computer	  imports	  and	  
complete	  market	  domination	  by	  the	  TNCs.	  Several	  reasons	  for	  this	  have	  been	  posited,	  
including	  customer	  confusion	  at	  the	  proliferation	  of	  product	  choice,	  the	  relatively	  high	  
price	  of	  imported	  equipment	  (due	  as	  much	  to	  TNC	  pricing	  policies	  as	  to	  the	  import	  
tariffs),	  the	  adequate	  functionality	  of	  the	  local	  installed	  base,	  and	  the	  very	  limited	  
spending	  power	  of	  individual,	  government	  and	  corporate	  buyers	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  an	  
extremely	  difficult	  economic	  climate.	  	  
	   Indeed,	  the	  transition	  period	  hit	  the	  industry	  hard	  in	  three	  notable	  ways:	  (1)	  a	  
32%	  decline	  in	  total	  informatics	  sales	  from	  1989	  to	  1992;	  (2)	  a	  30%	  decrease	  in	  total	  
informatics	   employment	   in	   the	   same	  period;	   and	   (3)	   a	   staggering	   67%	  decline	   in	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  author	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  indebted	  to	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  Mahrukh	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217	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2002)	  and	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995)	  both	  refer	  to	  this.	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research	  and	  development	  investment	  between	  1989	  and	  1992.	  Brazilian-­‐owned	  firms	  
were	  hit	  harder	   than	   foreign-­‐owned	  players	  during	   this	   time,	  experiencing	  a	  47%	  
decline	  in	  sales	  and	  50%	  reduction	  in	  employment.218	  	  
Contracting	  sales	  coupled	  with	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  policy	  –	  how	  it	  would	  be	  
implemented	  and	  how	  long	  the	  liberal	  market	  reforms	  would	  last	  –	  catalyzed	  more	  
than	  ten	  transnational	   joint	  ventures	  (JVs)	  and	  alliances	  in	  1990-­‐91.	  In	  addition	  to	  
wanting	  a	  hedge	  against	  an	  uncertain	  policy	  environment	  in	  the	  transition	  years,	  the	  
TNCs	  were	  attracted	  by	  the	  local	  companies’	  installed	  customer	  base	  and	  distribution	  
networks.	  For	  their	  part	  the	  Brazilian	  companies	  were	  interested	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	  
state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  components	  and	  technology	  as	  well	  as	  capital	  to	  grow.	  	  
Digital	  and	  Elebra	  entered	  a	  joint	  venture	  under	  the	  new	  rules	  introduced	  in	  
1991,	  moving	  from	  the	  licensing	  agreement	  struck	  in	  1989,	  whereby	  Elebra	  sold	  DEC’s	  
VAX	  and	  MICROVAX	  minicomputers,	  to	  an	  equity	  joint	  venture.	  By	  1993,	  Digital	  had	  
acquired	  83%	  of	  Elebra’s	  equity	  and	  integrated	  the	  Brazilian	  operation	  into	  its	  global	  
supply	  chain.	  	  
In	  this	  wave	  of	  foreign/national	  alliances,	  IBM	  notably	  violated	  its	  standard	  
practice	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  world	  and	  established	  a	  JV	  with	  SID	  Informatica	  where	  IBM	  
had	  a	  49%	  minority	  stake.219	  The	  venture	  –	  MC&A	  Personal	  Systems	  –	  was	  created	  to	  
assemble	  and	  market	  IBM’s	  PS/2	  microcomputers.	  Exemplifying	  the	  difficult	  market	  
environment,	   the	   company	   sold	   very	   few	   computers	  when	   the	   product	  was	   first	  
                                                
218	  Schoonmaker	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995):	  389-­‐390	  
219	  One	  shouldn’t	  ascribe	  too	  much	  specific	  bargaining	  significance	  to	  IBM’s	  decision	  to	  
joint	  venture	  with	  SID	  and	  later	  with	  Itautec.	  The	  global	  industry	  was	  increasingly	  requiring	  
even	  the	  large	  players	  to	  create	  alliances	  in	  order	  to	  compete.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  IBM	  is	  
reputed	  to	  have	  entered	  over	  300	  global	  alliances.	  See	  John	  M.	  Stopford,	  “Competing	  
Globally	  for	  Resources”,	  Transnational	  Corporations,	  4	  (August,	  1995).	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introduced	  and	  was	  forced	  to	  reduce	  the	  price	  by	  25%	  before	  sales	  accelerated.220	  IBM	  
later	  increased	  its	  share	  in	  the	  JV	  to	  control	  70%	  of	  the	  enterprise.	  
Itautec,	  the	  largest	  and	  commercially	  most	  successful	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  firms	  that	  
developed	  under	  the	  protective	  rubric	  of	  the	  market	  reserve,	  also	  struck	  a	  deal	  with	  
IBM.	  Itautec	  negotiated	  an	  agreement	  to	  manufacture	  and	  sell	  IBM’s	  most	  successful	  
mid-­‐sized	  computer,	  the	  AS-­‐400.	  Itautec	  was	  also	  able	  to	  leverage	  its	  leading	  market	  
position	  in	  financial	  automation	  to	  negotiate	  a	  deal	  to	  become	  one	  of	  two	  worldwide	  
manufacturers	  for	  IBM	  communications	  controllers.	  Itautec	  also	  partnered	  successfully	  
with	  Microsoft	  to	  produce	  an	  operating	  system	  to	  sell	  with	  Itautec’s	  brand	  of	  personal	  
computers	  and	  struck	  a	  partnership	  with	  Intel	  for	  server	  distribution.	  	  
At	  one	  level	  these	  alliances	  between	  local	  and	  transnational	  capital	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  evidence	  of	  the	  market	  reserve’s	  failure	  to	  nurture	  an	  enduring	  national	  industry.	  
After	   all,	   some	  of	   the	  most	   important	   original	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   reserve	   in	   the	  
minicomputer	   sector	   –	   Elebra,	   SID	   and	   Itautec	   –	   all	   jumped	   into	   alliances	   with	  
transnational	  capital	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  reserve’s	  restrictions	  were	  abolished.	  With	  the	  
lone	  exception	  of	  Itautec,	  the	  Brazilian	  firms	  each	  accepted	  a	  minority	  position	  within	  
a	  year	  or	  two	  of	  the	  joint	  venture.	  	  
On	   the	  other	   hand,	   the	   alliances	   and	   joint	   ventures	   have	  been	  offered	   as	  
evidence	   of	   the	   success	   of	   the	   market	   reserve.221	   Clearly,	   the	   local	   players	   had	  
established	  a	  position	  in	  the	  market	  and	  developed	  critical	  assets	  and	  capabilities	  that	  
large	   foreign	   players	   couldn’t	   ignore.	   A	   sizable	   number	   of	   Brazilian	   players	  were	  
                                                
220	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2002).	  
221	  Evans	  makes	  this	  point	  in	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995)	  pp.	  185-­‐189.	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perceived	  as	  competent	  and	  desirable	  –	  perhaps	  even	  necessary	  –	  partners	  for	  foreign	  
capital.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  relationship	  between	  national	  and	  foreign	  capital	   in	  the	  sector	  
changed	  markedly	  once	  the	  reserve	  was	  dismantled.	  Battle	  lines	  had	  to	  be	  redrawn.	  
Old	  adversaries	  became	  allies.	  National	  firms	  traded	  a	  competitive	  position	  based	  on	  
the	  protection	  afforded	  by	  their	  government’s	  market	  reserve	  for	  a	  position	  bolstered	  
by	  access	  to	  international	  technology	  and	  financial	  capital.	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  very	  firms	  
that	  the	  state	  had	  been	  protecting	  weakened	  the	  bargaining	  leverage	  of	  the	  state.	  	  
Rather	  than	  argue	  policy	  success	  or	  failure	  based	  on	  the	  alliances	  alone,	  it	  is	  
more	  instructive	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  reserve	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  Did	  
the	  market	  reserve	  policy,	  sustained	  over	  a	  14	  year	  time	  period,	  succeed	  in	  spawning	  
an	   enduring	   national	   capability	   to	   design,	   develop	   and	   produce	   internationally	  
competitive	  electronic	  equipment	  and	  software	  in	  Brazil?	  Evidence	  for	  success	  should	  
be	  apparent	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  national	  players	  competing	  successfully	  with	  foreign	  
capital	  across	  the	  industry	  value	  chain,	  a	  large	  trained	  professional	  class,	  sustained	  
investment	  in	  R&D,	  and	  a	  rough	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector.	  With	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  
much	   longer	  hindsight,	  one	  sees	   the	  same	  picture	  as	   in	   the	   late	  1980s,	  only	  with	  
greater	  clarity.	  It’s	  a	  mixed	  picture	  of	  qualified	  success	  in	  important	  areas	  and	  failure	  
in	  others.	  	  
Without	   a	   doubt,	   the	   market	   reserve	   policy	   created	   space	   for	   a	   national	  
informatics	  capability.	  The	  policy	  induced	  large	  private	  sector	  actors	  like	  Itau	  Group,	  
Elebra,	  Gerdau,	  SID	  and	  others	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   informatics	   industry	  and	  compete	  
credibly	  in	  many	  of	  the	  sub-­‐sectors	  of	  the	  industry,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  mainframes	  
and	  components.	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Itau	  Group	  offers	  the	  clearest	  success	  story.	  Itau’s	  entry	  into	  the	  computer	  
industry	  in	  1979	  owed	  entirely	  to	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy.	  The	  Group	  went	  on	  to	  
participate	   successfully	   in	   computers	   and	   peripherals	   (Itautec),	   semiconductors	  
(Itaucom),	  telecommunications	  (SESA)	  and	  consumer	  electronics	  (Philco,	  purchased	  
from	  Ford	  in	  1987).	  In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  Itautec	  had	  a	  300-­‐strong	  R&D	  team,	  though	  that	  
was	  significantly	  reduced	  in	  the	  post-­‐reserve	  climate.	  The	  company	  established	  an	  
internationally	   competitive	   advantage	   in	   banking	   software	   and	   automation	   that	  
survives	  to	  this	  day.	  Itautec	  began	  exporting	  ATMs	  to	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	  in	  2001.	  As	  
noted	  above,	  Itautec	  leveraged	  its	  leading	  position	  in	  the	  market	  to	  strike	  favourable	  
alliances	  with	  international	  leaders	  IBM,	  Microsoft	  and	  Intel	  –	  a	  rare	  feat	  indeed.	  	  
There	  are	  not	  many	  success	  stories	  like	  Itautec	  but	  it	  is	  not	  completely	  isolated.	  
A	   local	   systems	   integrator	   in	   the	   financial	   automation	   sector,	   PROCOMP,	   began	  
operations	  in	  1988	  and	  by	  1991	  was	  the	  fourth	  largest	  local	  firm	  by	  sales	  and	  first	  in	  
terms	   of	   profitability.	   Unlike	   Itautec,	   however,	   PROCOMP	   was	   acquired	   by	   an	  
international	  leader	  in	  financial	  automation	  and	  ATMs,	  Diebold,	  and	  operates	  as	  a	  
wholly	  owned	  subsidiary	  selling	  Diebold	  systems	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  
Sistema,	   a	   producer	   of	   industrial	   automation	   systems,	   and	   its	   associated	  
peripherals	  manufacturer,	  Rima,	  each	  achieved	  some	  measure	  of	  international	  market	  
success	   in	   the	   1990s.	   Sistema	   established	   a	   German	   joint	   venture	   that	   supplied	  
process	  control	  systems	  in	  Europe.	  Rima	  set	  up	  an	  alliance	  with	  an	  Italian	  producer	  of	  
microcomputers	  and	  proceeded	  to	  sell	  its	  printers	  in	  the	  Italian	  market.222	  
                                                
222	  Frischtak,	  Claudio,	  “The	  International	  Market	  and	  the	  Competitive	  Potential	  of	  National	  
Producers	  of	  Equipment	  and	  Systems,”	  in	  Evans,	  Frischtak	  and	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1992).	  Evans	  
also	  cites	  Frischtak’s	  analysis	  in	  Evans	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995):	  188-­‐189.	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In	  the	  market	  for	  PCs,	  Brazilian	  manufacturers	  maintained	  a	  credible	  position.	  
In	  1997,	  six	  Brazilian	  players	  supplied	  just	  over	  25%	  of	  branded	  the	  market.	  Among	  
them,	  Itautec	  was	  the	  national	  leader	  with	  6.8%	  share,	  second	  behind	  Compaq	  with	  
10.4%	  of	   the	  market.	  So-­‐called	  “white	  box”	  clones	  accounted	   for	  half	   the	  market	  
meanwhile.223	  	  
Cobra,	  the	  original	  state-­‐owned	  flagship	  in	  the	  sector,	  succeeded	  in	  creating	  an	  
authentic	  national	  technology.	  After	  dedicating	  50	  software	  engineers	  to	  the	  task	  for	  
six	   years,	   Cobra	   developed	   the	   SOX	   operating	   system	   and	   architecture	   for	   the	  
superminicomputer	  in	  1989.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  technological	  success,	  however,	  Cobra	  was	  
a	  commercial	  failure.	  Saddled	  with	  high	  costs	  and	  sluggish	  management,	  the	  company	  
disastrously	  chose	  to	  enter	  the	  low	  margin	  PC	  clone	  market	  and	  incurred	  the	  wrath	  of	  
local	   players.	   Here	   was	   the	   national	   flagship,	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   catalyst	   for	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  industry,	  competing	  with	  local	  players	  at	  the	  commodity	  end	  of	  
the	  market.	  Banco	  do	  Brasil	  acquired	  a	  majority	  stake	  in	  the	  company	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s	  and	  Cobra	  Tecnologia	  lives	  on	  today,	  a	  shadow	  of	  its	  former	  self.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  major	  groups	  that	  played	  across	  several	  sub-­‐sectors	  of	  the	  
informatics	   industry,	  national	  players	  developed	  at	   the	  dynamic	   lower	  end	  of	   the	  
market.	  From	  1991	  to	  1997	  the	  number	  of	  firms	  in	  the	  sector	  grew	  from	  420	  to	  522.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  dominant	  player	  in	  the	  industry	  remained	  IBM	  throughout	  
the	  1990s,	  with	  sales	  five	  times	  higher	  than	  its	  nearest	  Brazilian	  competitor,	  Itautec.	  
IBM	  and	  Unisys	  (Burroughs)	  were	  the	  two	  largest	  firms	  when	  the	  market	  reserve	  was	  
instituted	  in	  1977,	  and	  they	  were	  the	  two	  largest	  firms	  when	  it	  ended	  in	  the	  1990s.	  
Indeed	  a	  marked	  shift	  in	  market	  shares	  from	  locally-­‐owned	  to	  foreign-­‐owned	  firms	  
                                                
223	  Data	  from	  IDC,	  cited	  in	  Dedrick,	  Kraemer,	  Palacios	  and	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2001),	  p.	  1209.	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accelerated	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   1990s	   as	   sales	   grew	   rapidly:	   “Gross	   sales	   of	   the	  
information	   technology	   industries	   increased	   from	  US$	  16	  billion	   to	  US$	  30	  billion	  
between	  1996	  and	  2000,	  with	  foreign-­‐owned	  firms	  expanding	  their	  market	  share	  from	  
48.2%	  to	  65.8%	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  locally-­‐owned	  private	  firms.”224	  
The	  development	  of	   a	   large	   cadre	  of	   professionals	   in	   the	   sector	   is	   a	   clear	  
success	  of	  the	  reserve	  policy.	  	  In	  1979	  there	  were	  just	  over	  4,000	  university-­‐trained	  
employees	  in	  the	  informatics	  sector.	  Ten	  years	  later,	  in	  1989	  –	  just	  before	  the	  reserve	  
was	  dismantled,	   that	   number	   increased	   six-­‐fold	   to	   24,000.	   By	   1997,	   the	  Brazilian	  
informatics	  industry	  employed	  approximately	  100,000	  workers	  of	  which	  35-­‐40%	  had	  
college	   degrees	   –	   a	   10-­‐fold	   increase	   in	   18	   years.225	  Many	   of	   these	   professionals	  
worked	   in	   the	   powerful	   technology	   cluster	   that	   developed	   in	   São	   Paolo	   state.	  
Nevertheless,	   Brazil	   was	   unable	   to	   combine	   and	   maintain	   scientific	   R&D	   with	   a	  
national	  enterprise	  of	  scale.	  	  
While	  imports	  were	  held	  in	  check	  and	  national	  content	  in	  computers	  was	  high	  
during	  the	  period	  of	  the	  market	  reserve,	  the	  national	  industry	  as	  a	  whole	  was	  not	  
internationally	  competitive.	  As	  a	  result,	  exports	  grew	  just	  18%	  from	  1981	  to	  1989.226	  	  
After	  the	  reserve	  was	  abolished,	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  worsened	  markedly.	  By	  
the	  year	  2000,	  informatics	  exports	  were	  $317	  million	  –	  a	  58%	  increase	  from	  1989	  –	  
while	  imports	  were	  $1,259	  million	  –	  a	  270%	  increase	  from	  1989,	  resulting	  in	  a	  negative	  
trade	  balance	  in	  2000	  of	  $942	  million.227	  	  
                                                
224	  João	  Carlos	  Ferraz,	  David	  Kupfer	  and	  Marianna	  Iootty.	  “Industrial	  Competitiveness	  in	  
Brazil:	  Ten	  Years	  After	  Economic	  Liberalization,”	  CEPAL	  Review	  82,	  April	  2004,	  p.	  114. 
225	  DEPIN,	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995)	  and	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2002).	  
226	  SCT	  1991	  quoted	  in	  Borja	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995).	  	  	  
227	  Associação	  Brasileira	  da	  Industria	  Elétrica	  e	  Eletrônica	  2001,	  cited	  in	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  
Cit.	  (2002):167.	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Imported	  informatics	  components	  comprised	  more	  than	  60%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  
imports	   in	  1999	  and	  2000,	  reflecting	  the	  lack	  of	  a	   local	  microelectronics	   industrial	  
complex.	  “The	  computer	  industry	  has	  managed	  to	  outgrow	  component	  production.”228	  
While	  there	  was	  some	  public	  discussion	  about	  the	  worsening	  balance	  of	  trade	  and	  
dependency	  on	  imported	  components	  at	  this	  time,	  the	  new	  Informatics	  Law	  passed	  in	  
2001	  contained	  no	  provisions	  to	  encourage	  local	  component	  production	  or	  stimulate	  
exports.	  Foreign	  investment	  alone	  did	  not	  help	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  informatics.	  But	  
it	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  foreign	  investment	  was	  the	  primary	  cause	  of	  its	  worsening.	  
Rather,	  the	  negative	  balance	  of	  trade	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  legacy	  of	  the	  market	  reserve,	  
which	  focused	  domestic	  players	  on	  producing	  for	  the	  domestic	  market	  –	  a	  market	  that	  
was	  too	  small	  to	  support	  efficient	  scale.	  While	  access	  to	  the	  MERCOSUR	  free	  trade	  
area229	  helped,	  the	  addressed	  market	  was	  still	  small	   in	  relative	  terms.	  Indeed,	  the	  
whole	  of	  the	  South	  American	  computer	  market	  including	  Brazil	  is	  less	  than	  10%	  the	  
size	  of	  the	  US	  market.230	  	  
Over	   the	   time	  period	  under	   study,	   the	   informatics	   industry	   shifted	   from	  a	  
world	   of	   proprietary	   hardware,	   developed	   and	   sold	   by	   a	   few	   large	   TNCs	   earning	  
outsized	  profits,	  to	  a	  world	  where	  components	  and	  software	  are	  the	  key	  inputs	  and	  
alliances	   have	   become	   the	   norm.	   Brazil	   remains	   dependent	   in	   informatics,	   but	  
dependence	   had	   been	   shifted	   further	   back	   in	   the	   value	   chain	   of	   the	   industry	   to	  
components.	   And	   in	   the	   dynamic	   global	   informatics	   industry,	   no	   country	   is	   self-­‐
sufficient.	  
                                                
228	  Ferraz	  ET	  Al.	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p	  113.	  
229	  Established	  by	  treaty	  in	  1991,	  MERCOSUR	  comprises	  Brazil,	  Argentina,	  Uruguay	  and	  
Paraguay.	  	  
230	  Dedrick,	  ET.	  Al.	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2001),	  p.	  1209.	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Concluding	  Observations	  
	   The	  Brazilian	  informatics	  case	  has	  been	  analyzed	  and	  discussed	  by	  academics	  
and	  commentators	  since	  1990.	  The	  most	  noteworthy	  discussion	  of	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  contained	  in	  Peter	  Evans’	  book,	  Embedded	  Autonomy:	  States	  
and	   Industrial	   Transformation.231	   Following	   on	   from	   his	   earlier	   work,	  Dependent	  
Development,232	  Evans	  essentially	  argues	  three	  general	  points:	  
1. Development	  outcomes	  depend	  on	  both	  the	  general	  character	  of	  state	  structures	  
(contrasting	  the	  developmental	  state	  with	  the	  predatory	  state)	  and	  the	  role	   it	  
pursues.	  
2. State	   involvement	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   transformation	   even	   in	   high	   tech	  
industries.	  	  
3. Successful	  long-­‐term	  transformation	  requires	  constant	  adjustments:	  state-­‐to-­‐local	  
industry,	  state-­‐to-­‐foreign	  capital,	  state-­‐to-­‐state.	  
	   Evans	  then	  posits	  four	  types	  of	  state	  activity	  to	  promote	  industry	  development.	  
He	  describes	  these	  four	  roles	  using	  some	  typically	  original	  nomenclature:	  (a)	  Custodial	  
–	  the	  state	  as	  a	  rule-­‐maker	  and	  regulator;	  (b)	  Demiurge	  –	  the	  state	  as	  a	  participant,	  
establishing	  enterprises	  that	  compete	  in	  the	  market;	  (c)	  Midwife	  –	  the	  state	  assisting	  
the	  emergence	  of	  new	  entrepreneurial	  groups	  by	  creating	  a	  greenhouse	  of	  reserves,	  
tariffs	  and	  other	  incentives	  to	  encourage	  the	  desired	  investment;	  and	  (d)	  Husbandry	  –	  
the	  state	  nurturing	  national	  industry	  by	  taking	  on	  complementary	  tasks	  like	  R&D	  and	  
encouraging	  the	  newly	  born	  private	  sector	  to	  participate	  in	  priority	  initiatives.	  	  
                                                
231	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995).	  	  
232	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1979).	  	  
        177 
In	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil,	  the	  state	  played	  each	  of	  these	  four	  roles	  during	  the	  period	  
in	  question.	  Through	  the	  Informatics	  Laws	  and	  the	  agencies	  CAPRE	  and	  its	  successor	  
SEI,	  the	  state	  clearly	  played	  a	  custodial	  role,	  regulating	  the	  informatics	  industry	  using	  a	  
variety	  of	  mechanisms.	  By	  investing	  in	  Cobra,	  the	  state	  also	  played	  Demiurge,	  though	  
it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  was	  the	  original	  intention	  with	  Cobra.	  Cobra	  was	  meant	  to	  take	  
on	  risky	  R&D	  investment	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  would	  not.	  In	  so	  doing,	  Cobra	  was	  to	  
be	  a	  catalyst	  for	  the	  local	  industry,	  not	  a	  competitor.	  	  
The	  Brazilian	  state	  as	  midwife	  seems	  most	  apt.	  The	  reserve	  policies	  created	  a	  
greenhouse	  for	  local	  capital	  to	  develop	  over	  a	  14-­‐year	  period.	  After	  14	  years	  a	  national	  
industry	  was	  established,	  but	  it	  was	  still	  adolescent	  and,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  few	  
market	  niches,	  incompatible	  and	  uncompetitive	  with	  the	  international	  industry.	  Would	  
the	  state	  successfully	  shift	  to	  play	  the	  husbandry	  role	  envisaged	  by	  Evans?	  	  
The	   short	   answer	   is	   no.	   Internal	   and	   external	   pressure	   to	   dismantle	   the	  
greenhouse,	  combined	  with	  a	  rapidly	  changing,	  globalizing	  industry	  meant	  that	  the	  
Brazilian	  state	  would	  never	  make	  the	  shift	  from	  midwife	  to	  husbandry.233	  	  
In	  fact,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  could	  have	  played	  a	  successful	  
husbandry	   role	   in	   informatics	   even	   if	   the	   political	   will	   and	   institutional	   fortitude	  
existed	   for	   the	   task.	   The	   dynamics	   of	   the	   industry	   itself	   would	   have	   made	   this	  
exceedingly	  difficult.	   In	   the	  context	  of	  a	  political	  democracy,	   is	   it	  possible	   for	   the	  
relevant	  agencies	  of	  state	  to	  anticipate	  change	  and	  adapt	  policy	  accordingly?	  With	  all	  
the	  alliances	  between	  national	  and	  foreign	  capital,	  which	  firms	  would	  enjoy	  the	  state’s	  
                                                
233	  Evans	  makes	  a	  somewhat	  different	  point	  here.	  He	  argues	  “intense	  struggles	  over	  
regulating	  the	  inflows	  of	  foreign	  technology	  bequeathed	  a	  political	  culture	  in	  which	  state	  
involvement	  was	  equated	  with	  policing…	  Husbandry	  might	  be	  the	  obvious	  next	  phase	  in	  a	  
promotional	  strategy,	  but	  the	  political	  and	  institutional	  resources	  that	  had	  been	  absorbed	  
by	  old	  strategies	  could	  not	  be	  recuperated	  quickly	  or	  easily.”	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995):	  213.	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husbandry,	  even	  if	  extremely	  deft	  and	  skilful?	  Whilst	  it	  sounds	  appealing,	  the	  Brazilian	  
case	  does	  not	  give	  us	  an	  example	  of	  successful	  high-­‐tech	  husbandry	  in	  action.	  	  
With	  the	  benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  the	  researcher	  is	  left	  with	  many	  of	  the	  same	  
conclusions	   drawn	   in	   the	   late	   1980s.	   Brazil’s	   informatics	   development	   policy	  
succeeded	  in	  attracting	  national	  companies	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  industry	  and	  developing	  a	  
cadre	  of	  technically	  qualified	  professionals.	  The	  policy	  also	  succeeded	  for	  a	  time	  in	  
shifting	  dependency	  further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  chain.	  Despite	  the	  policy	  successes	  
documented	   here,	   the	   Brazilian	   case	   does	   not	   demonstrate	   the	   validity	   of	   the	  
“obsolescing	  bargain”	  theory	  in	  high	  technology	  industries.	  Indeed,	  as	  noted	  in	  1988,	  
the	  bargaining	  gains	  were	  not	  secure	  and	  shifts	  in	  such	  a	  dynamic	  industry	  and	  policy	  
environment	  were	  not	  unilinear.	  Now,	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  longer	  hindsight,	  these	  
cautions	  are	  emphatically	  underlined.	  The	  specifics	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  support	  the	  general	  
power	  shift	  from	  state	  to	  TNC	  over	  time,	  driven	  largely	  by	  technology,	  that	  Strange	  
asserts.234	  	  
Observers	   and	   analysts	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   case	   pay	   too	   little	   attention	   to	  
entrepreneurial	  and	  managerial	  talent	  as	  determinants	  of	  market	  success.	  Instead,	  
they	  turn	  too	  soon	  to	  external,	  structural	  conditions	  and	  policy	  instruments	  to	  explain	  
differential	  results.	  The	  market	  reserve	  can	  be	  credited	  with	  Itautec’s	  entry	  into	  the	  
computer	  industry	  (i.e.	  successful	  midwifery),	  but	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  explain	  Itautec’s	  
sustained	  success	  amidst	  the	  failure	  of	  so	  many	  other	  firms	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  
quality	  of	  the	  firm’s	  strategy	  and	  management.	  State	  husbandry	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  deft	  
–	   is	   a	   poor	   substitute	   for	   sound	   strategic	   choices	   at	   the	   firm	   level	   and	   strong	  
management	  to	  implement	  them.	  	  	  
                                                
234	  Strange,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1996)	  and	  discussed	  in	  the	  Introduction.	  
        179 
Observing	  the	  Brazilian	  case,	  development	  economists	  have	  noted	  the	  hyper-­‐
dynamism	  of	  the	  informatics	  industry,	  but	  underestimate	  its	  importance.	  Static	  models	  
that	  predict	  outcomes	  based	  on	  structural	  factors	  lack	  explanatory	  power	  in	  such	  a	  
dynamic	   industry	  (and,	   in	  any	  case,	  are	  of	   little	  use	  to	  policy	  makers	  and	  industry	  
participants	  who	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  real	  time).	  	  
In	  the	  1970s,	  Brazilian	  policy	  makers	  could	  sense	  the	  coming	  importance	  of	  
information	  technology	  and	  set	  out	  to	  develop	  a	  national	  informatics	  industry.	  They	  
believed	   that	   their	  domestic	  market	  was	   large	  enough	   to	  attract	  Brazilian	  private	  
capital	  into	  the	  greenhouse	  they	  constructed,	  resulting	  in	  a	  world-­‐class	  industry.	  And	  
they	  believed	  that	  the	  national	  market	  was	  attractive	  enough	  to	  afford	  them	  sufficient	  
bargaining	  power	  with	  the	  TNCs	  who	  still	  controlled	  the	  top	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  	  
In	  a	  few	  short	  years,	  the	  informatics	   industry	  transformed	  from	  a	  world	  of	  
proprietary	  hardware,	  developed	  and	  sold	  by	  a	   few	   large	  American	  TNCs	  earning	  
outsized	   profits,	   to	   a	   global	   industry	   and	   disaggregated	   value	   chain	   where	  
components,	  software	  and	  networking	  are	  the	  key	  inputs,	  and	  alliances	  became	  the	  
norm.	   This	   change	   opened	   up	   opportunities	   for	   local	   players	   and	   policy	  makers.	  
Internationally	   competitive	   high	   technology	   resided	   in	   a	   chip	   and	   could	   now	   be	  
sourced	  on	  the	  open	  market.	  In	  a	  sense,	  everyone	  was	  just	  “assembling”	  computers.	  
Yet,	  the	  globalization	  of	  the	  industry	  that	  brought	  international	  standards	  (especially	  in	  
operating	  software)	  made	  it	  ultimately	  impossible	  to	  build	  a	  national	  industry	  that	  did	  
not	  conform.	  	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	   informatics	  shifted	  from	  being	  an	   important	   industry	  to	  
develop,	  to	  being	  the	  critical	  competitive	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  whole	  economy.	  For	  Brazil,	  
lower	  labour	  costs	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  enough.	  These	  needed	  to	  be	  combined	  with	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productivity	   enhancements	   enabled	   by	   technology	   and	   knowledge	  management.	  
Brazil	  risked	  being	  caught	  in	  the	  middle,	  with	  higher	  labour	  costs	  than	  China	  or	  India,	  
but	  not	  yet	  a	  highly	  productive	  IT-­‐enabled	  producer.	  As	  a	  result,	  local	  industry	  became	  
a	  powerful	  voice	  to	  shift	  the	  policy	  agenda	  from	  industry	  development	  to	  world-­‐class	  
technology	  diffusion.	  
The	   hyper-­‐dynamism	   of	   the	   industry	   forced	   a	   restructuring	   of	   the	   many	  
bargains	  that	  were	  struck	  earlier.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  noteworthy	  fact	  arising	  from	  the	  
case	  is	  the	  impossible	  challenge	  the	  industry	  dynamics	  presented	  to	  policy	  makers.	  
Policy	  was	  simply	  unable	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  the	  industry.	  Strange’s	  
general	  comment	  about	  the	  state’s	  limitations	  is	  overstated,	  but	  it	  seems	  directionally	  
correct	  in	  the	  Brazilian	  informatics	  case:	  “Their	  [the	  host	  state’s]	  failure	  to	  manage	  the	  
national	   economy,	   to	   maintain	   employment…	   is	   not	   a	   matter	   of	   technical	  
incompetence,	  nor	  moral	  turpitude	  nor	  political	  maladroitness.	  It	   is	  neither	  in	  any	  
direct	  sense,	  their	  fault,	  nor	  the	  fault	  of	  other	  governments.	  They	  are,	  simply,	  the	  
victims	  of	  the	  market	  economy.”235	  Industry	  dynamics	  required	  greater	  adaptability	  
among	  policymakers	  and	  their	  policy.	  	  
                                                
235	  Ibid.,	  (1996)	  p.	  14.	  Edited	  from	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  quote	  is	  a	  long	  list	  of	  macroeconomic	  
outcomes.	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CHAPTER	  6	  
INTRODUCING	  THE	  CASE	  OF	  MÉXICO:	  
GENERAL	  POLITICAL	  AND	  ECONOMIC	  CONTEXT	  
	  
Introduction	  to	  the	  Mexican	  Case	  
	   In	   September	   1981	   the	   Mexican	   Bureau	   of	   Industries	   in	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Resources	  and	  Industrial	  Promotion	  (Secretaria	  de	  Patrimonio	  y	  Fomento	  Industrial	  or	  
SEPAFIN)	  published	  a	  "Development	  Programme	  for	  the	  Manufacture	  of	  Electronic	  
Computer	  Systems,	  Their	  Main	  Modules	  and	  Peripheral	  Equipment."	  	  This	  was	  the	  
government's	  first	  coordinated	  attempt	  to	  foster	  a	  domestic	  computer	  industry	  in	  
México.	  	  
	   At	  this	  time	  there	  were	  no	  Mexican	  firms	  involved	  in	  computer	  manufacture	  
and	   few	  Mexicans	  with	  knowledge	  and	   skills	   in	   computer	  electronics.	   	   The	  policy	  
initiative	  was	  thus	  extremely	  ambitious,	  requiring	  strong,	  broad	  commitment	  within	  
the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  a	  favourable	  investment	  climate.	  	  In	  the	  end	  neither	  was	  
forthcoming.	   	   Proponents	   of	   the	   policy	   initiative	   received	   neither	   support	   nor	  
repudiation	  from	  the	  government	  above.	  They	  were	  left	  to	  regulate	  the	  industry	  as	  
best	   they	   could	   in	   the	   context	   of	   economic	   crisis	   and	   an	   export–oriented	  
macroeconomic	  policy.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  computer	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  
processes	   they	  need	  to	  be	  viewed	  clearly	   in	  political	  and	  economic	  context.	   	  This	  
exploration	  of	  the	  Mexican	  case	  begins	  therefore	  with	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  general	  
political	  and	  economic	  situation	  at	  and	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  computer	  decree.
236	   	  This	  
review	  reveals	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  obstacles	  to	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  
an	  industrial	  development	  programme	  for	  computers.	  	  These	  obstacles	  include	  the	  
worsening	  of	  the	  country's	  economic	  fortunes	  and	  the	  resultant	  preoccupation	  with	  
the	  external	  debt	  and	  balance	  of	  payments;	  the	  growing	  disillusionment	  with	  import	  
                                                
236	  This	  review	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  exhaustive.	  	  The	  author’s	  aims,	  rather,	  are	  to	  highlight	  the	  
salient	  political	  and	  economic	  characteristics	  of	  this	  period	  that	  have	  particular	  relevance	  to	  
the	  policy	  effort	  in	  computers,	  and	  to	  establish	  chronological	  'signposts'	  referenced	  later.	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substituting	  industrialisation	  (ISI)	  policies	  and	  the	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  international	  
competitiveness	   and	   exports;	   the	   alienation	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   industrialists––
foreign	  and	  domestic	  alike––after	  the	  banks	  nationalization,	  devaluations,	  and	  the	  
imposition	  of	  exchange	  controls;	  and	  finally	  the	  transition	  of	  presidential	  power	  and	  
the	  concomitant	  loss	  of	  nationalist/expansionist	  policy	  support	  at	  the	  cabinet	  level	  in	  
the	  Mexican	  government.	  	  	  
	   Following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  general	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  in	  
this	  chapter,	  Chapter	  7	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  evolution	  of	  México’s	  1981	  computer	  
policy.	   One	   can	   see	   here	   the	   uphill	   challenge	   faced	   by	   the	   promulgators	   of	   the	  
computer	  development	  programme.	  	  The	  Mexican	  experience	  in	  computer	  electronics	  
had	   been	   characterised	   by	   three	   mutually–reinforcing	   factors:	   	   (i)	   the	   historical	  
dominance	  of	  the	  Mexican	  market	  by	  the	  computer	  transnationals;	  (ii)	  the	  lack	  of	  
Mexican	   computer	   scientists	   and	   technicians	   owing	   to	   educational	   policies	   that	  
neglected	  this	  particular	  area	  until	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  1980s;	  and	  (iii)	  the	  limitation	  of	  
the	  Mexican	  state's	  role	  to	  that	  of	  a	  consumer	  of	  computer	  electronics.	  	  In	  addition,	  
there	  was	  little	  private	  sector	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  initiative	  and	  the	  United	  States	  
government	  privately	  pressured	  the	  Mexican	  government	  not	  to	  implement	  the	  policy	  
almost	  before	  the	  ink	  had	  dried	  on	  the	  plan.	  	  U.S.	  concern	  was	  voiced	  at	  a	  time	  when	  
México	  was	   particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   such	   pressure	   from	   its	   influential	   northern	  
neighbour.	  	  	  
	   These	   general	   and	   specific	   political	   and	   economic	   factors	   inhibited	   the	  
successful	  implementation	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  IBM	  successfully	  exploited	  the	  situation	  in	  its	  
negotiations	  with	   the	  Mexican	   government	   concerning	   a	  proposed	   investment	   in	  
microcomputer	  manufacturing.	  	  In	  July	  1985	  IBM	  obtained	  an	  exceptional	  ruling	  which	  
contradicted	   the	   programme's	   explicit	   prohibition	   of	   foreign–controlled	  
microcomputer	  operations	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Thus	  the	  policy	  was	  further	  altered	  and	  
conditioned	  by	  the	  pressure	  of	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  led	  by	  IBM.	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   For	  its	  part,	  the	  Mexican	  government	  leveraged	  the	  policy	  guidelines	  to	  bargain	  
successfully	  with	  IBM	  and	  other	  computer	  transnationals	  for	  increased	  investment	  and	  
export	  commitments.	  	  	  	  
	   Despite	  the	  conditioning	  of	  the	  programme	  by	  these	  factors	  and	  events,	  the	  
initiative	  did	  succeed	  in	  some	  of	  its	  objectives.	  	  Chapter	  8	  contains	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  
of	  the	  policy	  achievements	  compared	  to	  its	  original	  objectives.	  	  
	  
The	  General	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Context	  (1970	  –	  1982)	  
	   By	  1970	  México	  had	  experienced	  thirty	  years	  of	  remarkable	  economic	  growth	  
and	  industrialization.	  	  Overall,	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  of	  6.5	  percent	  
annually	   between	   1940	   and	   1970,	   during	  which	   time	   inflation	   averaged	   only	   4.4	  
percent.
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   In	  addition	  to	  the	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  of	   this	  period,	   the	  Mexican	  
economy	  underwent	  a	  structural	  transformation	  from	  agriculture	  to	  manufacturing.	  	  
Industrial	  growth	  experienced	  peaks	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1960s,	  averaging	  in	  excess	  of	  
11%	  and	  9%	  per	  year	  in	  these	  respective	  decades.
238
	  
	   Much	  of	  the	  credit	  for	  this	  remarkable	  industrial	  growth	  and	  transformation	  
was	  attributed	  to	  the	  long–standing	  policy	  of	  import	  substituting	  industrialization	  (ISI).	  	  
ISI	  policy	  employed	  a	  system	  of	  import	  licensing	  to	  encourage	  foreign	  companies	  to	  
construct	  plants	  in	  México	  rather	  than	  to	  import	  from	  abroad	  to	  serve	  the	  domestic	  
market.	  	  Import	  substitution	  was	  emphasized	  first	  in	  nondurable	  consumer	  goods,	  and	  
later	  in	  intermediate	  and	  capital	  goods.
239
	  
	   This	  period	  of	  the	  "Mexican	  Miracle"	  was	  not	  without	  its	  problems,	  however.	  	  
Economic	  growth	  was	  not	  uniformly	  linear;	  rather	  there	  were	  often	  wild	  fluctuations	  
from	  year	  to	  year.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  benefits	  of	  growth	  did	  not	  trickle	  down	  the	  socio–
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  Roger	  D.	  Hansen,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Mexican	  Development,	  (Baltimore:	  	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  
University	  Press,	  1974),	  p.	  
238	  	  Dale	  Story,	  Industry,	  the	  State,	  and	  Public	  Policy	  in	  México,	  (Austin,	  Texas:	  	  University	  of	  
Texas	  Press,	  1986),	  p.	  21.	  
239	  	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  23–28.	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economic	  ladder.	  	  Income	  inequality	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  government's	  regressive	  
taxation	  policy	  and	  expenditure	  priorities	  that	  neglected	  social	  welfare.
240
	  
	   The	  country's	  industrial	  strength	  became	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  very	  
few	  firms	  located	  primarily	  in	  one	  of	  three	  urban	  centres:	  	  México	  City,	  Monterrey,	  
and	  Guadalajara.	   	   In	   1975,	   80	   percent	   of	   all	   industrial	   firms	   accounted	   for	   just	   3	  
percent	   of	   total	   value–added.	   	   By	   contrast,	   2.6	   percent	   of	   manufacturing	   firms	  
produced	  77	  percent	  of	  the	  country's	  industrial	  value–added.	  	  One	  scholar	  on	  México	  
comments:	  	  "These	  concentrations	  in	  terms	  of	  size	  and	  location	  have	  had	  negative	  
social	  effects	  (unemployment,	  urban	  congestion,	  and	  the	  like)	  and	  have	  stymied	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  more	  diversified	  national	  industrial	  plant."
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  Foreign	  investors,	  in	  
particular,	  controlled	  strategic	  and	  dynamic	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  In	  1970	  TNCs	  
controlled	  85	  percent	  of	  the	  rubber	  industry,	  79	  percent	  of	  electrical	  machinery,	  68	  
percent	  of	  chemical	  products,	  62	  percent	  of	  nonelectrical	  machinery,	  and	  50	  percent	  
of	  transportation	  equipment.
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  Though	  not	  yet	  considered	  strategic,	  the	  Mexican	  




	   Finally,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  import	  substitution	  policy,	  the	  country	  continued	  to	  run	  
ever–increasing	  current	  account	  deficits.	  	  The	  ISI	  policy	  goals	  of	  restricting	  imports,	  
encouraging	   local	   value–added	   and	   exports	   were	   clearly	   not	   being	   met.	   	   The	  
chronically	  over–valued	  peso	  undermined	  ISI,	  the	  protected	  Mexican	  industry	  was	  not	  
internationally	   competitive	   and	   therefore	   unable	   to	   generate	   sufficient	   export	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   Story,	   Op.	   Cit.,	   p.	   29.	   	   Figures	   from	   Secretaria	   de	   Programación	   y	   Presupuesto,	  
"Características	  de	  la	  industria	  de	  transformación	  en	  México,"	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  SPP,	  1980),	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cited	  by	  Story,	  p.	  29.	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  Richard	  Newfarmer	  and	  Willard	  Mueller,	  Multinational	  Corporations	  in	  Brazil	  and	  México:	  	  
Structural	  Sources	  of	  Economic	  and	  Non-­‐economic	  Power,	  Report	  to	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  
Multinational	  Corporations	  of	  the	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	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  States	  Senate,	  
August	  1975,	  p.	  57.	  	  Cited	  by	  Story,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  65.	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   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce,	   	   "Computer	   Equipment:	   	   Global	   Market	   Survey,"	  	  
(Washington	  D.C.:	  	  GPO,	  1973),	  p.	  76,	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  U.S.	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  of	  Commerce,	  "Computers	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  México	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  (Washington	  D.C.:	  	  GPO,	  1981),	  p.	  8.	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earnings	  to	  offset	  imports.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  transnationals,	  which	  were	  expected	  to	  lead	  
in	  exports,	  were	  instead	  contributing	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems.
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   It	  was	  in	  this	  economic	  and	  political	  milieu	  that	  Luís	  	  Echeverria	  assumed	  the	  
presidential	  mantle.	   	   Echeverria	  undertook	  a	  major	  departure	   from	   the	   generally	  
conservative	   economic	   policies	   of	   his	   predecessor	   and	  pursued	   a	   largely	   populist	  
programme	  dubbed	  "Shared	  Development"	  which	  emphasized	  the	  goal	  of	   income	  
redistribution	  over	  and	  against	  economic	  growth	  alone.	  	  	  
	   The	  new	  president	  was	   antagonistic	   toward	  private	   capital	   in	   general	   and	  
foreign	  capital	  in	  particular.	  	  Private	  capital,	  in	  turn,	  was	  suspicious	  of	  Echeverria's	  




	   During	  the	  Echeverria	  sexenio,	  three	  laws	  designed	  to	  limit	  foreign	  investment	  
and	  market	  dominance	  were	  enacted.	  	  First	  and	  most	  significant	  was	  the	  1973	  "Law	  to	  
Promote	  Mexican	  Investment	  and	  Regulate	  Foreign	  Investment."	  	  This	  law	  solidified	  
the	  government's	  "mexicanization"	  policy.	  	  It	  established	  majority	  Mexican	  ownership	  
of	  joint	  ventures	  as	  the	  general	  rule	  and	  created	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  Foreign	  
Investment	  to	  enforce	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  law	  and	  decide	  exceptions.	  	  The	  1973	  "Law	  
on	   the	   Transfer	   of	   Technology"	   required	   the	   registration	   and	   review	   of	   all	   new	  
contracts	   and	   licenses	   with	   foreign	   firms	   through	   a	   newly	   created	   Registry	   on	  
Technology	  Transfer.	   	  This	   law	  also	   limited	  payments	  of	   royalties	   to	   foreign	   firms	  
under	  licensing	  and	  contractual	  arrangements.	  	  Finally,	  the	  1976	  "Law	  on	  Patents	  and	  
Trademarks"	   limited	   the	   use	   of	   patents	   and	   foreign	   trademarks	   in	  México	   in	   an	  
attempt	  to	  lower	  non–price	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  Mexican	  firms	  in	  foreign–dominated	  
industries.	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  See	  Story,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  65	  (table).	  	  In	  1971,	  for	  example,	  foreign	  enterprises	  ran	  a	  current	  
account	  deficit	  of	  782.6	  million	  dollars,	  which	  accounted	  for	  84.3	  percent	  of	  the	  country's	  total	  
current	  account	  deficit.	  
245	  	  From	  1970	  to	  1976	  state	  majority	  shareholding	  companies	  grew	  thirteen-­‐fold	  from	  39	  to	  
524.	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   Echeverria's	  policies	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  limiting	  foreign	  investment;	  however	  the	  
TNCs	  continued	  to	  dominate	  strategic	  and	  dynamic	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  ran	  
ever-­‐increasing	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits.
246	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  rapidly	  expanding	  
state	  bureaucracy	  exacerbated	  the	  external	  deficits.	  	  	  
	   In	  August	  and	  October	  1976	  Echeverria	  reacted	  to	  the	  worsening	  economic	  
situation	  by	  devaluing	  the	  peso	  to	  one	  half	  of	  its	  previous	  level.	  	  This	  surprise	  action	  
followed	  capital	  flight	  of	  staggering	  proportions.	  	  The	  president	  then	  publicly	  attacked	  
the	  private	  sector	  and	  expropriated	  100,000	  hectares	  of	  farmland	  in	  northwestern	  
México.	  	  These	  final	  actions	  of	  the	  Echeverria	  administration	  ensured	  the	  alienation	  of	  
the	  private	  sector––foreign	  and	  domestic	  alike.	  	  	  
	   In	  sum,	  the	  Echeverria	  years	  were	  marked	  by	  a	  questioning	  of	  ISI	  policy,	  the	  
enactment	  of	  controls	  on	  foreign	  investment,	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  a	  
greatly	  expanded	  state	  bureaucracy	  (with	  a	  concomitant	  increase	  in	  the	  state's	  use	  of	  
foreign	  computer	  equipment	  and	  services	  which	  will	  be	  elaborated	  later),	  and	  growing	  
external	  deficits	  and	  foreign	  debt.	  
	   With	  the	  economy	  in	  turmoil,	  Lopez	  Portillo	  came	  to	  power	  distancing	  himself	  
from	  the	  policies	  of	  his	  predecessor	  (as	  Echeverria	  had	  done	  before),	  attempting	  to	  
court	  the	  private	  sector	  with	  his	  so–called	  "Alliance	  for	  Production"	  policy.	   	  Lopez	  
Portillo	  initially	  succeeded	  in	  gaining	  the	  trust	  of	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  business;	  
however,	   he	   ended	   his	   term	   accentuating	   the	   very	   things	   that	   characterized	   his	  
predecessor's	  reign.	  
	   Lopez	  Portillo	  applied	  the	  1973	  Law	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  more	  loosely	  than	  
Echeverria,	   but	   still	   only	   44	   new	   enterprises	   were	   formed	   with	   majority	   foreign	  
participation	   from	   1973	   to	   1982.	   	   This	   compares	   with	   1,987	   new	   minority	   joint	  
ventures	  and	  498	  mexicanizations	  during	  this	  period.
247	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  p.	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   The	  new	  administration	  liberalized	  import	  restraints,	  simplifying	  tariffs	  and	  
removing	  import	  license	  requirements	  on	  some	  5,600	  products	  from	  1976	  to	  1980.
248	  	  
The	  more	  liberal	  trade	  and	  investment	  policies	  of	  this	  administration,	  coupled	  with	  the	  
discovery	  of	  large	  oil	  reserves	  that	  presaged	  a	  brighter	  economic	  outlook,	  encouraged	  
foreign	  investors.	  	  Foreign	  direct	  investment	  grew	  rapidly	  from	  1977	  to	  1980.	  	  
	   In	  1979	  Lopez	  Portillo's	  Minister	  of	  Resources	  and	  Industrial	  Promotion,	  José	  
Andres	  de	  Oteyza	  unveiled	  the	  National	  Industrial	  Development	  Plan.	  	  It	  was	  under	  
this	   plan	   that	   the	   computer	   programme	   would	   eventually	   be	   developed.	   	   The	  
Industrial	  Development	  Plan	  established	  a	  coordinated	  set	  of	  ambitious	  goals	  and	  
incentives	   to	  develop	   the	  economy	   to	  1990.	   	   The	  plan	  encouraged	   investment	   in	  
priority	  zones	  to	  redress	  the	  problem	  of	  geographic	  concentration	  of	  Mexican	  industry	  
and	  population	  in	  the	  large	  urban	  centres,	  and	  it	  designated	  seventy	  priority	  industrial	  
sectors	  to	  receive	  incentives	  to	  meet	  specified	  growth	  rates.	  	  The	  computer	  industry	  
was	  included	  among	  these	  designated	  industries.	  	  	  
	   Lopez	  Portillo's	  administration	  exercised	  fiscal	  restraint	  until	  1980–81.	  	  In	  these	  
years	  however,	  profligate	  government	  spending,	  encouraged	  by	  the	  growing	  oil	  wealth	  
and	  the	  highly	  ambitious	  economic	  development	  programme,	  fuelled	  inflation.	  	  The	  
economy	  became	  more	  and	  more	  dependent	  upon	  oil	  exports	  while	  the	  overvalued	  
peso	  combined	  with	  trade	  liberalization	  resulted	  in	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  manufactured	  
imports.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  resulted	  in	  a	  growing	  external	  imbalance	  and	  increased	  foreign	  
debt.	  	  The	  Mexican	  economy	  was	  thus	  increasingly	  vulnerable	  to	  external	  shock	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  internal	  economic	  policy.	  	  	  
	   Three	  exogenous,	  interrelated	  "events"	  provided	  that	  unwanted	  shock:	  	  first	  
was	  the	  rise	  of	  world	  interest	  rates	  in	  1979;	  second	  was	  the	  1980–81	  recession	  in	  the	  
world	  economy;	  and	  third	  was	  the	  1981	  decline	  of	  world	  oil	  prices.	  	  The	  combination	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  The	  number	  of	  restricted	  product	  categories	  decreased	  from	  7,600	  to	  2,000	  during	  this	  
time.	  Import	  license	  coverage	  was	  correspondingly	  reduced	  from	  80%	  of	  import	  value	  in	  
1977	  to	  24%	  in	  1980.	  Banco	  de	  México,	  Dirección	  de	  Investigaciones	  Económicas	  cited	  in	  
Review	  of	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Liberalization	  Measures	  by	  México	  and	  Prospects	  for	  
Future	  United	  States–Mexican	  Relations,	  Phase	  I.	  Washington,	  DC:	  US	  International	  Trade	  
Commission,	  1990.	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served	  to	   increase	  fundamental	  costs	  and	  decrease	  vital	  revenues	  to	  the	  Mexican	  
economy.	  	  In	  1981	  México	  faced	  a	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficit	  of	  11.5	  billion	  dollars.
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   In	  order	  to	  decrease	  imports	  and	  increase	  the	  export	  of	  manufactured	  goods	  
Lopez	  Portillo	  re–established	  import	  controls	  and	  raised	  tariff	  barriers	  in	  1981.	  	  He	  also	  
initiated	  a	  series	  of	  mini–devaluations.	  	  In	  May	  1981	  he	  reacted	  against	  the	  foreign	  
controlled	   automobile	   sector,	   which	   had	   been	   running	   chronic	   trade	   deficits	   by	  
strengthening	  export	  performance	  requirements	  for	  the	  industry.	  
	   The	  administration's	  policy	  reversal	  culminated	  in	  August	  and	  September	  of	  
1982	  with	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  that	  appealed	  to	  economic	  nationalism	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
At	  the	  beginning	  of	  August,	  Lopez	  Portillo	  instituted	  exchange	  controls	  freezing	  all	  
dollar	  accounts	  and	  established	  two	  rates	  of	  exchange:	  	  a	  preferential	  rate	  for	  debt	  
servicing	  and	  necessary	  imports,	  and	  a	  devalued	  free	  rate.	  	  In	  September	  the	  president	  
shocked	  the	  private	  sector	  by	  nationalizing	  the	  remaining	  private	  banks.	  	  These	  policy	  
initiatives	  reflected	  the	  opinions	  of	  the	  nationalists	  within	  the	  "economic	  cabinet"	  
which	  included	  Andres	  de	  Oteyza	  of	  SEPAFIN,	  Carlos	  Tello	  Macias,	  former	  Minister	  of	  
Programming	  and	  Budget	  (SPP),	  and	  José	  Ramon	  Lopez	  Portillo,	  the	  president's	  son	  
and	  undersecretary	  at	  the	  SPP.
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   Hence,	   Lopez	   Portillo	   ended	   by	   amplifying	   the	   legacy	   of	   the	   previous	  
administration	  even	  though	  he	  had	  started	  out	  on	  a	  completely	  different	  tack.	  	  The	  
economy	  was	   in	   severe	   recession,	   inflation	  was	   running	   at	   100	   percent,	   and	   the	  
external	  debt	  was	  now	  80	  billion	  dollars.
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  Controls	  on	  imports	  were	  re–established	  
and	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  ensured	  by	  the	  banks	  nationalization,	  
currency	  devaluations	  and	  exchange	  controls.	  Meanwhile,	  financed	  by	  oil	  revenues,	  
the	  state	  bureaucracy	  had	  expanded	  its	  role	  in	  the	  economy.	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  World	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  Outlook.	  Washington	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  Fund,	  1983.	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  Story,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  148.	  	  Tello	  was	  not	  officially	  a	  member	  of	  the	  cabinet	  at	  this	  time	  but	  he	  
continued	  a	   close	   friend	  of	   the	  president	  and	   informal	  adviser.	   	  He	   replaced	  Mancera	  as	  
President	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  México	  when	  Mancera	  resigned	  after	  the	  banks	  nationalization.	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   Miguel	   De	   la	   Madrid	   Hurtado	   was	   President	   Lopez	   Portillo's	   Minister	   for	  
Programming	  and	  Budget	  as	  from	  May	  1979.	  	  He	  was	  "unveiled"	  as	  Lopez	  Portillo's	  
successor	  in	  September	  1981.	  	  De	  la	  Madrid	  came	  to	  power	  facing	  one	  of	  the	  worst	  
economic	  crises	  in	  the	  country's	  history.	  	  As	  the	  two	  previous	  presidents	  had	  done,	  he	  
wasted	  no	  time	  distancing	  himself	  from	  his	  predecessor's	  policies.	  
	   De	   la	  Madrid	   responded	   to	   the	   economic	   crisis	   by	   pledging	   the	   structural	  
change	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  His	  "Immediate	  Programme	  for	  Economic	  Restructuring"	  
included,	  among	  other	  measures,	  reduced	  growth	  in	  public	  spending,	  an	  increase	  in	  
taxation,	   a	   "realistic"	   exchange	   rate	   policy,	   and	   the	   reordering	   of	   the	   federal	  
bureaucracy	  for	  greater	  efficiency.	  	  	  
	   Dependence	  upon	  oil	  to	  finance	  industrial	  growth	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  viable	  option	  
for	  the	  new	  administration;	  manufacturing	  would	  have	  to	  finance	  its	  own	  growth.	  	  De	  
la	  Madrid	  needed	   to	   restore	   the	   confidence	  of	   the	  private	   sector	   in	  general,	   and	  
foreign	  investors	  in	  particular,	  as	  they	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  his	  plan	  to	  restructure	  
the	  Mexican	  economy.	  	  	  
	   The	   new	   president	   emphasized	   free	   market	   efficiency	   and	   international	  
competitiveness	  in	  his	  restructuring	  programme.	  	  The	  1983–88	  National	  Development	  
Plan	  signed	  by	  De	  la	  Madrid	  in	  May	  1983	  signalled	  the	  greater	  opening	  of	  the	  economy	  
and	  further	  elucidated	  his	  approach:	  
	   	  
"The	   Plan	   assigns	   priority	   importance	   to	   the	  modernization	   of	   the	  
productive	   apparatus,	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   promoting	   an	   efficient	  
insertion	  of	  the	  industrial	  sector	  into	  the	  stream	  of	  international	  trade,	  
and	   in	   a	   greater	   way,	   to	   strengthen	   the	   country's	   bonds	   with	   the	  
worldwide	  economy.	  
	   “For	  that	  reason,	  the	  Plan	  considers	  that	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  
bases	   of	   growth	   and	   the	   structural	   re–orientation	   of	   national	  
development	   demand	   a	   more	   efficient	   link	   with	   the	   international	  
economy,	  particularly	  in	  matters	  of	  industry	  and	  foreign	  trade,	  external	  
financing,	  foreign	  investment,	  and	  technology	  transfer.	  
	   “In	  this	  context	  the	  National	  Development	  Plan	  establishes	  a	  
group	  of	   guidelines	   to	   raise	   the	   contribution	  of	   foreign	   technology,	  
administration	  and	  finance	  resources	  that	  are	  required	  in	  the	  country's	  
process	  of	  development.	  	  With	  this	  aim,	  the	  Plan	  points	  out	  that	  in	  the	  
expansion	  and	  diversification	  of	  the	  national	  productive	  plant,	  foreign	  
        191 
resources	  will	  be	  utilized	  in	  complementary	  form,	  for	  which	  purpose,	  
the	  technological,	  administrative	  and	  financial	  contribution	  of	  foreign	  
investment	  will	  be	  oriented	  in	  a	  flexible	  manner	  to	  the	  priorities	  of	  
economic	  development,	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  its	  contribution."
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   De	  la	  Madrid	  followed	  through	  on	  his	  pledges.	  	  He	  presented	  a	  1983	  federal	  
budget	  that	  amounted	  to	  8.5	  percent	  of	  projected	  gross	  national	  product,	  down	  from	  
16.5	  percent	  the	  previous	  year,
253
	  and	  pushed	  ahead	  with	  substantial	  tax	  increases.	  	  
He	  relaxed	  exchange	  controls	  and	  allowed	  the	  market	  to	  further	  devalue	  the	  peso.	  	  At	  
the	  beginning	  of	  1983	  the	  president	  relaxed	  the	  system	  of	  import	  licenses	  and	  reduced	  
tariffs.	  	  	  
	   With	  regard	  to	  his	  pledge	  to	  restructure	  the	  federal	  bureaucracy,	  the	  most	  
visible	  change	  De	   la	  Madrid	  made	  was	  to	  partition	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Resources	  and	  
Industrial	  Promotion	  (SEPAFIN),	  linking	  the	  industrial	  promotion	  side	  of	  it	  with	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Trade	  to	  form	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Trade	  and	  Industrial	  Promotion	  (SECOFI).	  	  
State–controlled	  industry	  was	  then	  placed	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  new	  Ministry	  
of	  Energy,	  Mines,	  and	  Public	  Enterprises	  (SEMIP).	  	  By	  creating	  a	  ministry	  dedicated	  to	  
public	  enterprise	  the	  new	  administration	  hoped	  "to	  promote	  the	  goals	  of	  efficiency	  
and	  productivity	  within	  the	  public	  sector."
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  In	  addition,	  the	  new	  administration's	  
concern	  with	   foreign	   investment,	  exports	  and	   international	  competitiveness	  were	  
reflected	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  link	  industrial	  promotion	  with	  the	  ministry	  concerned	  with	  
controlling	  foreign	  trade	  policy.	  
	   More	   significant	   than	   the	   restructuring	   of	   the	   ministries	   were	   the	   new	  
ministers	  themselves.	  	  The	  computer	  programme	  had	  been	  formulated	  in	  1980–81	  
within	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Industries	  in	  SEPAFIN.	  	  The	  minister	  of	  SEPAFIN,	  José	  Andres	  de	  
Oteyza,	   was	   a	   long–standing	   associate	   of	   President	   Lopez	   Portillo	   and	   a	   strong	  
proponent	  of	  nationalist/expansionist	  policy.	  	  Architects	  of	  the	  computer	  programme	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  "Plan	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  in	  Inversiones	  Extranjeras:	  	  Marco	  
Jurídico	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  and	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  mine.	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reported	   that	   Oteyza's	   close	   relationship	  with	   the	   president	   provided	   them	  with	  
necessary	  'insulation'	  from	  political	  attack	  from	  other	  ministries.255	  
	   However,	  the	  nationalist	  actions	  of	  late	  1982	  were	  a	  political	  "last	  stand"	  not	  
just	  for	  Lopez	  Portillo,	  but	  for	  Oteyza	  as	  well.	  	  De	  la	  Madrid's	  economic	  cabinet	  was	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   As	   Undersecretary	   of	   Trade	   in	   the	   Lopez	   Portillo	   administration,	   Hector	  
Hernandez	  Cervantes	  negotiated	  the	  Protocol	  of	  Accession	  to	  GATT	  for	  México	  in	  1979	  
and	  was	  thus	  identified	  with	  conservative,	  free	  market	  economics.	  	  It	  was	  now	  within	  
his	  ministry	  that	  the	  computer	  programme	  would	  be	  administered.	  	  Salinas	  de	  Gortari	  
was	  the	  main	  architect	  of	  the	  1983–88	  National	  Development	  Plan,	  which	  strongly	  
emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  free	  market	  efficiency	  in	  the	  Mexican	  economy.	  	  Silva	  Herzog	  
and	   Mancera	   were	   both	   part	   of	   Lopez	   Portillo's	   cabinet	   during	   the	   banks	  
nationalization,	  but	  both	  strongly	  opposed	  it.	   	  Mancera,	   in	  fact,	  resigned	  over	  the	  
issue.	   	  Thus,	   their	   cabinet	  appointments	   reflected	  De	   la	  Madrid's	   commitment	   to	  
restoring	  business	  confidence.	  
	   As	   part	   of	   the	   re–organization	   of	   SEPAFIN	   and	   SECOM	   into	   SECOFI,	   De	   la	  
Madrid	   established	   a	   new	   post:	   	   the	   Undersecretary	   of	   Foreign	   Investment	   and	  
Technology	   Transfer	   to	   which	   he	   appointed	   Adolfo	   Hegewisch.	   	   In	   so	   doing,	   the	  
president	  underlined	  his	  commitment	  to	  promoting	  these	  two	  objectives	  as	  per	  the	  
Development	   Plan.	   	   The	   new	   undersecretary	   would	   also	   chair	   the	   National	  
Commission	  on	  Foreign	  Investment,	  which	  decides	  all	  cases	  for	  foreign	  investment	  
where	  majority	  foreign	  control	  is	  proposed.	  	  	  
	   On	  February	  17,	  1984	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  Foreign	  Investment,	  under	  
its	   new	   leadership,	   issued	   its	   new	   "Guidelines	   for	   Foreign	   Investment	   and	   its	  
Promotional	  Objectives."	  	  In	  describing	  the	  guidelines	  the	  Commission	  wrote:	  
	  
"To	  summarize,	  the	  selective	  promotion	  policy	  will	  orient	  the	  inflow	  of	  
foreign	  investment	  towards	  pre–selected	  activities	  that	  may	  generate	  a	  
net	   gain	   in	   foreign	   exchange	   balance,	   incorporate	   and	   adapt	  
technologies	   that	   will	   contribute	   to	   the	   national	   scientific	   and	  
technological	  development	  and	  to	  the	  technologically	  complex,	  and	  
high	  investment–per–man–hour	  activities.	  	  In	  these	  activities,	  direct	  
foreign	   investment	   can	   positively	   contribute	   to	   the	   development	  
objectives	  without	  displacing	  domestic	  investment."
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   The	  guidelines	  included	  a	  list	  of	  "priority	  industrial	  activities"	  in	  which	  direct	  
foreign	   investment	   with	   majority	   foreign	   capital	   would	   be	   welcomed,	   while	  
recognizing	   that	   these	  areas	  are	  exceptions	   to	   the	  1973	  Foreign	   Investment	   Law.	  	  
Included	  in	  this	  list	  were	  consumer	  electronics,	  computers,	  their	  parts	  and	  software,	  




	   The	  computer	  industry	  development	  programme	  was	  formulated	  in	  1980–81,	  
official	   approval	   sought	   in	   late	   1981	   and	   1982,	   and	   implementation	   attempted	  
thereafter.	  How	  did	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  situation	  in	  México	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  
early	  1980s	  influence	  policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation?	  Below	  is	  a	  summary.	  
(i)	  Worsening	  Economic	  Problems.	  
	   The	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  in	  the	  thirty	  years	  from	  
1940	   has	   not	   been	   consistently	  matched.	   	   At	   the	   time	   of	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	  
computer	  guidelines	  the	  economy	  was	  experiencing	  growth	  that	  was	  largely	  financed	  
by	   oil	   exports	   and	   foreign	   debt.	   	   By	   the	   time	   official	   approval	   was	   sought	   and	  
implementation	   attempted,	   however,	   the	   economy	   had	   plunged	   into	   crisis:	   	   the	  
economy	  was	  in	  severe	  recession;	  inflation	  was	  100	  percent;	  manufactured	  imports	  
soared;	  and	   foreign	  debt	  climbed	   to	  $80	  billion.	   	   Industrial	  growth	   from	  1980–83	  
averaged	  –2.4	  percent	  per	  year.
258	  	  
	   While	  the	  growth	  of	  manufactured	  imports	  in	  general,	  and	  computer	  imports	  
in	  particular––which	  grew	  175	  percent	  from	  1979	  to	  1980
259
––argued	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
import	  restrictions	  contained	  in	  the	  computer	  decree,	  the	  unfavourable	  investment	  
climate	  and	  the	  need	  for	  exports	  weighed	  heavily	  against	  the	  domestic	  private	  or	  
public	  investment	  required	  to	  develop	  a	  Mexican	  computer	  industry.	  	  	  
(ii)	  Vacillating	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Policy.	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  Ibid.	  pp.	  17–18.	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  Story,	  Op.	  Cit.	  
259	   	   SEPAFIN,	   "Development	   Programme	   for	   the	   Manufacturing	   of	   Electronic	   Computer	  
Systems,	  their	  Main	  Modules	  and	  Peripheral	  Equipment,"	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  SEPFAIN,	  1981),	  p.	  2.	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   Trade	  and	  investment	  policy	  in	  México	  vacillated	  wildly	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  
1980s	  with	  changes	  in	  administrations	  and	  economic	  fortunes.	  	  Echeverria	  actively	  
discouraged	   foreign	   investment	   by	   initiating	   and	   strictly	   enforcing	   restrictive	  
legislation.	  	  Further,	  he	  employed	  both	  tariff	  and	  non–tariff	  trade	  barriers	  in	  order	  to	  
protect	  domestic	  industry;	  by	  1976	  import	  licenses	  were	  required	  for	  7,600	  products.	  	  
Lopez	  Portillo	  reversed	  his	  predecessor's	  restrictive	  policies	  in	  the	  first	  four	  years	  of	  his	  
sexenio	  and	  foreign	  investment	  flourished.	  	  However,	  in	  1981	  import	  controls	  were	  re–
established.	  	  The	  banks	  nationalization	  and	  foreign	  exchange	  controls	  of	  1982	  were	  
arguably	  more	  effective	  in	  halting	  foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  country	  than	  Echeverria's	  
legislation.	  	  Finally,	  De	  la	  Madrid	  reversed	  course	  once	  again.	  	  In	  1983	  the	  trade	  policy	  
was	  liberalized	  and	  foreign	  investment,	  once	  again,	  encouraged.	  	  	  
	   The	  effect	  of	  the	  vacillating	  trade	  and	  investment	  policy	  was	  to	  confuse	  the	  
private	  sector.	  The	  computer	  development	  programme	  relied	  on	  the	  private	  sector;	  no	  
public	  investment	  was	  envisaged.	  	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  therefore	  that	  local	  private	  capital	  
reacted	  with	  limited,	  opportunistic	  investments	  while	  foreign	  capital	  took	  nominal	  
positions	  in	  the	  market	  and	  adopted	  a	  "wait–and–see"	  attitude.	  
	   More	  concretely,	  the	  liberal	  trade	  and	  investment	  regime	  pursued	  by	  De	  la	  
Madrid	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  programme	  was	  to	  be	  implemented	  ran	  directly	  counter	  
to	  the	  restrictive	  guidelines	  outlined	  in	  the	  plan.	  	  This	  naturally	  added	  to	  the	  confusion	  
and	   uncertainty	   surrounding	   the	   computer	   development	   programme.	   	   One	  
government	  official	  described	  Adolfo	  Hegewisch	  –	  the	  person	  responsible	  for	  both	  
foreign	  investment	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  computer	  programme	  –	  as	  “caught	  
between	  the	  devil	  and	  the	  deep	  blue	  sea.”260	  
(iii)	  Lack	  of	  Private	  Sector	  Support.	  
	   As	   Dale	   Story	   argues	   persuasively,	   the	   Mexican	   private	   sector	   exercises	  
considerable	   economic	   and	   ideological	   autonomy	   from	   the	   state.	   	  Moreover,	   the	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  Author	  interview	  with	  SECOFI	  official,	  March	  1987.	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Mexican	  private	  sector	  has	  had	  an	  adversarial	  relationship	  with	  the	  state.
261
	  	  For	  its	  
part	   the	   Mexican	   state	   has	   antagonized	   the	   private	   sector,	   consistently	   under	  
Echeverria	   and	   latterly	   under	   Lopez	   Portillo.	   	   This	   alienation	   and	   adversarial	  
relationship	  has	  limited	  private	  sector	  support	  for	  nationalist	  policies	  in	  general	  and	  
the	  computer	  development	  programme	  in	  particular.	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  programme	  
were	  never	  able	   to	  generate	  private	  sector	  support	   for	   the	  policy	  even	  when	  the	  
programme	  received	  national	  media	  coverage	  in	  1984–85.
262
	  
(iv)	  Growth	  of	  the	  State	  Bureaucracy.	  
	   The	   growth	   of	   the	  Mexican	   state	   bureaucracy	   and	   its	   involvement	   in	   the	  
economy	  since	  1970	  has	  been	  astounding.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  this	  growth	  result	  in	  increased	  
public	   sector	   deficits;	   it	   implied	   an	   ever–increasing	   state	   demand	   for	   computer	  
equipment	  and	  services	  for	  use	  in	  both	  its	  normative	  and	  economic	  functions.	  	  For	  
reasons	  that	  are	  explored	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  state	  has	  not	  used	  its	  buying	  power	  
to	  aid	  the	  development	  of	  the	   local	   industry.	   	  Rather,	   it	  has	  chosen	  to	  employ	   its	  
virtual	   monopsony	   primarily	   to	   extract	   price	   concessions	   from	   the	   computer	  
transnationals.	  	  	  
	   Thus,	   the	  growth	  of	   the	   state	  bureaucracy	  expanded	   the	   local	   informatics	  
market	  and	  concentrated	  buying	  power.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  results	  could	  have	  influenced	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  local	  industry	  positively,	  but	  were	  not	  employed	  to	  that	  end.	  
(v)	  Reordering	  of	  the	  Economic	  Cabinet.	  
	   Finally,	  the	  transition	  of	  administrations	  in	  1982	  resulted	  in	  the	  reordering	  of	  
the	  ministry	  in	  which	  the	  guidelines	  were	  formulated	  and	  would	  be	  implemented.	  	  The	  
reordering	   emphasized	   the	   new	   administration's	   goals	   of	   attracting	   foreign	  
investment,	   and	   encouraging	   exports.	   	   Furthermore,	   the	   economic	   cabinet	   now	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  Story,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  see	  for	  example	  pp.	  122–124.	  	  Story	  posits	  that	  the	  adversarial	  relationship	  
owes	  in	  part	  to	  the	  entrepreneurs'	  concern	  about	  state–labour–peasantry	  axis	  that	  excludes	  
them.	  	  This	  prospect	  was	  particularly	  ominous	  under	  Echeverria	  and	  arose	  again	  when	  Lopez	  
Portillo	  nationalized	  the	  banks.	  	  
262
The	  media	  coverage	  concerned	  IBM's	  proposed	  investment	  in	  the	  country.	  	  This	  is	  discussed	  
in	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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comprised	  ministers	  espousing	  free	  market	  efficiency;	  by	  1983	  the	  president	  and	  his	  
closest	  advisers	  were	  ostensibly	  opposed	  to	  "nationalist/expansionist"	  policies.	  	  The	  
national	  computer	  development	  programme	  thus	  was	  without	  a	  committed	  sponsor	  at	  
cabinet	  level	  after	  the	  change	  of	  administrations.	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CHAPTER	  7	  
EVOLUTION	  OF	  MÉXICO’S	  COMPUTER	  POLICY	  
	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  challenges	  arising	  from	  the	  general	  political	  and	  economic	  
situation	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  computer	  development	  programme	  faced	  several	  more	  
immediate	   obstacles.	   	   These	   included:	   the	   historical	   market	   dominance	   of	   the	  
computer	  transnationals;	  the	  lack	  of	  Mexican	  computer	  scientists	  and	  technicians;	  the	  
Mexican	  state's	  reluctance	  to	  use	  its	  market	  monopsony	  to	  aid	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
indigenous	   industry;	  private	  sector	  ambivalence	  toward	  the	  programme;	  and	  U.S.	  
government	   pressure.	   	   These	   factors	   and	   their	   effect	   on	   the	   development	   and	  
implementation	  of	  the	  computer	  programme	  are	  explored	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
TNC	  Market	  Dominance	  
	   Although	   at	   least	   seven	   major	   computer	   transnationals	   had	   established	  
subsidiaries	  in	  México	  prior	  to	  1970
263
,	  none	  of	  these	  companies	  actually	  produced	  
computer	  equipment	  for	  the	  local	  market	  until	  1978	  when	  NCR	  began	  manufacturing	  
minicomputers	   in	   México.	   	   Thus,	   in	   1970	   México	   was	   importing	   all	   of	   its	   data	  
processing	  equipment.	  	  Moreover,	  just	  three	  computer	  transnationals	  controlled	  85%	  
of	  the	  Mexican	  market	  in	  1971.
264	  	  At	  this	  time	  the	  state	  owned	  51%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  
medium	  and	  large–size	  data	  processing	  equipment	  installed	  in	  the	  country.
265	  	  The	  
manufacturing	  of	  computer	  equipment	  in	  1972	  was	  limited	  to	  a	  Burroughs	  assembly	  
plant	  for	  in–bond	  production	  whose	  products	  were	  entirely	  for	  export.	  	  	  
	   TNC	  market	  dominance	  continued	  throughout	  the	  decade	  of	  the	  seventies.	  	  In	  
1977,	  U.S.	  companies	  or	  their	  subsidiaries	  supplied	  75%	  of	  the	  computers	  installed	  in	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  IBM	  and	  Burroughs	  had	  sales	  subsidiaries	  in	  1927;	  NCR	  in	  1936;	  Honeywell	  in	  1947;	  CDC	  
and	  Digital	  in	  the	  early	  1960s;	  and	  Hewlett–Packard	  in	  1966.	  	  Source:	  	  author	  interviews	  and	  
company	  reports.	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   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce.	   "Computer	   Equipment:	   	   Global	   Market	   Survey,"	  
(Washington:	  	  GPO,	  1973),	  p.	  76.	  
265	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce.	  "Electronic	  Data	  Processing	  Equipment,	  Peripheral	  Devices,	  
and	  Software,"	  (Washington:	  	  GPO,	  1970),	  p.	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México,	  representing	  97%	  of	  the	  total	  value.
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   In	  1978	  over	  98%	  of	  the	  Mexican	  
market	  for	  computers	  and	  their	  peripherals	  was	  supplied	  by	  imports.
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   By	   1980	   there	   were	   some	   Mexican	   companies	   supplying	   modems	   and	  
terminals.	  	  However,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Mexican	  companies	  involved	  in	  the	  sector	  
were	  acting	  as	  distributors	  for	  foreign	  companies.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  TNCs	  involved	  in	  the	  
microcomputer	  segment	  of	  the	  market	  such	  as	  Apple	  and	  Tandy,	  were	  by	  this	  time	  
shipping	   some	  sub–assemblies	   (semi–knocked–down	  or	  SKD	  kits)	  which	  were	  put	  
together	   by	   their	   distributors	   or	   directly	   by	   their	   customers	   in	  México.	   	   But	   any	  
significant	  electronic	  assembly	  and	  testing	  efforts	  in	  México	  took	  place	  in	  plants	  set	  up	  
specifically	  for	  export	  production	  (in–bond	  assembly	  plants	  or	  maquiladoras)	  by	  the	  
TNCs.	  	  	  
	   Because	  of	  the	  lower	  sophistication	  of	  computer	  users	  in	  México	  relative	  to	  
North	  America	  or	  Europe,	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  were	  able	  to	  employ	  the	  same	  strategies	  
in	  México	  for	  fostering	  user–dependence,	  only	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time	  and	  with	  
greater	  effect.	   	  The	  standard	  commercial	  procedure	  until	  1977	  was	  the	   leasing	  of	  
computing	  equipment;	  95%	  of	  the	  systems	  in	  operation	  at	  that	  time	  were	  rented.
268	  	  
This	  practice	  served	   to	   increase	  customer	  dependence	  on	   the	  manufacturers	  and	  
permitted	   the	   suppliers	   to	   earn	   very	   high	   profits	   on	   fully–depreciated,	   older	  
technology.	  	  With	  the	  arrival	  of	  minicomputers,	  large	  companies	  such	  as	  IBM,	  NCR,	  
and	  UNIVAC	  continued	  renting	  their	  equipment	  while	   the	  newer	  companies	   (e.g.,	  
Digital,	   Hewlett–Packard)	   began	   to	   sell	   directly	   to	   the	   end–users.	   	   Technological	  
change	  lowered	  the	  cost	  of	  computers,	  putting	  downward	  pressure	  on	  prices	  to	  the	  
end–user.	  	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  continuing	  oligopolistic	  structure	  of	  the	  industry	  
in	  México,	  prices	  remained	  much	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  U.S.	  or	  Europe	  as	  the	  market	  
leader––IBM––continued	  to	  harvest	  older	  technology.	  	  Furthermore,	  market	  shares	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   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce.	   "Computers	   and	   Peripheral	   Equipment:	   México,"	  
(Washington:	  	  GPO,	  1981),	  p.	  4.	  
267	  	  Ibid.,	  	  The	  United	  States	  alone,	  supplied	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  Mexican	  market.	  
268	  	  Jorge	  Valerdi	  &	  Associates,	  Computer	  Communications	  Marketing	  in	  México:	  	  A	  Study	  on	  
Strategies,	  (Miami:	  LATCOM	  Inc.,	  April	  1982).	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were	  maintained	  by	  means	  of	  sales	  and	  service	  strategies	  that	  were	  based	  on	  existing	  
technical	  incompatibilities	  rather	  than	  price	  reductions.	  	  Thus,	  a	  typical	  mechanism	  for	  
maintaining	  market	  share	  was	  to	  force	  the	  end–user	  to	  stay	  with	  one	  specific	  line	  of	  
computer	  equipment	  because	  of	  equipment	  incompatibility	  to	  other	  systems,	  which	  
might	  be	  cheaper.	  
	   From	  1979	  to	  1981	  liberal	  trade	  policies	  coupled	  with	  a	  grossly	  overvalued	  
peso	  conspired	  to	  worsen	  severely	  the	  Mexican	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  electronics.	  	  	  	  Any	  
local	   suppliers	   operating	   on	   the	  margin	   of	   the	  market	   were	   squeezed	   out	   while	  




	   The	  proximity	  to	  the	  U.S.	  coupled	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  import	  restrictions	  resulted	  
in	  great	  confusion	  in	  the	  Mexican	  marketplace.	  	  Within	  a	  few	  short	  years	  a	  plethora	  of	  
diverse	   computer	   equipment	   was	   on	   offer	   in	   México.	   	   In	   1979,	   140	   out	   of	   235	  
computer	   models	   being	   sold	   in	   the	   world	   market	   could	   be	   found	   operating	   in	  
México.
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   This	   meant	   that	   the	   market,	   which	   was	   already	   small,	   was	   further	  
fragmented	  into	  even	  smaller	  user	  groups	  much	  less	  able	  to	  create	  and	  maintain	  their	  
own	   software	   and	   technical	   support	   needs.	   	   The	  market	   was	   flooded	   with	   local	  
distributors	  out	  for	  quick	  profits.	  	  These	  local	  distributors	  often	  disappeared	  as	  quickly	  
as	  they	  appeared	  and	  there	  was	  very	   little	  after–sales	  support.	   	  Thus,	   the	  market	  
acquired	  a	  very	  unfavourable	  image.	  	  The	  end	  result	  was	  a	  chaotic,	  confused,	  and	  
dependent	  Mexican	  market.	  
	   The	  situation	  in	  1980–81	  was	  thus	  a	  dire	  one	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  those	  
arguing	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry.	  	  In	  1980	  six	  computer	  
transnationals	  controlled	  96.2	  percent	  of	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market,	  with	  IBM	  
holding	  the	  dominant	  share	  of	  44	  percent.
271	   	   In	  1981,	   imports	  accounted	  for	  230	  
                                                
269
	  	  SEPAFIN,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  2.	  
270	  Montoya	  Martín	  Del	  Campo,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1986)	  p.	  232.	  
271	  	  1980	  market	  shares:	  	  IBM	  44	  percent,	  Honeywell	  12.1,	  Univac	  11.7,	  Burroughs	  10.9,	  CDC	  
9.1,	  NCR	  8.4,	  and	  all	  others	  3.8	  percent.	  	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1981),	  p.	  8.	  
        201 




	   TNC	  dominance	  was	  not	  only	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  stranglehold	  on	  the	  
market.	   	  Until	  1976	  the	  computer	   transnationals	  conditioned	  the	  development	  of	  
informatics	  in	  México	  through	  their	  direct	  participation	  in	  the	  Import	  Committees	  of	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Industry	  and	  Commerce.	  In	  these	  committees,	  decisions	  were	  made	  in	  
relation	   to	   the	   amount	   and	   origin	   of	   computer	   imports.	   	   TNCs	   had	   in	   this	   policy	  
instrument	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  commercial	  interests	  and	  limit	  
the	  possibilities	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  domestic	  Mexican	  computer	  industry.	  	  	  
	   This	  foreign	  intervention	  within	  the	  Mexican	  state	  bureaucracy	  was	  partially	  
neutralized	   in	   1977	   when	   these	   decisions	   were	   placed	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  
Ministry	  of	  Programming	  and	  Budget.	   	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   lack	  of	  alternative	  
sources	  of	  locally	  produced	  equipment	  during	  these	  years	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  
the	  state	  was	  forced	  to	  establish	  certain	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  policies	  as	  well	  as	  
policies	   pertaining	   to	   the	   use	   of	   informatics	   within	   public	   administration	   that	  
necessarily	  favoured	  the	  activities	  of	  those	  foreign	  corporations.	  
	  
Inadequate	  Scientific	  and	  Technical	  Training	  
	   Contributing	   to	   the	   lack	  of	   "local	  alternatives"	  was	   the	  situation	   regarding	  
training	  of	   computer	   specialists	   in	  Mexican	   institutions	  of	   higher	   education.	   	   The	  
training	  of	  specialists	  is	  vital	  to	  the	  development	  of	  indigenous	  technological	  capacity.	  	  
David	  O'Connor	  puts	  it	  well:	  
	  
"The	  computer	  industry	  is	  essentially	  a	  knowledge–intensive	  industry	  
wherein	   skilled,	   highly	   trained	   scientific,	   engineering	   and	   technical	  
labor	  power	  is	  probably	  the	  single	  most	  important	  asset.	  	  Without	  such	  
labor,	  even	  access	  to	  adequate	  financial	  resources	  and	  material	  inputs	  
                                                
272	   	   Secretaria	   de	   Comercio	   y	   Fomento	   Industrial,	   Dirección	   de	   la	   Industria	   Electrónica,	  
"Estadísticas	  sobre	  la	  Industria	  de	  Computadoras	  en	  México,"	  mimeo.	  	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  SECOFI,	  
1987),	  p.	  5.	  	  Total	  market	  size	  in	  1981	  from	  Infocom,	  The	  Market	  for	  Macro-­‐computers	  and	  
Minicomputers,	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  Infocom,	  May	  1987).	  Infocom	  is	  a	  market	  research	  company	  
specializing	  in	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  industry.	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   The	  Mexican	  state	  responded	  very	  slowly	  and	  inadequately	  to	  the	  need	  for	  an	  
educational	   infrastructure	   capable	   of	   training	   personnel	   highly	   competent	   in	   the	  
diverse	  areas	  of	  computer	  science	  and	  engineering.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  courses	  offered	  
reflected	  both	  the	  TNC	  dominance	  of	  the	  industry	  and	  an	  orientation	  to	  computer	  
usage	  rather	  than	  design	  and	  production.	  	  And	  although	  the	  number	  of	  courses	  and	  
student	  enrolment	  increased	  dramatically	  over	  the	  years,	  there	  was	  a	  high	  desertion	  
rate,	  a	  relatively	  low	  level	  of	  academic	  qualification	  in	  the	  teaching	  faculties,	  and	  a	  
scarcity	  of	  on–going	  basic	  research	  in	  the	  field.	  
	   The	   courses	  offered	  were	  organized	  on	   three	   fronts:	   	   the	   first	   two	  by	   the	  
equipment	  vendors	  themselves,	  and	  the	  last	  by	  the	  state	  in	  the	  national	  education	  
system.	  
	   Some	  of	  the	  first	  courses	  directly	  related	  to	  computers	  were	  organized	  by	  the	  
transnational	  computer	  manufacturers	  in	  1966–67.	  These	  courses	  emphasized	  the	  
operation	   of	   equipment,	   basic	   principles	   of	   problem	   solving	   using	   computers	  
(elementary	  programming),	  the	  fundamental	  elements	  of	  operating	  systems,	  and	  the	  
management	  of	  information.	  	  These	  vendor	  courses	  were	  naturally	  self–serving;	  their	  
goal	   was	   to	   educate	   and	   expand	   the	   local	   market	   and	   the	   sponsoring	   vendor's	  
participation	  in	  it.	  	  Thus,	  the	  courses	  served	  to	  train	  specialists	  who	  could	  later	  fill	  roles	  
in	   the	   marketing	   of	   technical	   equipment,	   and	   to	   train	   users	   to	   operate	   their	  
equipment.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  courses	  emphasized	  the	  peculiar	  characteristics	  of	  the	  
sponsor	  vendor's	  equipment,	  thereby	  limiting	  the	  course	  participants'	  knowledge	  to	  
that	  equipment.	  
	   Soon	  these	  informal	  short	  courses	  were	  not	  enough	  to	  supply	  the	  vendors'	  
increasing	   demand	   for	   competent	   personnel.	   	   In	   the	   early	   1970s	   these	   same	  
transnational	  computer	  companies	  established	  "commercial	  trade	  schools."	  	  By	  1978	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   David	   C.	   O'Connor,	   "The	   Computer	   Industry	   in	   the	   Third	  World:	   	   Policy	  Options	   and	  
Constraints,"	  World	  Development,	  13.3	  (1985)	  pp.	  324–325.	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there	  were	  sixty	  such	  schools	  offering	  courses	  in	  elementary	  coding,	  programming,	  
and	  systems	  analysis.	  	  These	  schools	  required	  only	  a	  high	  school	  education	  of	  their	  
students.	   	   Once	   again,	   the	   emphasis	   in	   these	   schools	   was	   on	   training	   another	  
generation	  of	  computer	  salesmen,	  maintenance	  engineers,	  and	  users.	  
	   The	  first	  computer–related	  course	  established	  in	  the	  national	  education	  system	  
was	  a	  postgraduate	  Masters	  programme	  in	  "systems	  engineering"	  at	  the	  National	  
Polytechnic	  Institute	  (Instituto	  Politécnica	  Nacional	  or	  IPN)	  in	  1962.	  	  The	  course	  at	  IPN	  
was	  followed	  in	  1967	  by	  the	  Ibero–American	  University	  (UIA),	  which	  also	  established	  a	  
programme	   at	   the	   Masters	   level.	   	   The	   first	   bachelors	   course	   was	   set	   up	   at	   the	  
Technological	  Institute	  of	  Higher	  Studies	  of	  Monterrey	  (ITESM)	  in	  1968	  in	  "computer	  
systems	  engineering."	  	  Others	  followed	  in	  1974	  as	  the	  idea	  gradually	  caught	  hold	  in	  
the	  formal	  education	  sector.	  	  At	  the	  start	  of	  the	  1980s	  there	  were	  160	  institutions	  of	  
higher	  education	  offering	  more	  than	  180	  computer–related	  courses	  of	  study.
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   However,	  TNC	  involvement	  in	  the	  training	  of	  computer	  specialists	  remained	  
dominant.	  	  By	  as	  late	  as	  1977,	  only	  4	  percent	  of	  all	  technical	  personnel	  in	  informatics	  
received	  their	  training	  in	  Mexican	  colleges	  and	  universities.	  	  In	  contrast,	  55	  percent	  of	  
computer	  science	  specialists	  were	  trained	  directly	  by	  the	  TNCs	  that	  were	  vending	  their	  
imported	  equipment	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Of	  this	  training,	  85	  percent	  was	  carried	  out	  on	  
site	  and	  was	  related	  primarily	  to	  operating	  and	  selling	  the	  equipment,	  rather	  than	  to	  
design	  or	  production.	  	  In	  this	  same	  year	  30	  percent	  received	  training	  from	  private	  
institutions	   and	   10	   percent	   from	   user	   companies,	   especially	   financial	   service	  
bureaus.
275	  	  The	  educational	  level	  of	  the	  personnel	  operating	  computer	  systems	  in	  the	  
country	  captures	  the	  situation.	  	  In	  1977,	  "more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  systems	  analysts	  did	  
not	  have	  a	  bachelor's	  degree	  and	  a	  large	  number	  were	  at	  high	  school	  level.	  	  Those	  with	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  Dr.	  Octavio	  Rascon	  Chávez,	  "La	  Educación	  en	  Computación	  en	  México,"	  La	  Informática	  a	  
Futuro	  en	  México:	   	  Memorias	  del	  Ciclo	  de	  Conferencias	  1983,	  (México	  D.F.:	   	  SPP/INEGI	  &	  
UNAM,	  1984),	  p.	  30.	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  Secretaria	  de	  Programación	  y	  Presupuesto.	  Diagnostico	  de	  la	  Informática	  en	  México:	  1980.	  
(México	  D.F.,	  SPP/INEGI,	  1980).	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university	   degrees	   were	   engineers	   without	   specific	   training	   in	   computers.	  	  
Programmers	  were	  high	  school	  graduates	  without	  higher	  education."
276	  	  	  
	   By	  1980	  the	  situation	  had	  not	  altered	  significantly.	  	  Although	  the	  universities	  
had	   increased	   to	   15	   percent	   their	   participation	   in	   the	   training	   of	   technicians,	   67	  
percent	   of	   the	   informatics	   personnel	   had	   been	   trained	   in	   courses	   given	   by	   the	  
companies	  producing	  the	  equipment,	  and	  23	  percent	  by	  commercial	  enterprises.
277	  	  
Moreover,	  not	  one	  computer–related	  doctoral	  programme	  existed	  in	  the	  country	  by	  
1983.	  
	   The	  involvement	  of	  the	  TNCs	  in	  general	  and	  IBM	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
education	   is	   illustrated	   in	  Table	  7.1	  which	   lists	   the	  number	  of	   courses	  offered	  by	  




Courses	  Offered	  by	  Equipment	  Manufacturers	  1981–82	  
Manufacturer	  	   	   	   	   Number	  of	  Courses	  
IBM	   	   	   	   	   	   	   816	  
Honeywell	   	   	   	   	   	   156	  
Sperry–Univac	  	   	   	   	   	   155	  
Burroughs	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  73	  
Control	  Data	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  49	  
Hewlett	  Packard	   	   	   	   	   	  	  47	  
Digital	  Equipment	   	   	   	   	   	  	  41	  
NCR	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  32	  
MAI	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  26	  
Others	  	   	   	   	   	   	   176	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =====	  
TOTAL	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,571	  
	  




                                                
276	   	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   Commerce.	   "Market	   Survey	   for	   Computers:	   México,"	   (Virginia:	  	  
National	  Technical	  Information	  Service,	  1979),	  pp.	  3,	  30.	  
277	  	  SPP,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1980).	  
278	   	   Secretaria	   de	   Programación	   y	   Presupuesto,	   Manual	   de	   Información	   Estadística	   en	  
Informática	  1983,	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  SPP/INEGI,	  1983),	  p.	  13.	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   In	  these	  statistics	  one	  can	  see	  the	  early	  dominance	  of	  the	  technical	  schools	  that	  
provided	   basic	   instruction	   in	   programming	   and	   computer	   operations.	   	   The	   rapid	  
growth	  of	  bachelors	  programmes	  that	  replaced	  technical	  schools	  in	  popularity	  by	  the	  
mid–seventies	   is	   also	  noticeable.	   	   Finally,	   the	  very	   small	  number	  of	  postgraduate	  
students	   in	   computer–related	   courses	   is	   remarkable.	   	   In	   total,	   fewer	   than	   1,000	  
postgraduates	  had	  enrolled	  in	  computer–related	  programmes	  by	  1981.	  	  Nevertheless,	  
total	  enrolment	  increased	  dramatically	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1980s.	  
	   While	   the	   increasing	   numbers	   of	   students	   enrolling	   in	   computer–related	  
courses	   is	  encouraging,	  the	  numbers	  actually	  graduating	  are	  abysmal.	   	  Of	  the	  966	  
postgraduates	  admitted	  to	  study	  between	  1965	  and	  1980,	  only	  233	  had	  graduated	  by	  
1984	  -­‐	  a	  completion	  rate	  of	  just	  24	  percent.	  	  Twenty-­‐nine	  percent	  of	  the	  students	  for	  
bachelors	  degrees	  in	  computer	  courses	  and	  only	  ten	  percent	  of	  technical	  students	  
graduated	  during	  this	  same	  period.	  	  Thus,	  while	  some	  68,000	  students	  enrolled	  in	  
some	  kind	  of	  computer	  course	  in	  those	  twenty	  years,	  only	  7,000	  graduated.
280
	  
                                                                                                                                    
279	  	  Source:	  	  Secretaria	  de	  Programación	  y	  Presupuesto,	  Catalogo	  de	  Programas	  de	  Formación	  
de	  Recursos	  Humanos	  en	  Informática	  1983,	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  SPP/INEGI,	  1984),	  pp.	  21–22.	  
280	  	  Ibid.	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TABLE	  7.2	  
Admissions	  to	  Computer–Related	  Courses	  of	  Study	  
Academic	  Year	   	   Technical	   	  	  	  Bachelors	   	  Postgrad	   	  	  	  Total	  
	   	   	   	   Qualif'n	   	  	  	  	  	  Degree	   	  	  Degree	  
	  
1965–66	   	   	   	  	  	  	  86	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	   	  	  	  	  86	  
1966–67	   	   	   	  	  116	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  119	  
1967–68	   	   	   	  	  134	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   	   	  	  141	  
1968–69	   	   	   	  	  110	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  111	  
1969–70	   	   	   	  	  112	   	   	  	  	  	  136	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  249	  
1970–71	   	   	   	  	  338	   	   	  	  	  	  212	   	   	  	  	  	  	  35	   	   	  	  585	  
1971–72	   	   	   	  	  454	   	   	  	  	  	  361	   	   	  	  	  	  	  13	   	   	  	  828	  
1972–73	   	   	   	  	  633	   	   	  	  	  	  507	   	   	  	  	  	  	  29	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1169	  
1973–74	   	   	   	  	  662	   	   	  	  	  	  614	   	   	  	  	  	  	  36	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1312	  
1974–75	   	   	   	  	  646	   	   	  	  	  	  840	   	   	  	  	  	  	  24	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1510	  
1975–76	   	   	   	  	  638	   	   	  	  1879	   	   	  	  	  	  	  47	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2564	  
1976–77	   	   	   	  	  633	   	   	  	  2306	   	   	  	  	  	  	  86	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3025	  
1977–78	   	   	   	  	  674	   	   	  	  2417	   	   	  	  	  105	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3206	  
1978–79	   	   	   	  	  719	   	   	  	  2744	   	   	  	  	  129	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3592	  
1979–80	   	   	   	  	  761	   	   	  	  3765	   	   	  	  	  204	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4730	  
1980–81	   	   	   	  	  975	   	   	  	  4823	   	   	  	  	  246	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6044	  
1981–82	   	   	   	  2245	   	   	  	  5730	   	   	  	  	  361	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8336	  
1982–83	   	   	   	  2835	   	   	  	  8587	   	   	  	  	  860	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12282	  
1983–84	   	   	   	  3947	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12943	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  934	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17824	  
	   	  
	   The	  low	  completion	  rate	  is	  attributed	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  factors.
281	  	  Ironically,	  the	  
same	  economic	  forces	  that	  attracted	  students	  in	  computer	  sciences	  often	  drove	  them	  
out	  of	  their	  course	  prematurely.	  	  The	  high	  demand	  for	  specialists	  in	  the	  marketplace	  
combined	   with	   the	   chronic	   lack	   of	   financial	   resources	   for	   students––particularly	  
postgraduates	  who	  often	  have	  family	  commitments––conspired	  to	  draw	  students	  out	  
of	  academia	  and	  into	  industry	  where	  they	  could	  earn	  a	  salary.	  	  Another	  factor	  that	  
contributed	  to	  the	  low	  completion	  rate	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  resources	  at	  the	  
institutions	   themselves.	   	   In	   particular,	   the	   availability	   of	   up–to–date	   computer	  
equipment	  did	  not	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  students.	  	  Finally,	  the	  
                                                
281
	  	  These	  reasons	  were	  articulated	  by	  Dr	  Victor	  Guerra	  Ortiz	  in	  "Educación	  de	  Posgrado	  en	  
Computación,"	  La	  Informática	  a	  Futuro	  en	  México:	  	  Memorias	  del	  Ciclo	  de	  Conferencias	  1983,	  
(México	  D.F.:	  	  SPP/INEGI	  &	  UNAM,	  1984),	  pp.	  37–40.	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lack	   of	   adequate	   preparation	   of	   the	   students	   prior	   to	   beginning	   their	   course	  
contributed	  to	  the	  high	  desertion	  rate.	  	  	  
	   Whatever	  the	  reasons,	  the	  story	  is	  clear.	  	  While	  enrolment	  in	  computer	  courses	  
was	  up,	   students	  often	  did	  not	  complete	   their	   course	  of	   study.	   	  The	   result	  was	  a	  
growing	  number	  of	  inadequately	  trained	  personnel	  entering	  the	  workforce,	  who	  were	  
often	  qualified	  only	  to	  sell,	  service,	  or	  operate	  equipment	  that	  was	  designed	  outside	  
the	  country.	  	  	  
A	  corollary	  result	  was	  a	  lack	  of	  academic	  and	  research	  staff	  in	  the	  country's	  
colleges	  and	  universities.	  	  A	  measure	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  coursework	  is	  the	  qualifications	  
of	  the	  faculty	  and	  their	  level	  of	  commitment	  to	  teaching	  and	  research.	  	  The	  faculty	  
statistics	  indicate	  generally	  low	  levels	  of	  academic	  qualification,	  with	  two–thirds	  of	  
teaching	   faculty	   possessing	   a	   bachelors	   degree	   or	   less.	   	   Again	   due	   to	   economic	  
pressures	  and	  the	  relatively	   low	  rate	  of	  pay	  that	   teachers	   in	   the	  public	  education	  
system	  received,	  only	  23	  percent	  of	  the	  faculty	  were	  full–time	  academic	  staff	  while	  64	  
percent	  taught	  on	  an	  hourly	  contract	  basis	  (the	  remainder	  were	  half–time	  staff).
282
	  
	   The	   situation	   was	   disastrous	   for	   research	   efforts	   as	   it	   was	   impossible	   to	  
maintain	   continuity	   of	   research	   efforts	   if	   the	   team	   was	   always	   changing.	   	   Basic	  
research	  in	  computer	  science	  was	  rare	  in	  the	  national	  education	  system.	  	  The	  limited	  
financial	  and	  human	  resources	  that	  existed	  in	  academia	  were	  devoted	  primarily	  to	  
applied	  research.	  	  As	  an	  indication,	  out	  of	  roughly	  10,000	  researchers	  in	  México	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  1983,	  only	  200	  worked	  in	  matters	  related	  to	  solid-­‐state	  electronics,	  and	  out	  of	  
those	  only	  35	  had	  some	  knowledge	  of	  microelectronics.
283	  	  	  
	   What	  then	  was	  the	  outlook	  for	  the	  training	  of	  computer	  specialists	  in	  México?	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   increasing	   student	   interest,	   the	   cause	   received	   impetus	   from	   the	  
National	  Council	  on	  Science	  and	  Technology	  (CONACYT).	  	  CONACYT	  was	  established	  to	  
promote	   scientific	   research	   and	   technological	   development,	   and	   to	   promote	   the	  
                                                
282	  	  SPP/INEGI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1984),	  p.	  44.	  
283	   	   José	   Moreno,	   "Reflexiones	   en	   torno	   a	   una	   estrategia	   para	   el	   desarrollo	   de	   la	  
microelectrónica	  en	  México",	  in	  Información	  Científica	  y	  Tecnología.	  No.	  5,	  October	  1983.	  
        208 
formation	   of	   human	   resources	   in	   these	   areas.	   	   The	   Council	   initiated	   a	   successful	  
scholarship	  fund	  and	  developed	  and	  proposed	  policy	  guidelines	  for	  this	  area.	  	  Further,	  
the	  cause	  received	  official	  encouragement	  from	  President	  De	  la	  Madrid.	  	  He	  increased	  
CONACYT's	  budget	  tenfold	  from	  1982	  to	  1985.	  	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  inadequate	  
funding	   hurt	   the	   scholarship	   programme	   and	   CONACYT's	   policy	   proposals	   were	  
shelved	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  changes	  in	  its	  leadership.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Council	  was	  never	  
charged	  with	  relating	  technical	  and	  scientific	  research	  to	  industrial	  production.	  	  	  
	   The	  education	  of	  specialists	  is	  a	  long–term	  investment	  that	  continued	  to	  be	  
eschewed,	  as	  scarce	  resources	  were	  committed	  to	  areas	  that	  promised	  a	  near-­‐term	  
return.	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	   assimilation	   of	   user	   technology	   and	   some	   production	  
technology	  continued;	  while	  design	  technology	  and	  microelectronics	  remained	  the	  
domains	  of	  the	  computer	  transnationals.	  	  Without	  a	  strong	  lead	  from	  the	  Mexican	  
state	   to	  promote	   the	   training	  of	  computer	  specialists,	   scientific	   research,	  and	  the	  
linkage	  of	  research	  to	  local	  industry,	  México	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  the	  purchase	  
of	  foreign	  technology	  or	  the	  direct	  operation	  of	  electronics	  TNCs	  in	  its	  economy.	  
	  
The	  Mexican	  State	  as	  Computer	  Consumer	  
	   A	  second	  area	  in	  which	  the	  Mexican	  state	  failed	  to	  give	  strong	  impetus	  to	  the	  
development	   of	   a	   national	   computer	   industry	   was	   in	   its	   historical	   computer	  
procurement	  policies.	  
	   The	  Mexican	  government	  was	  easily	   the	  dominant	   consumer	  of	   computer	  
electronics	  in	  the	  country.	  	  This	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  its	  own	  extensive	  bureaucracy	  and	  
its	   extensive	   direct	   involvement	   in	   the	   economy.	   	   Government	   expenditures	   on	  
informatics	   totalled	  some	  13.7	  billion	  of	   the	  19.8	  billion	  pesos	  spent	   in	  México	   in	  
1982––roughly	  70%	  of	  total	  expenditures.	  	  Of	  this	  13.7	  billion	  pesos,	  4.25	  billion	  was	  
spent	   on	   informatics	   used	   directly	   by	   the	   government	   in	   its	   administrative	   and	  
normative	  activities,	  2.95	  billion	  in	  the	  finance	  area	  (prior	  to	  the	  banks	  nationalization,	  
most	  of	  this	  would	  have	  been	  in	  the	  private	  sector),	  1.52	  billion	  on	  health	  and	  social	  
security,	  380	  million	  on	  public	   transportation,	  while	   the	  remaining	  4.6	  billion	  was	  
        209 
attributed	  to	  publicly–owned	  industrial	  enterprises	  (e.g.,	  Pemex).	  	  In	  terms	  of	  installed	  
base,	  the	  government	  possessed	  approximately	  66%	  of	  computer	  capacity	  installed	  in	  
the	  country.
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  In	  terms	  of	  value,	  the	  government	  spent	  most	  of	  its	  informatics	  budget	  
on	  large	  computer	  systems––mainframes	  and	  minicomputers.	  	  As	  such,	  its	  primary	  
suppliers	  were	  the	  large	  computer	  TNCs.	  	  	  
	   Because	  the	  government	  exercised	  such	  enormous	  purchasing	  power	  in	  the	  
market,	  it	  is	  worth	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  its	  computer	  needs	  and	  corresponding	  
purchasing	  policies.	  	  In	  so	  doing	  one	  sees	  the	  government's	  increasing	  appetite	  for,	  
and	  dependence	  upon,	  imported	  informatics	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  	  
	   It	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  this	  dependence	  was	  mutual;	  for	  each	  of	  the	  
computer	  TNCs,	  the	  Mexican	  government	  was	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  customer,	  accounting	  
for	  between	  20%	  and	  80%	  of	  sales	  for	  the	  mini	  and	  mainframe	  manufacturers.
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  And	  
along	  with	  the	  increasing	  expenditures	  came	  an	  increasingly	  centralized	  control	  of	  
government	  computer	  purchases.	  	  However,	  the	  government	  made	  little	  effort	  to	  use	  
its	  monopsony	   actively	   to	   promote	   a	   national	   capability	   in	   computer	   electronics.	  	  
Rather,	  it	  was	  content	  to	  use	  its	  purchasing	  power	  to	  acquire	  better	  products	  and	  
services	  at	  lower	  prices.	  
	   During	   the	   Echeverria	   and	   Lopez	   Portillo	   administrations,	   the	   size	   and	  
complexity	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state	  structure	  grew	  dramatically.	  	  The	  number	  of	  state-­‐
owned	  enterprises	  mushroomed	  from	  272	  in	  1970	  to	  1,155	  in	  1982.	  In	  1982	  state-­‐
owned	   enterprises	   accounted	   for	   4.4	   percent	   of	   the	   labour	   force	   and	   received	  
subsidies	  equivalent	  to	  almost	  13	  percent	  of	  GDP.
286	  All	  this	  meant	  a	  huge	  growth	  in	  
the	  quantity	  and	  complexity	  of	  administratively	  controlled	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  of	  those	  
activities	   interconnected	   by	  means	   of	   general	   and	   sectoral	   policies.	   	   In	   1975	   the	  
                                                
284	  	  All	  of	  these	  figures	  come	  from	  SPP/INEGI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1983,	  p.	  6.	  
285	  Figures	  based	  on	  company–furnished	  data	  received	  in	  personal	  interviews	  conducted	  from	  
January	  to	  June	  1987.	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  Figures	  cited	  in	  Alberto	  Chong	  and	  Florencio	  López-­‐de-­‐Silanes,	  Privatization	  in	  México,	  Inter	  
American	  Development	  Bank	  Research	  Department	  Working	  Papers,	  2004,	  p.	  8,	  come	  from	  
Pedro	  Aspe, Economic	  Transformation	  the	  Mexican	  Way.	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press	  1993). 
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Commission	  of	  Public	  Administration	  was	  formed	  inside	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Presidency.	  	  
This	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   informatics	   into	   the	   activities	   of	  
government.	  
	   The	  growth	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state	  structure	  culminated	  in	  the	  nationalization	  of	  
the	   nation's	   banking	   industry	   in	   1982.	   	   The	   need	   to	  modernize	   the	   bureaucratic	  
organization	   of	   the	   state	   influenced	   the	   policy	   decisions	   taken	   with	   regard	   to	  
informatics.	  	  As	  part	  of	  the	  Programme	  of	  Administrative	  Reform	  the	  law	  concerning	  
the	   Federal	   Public	   Administration	   (PFA)	   authorized	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Planning	   and	  
Budget	   (SPP)	   to	   take	   the	   necessary	  measures	   to	   institute	   a	   national	   information	  
system.	   	   Within	   the	   SPP,	   the	   responsibility	   for	   this	   was	   given	   to	   the	   General	  
Coordination	   of	   the	   National	   Information	   System.	   	   Included	   among	   this	   group's	  
responsibilities	  were	  the	  establishment	  of	  general	  informatics	  policies	  for	  the	  federal	  
public	  sector	  and	  the	  coordination	  of	  offices	  dependent	  on	  the	  PFA	  so	  as	  to	  negotiate	  
the	  purchasing	  of	  equipment	  as	  a	  uniform	  group.	  
	   Within	  this	  Coordination	  Group,	  a	  Director's	  Office	  of	  Informatics	  Policy	  was	  set	  
up	   in	   March	   1977.	   	   The	   general	   objectives	   of	   this	   office	   were:	   	   "to	   assist	   the	  
development	  of	  informatics	  personnel	  and	  technology,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  optimum	  use	  of	  
the	  available	  material	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  those	  acquired	  by	  the	  country.	  	  The	  aim	  was	  
to	  achieve	  greater	  productivity	  in	  public	  spending	  for	  this	  material,	  to	  support	  the	  
administrative	  reform	  programmes	  of	  the	  federal	  government,	  to	  help	  other	  agencies	  




	   On	  January	  16,	  1979	  President	  Lopez	  Portillo	  issued	  an	  agreement	  authorizing	  
the	  SPP	  to	  standardize	  and	  coordinate	  the	  information	  tasks	  within	  the	  PFA.	  	  From	  that	  
moment	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  SPP	  were	  specifically	  defined	  as	  consisting	  of:	   	   (1)	  the	  
diagnosis	  of	  informatics	  requirements	  in	  the	  public	  sector;	  (2)	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  
rational	  utilization	  of	  informatics	  resources;	  (3)	  the	  formulation	  of	  regulations	  and	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  Secretaria	  de	  Programación	  y	  Presupuesto.	  Comunidad	  Informática.,	  No.	  1,	  May–June	  
1978.	  pp.	  11–15.	  
        211 
their	  enforcement	  in	  the	  acquisition	  and	  contracting	  of	  computer	  equipment;	  (4)	  the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  Teleinformatic	  Internal	  System	  of	  the	  Federal	  Public	  Sector;	  and	  
(5)	   the	  monitoring	  of	   the	  development	  of	   informatics	  activities	   in	  all	  areas	  of	   the	  
PFA.
288	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  next	  president,	  Miguel	  De	  la	  Madrid	  	  	  	  was	  to	  take	  charge	  of	  
the	  SPP	  in	  May	  of	  that	  year.	  
	   In	  1980	  the	  National	  Coordination	  of	  the	  National	  Information	  System	  became	  
known	  as	  the	  General	  Coordination	  of	  National	  Statistical,	  Geographical	  and	  Informatic	  
Services.	  	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  integrate	  the	  national	  systems	  of	  statistical	  and	  geographic	  
information,	  optimizing	  the	  use	  of	  electronic	  computer	  systems	  in	  the	  process.	  
	   In	  1983	  the	  Senate	  passed	  the	  Initiative	  for	  a	  Decree	  of	  Reforms	  and	  Additions	  
to	  the	  Law	  of	  Statistical	  and	  Geographical	  Information	  proposed	  by	  President	  De	  la	  
Madrid.	   	   The	   reforms	   referred	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   National	   Institute	   of	  
Statistics,	  Geography,	  and	  Informatics	  (INEGI)	  as	  the	  agency	  through	  which	  the	  SPP	  
would	  exercise	  its	  rights	  given	  by	  the	  law.	  	  The	  reforms	  gave	  INEGI	  greater	  resources	  
and	  consolidated	  the	  power	  of	  the	  institute	  as	  the	  central	  coordinator	  and	  overseer	  of	  
government	  informatics	  purchases	  and	  use.	  
	   INEGI's	  function	  with	  regard	  to	  computer	  purchasing	  remained	  basically	  the	  
same	  from	  1980	  to	  1990:	  	  to	  rationalize	  government	  spending	  in	  informatics	  through	  
the	  establishment	  of	  technical,	  contractual,	  and	  procedural	  norms	  for	  all	  government	  
purchases	  of	  informatics	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  The	  primary	  motivation	  for	  this	  
rationalization	   was	   the	   government's	   increasing	   complexity	   and	   felt	   need	   for	  
informatics	   equipment	   and	   services.	   	   A	   secondary	   motive	   was	   the	   concern	   that	  
individual	  government	  departments	  and	  enterprises	  could	  be	  unduly	  influenced	  by	  the	  
large	   computer	   transnationals.	   	   Thus,	   the	   central	   government	   was	   to	   play	   a	  
paternalistic	  role	  in	  overseeing	  government	  purchases.	  	  Moreover,	  INEGI	  had	  the	  de	  
facto	  power	  to	  influence	  purchasing	  in	  that	  it	  controlled	  the	  government's	  informatics	  
budget.	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  Secretaria	  de	  Programación	  y	  Presupuesto.	  Política	  Informática	  Gubernamental.,	  (México:	  	  
SPP,	  December	  1979).	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   Prior	  to	  1985	  INEGI	  was	  not	  seen	  to	   interfere	  very	  much	  with	  government	  
institutions'	  purchasing	  decisions;	  INEGI	  set	  guidelines	  and	  respected	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  
end–user.	   	   From	   1982	   to	   1985	   INEGI	   overruled	   just	   four	   purchasing	   decisions	   of	  
government	  entities.	   In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  Director	  General	  of	   Informatics	  Policy	   in	  
INEGI	  at	  the	  time,	  "We	  blessed	  their	  [the	  government	  entities']	  decisions.	  I	  always	  
respected	  the	  choice	  of	  other	  people."	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As	  such,	  those	  in	  SECOFI	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  the	  policy	  saw	  INEGI’s	  
reticence	  to	  use	  its	  purchasing	  power	  to	  assist	  the	  development	  of	  the	  local	  industry	  
as	  a	  missed	  opportunity,	  or	  worse.	  “Grijalva	  [Director	  General	  of	  Informatics	  Policy,	  
INEGI]	  was	  an	  important	  obstacle	  to	  the	  policy.”290	  	  
However,	  after	  a	   change	   in	   the	   leadership	  at	   INEGI	   in	  1985,
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   the	  agency	  
exercised	  increasing	  influence	  on	  the	  purchasing	  decisions	  of	  government	  entities.	  	  
Upon	  receiving	  a	  written	  "project"	  from	  a	  government	  institution,	  INEGI	  would	  qualify	  
the	  project	  and	  recommend	  a	  vendor.	  	  By	  law,	  the	  decision	  was	  to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  
lowest	  priced	  bid	   that	  met	   the	   technical	   requirements	  of	   the	  project.	   	  Of	   course,	  
"lowest	  price"	  in	  this	  context	  was	  not	  as	  clear–cut	  as	  it	  sounds.	  	  TNCs	  reported	  that	  
intangibles	  such	  as	  the	  company's	  relationship	  with	  the	  government	  and	  personal	  
feelings	  entered	  into	  the	  decision.	  	  If	  the	  individual	  institution	  disagreed	  with	  INEGI's	  
recommendation	  long	  delays	  in	  the	  purchase	  ensued––delays	  the	  institution	  usually	  
could	  ill–afford.	  	  Thus,	  there	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  procedure	  for	  vendor	  
selection:	   	   whereas	   prior	   to	   1985	   INEGI	   "blessed"	   the	   recommendation	   of	   the	  
government	  entity,	  post-­‐1985	  the	  recommendation	  would	  appear	  to	  come	  from	  INEGI	  
itself.	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Pablo	  Grijalva,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Informatics	  Policy,	  INEGI	  
(1982-­‐85),	  April	  1987.	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  Author	  interview	  with	  Ricardo	  Zermeño,	  Director	  General,	  SECOFI,	  June	  1987.	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  In	  1985,	  Jose	  Luis	  Soberanes	  replaced	  Luis	  Pablo	  Grijalva	  as	  Director	  General	  of	  Informatic	  
Policy.	  	  Grijalva	  never	  really	  believed	  that	  México	  should	  try	  to	  develop	  a	  national	  computer	  
industry.	  	  However,	  with	  Soberanes	  came	  Alberto	  Montoya	  Martín	  Del	  Campo	  as	  Director	  of	  
Policy	  and	  Norms	  in	  Informatics.	  	  Montoya	  had	  argued	  strongly	  in	  his	  1986	  PhD	  dissertation	  
for	  the	  Mexican	  state	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  developing	  a	  national	  computer	  capability.	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   The	  ownership	  of	  the	  vendor	  was	  not	  a	  primary	  factor	  in	  the	  government's	  
purchasing	  decision.	  	  By	  law,	  INEGI	  had	  been	  restricted	  from	  accepting	  a	  local	  vendor's	  
bid	  if	  price	  and	  technological	  competence	  were	  not	  competitive.	  	  However,	  all	  other	  
things	  being	  equal,	  the	  government	  would	  choose	  a	  local	  vendor	  over	  a	  foreign	  one.	  	  
In	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  1980s	  INEGI	  facilitated	  the	  sale	  of	  local–vendor	  equipment	  to	  
government	  entities	  on	  occasion,	  reflecting	  the	  institution's	  growing	  desire	  to	  use	  its	  
power	   to	  aid	   the	  development	  of	   a	   local	   computer	   industry.	   	  One	   small	  Mexican	  
manufacturer	  of	  IBM	  compatible	  micros	  made	  a	  sale	  of	  360	  units	  to	  Pemex	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  INEGI.	  	  In	  the	  words	  of	  the	  company's	  representative,	  "INEGI	  is	  our	  business."	  
(Considerations	  of	  ownership	  were	  only	  applicable	  in	  purchases	  of	  microcomputers	  
and	  peripherals).	  	  Furthermore,	  if	  the	  firm	  was	  not	  a	  manufacturer	  of	  record	  in	  the	  
country	   (i.e.,	   not	   registered	   with	   SECOFI's	   industrial	   development	   programme,	  
manufacturing	   some	  electronics	   equipment	   in	  México)	   it	   could	   not	   participate	   in	  
government	  bids.	  	  This	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Control	  Data,	  which	  could	  not	  participate	  in	  
government	  bids	  from	  December	  1986	  to	  April	  1987	  when	  the	  company	  did	  not	  have	  a	  
registered	  local	  manufacturing	  operation.	  	  As	  a	  result	  the	  company	  experienced	  severe	  
losses	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  1987.	  
	   In	  conclusion,	  government	  purchasing	  power,	  though	  dramatically	  increased	  
through	  volume	  and	  centralization,	  was	  not	  used	  directly	  or	  systematically	  to	  develop	  
the	  local	   informatics	  industry.	   	  With	  the	  1985	  change	  of	   leadership	  in	  INEGI	  some	  
efforts	  were	  made	  to	  coordinate	  government	  purchasing	  policy	  with	  the	  industrial	  
development	  efforts	  of	  SECOFI.	  	  However,	  these	  efforts	  were	  limited	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  
local	  alternative	  sources	  of	  computer	  technology	  in	  all	  but	  basic	  microcomputers	  and	  
peripherals.	  	  Moreover,	  by	  the	  late	  1980s,	  the	  president	  of	  INEGI,	  Pedro	  Aspe,	  was	  
shifting	  back	  to	  the	  liberal	  procurement	  policies	  practiced	  prior	  to	  1985.	  	  	  
	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   government	   of	   México	   expanded	   its	   use	   of	   information	  
technology	   commensurate	   with	   the	   increased	   size	   and	   complexity	   of	   the	   state	  
bureaucracy.	  	  Information	  technology	  was	  and	  is	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  government	  in	  its	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exercise	  of	  power	  and	  control	  over	  society.
292	  	  It	  is	  patently	  in	  the	  government's	  self–
interest	   to	   expand	  with	   the	  most	   up–to–date	   and	   cost–effective	   equipment	   and	  
services	  available.	   	  So	  the	  government	  used	   its	  monopsony	  primarily	  to	  negotiate	  
lower	  prices,	  while	  procuring	  an	   increasing	  volume	  of	   state–of–the–art	   computer	  
equipment	  and	  services	  from	  the	  transnationals.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Thus,	  while	  SECOFI's	  computer	  industry	  guidelines	  grew	  ever	  more	  flexible,	  the	  
government	  as	  a	  customer	  grew	  more	  monolithic	  and	  demanding.	  	  México	  continued	  
to	  be	  primarily	  a	  consumer––not	  a	  producer––of	  computer	  electronics.	  
	  
Lack	  of	  Private	  Sector	  Support	  
	   The	  discussion	  of	  the	  general	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter	   noted	   the	   Mexican	   private	   sector's	   wariness	   of	   nationalist/expansionist	  
policies.	   	   This	   general	   wariness	   certainly	   applied	   to	   the	   computer	   development	  
programme.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  at	  least	  three	  more	  specific	  factors	  further	  inhibited	  
private	  sector	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  programme.	  
	   Firstly,	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  industry	  was	  thoroughly	  dominated	  by	  foreign	  
transnationals	  at	  the	  time	  the	  programme	  was	  introduced.	  	  Mexican	  participation	  was	  
limited	  to	  retail	  distribution	  under	  license	  (which	  would	  not	  be	  directly	  affected	  by	  the	  
programme	  either	   favourably	  or	   adversely),	   and	   the	  assembly	  of	   imported	   semi–
knocked–down	  microcomputer	  kits	  by	  a	  few	  small	  companies.	  	  Thus,	  there	  were	  no	  
major	   industrial	   groups	  with	   a	   vested	   interest	   in	   a	   protected	  domestic	   computer	  
industry.	  	  	  	  
	   Further,	  the	  policy	  initiative	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  support	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  
technology–minded	  elites	  in	  the	  private	  sector;	  such	  a	  critical	  mass	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  
1981–82.	   	   	   Brazil's	   academic	   institutions	   were	   producing	   increasing	   numbers	   of	  
electronic	   engineers	   and	   computer	   scientists	   from	   the	   1960s	   onward.	   	   These	  
                                                
292	  	  Many	  authors	  have	  commented	  on	  the	  potential	  abuses	  of	  information	  technology	  by	  
government.	  	  See	  for	  example,	  Armand	  Mattelart	  and	  Hector	  Schmucler,	  Communication	  and	  
Information	   Technologies:	   	   Freedom	  of	   Choice	   for	   Latin	   America?,	   (Norwood,	  NJ:	   	   Ablex	  
Publishing	  Corporation,	  1985).	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technicians	  had	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  local	  computer	  industry	  in	  
that	  country.	  	  By	  assuming	  governmental	  positions	  and	  forming	  formal	  and	  informal	  
networks,	   they	  were	   able	   to	   influence	   policy	   substantially	   in	   this	   area.	   	  México's	  
academic	  institutions,	  as	  noted	  above,	  were	  not	  active	  in	  this	  area	  until	  much	  later.	  	  As	  
there	  were	  few	  qualified	  personnel	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  local	  industry,	  likewise	  there	  
were	  few	  with	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  the	  development	  of	  such	  an	  industry.	  	  The	  few	  
that	  did	  exist	  had	  been	  trained	  largely	  by	  the	  computer	  transnationals	  to	  be	  users	  of	  
their	  computer	  equipment,	  not	  developers	  and	  innovators.	  	  	  
The	  local	  private	  sector	  was,	  at	  best,	  ambivalent	  toward	  the	  policy	  initiative.	  
Indeed,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  was	  in	  fact	  hostile	  to	  the	  programme	  
on	  balance.	   	  Without	   significant	  Mexican	  presence	   in	   the	   computer	   industry,	   the	  
private	   sector	  was	   primarily	   a	   user	   of	   computer	   technology	   developed,	   sold	   and	  
serviced	  by	   foreign	  companies.	   	  The	  market	  had	  been	  educated	  by	   the	  computer	  
transnationals	   since	   the	   introduction	   of	   computers	   in	   México.	   	   The	   market	   was	  
interested	  generically	  in	  obtaining	  the	  best	  equipment	  at	  the	  lowest	  price.	  	  However,	  
in	  1981–82,	   the	  market	  was	   still	  not	  very	   sophisticated	  and	  was	   thus	  highly	   risk–
averse.	  	  The	  computer	  development	  programme,	  while	  professing	  a	  commitment	  to	  
international	  competitiveness,	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  threatening	  current	  price	  and	  
technology	  standards.	  
	  
	   Two	   other	   factors	   served	   to	   inhibit	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   the	  
computer	  development	  programme:	   	   the	  dynamics	  of	   the	   change	  of	   government	  
administrations,	  and	  pressure	  from	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  these	  two	  
factors	   is	   best	   illustrated	   within	   the	   historical	   context	   of	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	  
guidelines	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  official	  recognition	  and	  approval	  of	  them.	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Formulation	  of	  the	  1981	  Computer	  Industry	  Guidelines	  
	   In	  1979	  José	  Andres	  de	  Oteyza	  unveiled	  the	  National	  Industrial	  Development	  
Plan.	  	  One	  of	  the	  priority	  areas	  designated	  in	  the	  plan	  was	  computer	  electronics.	  	  At	  
this	  time,	  however,	  no	  integrated	  development	  plan	  for	  the	  computer	  sector	  had	  been	  
developed.	  	  It	  fell	  to	  Natán	  Warman,	  Undersecretary	  of	  Industrial	  Development	  under	  
Oteyza,	  and	  Ernesto	  Marcos,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Industries,	  to	  devise	  a	  plan	  for	  
computers.	  	  Adding	  impetus	  and	  urgency	  to	  the	  formal	  need	  to	  formulate	  guidelines	  
for	  the	  industry	  were	  the	  soaring	  trade	  deficit	  in	  the	  sector	  and	  chaos	  at	  the	  low	  end	  
of	  the	  local	  market.	  	  
	   Lacking	  the	  necessary	  technical	  expertise	  in	  the	  ministry,	  Warman	  and	  Marcos	  
sought	  outside	  help	  to	  formulate	  policy.	  	  They	  commissioned	  Warman's	  brother,	  José	  
Warman,	  who	  was	  then	  an	  electronic	  engineer	  teaching	  at	  the	  national	  university	  
(UNAM).	  	  In	  early	  1981	  José	  Warman	  was	  joined	  by	  Ricardo	  Zermeño	  who	  had	  just	  
finished	   doctoral	   studies	   in	   England	   on	   technology	   policy	   concerning	   the	   use	   of	  
robotics	  in	  industry.	  	  By	  August	  1981	  a	  draft	  of	  the	  guidelines	  was	  complete.	  	  	  	  	  
	   Because	   the	   computer	   guidelines	  were	   first	   published	   under	   the	  National	  
Industrial	  Development	  Plan,	  no	  new	  government	  decree	  was	  needed	  to	  implement	  
them.
293	  	  What	  was	  needed,	  however,	  was	  the	  agreement	  and	  cooperation	  of	  four	  
government	  ministries	  if	  the	  policy	  was	  to	  be	  effective:	  	  namely,	  SEPAFIN,	  SPP,	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Trade	  (SECOM),	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Public	  Credit	  (Hacienda).	  	  
SPP	  was	  important	  because	  it	  controlled	  government	  computer	  purchases;	  SECOM,	  
because	  it	  controlled	  foreign	  trade;	  and	  Finance,	  because	  it	  held	  the	  purse	  strings	  with	  
respect	  to	  fiscal	  incentives	  incorporated	  in	  the	  development	  programme.	  
	   From	  within	  the	  Lopez	  Portillo	  administration	  there	  was	  neither	  strong	  support	  
nor	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposed	  policy	  of	  developing	  Mexican	  capability	  in	  computer	  
electronics	  at	  first.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  strong	  opinion	  owed	  in	  part	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  understanding;	  
                                                
293	   	   For	   reasons	  discussed	  below,	   the	  Computer	  Decree	  was	  never	  published	   in	  México's	  
Official	  Diary.	  	  However,	  because	  it	  was	  implemented	  under	  the	  1979	  Industrial	  Development	  
Plan	  and	  fell	  under	  the	  policy	  for	  capital	  goods	  published	  on	  October	  7,	  1981,	  the	  plan	  could	  
be	  implemented	  without	  formal	  approval.	  
        217 
there	  was	  a	  general	  ignorance	  within	  the	  government	  bureaucracy	  concerning	  the	  
sector.	  	  However,	  Marcos	  and	  Warman	  benefitted	  from	  the	  close	  relationship	  that	  the	  
Minister	  of	  SEPAFIN	  had	  with	  the	  president,	  which	  served	  to	  insulate	  them	  somewhat	  
from	  political	  opposition	  from	  other	  ministries.	  	  	  
	   Outside	   SEPAFIN,	   the	   only	   enthusiastic	   support	   for	   the	   plan	   within	   the	  
government	  came	  from	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  Informatics	  Policy	  within	  the	  SPP	  who	  
was	  responsible	  for	  regulating	  computer	  purchases	  by	  the	  government.	  	  The	  Director	  
General	  had	  been	  consulted	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  guidelines	  and	  was	  ideologically	  
committed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Mexican	  computer	  industry.	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  
the	   policy	   proponents,	   this	   Director	   General	   was	   replaced	   by	   one	   who	   was	   less	  
enthusiastic	  about	  this	  programme	  in	  1982.	  	  	  
	   SECOM	  initially	  opposed	  the	  guidelines	  because	  they	  contained	  severe	  import	  
restrictions	  that	  ran	  counter	  to	  the	  current	  policy	  of	  freer	  borders.	  	  Between	  1975	  and	  
1979	   SECOM	   had	   replaced	   much	   import	   licensing	   with	   a	   simpler	   tariff	   system.	  	  
However,	   SECOM	  was	   forced	   to	   reverse	   the	  policy	  with	   the	  economy	  headed	   for	  
severe	   crisis	   in	   1981.	   	   With	   this	   reversal	   SECOM	  was	   no	   longer	   opposed	   to	   the	  
programme.	  	  In	  fact	  the	  guidelines	  were	  welcomed	  as	  they	  served	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
administrative	  aspects	  of	  import	  licensing,	  defining	  and	  rationalizing	  import	  permits	  in	  
this	  sector	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  Thus,	  SECOM	  was	  at	  least	  pragmatically	  supportive	  of	  the	  
program.	  	  	  
	   Initially,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  under	  Silva	  Herzog	  offered	  neither	  aggressive	  
support	   nor	   opposition,	   though	   Herzog's	   inclinations	   would	   be	   for	   free	   trade	  
economics	   as	   demonstrated	   by	   his	   staying	   power	   during	   the	   changeover	   of	  
administrations.	  	  	  
	   These	  four	  government	  ministries	  were	  to	  sign	  the	  policy	  programme	  and	  the	  
policy	   was	   to	   be	   published	   in	   the	   Official	   Diary	   in	   November	   1982	   so	   that	   the	  
guidelines	   would	   have	   official	   recognition	   and	   the	   force	   of	   law.	   	   However,	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   the	   change	   of	   presidential	   administrations,	   pressure	   from	   the	   U.S.	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government	   on	   behalf	   of	   U.S.	   computer	   transnationals,	   and	   the	   economic	   crisis	  
conspired	  to	  inhibit	  approval	  and	  implementation	  of	  the	  programme.	  
	   Chapter	  6	  established	  that	  the	  1982	  cabinet	  changes	  had	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  
political	  support	  for	  the	  policy.	  	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  changes	  important	  in	  themselves,	  
the	  process	  by	  which	  these	  changes	  were	  made	  also	  was	  significant.	  	  	  	  
	   By	  late	  1981	  several	  of	  the	  government	  ministers	  who	  were	  to	  approve	  the	  
policy	  knew	  what	  their	  new	  posts	  would	  be	  in	  the	  next	  administration.	   	  The	  most	  
significant	  of	  these,	  perhaps,	  was	  Hector	  Hernandez	  who	  was	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	  
Trade	  (SECOM).	  	  In	  the	  new	  administration	  he	  was	  to	  become	  the	  Minister	  of	  Trade	  
and	  Industrial	  Development	  in	  SECOFI––the	  new	  ministry	  which	  was	  to	  result	  from	  the	  
merging	   of	   SEPAFIN	   and	   SECOM.	   	   Also	   of	   importance	  were	  Mauricio	   de	  María	   y	  
Campos	  who	  at	  the	  time	  was	  Undersecretary	  of	  Finance,	  and	  Luís	  Bravo	  Aguilerra,	  
Director	  General	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  in	  SECOM.	  	  Bravo	  Aguilerra	  was	  to	  be	  promoted	  to	  
the	  Undersecretary	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  in	  the	  newly	  consolidated	  ministry.	  	  De	  María	  y	  
Campos	  was	  to	  become	  Undersecretary	  of	  Industrial	  Development,	  also	  reporting	  to	  
Hernandez.	  	  The	  computer	  policy	  would	  be	  administered	  under	  him	  in	  this	  ministry.	  	  	  
	   These	  ministerial	  changes,	  and	  these	  men's	   foreknowledge	  of	  them,	  made	  
them	  reticent	  to	  commit	  themselves	  to	  a	  policy	  whose	  ramifications	  they	  did	  not	  fully	  
understand.	   	   If	   there	  were	   going	   to	   be	   political	   problems	  with	   the	   program,	   the	  
problems	  would	  be	  theirs.	   	  Further,	  Hernandez––as	  noted	  earlier––was	   identified	  
ideologically	   with	   free	   market	   principles	   and	   didn’t	   want	   to	   be	   constrained	   to	  
implement	   a	  programme	  he	  didn’t	   support.	   	   “Hernandez	   already	   knew	  he	  would	  
become	  head	  of	  SECOFI.	  He	  wanted	  his	  hands	  free	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  what	  he	  wanted.	  
He	  didn’t	  want	   to	  be	  bound	  by	   this	  programme.”294	  Thus,	  apart	   from	  the	  normal	  
bureaucratic	   delays	   inherent	   in	   a	   change	   of	   administration,	   the	   political	   and	  
institutional	  dynamics	  associated	  with	  such	  a	  transition	  inhibited	  the	  implementation	  
of	  this	  new	  policy	  initiative.	  	  	  
                                                
294	  Author	  interview	  with	  José	  Warman,	  Director,	  Office	  of	  Electronics,	  SECOFI,	  June	  1987.	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   The	  U.S.	  government	  did	  not	  waste	  time	  in	  expressing	  its	  concern	  over	  the	  new	  
policy	  initiative.	  	  In	  early	  1982,	  Malcolm	  Baldridge,	  the	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  Commerce,	  
sent	  a	  letter	  to	  Andres	  de	  Oteyza,	  the	  Minister	  of	  SEPAFIN,	  asking	  that	  the	  programme	  
not	  be	  passed	  into	  law	  without	  first	  consulting	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  	  
	   Prior	  to	  this,	  in	  1981,	  Presidents	  Reagan	  and	  Lopez	  Portillo	  had	  established	  a	  
joint	  trade	  commission	  to	  improve	  cooperation	  and	  to	  resolve	  trade	  issues	  between	  
México	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Sector	   "working	   groups"	   were	   set	   up	   under	   the	  
auspices	  of	  the	  commission	  at	  the	  initiative	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  shortly	  after	  the	  
computer	  policy	  was	   formulated	   in	   late	   1981.	   	   Sectors	  under	  discussion	   included	  
textiles,	  automobiles,	  petrochemicals,	  pharmaceuticals,	  and	  electronics.	  	  However,	  
electronics	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  topical	  area	  of	  concern	  at	  this	  time.
295
	  	  	  
	   These	  working	  parties	  took	  place	  at	  the	  undersecretary	  level	  and	  comprised	  
U.S.	  government	  officials	  from	  the	  departments	  of	  state	  and	  commerce,	  and	  Mexican	  
officials	  from	  SEPAFIN	  and	  SECOM.
296	  	  The	  objectives	  of	  the	  sector	  working	  group	  on	  
electronics	  included:	  	  (1)	  the	  examination	  of	  issues	  of	  concern	  regarding	  the	  computer	  
industry	   in	  México	  and	   the	  United	  States;	   (2)	   the	   identification	  of	   areas	   in	  which	  
cooperative	   efforts	   can	   better	   promote	   the	   growth	   and	   development	   of	   both	  
countries'	  computer	  industries	  and	  the	  freer	  flow	  of	  trade	  and	  investment;	  and	  (3)	  the	  
making	  of	  recommendations	  to	  the	  Commission.
297
	  	  In	  one	  meeting	  the	  U.S.	  presented	  
its	   agenda	   including	   its	   own	  proposals	   for	   electronics	   policy	   in	  México.	   	   The	  U.S.	  
proposals	  were	  six–fold:	  	  (1)	  immediate	  relaxation	  of	  local	  content	  requirements;	  (2)	  
removal	  of	  export	   requirements;	   (3)	   relaxation	  of	   required	  R&D	  expenditures;	   (4)	  
move	  toward	  open	  trade	  practices	  in	  computers;	  (5)	  access	  to	  the	  microcomputer	  
market	  for	  U.S.	  exporters	  or	  U.S.	  firms	  in	  México;	  and	  (6)	  removal	  of	  mixed	  investment	  
                                                
295
	   	   Mark	   P.	   Jacobsen,	   "México's	   Computer	   Decree:	   	   The	   Problem	   of	   Performance	  
Requirements	  and	  a	  U.S.	  Response",	  Law	  and	  Policy	  in	  International	  Business,	  14.	  4	  (1983),	  pp.	  
1172–1173.	  
296	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  meant	  that	  Hector	  Hernandez	  would	  be	  present	  at	  some,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  these	  
working	  parties.	  
297	   	   Unclassified	   Telegram	   from	   the	   U.S.	   Embassy	   in	   México	   to	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	  
Commerce,	  Washington	  D.C.	  (January	  1982)	  quoted	  in	  Jacobsen,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  1173.	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requirements.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  U.S.	  proposals	  attacked	  every	  major	  guideline	  in	  the	  policy	  
initiative.	   	   The	   thrust	   of	   the	   U.S.	   government's	   argument	   was	   that	   the	   "mutual	  
interests"	  of	  México	  and	  the	  U.S.	  were	  best	  served	  when	  U.S.	  companies	  were	  allowed	  
to	  supply	  high	  technology	  to	  México.	  "The	  United	  States	  believes	  that	  U.S.	  computers	  
can	  significantly	  contribute	  to	  the	  development	  of	  México's	  industrial	  capacity,	  and	  
assist	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  internationally	  competitive	  Mexican	  exports."
298
	  	  	  
	   Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  working	  group	  failed	  to	  reach	  substantive	  agreement.	  	  
José	  Warman,	   the	  architect	  of	   the	   computer	  programme,	   attended	   the	   talks	   and	  
noted,	  “The	  talks	  were	  not	  well	  set	  up.	  There	  was	  no	  definite	  attempt	  at	  substantive	  
agreement	  on	  either	  side.	  I	  felt	  the	  talks	  as	  general	  pressure,	  but	  little	  more.”299	  The	  
resultant	   effect,	   however,	   was	   a	   group	   of	   reticent	   Mexican	   ministers,	   and	   a	  
programme	   whose	   passage	   into	   law	   was	   forestalled	   indefinitely	   and	   whose	  
implementation	  was	  considerably	  delayed.	  	  	  
	   The	   programme	   was	   authorized	   by	   Natán	   Warman	   in	   August	   1981	   and	  
announced	   publicly	   in	   December	   of	   that	   year.	   	   Warman	   then	   worked	   with	   civil	  
servants	  in	  the	  SPP	  to	  modify	  and	  improve	  the	  policy	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  published	  in	  
the	   Official	   Diary	   in	   November	   1982	   with	   the	   signatures	   of	   all	   four	   government	  
ministers.	   	   In	   June	  1982	   the	  SPP	   formally	   approved	   the	  policy	  and	   in	   September,	  
Finance	   signed.	   	  However,	  Hector	  Hernandez	  of	  SECOM,	   for	   the	   reasons	  outlined	  
above,	  did	  not	  commit	  himself	  to	  the	  policy	  and	  the	  programme	  was	  never	  published	  
in	  the	  Official	  Diary.	  	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  policy	  to	  receive	  official	  status	  was	  to	  prove	  a	  
stumbling	  block	  to	  its	  successful	  implementation,	  as	  seen	  further	  below.	  
	   With	  the	  change	  of	  administrations,	  SEPAFIN	  and	  SECOM	  were	  amalgamated	  
into	  SECOFI	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Hector	  Hernandez.	  	  Despite	  Hernandez'	  reluctance	  
concerning	  the	  industrial	  development	  programme	  for	  computers,	  José	  Warman	  and	  
Ricardo	  Zermeño	  were	  appointed	  to	  administer	  the	  programme	  as	  best	  they	  could.	  	  
Though	  Hernandez	  was	  not	  committed	  to	  the	  programme,	  Warman	  had	  earned	  the	  
                                                
298	  	  "Discussion	  Paper	  on	  Implications	  of	  México's	  Computer	  Development	  Plan",	  mimeo.	  
299	  Author	  interview,	  June	  1987.	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respect	  of	  Hernandez,	  de	  María	  	  y	  Campos,	  and	  Bravo	  Aguilerra	  and	  so	  was	  appointed	  
Director	  of	  Electronics	  Policy	  Coordination	  under	  de	  María	  	  y	  Campos	  in	  SECOFI.
300	  	  
“Warman	  was	  appointed	  because	  although	  there	  was	  disagreement	  about	  the	  policy,	  
it	  was	  agreed	  it	  [referring	  to	  the	  Guidelines]	  was	  an	  impressive	  piece	  of	  work.	  Hector	  
Hernandez	  kept	  an	  attitude	  of	  ‘least	  resistance’	  and	  basically	  left	  Warman	  alone	  to	  do	  
what	  he	  could.”301	  	  
Furthermore,	  this	  was	  a	  new	  and	  technically	  complex	  area	  of	  policy	  making	  and	  
enforcement,	  and	  required	  the	  supervision	  of	  technically	  competent	  civil	  servants.	  	  
Warman	  recognised	  this	  fact	  in	  a	  typically	  blunt	  fashion:	  “There	  was	  supine	  ignorance	  
about	  electronics	  within	  the	  government	  [at	  that	  time].”302	  No	  one	  was	  better	  placed	  
therefore	  to	  implement	  the	  policy	  than	  its	  authors,	  Warman	  and	  Zermeño.	  
As	   in	  the	  Brazilian	  case,	  the	  specialised	  nature	  of	  the	   industry	  provided	  an	  
opportunity	   for	   a	   small	   cadre	   of	   elites	   to	   influence	   policy	   formulation	   and	  
implementation.	  México	  may	  not	  have	  been	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  “developmental	  
state”,	  but	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  country’s	  computer	  policy	  in	  the	  early	  days,	  a	  
meritocracy	  in	  policy	  responsibility	  applied,	  if	  only	  because	  no	  one	  else	  understood	  the	  
industry.303	  	  	  
	   Before	  examining	  further	  the	  politics	  surrounding	  the	  electronics	  programme	  
it’s	  helpful	  to	  look	  specifically	  at	  the	  decree	  itself.	  	  The	  next	  section	  will	  consider	  the	  
objectives	  of	  the	  programme	  and	  summarize	  the	  guidelines	  and	  incentives	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  a	   local	  computer	  electronics	   industry	   in	  México.	   	  There	   follows	  a	  
discussion	  of	  the	  initial	  attempts	  at	  implementing	  the	  programme	  in	  the	  years	  1983–
                                                
300	   	   De	  María	   y	   Campos	   continued	   to	   provide	   cautious	   support	   for	   the	   policy	   during	   its	  
implementation.	  	  Coming	  from	  the	  Finance	  Ministry,	  de	  María	  y	  Campos	  owed	  much	  of	  his	  
political	  influence	  to	  Silva	  Herzog.	  	  When	  Silva	  Herzog	  left	  the	  ministry	  in	  1987,	  de	  María	  y	  
Campos'	  hand	  was	  weakened	  and	  the	  computer	  policy	  received	  still	  less	  support	  from	  above.	  
301	  Author	  interview	  with	  Ricardo	  Zermeño,	  Director,	  SECOFI	  (under	  Warman	  at	  the	  time	  
referenced	  in	  the	  quote),	  May	  1987.	  
302	  Author	  interview	  with	  José	  Warman,	  March	  1987.	  
303	  Admittedly	  José	  Warman	  was	  Natán	  Warman’s	  brother,	  so	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  José	  
Warman’s	  appointment	  was	  hardly	  meritocratic.	  However,	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  it	  
was.	  He	  earned	  the	  respect,	  even	  of	  his	  political	  opponents,	  and	  was	  appointed	  based	  on	  
merit.	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84,	   IBM's	   successful	   effort	   to	   obtain	   an	   exceptional	   ruling	   on	   investment	   in	   a	  
microcomputer	  operation,	  and	  finally	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  on	  the	  
industry	  relative	  to	  the	  programme's	  objectives.	  
	  
The	  Computer	  Electronics	  Development	  Programme	  
	   The	  "Development	  Programme	  for	  the	  Manufacture	  of	  Electronic	  Computer	  
Systems,	  Their	  Main	  Modules	  and	  Peripheral	  Equipment"	  had	  four	  basic	  objectives:
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(i)	  to	  promote	  technological	  development	  relating	  the	  productive	  sector	  with	  centres	  
for	   research	   and	   development	   in	   computer	   electronics;	   (ii)	   to	   produce	   computer	  
equipment	   for	   the	   local	  market	  at	  price	  and	   technology	   levels	  comparable	   to	   the	  
international	  market;	  (iii)	  to	  promote	  the	  export	  of	  data	  processing	  equipment	  while	  
reducing	  imports;	  and	  (iv)	  to	  increase	  horizontal	  industrial	  integration	  through	  the	  
development	  of	  Mexican	  component	  suppliers.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  programme	  explicitly	  
aimed	  to	  expand	  and	  consolidate	  the	  computer	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  supply	  70	  percent	  of	  
the	  country's	  computer	  needs	  in	  five	  years.	  	  	  	  
	   Given	  that	  there	  was	  almost	  no	  local	  capacity	  for	  the	  design	  or	  manufacture	  of	  
computers	   in	  México	   in	   1981,	   these	   goals	   were	   highly	   ambitious.	   	  Warman	   and	  
Zermeño	  were	   faced	  with	   a	  dilemma	   in	   trying	   to	   stimulate	   a	  national	   electronics	  
industry.	   	  The	  electronics	  component	  manufacturers	  (e.g.,	  Texas	  Instruments,	  and	  
Motorola)	   did	   not	   want	   to	   manufacture	   in	   México,	   and	   the	   foreign	   computer	  
equipment	   vendors	   would	   not	   manufacture	   where	   there	   were	   no	   components.	  	  
However,	  the	  worldwide	  microcomputer	  explosion	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  microcomputers	  
could	   be	   assembled	   using	   "public	   technology"	   (i.e.	   integrated	   circuits	   that	   were	  
available	   on	   the	   international	   market)	   provided	   the	   policy–makers	   with	   an	  
opportunity.	  
	   The	  policy	  strategy	  thus	  turned	  on	  the	  market	  for	  microcomputers	  –	  a	  market	  
with	   lower	   technological	   and	   capital	   barriers	   to	   entry,	   and	   the	   market	   with	   the	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greatest	  potential	  growth	  in	  the	  medium–term.	  	  In	  minicomputers	  the	  policy	  was	  to	  
emphasize	  exports,	  allowing	  some	  imports	  of	  finished	  products	  to	  complement	  local	  
production.	  	  The	  policy	  thus	  allowed	  100%	  foreign	  ownership	  in	  this	  segment,	  but	  
encouraged	  the	  development	  of	  local	  component	  suppliers.	  	  The	  mainframe	  segment	  
permitted	   more	   limited	   policy	   goals.	   	   The	   local	   market	   was	   too	   small,	   and	   the	  
technology	   too	   advanced,	   to	   support	   local	   production.	   	   So	  mainframes	   could	   be	  
imported	  and	  sold	  in	  México	  so	  long	  as	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  compensated	  imports	  with	  
exports	  of	  other	  products	  manufactured	  locally.	  	  
	   Hence,	  the	  programme,	  recognizing	  the	  limitations	  of	  Mexican	  private	  capital,	  
did	  not	  intend	  to	  exclude	  foreign	  investment	  in	  any	  area	  of	  the	  industry,	  as	  was	  the	  
case	  in	  Brazil.	  	  Rather,	  the	  idea	  was	  to	  orient	  foreign	  investment	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  
necessary	  technological,	  managerial,	  and	  capital	  resources	  would	  be	  transferred	  and	  
local	  capabilities	  would	  develop––quickly	  in	  microcomputers	  and	  peripherals,	  more	  
gradually	  in	  minicomputers,	  and	  probably	  not	  at	  all	  in	  mainframes.	  	  	  
	   Following	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  main	  requirements	  for	  investment	  in	  mini–	  and	  
microcomputers	  and	  their	  peripherals	  as	  stated	  in	  the	  policy	  guidelines.
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1.	  	  In	  order	  for	  foreign	  companies	  legally	  to	  sell	  computer	  equipment	  in	  the	  Mexican	  
market	   they	  must	   register	   a	   local	  manufacturing	   project	  with	   the	   government	   of	  
México.	  
2.	   	   Foreign	   investors	   may	   maintain	   100%	   equity	   in	   their	   Mexican	   minicomputer	  
operations,	   but	   are	   restricted	   to	   49%	   equity	   in	   microcomputer,	   peripheral,	   or	  
component	   operations.	   	   The	   importation	   of	  minicomputers	  will	   be	   allowed	   on	   a	  
selective	  basis;	  however	  fully–assembled	  microcomputers	  cannot	  be	  imported.	  	  	  
3.	  	  A	  weighted	  measurement,	  the	  GIN,
306	  is	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  level	  of	  integration	  
of	  locally	  produced	  components	  into	  the	  machines.	  	  Such	  integration	  should	  proceed	  
according	  to	  the	  following	  schedule	  in	  Table	  7.3:	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  Ibid.,	  Chapters	  III	  and	  IV,	  pp.	  8–22.	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   GIN	   is	   the	   Grado	   de	   Integración	   Nacional	   and	   is	   calculated	   below:	  	  
GIN=[2(CI)+2(Ceb)+1.5(S)+A]/[0.7(CI+CJ)+CebT+ST+A+CIM]	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TABLE	  7.3	  
Local	  Integration:	  GIN	  Requirements	  %	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  1st	  year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2nd	  year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3rd	  year	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   Mini	  	  Micro	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mini	  	  Micro	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mini	  	  Micro	  
Recommended	  GIN%	  	  	  	  	   30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   35	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  
Minimum	  GIN%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   25	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  
	  
4.	  	  Each	  company	  will	  have	  a	  foreign	  currency	  budget	  and	  will	  have	  to	  compensate	  a	  
percentage	  of	  their	  imports	  with	  exports	  as	  follows	  in	  Table	  7.4:	  
	  
TABLE	  7.4	  
Export	  to	  Import	  Ratio	  Requirements	  %	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   1st	  year	  	  	  	  2nd	  year	  	  	  	  3rd	  year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4th	  year	  
Minis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100%	  
Micros	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45%	  
Peripherals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70%	  
	  
5.	  	  Price	  is	  to	  be	  kept	  within	  10–15%	  of	  the	  list	  price	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  quality	  is	  
expected	  to	  be	  up	  to	  international	  standards.	  
6.	  	  Research	  and	  development	  expenditures	  required	  to	  finance	  government	  approved	  
projects,	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  total	  sales,	  are	  to	  be	  as	  follows	  in	  Table	  7.5:	  
	  
TABLE	  7.5	  
R&D	  Expenditure	  Requirements	  (%	  of	  Sales)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Minis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Micros	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Peripherals	  &	  Components	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  5%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3%	  
	  
                                                                                                                                    
Where:	  CI=the	  costs	  of	  the	  integrated	  circuits	  purchased	  in	  the	  country	  from	  companies	  which	  
have	  been	  registered	  in	  the	  development	  programme;	  Ceb=the	  local	  cost	  of	  basic	  electronic	  
components	  (when	  these	  components	  are	  purchased	  from	  a	  maquiladora,	  only	  60%	  of	  their	  
value	   is	   used	   in	   the	   formula);	   CebT=the	   total	   value	   of	   the	   basic	   electronics	   components	  
purchased	  in	  the	  country;	  S=the	  value	  of	  sub–assemblies	  or	  modules	  purchased	  in	  the	  country	  
(50%	   of	   their	   value	   is	   used	   if	   they	   are	   purchased	   from	   a	   company	   not	   inscribed	   in	   the	  
programme);	  A=the	  local	  cost	  of	  non–electronic	  accessories	  required	  in	  production;	  ST=the	  
total	  value	  of	  the	  sub–assemblies	  purchased	  in	  the	  country;	  CJ=the	  cost	  of	  integrated	  circuits	  
acquired	  abroad;	  and	  CIM=the	  total	  value	  of	   inputs	  acquired	  abroad	  excluding	   integrated	  
circuits. 
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7.	  	  Foreign	  companies	  will	  furnish	  technical	  training	  to	  its	  Mexican	  personnel	  with	  
respect	   to	   design,	   research	   and	   development,	   production,	   and	   administration	   of	  
computer	  manufacturing	   operations.	   	   Furthermore,	   foreign	   investors	  will	   provide	  
access	  to	  the	  advances	  in	  research	  and	  development	  made	  in	  research	  centres	  located	  
in	  their	  home	  countries.	  
8.	   	   Production	   plants	   should	   be	   located	   in	   the	   geographic	   areas	   specified	   by	   the	  
National	  Plan	  for	  Industrial	  Development.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	   The	  programme	  envisaged	  flexible	  enforcement	  in	  that	  deficiencies	  in	  one	  area	  
could	  be	  compensated	  for	  by	  increases	  in	  another.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  a	  company	  was	  
actively	   promoting	   exports	   of	   completed	  machines	   or	   of	   components	   and	   had	   a	  
positive	  currency	  balance,	  local	  integration	  requirements	  might	  be	  relaxed.	  	  It	  seems	  
the	  most	  important	  area	  of	  government	  flexibility	  concerned	  the	  trade–off	  between	  
the	   integration	  of	   local	   components	  and	   the	   international	   competitiveness	  of	   the	  
equipment.	  	  The	  government	  appeared	  not	  to	  want	  to	  integrate	  at	  all	  costs.	  	  Indeed,	  
the	  proximity	  of	  the	  U.S.	  market	  meant	  that	  the	  government	  could	  not	  successfully	  
pursue	  an	  industrial	  development	  policy	  that	  entailed	  a	  prolonged	  period	  of	  inferior	  
technology	  and	  high	  prices.	  	  The	  constant	  threat	  of	  contraband	  equipment	  prevented	  
the	  Mexican	  government	  from	  enforcing	  national	  integration	  that	  is	  uneconomical.	  
	   The	  programme	  established	  incentives	  as	  well	  as	  restrictions	  and	  controls	  for	  
the	   production	   of	   computer	   equipment.	   	   The	   support	   furnished	   by	   the	  Mexican	  
government	  included:	  
1.	  	  Incentives	  with	  respect	  to	  financing:	  
a.	   Preferential	   interest	   rates	   and	   grace	   periods	   in	   the	   financing	   obtained	  
through	   government–approved	   financial	   institutions	   and	   funding	   agencies	  
(e.g.,	  FOMEX,	  FONEI);	  
	   b.	  Pre–investment	  studies	  financed	  by	  the	  government;	  
c.	  Fiscal	   credits	  up	   to	  20%	  of	   the	   required	   investment	   to	  expand	  or	   install	  
productive	  capacity.	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2.	  	  Incentives	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  process	  of	  investment:	  
	   a.	  30%	  discount	  in	  the	  consumption	  of	  energy	  products;	  
b.	   Fiscal	   credits	   of	   15%	   for	   the	   purchase	   of	   computers	   and	   peripherals	  
produced	  in	  México;	  
	   c.	  The	  elimination	  of	  import	  tariffs	  for	  equipment	  used	  for	  production;	  
d.	  Import	  quota	  preferences	  given	  to	  the	  producers	  of	  computer	  equipment	  
(although	   computer	   distributors	   still	   maintain	   import	   quotas	   they	   will	   be	  
gradually	  reduced);	  
e.	   Fiscal	   incentives	   to	   build	   laboratories	   destined	   for	   research	   and	  
development	  activities;	  
f.	  The	  possibility	  of	  consuming	  products	  made	  in	  the	  in–bond	  assembly	  plants	  
(maquiladoras);	  
g.	  Fiscal	  credits	  of	  20%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  new	  jobs	  generated	  by	  this	  new	  
investment.	  
3.	  	  Incentives	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  market:	  
a.	   The	  protection	  of	   the	   local	  market	   through	   the	  establishment	  of	   yearly	  
import	  quotas	  and	  previous	  import	  permits;	  
b.	   Import	   tariffs	  of	   30%	   for	  microcomputers,	   20%	   for	  mini-­‐computers	   and	  
mainframes,	  and	  15%	  for	  spare	  parts;	  
c.	   Preferential	   treatment	   for	   participating	   companies	   for	   sales	   to	   the	  
government;	  
d.	  Export	  incentives,	  in	  particular	  for	  exporting	  to	  the	  Latin	  American	  market	  
without	  additional	  tax	  payments,	  through	  the	  Latin	  American	  Association	  of	  
Free	  Trade.	  
4.	  	  Incentives	  with	  respect	  to	  institutional	  support:	  
	   a.	  Official	  support	  in	  negotiations	  with	  other	  state	  offices;	  
	   b.	  Support	  for	  establishing	  agreements	  for	  research	  and	  technical	  training.	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   Thus	  the	  programme	  had	  both	  a	  "carrot"	  and	  a	  "stick"	  to	  persuade	  companies	  
to	   comply	   with	   the	   programme.	   	   The	   government's	   "stick"	   was	   the	   denial	   of	  
permission	  to	  import.	  	  The	  policy's	  carrot	  consisted	  in	  the	  benefits	  of	  these	  incentives	  
and	   the	  opportunity	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   small,	  but	  growing,	  Mexican	  market	   for	  
computer	  electronics.	  
	   Despite	  the	  political	  ambivalence	  or	  even	  opposition	  of	  some	  in	  the	  Mexican	  
government,	  Warman	  attempted	  rigorous	  implementation	  of	  these	  policy	  guidelines	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1983	  until	  July	  1985	  when	  IBM	  was	  allowed	  100%	  ownership	  of	  a	  
microcomputer	  manufacturing	  subsidiary	  in	  México,	  directly	  contradicting	  the	  policy	  
guidelines.	  	  The	  next	  section	  explores	  the	  circumstances	  that	  led	  to	  this	  exceptional	  
ruling	  and	  its	  significance	  for	  the	  nascent	  industry	  and	  the	  policy	  initiative	  itself.	  	  	  
	  
The	  IBM	  Decision	  
	   Some	  observers	  have	  pointed	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  in	  
July	  1985	   to	  allow	   IBM	  100%	  ownership	  of	  a	   local	  microcomputer	  manufacturing	  
subsidiary	  as	  that	  which	  marked	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  government	  policy	  with	  regard	  to	  
computers.	   	   In	   fact,	   the	   IBM	  decision	  only	  explicitly	  manifested	  a	  policy	  shift	   that	  
began	  with	  the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  the	  change	  of	  administration	  two	  and	  half	  years	  
earlier.	  	  As	  has	  already	  been	  shown,	  the	  incoming	  De	  la	  Madrid	  administration	  was	  
pledged	  to	  opening	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  to	  foreign	  investment.	  	  Indeed,	  computer	  
electronics	   was	   designated	   explicitly	   in	   the	   new	   administration's	   "Guidelines	   on	  
Foreign	  Investment"	  as	  an	  area	  in	  which	  foreign	  investment	  would	  be	  welcomed.	  
	   Thus,	  well	  before	  the	  IBM	  decision	  the	  administration's	  attitude	  toward	  foreign	  
investment	  in	  computer	  electronics	  was	  manifestly	  less	  restrictive	  than	  the	  1981	  policy	  
guidelines.	  	  A	  representative	  in	  SECOFI's	  Office	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  stated	  
simply	  that	  the	  new	  administration	  thought	  that	  computers	  were	  not	  an	  area	  to	  be	  
developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  reserved	  market	  in	  México;	  "We're	  too	  far	  behind."	  
	   Within	  the	  same	  ministry	  (SECOFI),	  Warman	  and	  Zermeño	  were	  pursuing	  a	  
policy	  of	  restricted	  foreign	  ownership	  in	  microcomputers	  while	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	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Foreign	   Investment	   and	   Technology	   Transfer,	   Adolfo	   Hegewisch,	   was	   promoting	  
majority	   foreign	   ownership	   in	   computer	   electronics,	   specifically	   including	  
microcomputers.	  	  As	  the	  promotion	  of	  foreign	  investment	  had	  the	  presidential	  seal	  of	  
approval,	  it	  can	  be	  inferred	  that	  Hegewisch	  had	  a	  considerably	  stronger	  hand	  than	  
Warman.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  1981	  guidelines	  lacked	  the	  force	  of	  law	  as	  they	  had	  never	  
been	  published	  in	  the	  Official	  Diary,	  and	  they	  also	  lacked	  the	  committed	  support	  of	  
anyone	  at	  cabinet	  level.	  	  After	  all,	  this	  policy	  had	  been	  formulated	  during	  the	  final	  
tumultuous	  years	  of	  the	  now	  repudiated	  President	  Lopez	  Portillo.	  	  Hector	  Hernandez	  
in	  particular,	  adopted	  the	  path	  of	  least	  resistance	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  computer	  policy,	  
and	  as	  Undersecretary	  of	  Foreign	  Investment	  “was	  [after	  all]	  paid	  to	  promote	  foreign	  
investment.”307	  	  This	  was	  a	  classic	  case	  of	  Mexican	  policy	  by	  "regulation"	  and	  "non–
decision."
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  Politically,	  Warman	  was	  on	  his	  own.	  
	   It	  was	  in	  this	  context	  in	  early	  1984	  that	  IBM	  began	  negotiating	  in	  earnest	  to	  
establish	  a	  wholly–owned	  microcomputer	  operation	  in	  México.	  	  In	  March	  1984	  IBM	  
presented	   its	   plan,	   which	   included	   an	   investment	   of	   $6.6	   million	   to	   expand	   its	  
minicomputer	  plant	  in	  Guadalajara	  so	  that	  some	  600,000	  micros	  could	  be	  assembled	  
there	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  	  IBM	  would	  export	  roughly	  90	  percent	  of	  these	  micros,	  and	  
eighty	  new	  jobs	  would	  be	  created.	  	  	  
	   IBM	  made	  a	  simultaneous	  offer	  to	  UNAM	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  securing	  its	  long–
term	  future	  in	  the	  Mexican	  market.	  	  IBM	  offered	  to	  donate	  $4.5	  million	  toward	  the	  
establishment	  of	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  university	  to	  carry	  out	  long–term	  projects	  for	  
research	  and	  education	  in	  electronics.	  	  The	  plan	  would	  also	  integrate	  several	  state	  
universities	  and	  would	  involve	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Communications	  and	  Transport	  and	  the	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  Quote	  from	  José	  Warman	  in	  author	  interview,	  March	  1987.	  Warman	  was	  under	  no	  
illusions	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  policy	  support	  he	  would	  receive	  from	  above.	  
308	   	   Dale	   Story	   uses	   these	   terms	   to	   describe	   the	  Mexican	   government's	   habit	   of	   leaving	  
effective	  policy	  decisions	  to	  the	  implementers.	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Mexican	   telephone	   company,	   Telmex.
309	   	   As	   it	   turned	   out,	  UNAM	   rejected	   IBM's	  
overtures;	  however,	  the	  Mexican	  government	  found	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  resist	  Big	  Blue.	  
	   Warman	  vigorously	  opposed	  IBM's	  insistence	  on	  100%	  ownership,	  pointing	  to	  
Apple	  and	  Hewlett–Packard	  who	  had	  already	  signed	  joint	  venture	  agreements	  with	  
local	  capital	  and	  were	  registered	  with	  the	  programme.	  
	   It	   was	   at	   this	   juncture	   that	   Mexican	   private	   capital	   took	   its	   first	   political	  
initiative	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   national	   computer	   policy.
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   On	   October	   15,	   1984	  
ANFABI––the	  National	  Association	  of	  Manufacturers	  of	  Informatics	  Goods––which	  at	  
the	   time	   included	   Apple	   and	   H–P	   because	   they	   were	   minority	   partners	   in	   joint	  
ventures,	  publicly	  demanded	  that	  the	  programme	  be	  made	  official	  by	  its	  publication	  in	  
the	  Official	  Diary.
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  ANFABI	  argued	  from	  the	  programme's	  successes	  with	  regard	  to	  
investments,	  production,	  employment,	  and	  exports.	  
	   Initially	  it	  appeared	  that	  Warman	  and	  ANFABI	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  stopping	  
IBM's	  proposal.	  	  On	  January	  18,	  1985	  the	  National	  Commission	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  
unanimously	  rejected	  IBM's	  proposal.	  	  A	  month	  later	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	  Industrial	  
Development,	  Mauricio	  de	  María	  y	  Campos	  (Warman's	  superior)	  gave	  the	  reasons	  for	  
the	  Commission's	  decision.	  	  He	  cited	  the	  facts	  that	  the	  proposed	  investment	  was	  small,	  
entailed	  100%	  ownership,	  and	  noted	  that	  the	  project	  would	  create	  a	  negative	  trade	  
balance	  because	  it	  relied	  on	  imported	  components.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  industry	  already	  
had	  a	  good	  number	  of	  manufacturers.
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   In	  March	  1985	  IBM	  agreed	  to	  modify	  its	  proposal	  and	  renegotiate.	  	  IBM	  based	  
its	  argument	  for	  a	  wholly–owned	  subsidiary	  that	  was	  free	  to	  source	  components	  as	  it	  
wished	  on	  the	  government's	  objective	  of	  a	  competitive	  industry	  that	  could	  generate	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  Miguel	  A.	  Rivera,	  "Negociaciones	  ocultas	  entre	  funcionarios	  de	  IBM	  y	  UNAM",	  La	  Jornada,	  
México,	  December	  13,	  1984.	  p.	  7.	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  Though	  it	  seems	  remarkable	  on	  the	  surface	  that	  this	  was	  Mexican	  private	  capital's	  first	  
political	   initiative,	   it	  must	  be	   remembered	   that	  only	   two	   years	  previously	   there	  were	  no	  
significant	  Mexican	  computer	  manufacturers.	  	  ANFABI	  itself	  was	  a	  very	  new	  organisation.	  
311
	  	  Informatica,	  No.	  101,	  November	  1984.	  p.	  34.	  
312	  	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  January	  19,	  1985,	  p.	  1;	  The	  Times.	  (London)	  January	  21,	  1985;	  and	  La	  
Jornada.(México)	  February	  8,	  1985,	  p.	  9.	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foreign	  exchange.	  	  IBM	  argued	  that	  it	  could	  only	  export	  products	  that	  were	  of	  the	  
highest	   quality	   at	   a	   competitive	   price.	   	   IBM	   noted	   that	   insufficient	   component	  
suppliers	   existed	   in	  México	   for	   the	   company	   to	   meet	   both	   the	   local	   integration	  
commitments	  and	  a	  high	  level	  of	  exports.	  	  The	  company	  also	  was	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  
that,	  in	  fact,	  the	  government's	  official	  policy	  was	  to	  promote	  foreign	  investment	  in	  
microcomputers;	  not	  to	  restrict	  it.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  IBM	  put	  its	  finger	  on	  source	  of	  the	  
conflict	  existing	  within	  SECOFI	  concerning	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Mexican	  computer	  
industry,	  and	  underlined	  the	  political	  and	  legal	  weakness	  of	  the	  1981	  programme.	  José	  
Warman	  recognised	  IBM’s	  tactics.	  “They	  play	  one	  government	  department	  [Industrial	  
Development,	  Foreign	  Investment,	  Commerce]	  off	  against	  the	  other.”313	  	  
	   In	  June	  1985	  Adolfo	  Hegewisch	  announced	  to	  the	  press	  that	  negotiations	  with	  
IBM	  were	   advancing,	   but	   noted	   that	   the	   price	   of	   the	   computers	   in	   the	   domestic	  
market	  was	  now	  the	  sticking	  point.
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   ANFABI	  then	  took	  out	  full-­‐page	  announcements	  in	  several	  leading	  México	  City	  
newspapers.
315	   	  The	  announcements	  demanded	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	   industrial	  
development	   programme,	   highlighting	   the	   results	   of	   recent	   years.	   	   	   The	  
announcements	  appeared	  on	  the	  same	  day	  that	  President	  De	  la	  Madrid	  returned	  from	  
a	  tour	  of	  Western	  Europe.	  
	   De	  la	  Madrid	  returned	  to	  give	  an	  important	  speech	  in	  Guadalajara	  in	  July	  1985.	  	  
In	  this	  speech	  the	  Mexican	  president	  underlined	  his	  administration's	  commitment	  to	  
the	  further	  liberalization	  of	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  and	  emphasized	  again	  the	  positive	  
role	  for	  foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  Mexican	  economy.	  	  However,	  the	  TNCs	  and	  the	  U.S.	  
government	  wanted	  more	  than	  words;	  they	  wanted	  action.	  
	   It	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Schultz	  brought	  pressure	  to	  
bear	  on	  De	  la	  Madrid	  concerning	  the	  Mexican	  government's	  decision	  regarding	  IBM's	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  Author	  interview,	  March	  1987.	  In	  a	  later	  interview,	  Warman	  also	  recognized	  that	  it	  was	  
only	  a	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  IBM	  would	  get	  what	  it	  wanted.	  He	  noted	  ruefully,	  “Have	  the	  
Marines	  ever	  been	  stopped	  by	  Decree?”	  (Author	  interview,	  June	  1987.)	  
314	  	  La	  Jornada.	  June	  16,	  1985,	  p.	  1.	  
315	  	  See	  for	  example,	  Excelsior.	  June	  24,	  1985,	  p.	  16–A.	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proposed	  investment	  in	  their	  face–to–face	  meeting	  on	  July	  22,	  1985.	  	  The	  exact	  nature	  
of	  that	  pressure	  is	  known	  only	  to	  those	  two	  men.	  	  What	  is	  known	  is	  that	  the	  IBM	  
decision	   was	   on	   the	   agenda	   and	   two	   days	   after	   their	   meeting,	   the	   Mexican	  
government	   accepted	   IBM's	   proposal	   along	   with	   several	   other	   proposed	   foreign	  
investment	  projects.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  IBM	  decision	  never	  returned	  to	  the	  National	  
Commission	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  for	  consideration.	  	  Ricardo	  Zermeño	  explained:	  
	  
	  	   “The	  National	  Commission	  on	  Foreign	  Investment	  had	  rejected	  the	  
IBM	   proposal	   unanimously	   in	   December	   1985.	   All	   eight	   ministers	  
rejected	   it.	   Hegewisch	   was	   unable	   to	   lobby	   the	   eight	   ministers	  
successfully	  so	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  directly	  by	  Hegewisch	  with	  the	  
backing	   of	   President	   De	   la	   Madrid.	   It	   didn’t	   go	   back	   through	   the	  
Commission.”316	  	  
It	  is	  likely	  this	  did	  not	  disconcert	  members	  of	  the	  Commission;	  more	  likely,	  they	  were	  
relieved	  at	  not	  having	  to	  take	  the	  decision	  themselves.	  	  	  
	   Certainly	  México's	  need	  for	  new	  credit,	  and	  the	  sharp	  decline	  in	  oil	  prices	  made	  
the	  government	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  U.S.	  pressure	  at	  this	  time.	  	  Some	  observers	  
have	  noted	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  conditioned	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  bilateral	  commercial	  
treaty	  with	  México	  on	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  restrictions	  on	  foreign	  investment	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  microcomputers.
317	  	  Equally	  important,	  however,	  was	  De	  la	  Madrid's	  on–going	  
desire	  to	  encourage	  foreign	  investment	  without	  alienating	  the	  trade	  unions,	  public	  
sector	  bureaucracy,	  and	  nationalist	   forces	   in	   the	  country.	   	  To	  accomplish	   this	   the	  
Mexican	  government	  needed	  to	  signal	  a	  greater	  opening	  to	  foreign	  investors	  while	  
being	  seen	  to	  drive	  a	  very	  hard	  bargain	  with	  them.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  IBM,	  De	  la	  Madrid	  
succeeded	  in	  both	  objectives.	  
	   On	   July	   24,	   1985,	   IBM's	   "modified	   proposal"	   was	   approved	  whereby	   IBM	  
agreed	  to	  export	  92%	  of	  the	  603,000	  personal	  computers	  the	  company	  would	  produce	  
in	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  production.	  	  Proposed	  total	  investment	  in	  the	  operation	  was	  
reported	  in	  the	  press	  as	  $91	  million,	  up	  dramatically	  from	  the	  original	  proposal	  of	  $6.6	  
                                                
316	  Author	  interview,	  May	  1987.	  
317	  	  Montoya	  claims	  this	  in	  his	  PhD	  dissertation.	  	  Alberto	  Montoya,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  257.	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million.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  the	  company	  was	  going	  to	  invest	  such	  a	  large	  
sum	   in	  México,	  given	  the	  moderate	  nature	  of	   the	  plant	  modifications	  required	  to	  
produce	  the	  microcomputers.	  	  IBM	  promised	  to	  set	  up	  a	  research	  and	  development	  
centre	  for	  semiconductors	  and	  education	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  computer	  science.	  	  Even	  
if	   these	   investments	  are	   included	   in	   the	   total––which	   they	   surely	  must	  be––total	  
investment	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  $91	  million.	  	  In	  reality,	  IBM	  would	  spend	  $6.6	  million	  
expanding	  its	  plant	  (as	  proposed	  originally),	  $11	  million	  on	  the	  semiconductor	  facility,	  
and	  $3	  million	  on	  supplier	  development.
318
	  
	   The	  total	  investment	  figure	  was	  thus	  extremely	  exaggerated	  in	  the	  press.	  	  Once	  
again,	  the	  rushed	  nature	  of	  the	  decision	  is	  partly	  to	  blame	  for	  this.	  	  Industry	  sources	  
indicate	  that	  many	  in	  IBM	  were	  surprised	  by	  the	  announcement,	  implying	  that	  the	  
government	  agreed	  to	  no	  specific	  proposal	  of	  IBM's,	  and	  released	  exaggerated	  figures	  
prematurely	  in	  order	  to	  impress	  public	  opinion.	  Zermeño	  noted,	  “The	  numbers	  were	  
manipulated	  and	  released	  in	  a	  hurry.”319	  Indeed,	  the	  press	  worldwide	  remarked	  on	  the	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  Figures	  from	  SECOFI,	  Dirección	  de	  la	  Industria	  Electrónica. 
319	  Author	  interview	  with	  Ricardo	  Zermeño,	  June	  1987.	  
320
	  	  See	  for	  example	  The	  Times.	  July	  30,	  1985.	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TABLE	  7.6	  
Comparison	  of	  IBM	  Proposals	  
	   	   	   	   	  	  Original	   	  	  	  	  Announced	  	  	  	  	  Agreed/Actual	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Foreign	  ownership	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  100%	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100%	   	   	  	  	  100%	  
	  
Production	  (5	  yrs)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  603,000	   	  	  	  	  	  603,000	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agreed	  603,000/	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  '86	  actual	  3400*	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  prod'n	  shifted	  to	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  PS/2	  in	  1987	  
	  
Exports	  (%	  of	  output)	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92%	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92%	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  export	  2x	  import^/	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  no	  exports	  prior	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  to	  1988	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Local	  content	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35–50%	  after	  4	  yrs	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  51–82%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51–82%/	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25%	  in	  1986^	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  fell	  in	  1987	  with	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  PS/2	  intro^	  	  	  
	  
Market	  share	  limit	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  –––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agreed	  33%/	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4%	  actual	  1986*	  
	  
Price	  differential	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  –––	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  agreed	  15%/	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40–75%	  actual**	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Investment	  (US$	  mil)	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  6.6	   	   	   91	   	   	  	  	  	  	  25–40	  
	  	  Plant	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  6.6	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6.6^^	  
	  	  Semiconductor	  Fac'ty	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  –––	  	  	   }	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  11.0^^	  
	  	  Supplier	  Devt	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  –––	   	   }	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3.0^^	  
	  	  Other	  R	  &	  D	   	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  –––	   	   }	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.0@	  
	  
Sources:	  	  	  
Figures	  on	  original	  and	  announced	  proposals	  from	  David	  Gardner,	  "México	  Opens	  Door	  to	  
IBM,"	  Financial	  Times,	  July	  25,	  1985,	  p.	  40–e.	  
*Infocom,	  The	  Mexican	  Market	  of	  Microcomputers,	  (México	  D.F.:	  	  Infocom,	  1987).	  
^Author	  interviews	  with	  IBM	  de	  México,	  May	  1987.	  
**Margaret	  Miller,	  "High	  Technology	  Transfer:	  	  The	  Mexican	  Computer	  Electronics	  Industry,"	  
unpublished	  BA	  Honours	  Thesis	   in	  Economics,	  Stanford	  University,	  June	  1986;	  and	  author	  
observations.	  
^^Author	  interviews	  with	  Office	  of	  Electronics	  Industry,	  SECOFI,	  June	  1987.	  
@Author	  interviews	  revealed	  that	  IBM	  spends	  5%	  of	  sales	  on	  local	  R&D,	  which	  in	  1986	  would	  
have	  been	  $8.8	  million.	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  generous	  to	  add	  this	  to	  the	  $14	  million	  committed	  to	  the	  
semiconductor	  facility	  and	  supplier	  development.	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   Furthermore,	   IBM's	   actual	   performance	   in	   the	   first	   two	   years	   after	   the	  
agreement	  nowhere	  approached	  the	  announced	  agreement.	  	  The	  company	  produced	  
no	  micros	  in	  1985,	  3,400	  in	  1986,	  and	  then	  shifted	  production	  to	  its	  new	  Personal	  
System/2	  in	  March	  1987	  thereby	  slowing	  production	  just	  after	  it	  had	  started.	  	  Thus	  
after	  eighteen	  months	  of	  its	  five–year	  agreement,	  IBM	  had	  produced	  barely	  5,000	  of	  
the	  603,000	  promised	  microcomputers.	  	  With	  regard	  to	  exports,	  the	  company	  agreed	  
to	  export	   twice	  the	  value	  of	   its	   imports	   into	  México.	   	  However,	  company	  officials	  
admitted	   in	   interviews	   that	   there	   would	   be	   no	   exports	   of	   microcomputers	   until	  
1988.321	  	  Actual	  performance	  with	  respect	  to	  local	  content	  was	  much	  worse	  even	  than	  
the	  company's	  original	  proposal.	  	  Moreover,	  when	  the	  company	  switched	  production	  
to	  the	  PS/2	  local	  content	  fell	  further.	  	  Finally,	  IBM	  did	  not	  keep	  to	  its	  commitment	  with	  
respect	   to	   pricing.	   	   The	   PC	   was	   introduced	   at	   a	   price	   75	   percent	   greater	   than	  
comparable	  U.S.	  prices.	  	  Competition	  drove	  the	  price	  down,	  but	  in	  1987	  prices	  were	  
still	  some	  40	  percent	  above	  U.S.	  price.	  	  	  
	   Clearly	   then,	   the	   announced	   agreement	   was	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   Mexican	  
nationalists.	  	  De	  la	  Madrid	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  drive	  a	  hard	  bargain	  with	  IBM.	  	  However,	  
the	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  announced	  agreement	  was	  grossly	  exaggerated	  and	  IBM	  has	  no	  
intention	   of	   complying.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   government	   would	   appear	   to	   have	   little	  
intention	  of	  strictly	  enforcing	  the	  agreement.	  
	   The	  IBM	  decision	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  México.	  	  
Immediately	   after	   the	   announcement	   of	   IBM's	   plans	   to	   enter	   the	   Mexican	  
microcomputer	  market,	  several	  proposed	  investments	  in	  the	  industry	  were	  cancelled	  
and	  others	  were	  considerably	  reduced.	  	  Warman	  himself	  acknowledged	  this	  fact:	  “I	  
know	  of	  investments	  that	  were	  decided	  and	  agreed	  but	  then	  were	  backed	  away	  from	  
after	  the	  [IBM]	  decision.”322	  At	  least	  two	  factors	  were	  at	  work	  here:	  fear	  of	  IBM	  market	  
dominance,	  and	  more	  significantly,	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  regulatory	  environment:	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what	  was	  now	  the	  government's	  policy	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  industry?	  “The	  issue	  is	  not	  
whether	  IBM	  is	  in	  or	  out.	  The	  issue	  is:	  do	  we	  have	  a	  policy?”323	  
	   After	  the	  IBM	  decision,	  Hewlett–Packard	  and	  Apple	  both	  moved	  to	  buy	  out	  
their	  joint–venture	  partners.	  	  The	  "price"	  for	  100%	  ownership	  in	  microcomputers,	  as	  it	  
was	  with	  IBM,	  was	  greater	  exports.	  	  H–P	  and	  Apple	  committed	  to	  exporting	  twice	  the	  
value	  of	  their	  imports	  in	  this	  product	  range.	  	  	  
	   H–P	  and	  Apple	  both	  indicated	  that	  the	  only	  compelling	  reason	  for	  the	  joint	  
ventures	  in	  the	  first	  place	  was	  the	  government's	  insistence	  upon	  minority	  investment	  
as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  participation	  in	  the	  market.	  	  Industry	  observers	  understood	  the	  
joint	  ventures	  as	  a	  rational	  strategy	  under	  the	  circumstances	  pertaining	  prior	  to	  the	  
IBM	  decision:	  “H-­‐P	  and	  Apple	  moved	  cautiously	  and	  took	  positions	  in	  the	  market	  via	  
joint	  ventures.	  They	  didn’t	  invest	  seriously;	  this	  was	  more	  of	  a	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	  attitude.	  If	  
the	  policy	  sticks,	  they’re	  in.	  If	  not,	  they’ll	  have	  a	  head	  start	  in	  the	  market.”324	  	  
However,	  the	  joint	  ventures	  were	  not	  working	  well	  in	  microcomputers.	  	  The	  
local	  partners	  were	  interested,	  naturally,	  in	  profits	  from	  the	  venture.	  	  The	  TNCs,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  recognized	  that	  the	  market	  for	  micros	  was	  growing	  more	  competitive	  and	  
less	  profitable,	  and	  were	  content	  to	  use	  micros	  as	  a	  "loss	   leader"––that	   is	  to	   lose	  
money	  in	  this	  segment	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  other	  products	  (which	  were	  not	  part	  of	  the	  joint	  
venture).	   	   This	   coupled	  with	   the	   need	   for	   quick	   decision–making	   in	   the	   dynamic	  
microcomputer	  market	   encouraged	   the	   two	   companies	   to	   end	   the	   joint	   venture	  
arrangements	  within	  a	  year	  after	  IBM's	  victory.	  
	   Unisys	  (the	  company	  formed	  from	  the	  merger	  of	  Burroughs	  and	  Sperry	  in	  1986)	  
maintained	  its	  joint	  venture	  in	  microcomputers	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  despite	  the	  
shift	  in	  policy.	  	  Firstly,	  the	  joint	  venture	  company,	  Compubur,	  operated	  at	  the	  high	  end	  
of	  the	  microcomputer	  market,	  assembling	  multi–user	  micros.	   	  The	  market	  for	  this	  
equipment	  was	  less	  dynamic	  than	  for	  16–bit	  micros	  at	  the	  time	  and	  therefore	  the	  
need	   for	   rapid	   decision–making	   was	   not	   as	   acute.	   	   Further,	   the	   local	   partners,	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Banamex	  (24.9%)	  and	  CCI
325
	  (26.1%)	  provided	  considerable	  political	  support,	  financing	  
opportunities	   and	  good	   local	   connections,	   leaving	   the	  day–to–day	   running	  of	   the	  
company	  to	  Unisys	  (49%).	  
	   It	  is	  instructive	  at	  this	  point	  to	  contrast	  the	  approach	  IBM	  took	  in	  México	  with	  
that	  taken	  in	  Brazil.	  In	  both	  cases,	  IBM	  openly	  tested	  the	  policy.	  In	  Brazil,	  IBM	  first	  
ignored	  the	  minicomputer	  reserve	  and	  began	  manufacturing	  its	  own	  minicomputer	  in	  
country	   while	   enlisting	   market	   support	   for	   the	   product.	   After	   losing	   this	   initial	  
skirmish,	  IBM	  tested	  the	  policy	  successfully	  at	  the	  margins	  on	  two	  other	  occasions:	  
receiving	  approval	  first	  to	  manufacture	  its	  small	  mainframe	  computer	  in	  country,	  and	  
secondly,	  to	  establish	  a	  joint	  venture	  with	  Gerdau	  to	  provide	  data	  processing	  services	  
on	   IBM	  equipment.	   In	  México,	   IBM	  again	  openly	  tested	  the	  policy	  by	  proposing	  a	  
wholly	  owned	  microcomputer	  plant	  in	  direct	  contradiction	  of	  the	  policy	  guidelines	  
allowing	  only	  minority	  foreign	  ownership.	  While	  initially	  rebuffed,	  IBM	  ultimately	  got	  
what	  it	  wanted.	  In	  both	  the	  Brazilian	  and	  Mexican	  cases,	  IBM	  was	  prepared	  to	  offer	  
greater	  investment	  and	  export	  commitments	  in	  exchange	  for	  production	  and	  supply	  
chain	  autonomy.	  
The	   main	   difference	   in	   the	   two	   cases	   was	   IBM’s	   recruitment	   of	   the	   US	  
government	   to	   actively	   support	   the	   firm	   in	   fighting	   the	   policy	   in	   México.	  
Understanding	  the	  gap	  that	  had	  opened	  between	  those	  who	  had	  written	  and	  were	  
seeking	  to	  enforce	  the	  restrictive	  Mexican	  policy	  guidelines	  and	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  
Mexican	   president	   and	   his	   senior	  ministers	   and	   the	   vulnerability	   of	   the	  Mexican	  
economy	  at	   the	   time,	   IBM’s	  offer	  of	   increased	   investment	  and	  exports	  may	  have	  
succeeded	   without	   American	   political	   pressure.	   The	   political	   pressure	   from	   its	  
northern	  neighbour	  in	  all	  likelihood	  simply	  hastened	  the	  decision	  rather	  than	  altering	  
it.	  	  
	   After	  the	  approval	  of	  IBM's	  proposal,	  José	  Warman's	  position	  as	  Director	  of	  
Electronics	  Industrial	  Coordination	  became	  untenable.	  	  The	  policy	  he	  had	  formulated,	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implemented	  and	  defended	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  policy	  in	  force.	  	  So	  Warman	  stepped	  
down	  as	  Director	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1985	  and	  a	  year	  later	  started	  the	  Centre	  of	  Electronics	  
and	  Informatics	  Technology	  (Centro	  de	  Tecnología	  Electrónica	  e	  Informática	  or	  CETEI).	  	  
CETEI	  was	  co–funded	  by	  UNAM	  and	  the	  National	  Chamber	  of	   the	  Electronics	  and	  
Electrical	  Communications	  Industries	  (CANIECE)	  and	  seeks	  to	  support	  the	  development	  
of	  technology	  bringing	  together	  industry	  needs	  and	  university	  talent	  to	  pool	  and	  focus	  
the	  technological	  resources	  in	  the	  country.	   	  Thus,	  Warman	  remained	  active	  in	  the	  
sector,	  taking	  up	  one	  of	  the	  original	  objectives	  of	  the	  policy:	   	  the	  development	  of	  
indigenous	  technological	  capability.	  
	   Ricardo	  Zermeño	  succeeded	  Warman	  in	  SECOFI,	  and	  remained	  the	  Director	  of	  
Electronics	  Industrial	  Coordination	  until	  the	  change	  of	  presidential	  administrations.	  	  
The	  policy	  guidelines	  were	  considerably	  weakened	  and	  evolved	  further	  following	  the	  
IBM	  decision.	  	  As	  one	  TNC	  representative	  put	  it,	  "You	  drop	  one	  rule	  (the	  most	  debated	  
one)	  and	  the	  others	  appear	   less	   rigid."	   	  The	  results	  can	  be	  seen	  either	  as	  greater	  
flexibility,	  in	  that	  each	  company	  negotiates	  its	  own	  agreement	  with	  SECOFI,	  or	  greater	  
confusion.	  	  Even	  the	  transnational	  computer	  firms	  that	  stood	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  policy	  
shift	  expressed	  consternation.	  A	  Unisys	  official’s	  comment	  was	  typical:	  	  
“Everyone	  has	  a	  different	  package	  now.	  We	  need	   to	  keep	   in	  close	  
contact	   with	   government	   officials	   so	   there	   are	   no	   surprises.	   The	  
previous	   dogmas	   have	   been	   diluted.	   There	   is	   no	   consistency	   in	  
enforcement	   now.	   At	   least	   with	   Warman	   you	   had	   a	   consistent	  
policy.”326	  	  
Some	  were	  more	  scathing	  of	  the	  seemingly	  abrupt	  shift	  in	  policy:	  “You	  have	  to	  have	  
patience	  to	  endure	  stupidity.	  The	  government	  should	  have	  warned	  the	  market	  that	  
this	  [change	  in	  policy	  emphasis]	  was	  coming.”327	  
Nevertheless,	  Zermeño	  was	  successful	  in	  imposing	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  the	  other	  
major	  requirements	  stipulated	  in	  the	  guidelines,	  employing	  a	  less	  confrontational	  style	  
than	  his	  predecessor.	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   However,	  industry	  participants	  perceived	  a	  discontinuity	  in	  the	  way	  policy	  was	  
enforced.	  	  For	  locally–owned	  manufacturers,	  export	  requirements	  were	  not	  pressed,	  
while	   local	   content	   requirements	   were.	   	   With	   the	   transnationals,	   pressure	   was	  
extremely	   strong	   to	   meet	   export	   commitments.	   	   In	   fact	   some	   TNCs	   reported	  
purchasing	  non–electronic	  goods	   locally	  and	  exporting	   them	  to	  comply	  with	   their	  
export	  commitments:	  “In	  1985-­‐86	  we	  had	  to	  buy	  coffee	  and	  honey	  to	  export	  in	  order	  
to	  meet	  export	  earnings	  requirements.”328	  
	   The	   case	   of	   Apple	   Computer	   indicates	   the	   extent	   that	   the	   government	   of	  
México	  was	  willing	  to	  go	  to	  improve	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  The	  case	  also	  
reveals	   a	   remarkable	   naïveté	   on	   the	   part	   of	   this	   (at	   that	   time)	   young	   computer	  
transnational	  in	  signing	  agreements	  with	  which	  it	  had	  no	  chance	  of	  complying.	  	  In	  a	  
surprising	  turn	  of	  events,	  Apple	  was	  forced	  to	  shut	  down	  its	  Mexican	  operations	  in	  
early	  1988,	  unable	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  agreements	  the	  company	  had	  negotiated	  with	  
Zermeño’s	  office.	  	  Apple	  had	  been	  importing	  into	  México	  a	  value	  roughly	  two	  to	  three	  
times	  what	  it	  exported	  up	  until	  1987.	  	  The	  company	  then	  agreed	  to	  export	  twice	  the	  
value	  of	  its	  imports	  as	  a	  precondition	  to	  attaining	  100%	  ownership	  of	  the	  Mexican	  
operation.	   	   Later	   that	  year,	  Apple	  obtained	  permission	   to	   import	   fully–assembled	  
MacIntosh	  microcomputers	  from	  its	  automated	  U.S.	  plant.	  	  In	  return	  for	  the	  right	  to	  
import	  these	  micros	  (contrary	  to	  the	  written	  guidelines)	  Apple	  agreed	  to	  export	  three	  
times	  the	  value	  of	  these	  imports.	  	  In	  granting	  permission	  for	  the	  import	  of	  finished	  
micros,	  the	  government	  again	  relaxed	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  decree	   in	  order	  to	  
obtain	  greater	  export	  commitments.	  	  When	  IBM	  shifted	  to	  the	  PS/2	  product	  range	  in	  
March	  1987	  the	  company	  also	  received	  permission	  to	  import	  two	  of	  the	  four	  micros	  in	  
the	  range	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  same	  export	  commitment:	  	  three–to–one.	  	  Unlike	  IBM	  
and	  H–P,	  which	  could	  generate	  export	  earnings	  over	  a	  much	  broader	  product	  range,	  
Apple's	  product	  line	  was	  limited	  to	  micros.	  	  Apple	  was	  thus	  simply	  unable	  to	  meet	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  with	  multi-­‐national	  manager,	  April	  1987.	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these	  export	  commitments.	  	  After	  several	  warnings,	  the	  borders	  were	  closed	  to	  the	  
company	  and	  the	  subsidiary	  was	  closed.	  	  	  	  	  
	   In	   effect,	   the	   policy	   emphasis	   shifted	   from	   the	   development	   of	   a	   local	  
computer	  electronics	  industry	  to	  the	  development	  of	  México	  as	  an	  electronics	  export	  
base.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  policy	  better	  reflected	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  
also	  took	  better	  account	  of	  the	  country's	  limitations	  and	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  the	  
sector.	  	  But	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  two	  of	  the	  four	  original	  policy	  objectives––the	  
development	  of	  local	  technological	  capability	  and	  Mexican	  component	  suppliers––the	  
policy	  shift	  had	  negative	  consequences	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  8	  
IMPACT	  OF	  THE	  POLICY	  
	   Having	  described	  the	  general	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  and	  the	  evolution	  
of	  México’s	  computer	  policy,	  it	  is	  possible	  now	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  policy	  
guidelines	   in	   the	   1980s.	   	   It	   should	   be	   remembered	   that	   while	   the	   policy	   was	  
formulated	   during	   the	   period	   of	   the	   oil	   boom	   in	   México,	   initial	   attempts	   at	   its	  
implementation	  were	  made	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  worst	  economic	  crisis	  in	  México's	  
recent	  history.	  
	   This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  industry	  and	  its	  
market	  at	  the	  time.	  It	  takes	  a	  broad	  look	  at	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  industry	  in	  order	  to	  
define	  terms,	  measure	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  discuss	  competition	  in	  the	  
industry.	   	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  more	  specific	  evaluation	  of	  the	   impact	  of	  the	  
computer	  policy	  guidelines	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  original	  objectives.	  
Product	  Segments	  
	   Four	   product	   segments	  were	   addressed	  by	   the	   computer	   decree	  of	   1981:	  	  
mainframe	  computers,	  minicomputers,	  microcomputers,	  and	  peripheral	  equipment.	  	  
In	  the	  original	  guidelines,	  the	  different	  computer	  segments	  were	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  
memory	   size,	   processing	   speed,	   and	   price.
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   However,	   because	   the	   technology	  
developed	   so	   rapidly,	  many	   of	   the	   distinctions	   of	   1981	  were	   eclipsed,	   especially	  
concerning	  the	  distinction	  between	  mini-­‐computers	  and	  microcomputers.	  	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  these	  four	  product	  segments	  addressed	  by	  the	  policy,	  there	  are	  
several	  other	  related	  industries	  that	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  because	  they	  are	  integral	  to	  
the	  entire	  computer	  electronics	  complex.	  	  Further	  back	  in	  the	  industry	  chain	  is	  the	  
main	  technological	  component	  of	  computers,	  which	  is	  an	  industry	  in	  its	  own	  right;	  
namely,	  the	  microelectronics	  industry.	  	  Forward	  from	  the	  equipment	  industry	  is	  the	  
large	  computer	  maintenance	  and	  services	  industry.	  	  Included	  here	  are	  all	  the	  data	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  SEPAFIN,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  pp.	  23–30.	  	  Micros	  for	  example	  were	  defined	  as	  having	  a	  word	  length	  of	  
4	  to	  16	  bits,	  central	  memory	  of	  not	  more	  than	  64k	  bytes,	  and	  a	  selling	  price	  of	  between	  $300	  
and	  $20,000.	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processing	   bureaux.	   	   Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   software	   industry,	  which	   together	  with	  
microelectronics,	  was	  the	  dynamic	  heart	  of	  technological	  innovations	  in	  the	  field.	  
Market	  Evolution	  
	   As	  noted	  earlier,	  the	  Mexican	  market	  was	  supplied	  almost	  entirely	  by	  imports	  
from	   abroad	   until	   1982.	   	   The	  mainframe	  market	   continued	   to	   be	   supplied	   solely	  
through	  imports.	  	  A	  few	  manufacturers	  such	  as	  NCR	  began	  assembling	  minicomputers	  
in	  the	   late	  1970s	  with	  minimal	   local	  content.	   	  And	  by	  1982	  several	  more	  foreign–
owned	  companies	  set	  up	  minicomputer	  assembly	  operations.	  	  	  
	   The	  first	  microcomputers	  were	  introduced	  in	  México	  in	  1978	  through	  a	  few	  
distributors	  of	  Apple	  and	  Tandy,	  who	  imported	  finished	  product	  and	  subassemblies	  
until	  1982	  when	  the	  borders	  were	  closed	  and	  SEPAFIN's	  policy	  went	  into	  effect.	  	  An	  
aggregate	  total	  of	  13,000	  micros	  were	  imported	  in	  these	  four	  years:	  	  Apple	  importing	  
10,000	  and	  Tandy	  3,000.	  	  In	  1982	  when	  the	  government	  imposed	  import	  restrictions,	  
these	  local	  distributors	  of	  Apple	  and	  Tandy	  equipment	  closed	  their	  operations,	  and	  the	  
first	  breed	  of	  local	  vendors	  started	  assembly	  lines	  with	  minimal	  local	  content.	  	  Most	  of	  
these	  local	  vendors	  established	  licensing	  or	  component	  purchase	  agreements
330	  with	  
foreign	  microcomputer	  manufacturers.	  
	   1984	  saw	  the	  first	  major	  foreign	  vendors	  investing	  in	  Mexican	  microcomputer	  
operations.	  	  Apple	  and	  Hewlett–Packard	  took	  minority	  positions	  in	  joint–ventures	  to	  
manufacture	  microcomputers	  in	  México	  according	  to	  the	  computer	  decree.	  	  A	  year	  
later	  Olivetti,	   Burroughs,	  NCR,	  AT&T,	   and	  Tandy	   followed	   them	   into	   the	  Mexican	  
microcomputer	  industry.	  	  Finally,	  in	  1986	  IBM	  PCs	  and	  a	  host	  of	  Asian	  PC	  clones	  came	  
in	   through	   local	  assembly	   lines.	   	  The	  entry	  of	   these	   foreign	  computer	  giants	  gave	  
strong	  impetus	  to	  growth	  in	  the	  microcomputer	  market	  while	  the	  entry	  of	  the	  Asian	  
clones	  exerted	  downward	  pressure	  on	  prices	  in	  the	  market.	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  These	  agreements	  were	  typical	  forms	  of	  "technology	  transfer"	  in	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  
industry.	  	  In	  exchange	  for	  assistance	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  assembly	  and	  testing	  operations	  and	  
exclusive	  local	  marketing	  rights,	  the	  national	  company	  would	  commit	  to	  purchasing	  certain	  
essential	  components	  exclusively	  from	  the	  foreign	  technology	  provider.	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Market	  Size	  
	   In	   comparison	   with	   the	   total	   world	   market	   for	   computer	   equipment	   and	  
services,	   the	  Mexican	  market	  was	   small.	   	   In	  every	  product	   segment,	   the	  Mexican	  
market	  was	  substantially	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  world	  market.	  	  	  
TABLE	  8.1	  
1986	  Computer	  Market	  Size	  ($	  Millions)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   México	   	   	  World	  
Mainframes	  and	  Minicomputers*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   $400	   	  	  	  	  	   	   $	  56,500	  
Microcomputers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  111	   	   	  	   	  	  	  24,125	  
Software,	  Maintenance,	  &	  Services	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  220	   	   	  	   	  	  	  60,875	  
Peripherals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  40	   	   	  	   	  	  	  59,750	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   ======	  	  	  	  	  	   	   ========	  
TOTAL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  $771	   	  	  	  	  	   	   $201,250	  
	  
*	  Includes	  imports	  direct	  to	  users	  
Sources:	  	  Infocom	  estimates;	  Datamation	  
	  
However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  size	  of	  the	  market	  that	  primarily	  generated	  interest;	  it	  was	  the	  
prospects	  for	  rapid	  growth.	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1984	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  	  CAGR	  %	  	  
Mainframes	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –8.7	  
Minicomputers	   	   	  	  	  1,098	  	  	  	  	  	  1,119	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1.9	  
Microcomputers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13,921	  	  	  	  	  36,061	  	  	  	  51,336	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92.0	  
Home	  Computers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4,700	  	  	  	  	  36,685	  	  	  40,820	  	  	  	  	  	  192.3	  
	  
        243 
TABLE	  8.2	  (CONT’D)	  
	  
Market	  Growth	  
Revenues	  ($	  Millions)	  
	   	   	   	   	  1981	  	  1982	  	  1983	  	  1984	  	  1985	  	  1986	  	  CAGR	  %	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  83–86	  
Mainframes	  &	  Minis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  364	  	  	  	  262	  	  	  	  	  244	  	  	  	  302	  	  	  	  378	  	  	  	  349	  	  	  	  	  12.7	  
Micros	  &	  Home	  Computers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  	  	  	  117	  	  	  	  111	  	  	  	  	  77.0	  	  
	  
Source:	  	  Infocom	  
	   These	  growth	  prospects	  were	   realized	  only	  at	   the	   low–end	  of	   the	  market.	  	  
Growth	   in	   the	  mini	   and	  mainframe	  markets	  was	  more	  negatively	  affected	  by	   the	  
economic	  crisis.	  	  Border	  restrictions	  severely	  curtailed	  sales	  of	  the	  large	  computers,	  
which	  only	  recovered	  to	  their	  pre–crisis	  levels	  in	  1987.	  	  The	  home	  computer	  market	  
grew	  very	  rapidly;	  however,	  household	  incomes,	  limited	  distribution	  and	  high	  prices	  
slowed	   future	   growth.	   	   Professional	   microcomputers	   were	   the	   most	   attractive	  
segment	  of	  the	  market.	  	  
Competition	  
TABLE	  8.3	  
Total	  Revenues	  of	  Major	  Computer	  Manufacturers	  
($	  Millions)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Ownership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1981	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  	  	  Growth	  81–86	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CAGR	  %	  
IBM	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  178.4	  	  	  	  	  175.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  0.3	  
Unisys	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Foreign*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  59.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.2	  
Hewlett–Packard	  	  	  	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  	  	  11.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   31.8	  
NCR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Foreign*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  42.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  2.9	  
CDC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  	  	  25.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32.2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4.9	  
Honeywell	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  	  	  25.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  –	  1.6	  
Digital	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  11.8	  
Apple	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   100%	  Foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  47.6	  
Printaform**	  	  	  	  	  	   Owner/Manager	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NM	  
Sigma**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Owner/Manager	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NM	  
Mexel**	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Owner/Manager	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  NM	  
	  
*Unisys	  and	  NCR	  own	  49%	  of	  microcomputer	  joint	  ventures;	  while	  their	  other	  operations	  are	  
100%	  owned.	  	  Unisys'	  1981	  sales	  equals	  Burroughs	  and	  Sperry/Univac	  combined	  sales.	  	  	  
**Printaform	  icensed	  technology	  from	  Columbia,	  Sigma	  licensed	  from	  Commodore,	  and	  Mexel	  
licensed	  from	  Televideo.	  	  NM=Not	  meaningful	  
Source:	  	  Infocom	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   Although	  the	  large	  computer	  transnationals	  suffered	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  
economic	  crisis	  and	  import	  restrictions	  of	  1982–85,	  Table	  8.3	  confirms	  their	  continued	  
dominance	  of	  the	  Mexican	  market.	  	  On	  the	  whole,	  the	  transnationals	  still	  controlled	  
some	  85	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  Mexican	  computer	  market	  in	  value	  terms	  in	  1986.	  	  As	  
Table	  8.4	  illustrates,	  the	  TNCs	  had	  no	  Mexican	  rivals	  in	  minicomputers	  or	  mainframes.	  
	   While	  the	  transnationals	  in	  general	  controlled	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market,	  
IBM	  had	  the	  lion's	  share.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  IBM	  dominated	  the	  Mexican	  market	  much	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  it	  dominated	  the	  world	  market.	  	  Although	  IBM	  lost	  market	  share	  after	  
1981	  the	  company	  was	  still	  almost	  three	  times	  larger	  than	  its	  nearest	  competitor	  in	  
the	  Mexican	  market	  in	  1986.	  	  	  
TABLE	  8.4	  
Share	  of	  Installed	  Base	  (December	  1986)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  Minicomputers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Mainframes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Number	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Pct.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Number	  	  	  	  	   Pct.	  
IBM	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   2,014	  	  	  	  	  	   37%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   38%	  
Unisys	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   236	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   195	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   32%	  
Hewlett–Packard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  818	  	  	  	  	  	   	   15%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ––	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   ––	  
NCR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   960	  	  	  	  	  	   	   18%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   44	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7%	  
CDC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   48	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   1%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   11%	  
Honeywell	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   356	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   66	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   11%	  
Digital	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   465	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   9%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1%	  
Others*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   555	  	  	  	  	  	   	   10%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   0%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   =====	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   ====	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   ====	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   ====	  
TOTAL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   5,452	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   100%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   615	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   100%	  
	  
*Others	  include	  Wang,	  Data	  General,	  MAI,	  Prime	  and	  Tandem.	  	  All	  these	  companies	  were	  
100%	  foreign–owned.	  
Source:	  	  Infocom	  
	   The	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  sector	  and	  the	  policy	  guidelines	  had	  
some	  effect	  on	   this	   table	  of	   leading	  computer	  companies.	   	  Of	   the	   transnationals,	  
Hewlett–Packard	  and	  Apple	  experienced	  outstanding	  growth	  largely	  because	  of	  their	  
successful	   early	   entries	   into	   the	   microcomputer	   market.	   	   Secondly,	   notice	   the	  
emergence	  of	  several	  Mexican	  microcomputer	  manufacturers	  that	  licensed	  technology	  
        245 
from	  small	  foreign	  players.	   	  Clearly,	  by	  restricting	  imports	  of	  microcomputers,	  the	  
policy	  guidelines	  helped	  create	  a	  space	  in	  the	  industry	  for	  these	  Mexican	  firms.	  	  	  
	   The	  microcomputer	  market	  warrants	  a	  closer	  look	  now,	  because	  it	  was	  the	  
focus	  of	   the	  policy	  effort	  and	  the	  only	  area	   in	  which	  Mexican	  companies	  had	  any	  
success.	   	  Table	  8.5	  describes	  the	  installed	  base	  of	  microcomputers	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
Apple's	  enormous	  advantage	  here	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  its	  imports	  prior	  to	  1982.	  	  IBM's	  
position	   in	   the	  market	  was	  due	  almost	  entirely	   to	  direct	   imports––many	  of	   them	  
illegal––prior	   to	   1986	  when	   its	   local	   operation	   commenced.	   	   Printaform's	   strong	  
position	  in	  the	  market	  was	  a	  bright	  spot	  not	  only	  for	  the	  company	  but	  for	  the	  Mexican	  
policy–makers	  as	  well.	  	  This	  company's	  success	  during	  this	  period	  is	  discussed	  further	  
below.	  	  	  	  
TABLE	  8.5	  
Microcomputers	  
Share	  of	  Installed	  Base*	  (December	  1986)	  
	  
Apple	  	  	  	  	  	  	   39,870	  (10,000	  of	  which	  were	  imported	  prior	  to	  1982)	  
Printaform	  	   18,700	  
IBM	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   15,000	  (11,600	  imported	  directly	  prior	  to	  1986)	  
Mexel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  9,500	  
Denki	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  8,000	  
H–P	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  7,300	  
	  
*Excludes	  installed	  base	  of	  77,205	  very	  low–priced	  home	  computers	  sold	  by	  Sigma	  under	  
license	  from	  Commodore.	  	  Mexel	  and	  Denki	  licensed	  from	  Televideo	  and	  Corona	  respectively.	  
	  
Source:	  Infocom	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TABLE	  8.6	  
Annual	  Market	  Sales	  of	  Microcomputers	  1986	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Revenues	  ($	  millions)	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Share	  (%)	  
Apple*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   14.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12.6	  
Hewlett–Packard*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   14.0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12.6	  
Printaform	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   13.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12.5	  
IBM*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  9.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  8.6	  
Sigma	  (Commodore)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  9.5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  8.6	  
Mexel	  (Televideo)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  8.8	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  7.9	  
Denki	  (Corona)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  5.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  4.8	  
Micrologica	  Aplicada	  (Onyx)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  4.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  3.7	  
Infosistemas	  (AT&T)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  3.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  3.3	  
Planta	  Industrial	  Digital	  (Altos)	  	  	  	  	   	  	  3.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  3.3	  
18	  others	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   24.4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   22.0	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   =====	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   =====	  
TOTAL	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110.7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   100.0	  
	  
*	  Denotes	  100%	  foreign–owned.	  	  Revenues	  of	  Apple	  and	  H–P	  include	  sales	  of	  laser	  printers.	  	  
Firm	  in	  brackets	  is	  foreign	  licensor.	  
Source:	  	  Infocom	  
	  
	   While	  annual	  sales	  of	  microcomputers	  were	  led	  by	  Apple	  and	  Hewlett–Packard,	  
the	  market	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  fragmented	  one	  with	  no	  company	  claiming	  a	  dominant	  
position.	  	  As	  Table	  8.7	  indicates,	  the	  Mexican	  licensors	  had	  a	  majority	  of	  market	  sales.	  	  	  
As	  a	  sign	  of	  things	  to	  come,	  however,	  that	  majority	  was	  already	  shrinking	  rapidly	  as	  the	  
three	  major	  TNCs––Apple,	  H–P,	  and	  IBM––increased	  their	  share	  of	  the	  market	  after	  
1985.
331	   	   The	  TNCs	  were	  not	  winning	   sales	  by	   selling	  more	   cheaply.	  Rather,	   their	  
success	   was	   attributed	   to	   a	   perception	   of	   more	   up–to–date	   technology,	   better	  
marketing	  and	  stronger	  brand	  recognition.	  	  	  	  	  	  
TABLE	  8.7	  
Shares	  of	  Microcomputer	  Market	  (Revenues)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   1985	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1987*	  
	   Mexican	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   66.9%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61.5%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56.0%	  
	   Foreign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   33.1%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38.5%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44.0%	  
	  
Source:	  	  Calculated	  from	  Infocom	  data.	  *Company	  projections	  edited	  by	  Infocom.	  
                                                
331	  	  This	  trend	  was	  temporarily	  forestalled	  when	  Apple	  was	  forced	  out	  of	  the	  market	  in	  1988.	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Observations	  Concerning	  the	  Mexican	  Microcomputer	  Market	  
	   Microcomputers	  were	  not	  a	  particularly	  profitable	  business	  in	  the	  early	  years	  
of	  the	  sector’s	  development	  due	  to	  the	  tremendous	  pressure	  on	  prices,	  the	  relative	  
lack	  of	  brand	  loyalty	  on	  the	  part	  of	  consumers,	  and	  the	  rapid	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  the	  
market.	  	  Nevertheless,	  large	  players	  like	  IBM	  and	  H-­‐P	  perceived	  the	  vast	  potential	  of	  
the	  market	  and	  committed	  to	  participating.	  	  
	   Because	  of	  the	  pressure	  on	  prices	  and	  the	  rapid	  pace	  of	  technological	  change,	  
two	  factors	  were	  vital	  to	  long-­‐term	  success	  in	  the	  business:	  	  (i)	  financial	  strength	  and	  
(ii)	   large	  scale	  to	  exploit	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  component	  purchasing	  and	  sustain	  
investment	   in	   research	   and	  development.	   	   The	   local	   companies	   lacked	   the	   scale,	  
financial	  resources	  and	  the	  technical	  expertise	  to	  build	  competitive	  advantage.	  	  They	  
remained	  dependent	  upon	  their	  licensors	  (usually	  second–	  or	  third–tier	  international	  
computer	  firms)	  for	  technology	  development.	  	  And	  in	  a	  prolonged	  price	  war	  such	  as	  
was	   experienced	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,	   only	   the	   largest	   companies	  with	   the	   deepest	  
pockets	  would	  remain	  competitive.	  	  Clearly,	  IBM,	  H–P,	  and	  the	  other	  TNCs	  were	  most	  
likely	  to	  dominate	  market	  sales.	  	  The	  local	  assemblers	  with	  a	  small	  capital	  base	  were	  
extremely	  vulnerable.	  
	   The	  market	  manifested	  a	  significant	  division	  with	  the	  TNCs	  serving	  the	  medium	  
and	  large	  business	  customers,	  while	  the	  local	  vendors	  competed	  for	  the	  small	  office	  
and	   home	   markets.	   	   Government	   pressure	   on	   the	   locally–owned	   companies	   to	  
increase	   their	   use	   of	   locally–produced	   components	   which	   tend	   to	   be	   lower–
technology	  only	  reinforced	  this	  division	  in	  the	  market.	  
	   Among	   the	   Mexican	   companies,	   Printaform	   was	   the	   most	   successful.	  	  
Printaform	   was	   a	   well–established	   family–owned	   firm	   selling	   a	   range	   of	   office	  
equipment	  and	  supplies.	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  Asian	  production	  engineers,	  Printaform	  set	  
up	  an	  efficient	  production	  facility	  and	  the	  company	  built	  a	  leadership	  position	  in	  the	  
market	  for	  low–priced	  IBM	  compatibles.	  	  Printaform's	  major	  market	  tended	  to	  be	  the	  
small	  office	  and	  professional	  users.	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   Also	   successful	   among	   the	   Mexican	   firms	   was	   Mexel,	   which	   licensed	  
technology	  from	  the	  U.S.	  company,	  Televideo.	  	  Mexel	  invested	  in	  basic	  component	  
supply.	  In	  1987	  the	  company	  had	  70%	  of	  the	  market	  for	  basic	  terminals	  and	  made	  
power	   supplies	   as	   well.	   	   Mexel’s	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   was	   to	   supply	   the	   major	  
international	  vendors.	  
	   In	  the	  on–going	  shakeout	  of	  the	  market,	  it	  was	  widely	  held	  that	  the	  survivors	  
would	  be	  the	  major	  TNCs,	  Printaform,	  Mexel,	  and	  a	  handful	  of	  other	  players.	  	  Most	  of	  
the	   locally–owned	   vendors	  would	   disappear	   altogether	   or	   be	  merged	   into	   larger	  
groups.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  the	  same	  firms	  that	  dominated	  the	  U.S.	  
market	  would	  increasingly	  dominate	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market.	  
	   One	  final	  observation	  is	  the	  relative	  lack	  of	  IBM	  dominance	  in	  the	  Mexican	  
computer	  market.	   	   To	   be	   sure,	   IBM	  was	   the	   dominant	   force	   here	   as	   elsewhere.	  	  
However,	   its	   share	   of	   minicomputers	   and	   mainframes,	   at	   less	   than	   40%,	   was	  
significantly	   less	   than	   its	   50%	   worldwide	   share	   of	   these	   markets	   at	   that	   time.	  	  
Moreover,	  in	  large	  mainframes,	  Unisys	  outsold	  IBM	  in	  1986	  and	  was	  equal	  to	  Big	  Blue	  
in	  terms	  of	  installed	  base.	  	  In	  microcomputers,	  IBM's	  late	  entry	  and	  high	  price	  meant	  
sales	  far	  below	  expectations.	  	  The	  market	  clearly	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  pay	  significant	  
price	  premiums	  for	  the	  IBM	  name.	  	  Several	  of	  those	  interviewed	  commented	  on	  the	  
lack	  of	  popularity	  of	  IBM	  in	  México	  and	  attributed	  this	  to	  the	  company's	  "arrogance"	  
and	  "lack	  of	  flexibility".	  	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  government	  via	  INEGI	  consciously	  
sought	  to	  reduce	  IBM's	  dominance	  in	  the	  market	  by	  choosing	  an	  alternative	  vendor	  for	  
government	  purchases	  whenever	  possible.	  
	   In	  microcomputers,	  IBM	  made	  what	  many	  regarded	  as	  a	  serious	  mistake	  when	  
the	  company	  introduced	  its	  PC	  at	  prices	  well	  above	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  market.	  	  IBM	  was	  
clearly	  relying	  on	  brand	  loyalty	  and	  reputation;	  however,	  by	  1986	  the	  market	  had	  
already	  learned	  that	  it	  could	  do	  without	  IBM.	  	  As	  Francisco	  Thions,	  the	  president	  of	  
industry	  analyst	  Infocom,	  noted:	  “The	  customer	  had	  time	  to	  lose	  the	  mystical	  concept	  
that	   you	   had	   to	   go	  with	   large	   brand	   name	   vendors.”	   And	   he	   asserted	   that	   local	  
microcomputer	  assembler,	  Televideo,	  were	  selling	  products	  with	  better	  reliability	  and	  
        249 
service	  than	  IBM.332	  Thus,	  IBM's	  first	  year	  sales	  of	  micros	  were	  significantly	  below	  
expectations	  (and	  production	  was	  well	  short	  of	  commitments	  to	  the	  government)	  and	  
the	  company	  proceeded	  to	  reduce	  prices.	  	  Then,	  in	  1987	  the	  company	  discontinued	  
the	  PC	  range	  when	  it	  announced	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Personal	  System/2	  products.	  	  
IBM	  was	  to	  manufacture	  two	  of	  the	  four	  computers	  in	  the	  PS/2	  range	  and	  received	  
permission	  to	  import	  the	  other	  two	  in	  exchange	  for	  increased	  exports.	  	  Alas,	  the	  PS/2,	  
like	  its	  predecessor	  in	  México,	  was	  not	  particularly	  well	  received.	  
Industry	  Summary	  Conclusions	  
	   The	  Mexican	  computer	  market	  was	  small,	  but	  experienced	  rapid	  growth	  due	  to	  
the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  market.	  	  Minicomputer	  and	  mainframe	  sales	  were	  
clearly	  sensitive	  to	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  economy	  (and	  consequent	  import	  restrictions)	  
and	  were	  disappointing	  in	  the	  years	  since	  1981	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  1985).	  	  The	  
industry	  at	  the	  time	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  bi–lateral	  oligopoly	  wherein	  the	  few	  
large	  transnationals	  and	  the	  government	  occupied	  dominant	  positions	  as	  sellers	  and	  
buyer	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  	  	  
	   Microcomputers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  continued	  to	  grow	  strongly	  in	  unit	  terms,	  
though	  due	  to	  the	  price	  war	  in	  1987	  market	  growth	  slowed	  in	  value	  terms.	  	  Unlike	  
mainframes	  and	  minicomputers,	   the	  micro	  segment	  was	   fragmented	  with	  no	  one	  
company	   controlling	   the	   market;	   though	   the	   government	   remained	   the	   largest	  
purchaser	   of	  micros.	   	   A	   great	  many	  Mexican	   firms	   entered	   this	   industry,	   but	   the	  
outlook	  was	  one	  of	  consolidation	  and	  concentration	  with	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Mexican	  
firms	  dropping	  or	  selling	  out.	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  market	  supplied	  by	  a	  few	  transnationals	  
competing	  in	  the	  high	  value–added	  segment	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  a	  few	  Mexican	  firms	  
competing	  for	  the	  commodity	  business	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  
	   The	  1981	  policy	  guidelines	  effectively	  capitalized	  on	  the	  coming	  boom	  in	  the	  
microcomputer	  market,	  but	  they	  came	  just	  a	  few	  years	  too	  late	  to	  have	  a	  clear,	  lasting	  
impact.	   	   Certainly	   they	   gave	   impetus	   to	   growth	   in	   microcomputers	   by	   reducing	  
                                                
332	  Author	  interview,	  March	  1987.	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confusion	  and	  chaos	  in	  the	  marketplace.	  	  Further,	  they	  created	  space	  for	  some	  small	  
national	   companies	   to	   enter	   the	   industry.	   	   However,	   considering	   the	   computer	  
industry	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  inroads	  made	  by	  Mexican	  companies	  appear	  both	  small	  and	  
temporary.	  	  They	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  loosening	  the	  TNCs'	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  
industry	  or	  developing	  national	  capabilities.	  
	  
	   The	   thesis	   turns	   now	   to	   a	   specific	   evaluation	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   policy	  
guidelines	  with	  respect	  to	  their	  four	  objectives.	  	  The	  four	  objectives	  were:	  	  to	  produce	  
computer	  equipment	  at	  internationally	  competitive	  price	  and	  technology	  levels;	  to	  
improve	   the	   balance	   of	   trade	   in	   the	   sector;	   to	   promote	   local	   technological	  
development;	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  Mexican	  component	  suppliers.	  	  In	  
addition,	   two	   other	   objectives	   were	   implicit	   in	   the	   guidelines:	   	   the	   creation	   of	  
employment	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  national	  computer	  companies.	  	  The	  following	  review	  
is	  therefore	  structured	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  six	  objectives	  using	  specific	  restrictions	  
and	  mandates	  in	  the	  programme	  as	  measuring	  rods	  wherever	  possible.	  Because	  the	  
IBM	  decision	  marked	  a	  discontinuity	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  policy	  guidelines,	  
the	  ensuing	  discussion	  will	  examine	  the	  years	  1983–85	  (prior	  to	  IBM's	  agreement)	  
separately	  from	  the	  years	  1985–87	  when	  appropriate.	  
	  
Levels	  and	  International	  Competitiveness	  of	  Supply	  
	   This	  objective	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  sum	  of	  three	  requirements:	  	  first,	  that	  the	  
market	  is	  well	  supplied,	  and	  specifically	  that	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  local	  market	  be	  supplied	  
with	   locally–made	   products	   by	   1989;	   second,	   that	   technical	   quality	   is	   up	   to	  
international	  standards;	  and	  third,	  that	  prices	  are	  within	  15	  percent	  of	  U.S.	  prices	  as	  
stipulated	  by	  the	  guidelines.	  
	   The	   supply	   of	   computers	   was	   initially	   reduced	   as	   a	   result	   both	   of	   the	  
programme	  and	  of	  the	  severe	  import	  controls,	  which	  were	  enacted	  just	  prior	  to	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  programme.	  	  The	  market	  was	  initially	  severely	  constrained	  as	  it	  
had	  previously	  been	   supplied	  almost	  entirely	  by	   imports.	   	   Imports	   fell	   from	  $
        251 
million	  in	  1981	  to	  just	  $104	  million	  in	  1983.	  	  The	  value	  of	  actual	  production	  in	  1983	  
was	  only	  $20.3	  million,	  falling	  well	  short	  of	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  $131	  million.	  	  However,	  
this	  was	  a	  considerable	  improvement	  on	  1981	  output	  of	  locally–produced	  computer	  




	   While	   local	   production	   increased	   substantially,	   imports	   also	   increased.	  	  
However,	  the	  percentage	  of	  the	  market	  supplied	  by	  imports	  declined	  markedly,	  from	  
98	  percent	  in	  1981	  to	  79	  percent	  in	  1985.
334	  Thus,	  while	  imports	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  
dominant	  role	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market,	  the	  policy	  initiated	  a	  
favourable	  trend	  with	  respect	  to	  local	  supply.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  original	  goal	  of	  local	  
products	  supplying	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  market	  by	  1989	  was	  unattainable.	  
	   Further	  with	   respect	   to	   supply,	   the	  market	  experienced	  very	   long	  delivery	  
times.	  	  Again	  this	  was	  due	  partly	  to	  import	  restrictions	  on	  finished	  products,	  parts	  and	  
components,	  and	  partly	  to	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  local	  suppliers.	  
	   Minicomputers	   and	   mainframes	   were	   sold	   primarily	   through	   the	  
manufacturers’	  direct	  sales	  forces,	  though	  in	  some	  cases,	  value–added	  resellers	  or	  
large	  distributors	  were	  used.	  	  	  
	   In	   contrast,	   70	   percent	   of	   microcomputers	   were	   sold	   through	   distributor	  
networks	  that	  were	  nascent	  and	  fragmented.	  	  Infocom	  estimated	  that	  there	  were	  800	  
distributors	  in	  the	  country	  in	  1987.	  	  Of	  these,	  650	  were	  independent	  operators	  while	  
the	  remaining	  150	  were	  part	  of	  larger	  multiple	  chains.	  	  	  
	   Poor	  distribution	  impeded	  the	  development	  of	  the	  market.	  	  Distributors	  were	  
hurt	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  inflation	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  hold	  large	  inventories.	  	  This	  resulted	  
in	  uncertainty	  and	  delays	  in	  supply	  and	  further	  encouraged	  the	  contraband	  market.	  	  
Hence,	  although	  the	  chaotic	  market	  conditions	  of	  1978–82	  no	  longer	  prevailed,	  there	  
                                                
333
	   	   Ricardo	   Zermeño	   Gonzalez,	   Op.	   Cit.,	   1984;	   and	   SECOFI,	   Dirección	   de	   la	   Industria	  
Electrónica.	  "Estadísticas	  sobre	  la	  Industria	  de	  Computadoras	  en	  México",	  mimeo.	  1987.	  p.	  5.	  
334	  	  Ibid.,	  Tables	  4	  and	  5.	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remained	   considerable	   scope	   for	   rationalizing	   and	   improving	   distribution	   of	  
microcomputers	  to	  the	  market.	  
	   The	  technical	  quality	  of	  the	  products	  in	  the	  Mexican	  market	  was	  regarded	  as	  
fairly	   high.	   	   This	  was	   due	   not	   only	   to	   the	   predominance	   of	   imports;	   the	   locally–
produced	  equipment	  was	  considered	  of	  high	  quality	  as	  well.	  	  One	  line	  of	  Unisys	  multi–
user	  microcomputers	  manufactured	  in	  México	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  most	  reliable	  
made	  by	  the	  company	  worldwide.335	  	  Though	  there	  were	  some	  problems	  with	  the	  
supply	   of	   faulty	   components	   locally,	   these	   were	   generally	   considered	   to	   be	  
insignificant.	  	  This	  was	  partly	  because	  most	  of	  the	  components	  sourced	  locally	  were	  
low–technology	  items	  (see	  Local	  Integration	  below).	  
	   International	  competitiveness,	  measured	  in	  price	  differentials,	  did	  not	  improve	  
in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  programme.	  	  Prices	  remained	  90	  to	  150	  percent	  higher	  than	  
U.S.	  prices	  following	  previous	  historical	  patterns.
336	  	  The	  high	  prices	  were	  attributed	  to	  
the	  local	  producers'	  lack	  of	  scale,	  technological	  dependence,	  and	  lack	  of	  experience.	  	  	  
	   After	  1983	  government	   regulation	  had	   some	  success	   in	   reducing	  prices	  of	  
minicomputers	   and	   mainframes	   in	   México;	   however	   prices	   still	   remained	   35–40	  
percent	  higher	  than	  U.S.	  prices	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  In	  microcomputers,	  competition	  was	  
a	  much	   greater	   factor	   in	   reducing	   prices	   than	   government	   regulation.	   	  Micros	   in	  
México	  were,	  on	  average,	  70	  percent	  more	  expensive	  than	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1985.	  By	  1988	  
they	  were	  generally	  within	  15	  percent	  of	  comparable	  U.S.	  prices,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  
newly–introduced	  models	  such	  as	  the	  Apple	  MacIntosh	  and	  the	  IBM	  PCs	  which	  were	  





                                                
335	  Author	  interviews	  with	  industry	  participants	  and	  users,	  January	  to	  June	  1987.	  
336	  	  Zermeño,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  p.	  14.	  
337	  	  Price	  data	  come	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources	  including	  author	  observations,	  Infocom	  and	  
Margaret	   Miller,	   "High	   Technology	   Transfer:	   	   A	   Case	   Study	   of	   the	   Mexican	   Computer	  
Electronics	  Industry."	  Stanford	  University	  Economics	  Departmental	  Honors	  Thesis,	  June	  1986.	  	  
pp.	  48–49.	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Levels	  and	  Origins	  of	  Investment	  
	   The	  computer	  decree	  was	  designed	  to	  encourage	  investment	  in	  the	  Mexican	  
computer	   industry,	   particularly	   by	   Mexican	   investors.	   	   The	   original	   guidelines	  
specifically	   forbade	   majority	   foreign	   ownership	   in	   the	   microcomputer	   segment.	  	  
Furthermore,	  foreign	  companies	  wishing	  to	  sell	  mainframes	  in	  the	  Mexican	  market	  (via	  
imports)	  were	  required	  to	  register	  a	  local	  manufacturing	  operation	  with	  SECOFI.	  	  	  
	   When	  the	  policy	  was	  adopted	  all	  the	  major	  computer	  transnationals	  had	  been	  
selling	  equipment	  and	  services	  in	  México	  for	  more	  than	  twenty	  years,	  except	  Apple,	  
which	  began	  selling	  through	  Mexican	  distributors	  in	  1978.	  	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  
1981	  policy	  initiative,	  each	  of	  the	  major	  TNCs	  decided	  to	  invest	  in	  local	  production.	  	  
However,	  local	  investments	  remained	  relatively	  small	  and	  contained,	  reflecting	  both	  
the	  TNCs'	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  growing	  Mexican	  market,	  and	  TNC	  uncertainty	  




	   Mexican	  private	  capital	  also	  invested	  in	  the	  industry,	  participating	  primarily	  at	  
the	   low	   end	   of	   the	   microcomputer	   market	   producing	   IBM–compatibles,	   and	  
peripherals	  such	  as	  terminals	  and	  dot–matrix	  printers.	  	  However,	  none	  of	  the	  Mexican	  
firms	  were	  backed	  by	  a	  major	  industrial	  or	  commercial	  group.	  
	   The	  programme	  succeeded	  in	  attracting	  a	  large	  number	  of	  investors	  in	  the	  local	  
industry.	  	  In	  1981,	  before	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  programme,	  there	  were	  only	  four	  
firms	  registered	  as	  manufacturers	  of	  computers	  in	  México.	  	  At	  year–end	  1983	  there	  
were	   58	   such	   registered	   firms.	   	   Of	   these,	   27	   were	   registered	   to	   produce	  
microcomputers,	  11	  for	  minis,	  and	  20	  for	  peripheral	  equipment.	  	  	  By	  1986	  there	  were	  
73	  firms	  registered	  in	  the	  programme.
339	  	  (See	  Table	  8.8.)	  
                                                
338
	  	  IBM's	  $6.6	  million	  investment	  was	  explicitly	  geared	  for	  export	  production.	  	  Other	  TNC	  
investments	   illustrate	  the	  point:	   	  Unisys	   invested	  $2.2	  million	  in	  Compubur,	  NCR	  invested	  
$500,000	  in	  a	  microcomputer	  joint	  venture,	  and	  Control	  Data	  invested	  $500,000	  in	  the	  local	  
production	  of	  multilayer	  boards	  in	  order	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Mexican	  mainframe	  market.	  
339	   	   SECOFI,	   Dirección	   de	   la	   Industria	   Electrónica,	   "Estadísticas	   sobre	   la	   industria	   de	  
computadoras	  en	  México,"	  (México	  D.F.:	  SECOFI,	  1987)	  mimeo.	  Table	  1.	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TABLE	  8.8	  
Firms	  Registered	  as	  Computer	  Manufacturers	  with	  SECOFI	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  1981	   	   	  	  1983	   	   	  	  1986	  
Microcomputers	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  27	   	   	  	  	  	  	  32	  
Minicomputers	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  11	   	   	  	  	  	  	  12	  
Peripherals	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  20	   	   	  	  	  	  	  29	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  
TOTAL	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  58	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  
	  
	   Looking	   at	   the	   ownership	   of	   these	   registered	   firms,	   the	   encroachment	   of	  
foreign	  ownership	  since	  1983	  is	  clear.	  	  In	  1983,	  25	  of	  the	  27	  companies	  registered	  to	  
produce	  micros	  were	  wholly	  Mexican–owned,	  while	  the	  remaining	  two	  had	  minority	  
foreign	  partners.	  	  Five	  minicomputer	  manufacturers	  were	  100%	  Mexican–owned,	  five	  
were	  foreign–owned,	  and	  one	  was	  a	  joint	  venture	  with	  majority	  Mexican	  capital.	  	  Of	  
the	  20	  peripherals	  producers,	  fifteen	  were	  financed	  entirely	  by	  Mexican	  capital,	  three	  
were	   joint	  ventures	  with	  a	  Mexican	  majority,	  and	  two	  were	   joint	  ventures	  with	  a	  
foreign	  company	  owning	  the	  majority	  share.
340	   	  After	  the	  1985	  IBM	  decision,	  local	  
ownership	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  part	  of	  de	  facto	  policy.	  	  Instead,	  the	  government	  used	  the	  
ownership	  issue	  to	  bargain	  for	  commitments	  to	  increase	  exports.	  	  From	  1986	  onward,	  
a	  foreign	  company	  wishing	  to	  operate	  a	  wholly–owned	  microcomputer	  subsidiary	  in	  
México	   had	   to	   agree	   to	   export	   two	   times	   the	   value	   of	   its	   imports.	   	   Three	   TNCs	  
committed	  to	  this:	  	  IBM,	  H–P,	  and	  Apple.	  	  Thus,	  in	  1986	  three	  of	  the	  32	  microcomputer	  
manufacturers	  were	  wholly–owned	  subsidiaries	  of	  foreign	  companies,	  three	  were	  joint	  
ventures	   with	   a	   majority	   of	  Mexican	   capital,	   and	   the	   remaining	   26	   were	   wholly	  
Mexican–owned.
341	  	  (See	  Table	  8.9.)	  
                                                
340	   	   Ricardo	   Zermeño	   Gonzalez,	   SECOFI,	   "La	   Política	   de	   Desarrollo	   a	   la	   Industria	   de	  
Computadoras	  en	  México,"	  (México	  D.F.:	  mimeo,	  1984)	  Appendix	  Table	  3.	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  Author	  interviews	  with	  participating	  companies.	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TABLE	  8.9	  
Origins	  of	  Capital	  
Percent	  National	  Capital	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐1983-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   	  	  	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐1986-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  100%	  	  	  	  >50%	  	  	  	  <50%	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100%	  	  	  	  	  >50%	  	  	  	  <50%	  
Microcomputers	   	  	  	  	  	  25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  
Minicomputers	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  
Peripherals	   	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  15	   	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  na	  
	  
na	  =	  information	  not	  available	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Fixed	  investment	  increased	  by	  more	  than	  50%	  from	  less	  than	  $20	  million	  in	  
1981	  to	  $31	  million	  in	  1983,	  and	  then	  more	  than	  doubled	  to	  $68	  million	  in	  1985	  thanks	  
largely	   to	   the	   entry	   of	   Apple,	   Hewlett–Packard,	   and	   IBM	   in	   1984	   and	   1985.
342	  	  
However,	  only	  $9.6	  million	  of	  the	  $31	  million	  in	  1983	  was	  invested	  in	  production;	  a	  
fact	  that	  reveals	  the	  tendency	  of	  existing	  companies	  to	  devote	  the	  largest	  part	  of	  their	  
resources	  to	  marketing	  and	  the	  inclination	  of	  the	  new	  investors	  to	  make	  the	  least	  risky	  
investments	  (i.e.,	  in	  selling	  and	  marketing	  products	  with	  licensed	  technology	  rather	  
than	  in	  production	  and	  development	  capacity).	  
	   The	  government	  tried	  to	  enforce	  the	  requirement	  of	  local	  production,	  but	  was	  
flexible	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  size	  of	  the	  investment	  and	  local	  operation.	  	  After	  1986	  
however,	  some	  imports	  of	  finished	  microcomputers	  such	  as	  the	  Apple	  MacIntosh	  were	  
allowed	  as	  "complementary	  product	  lines,"	  contrary	  to	  the	  original	  restrictions.	  	  TNCs	  
wishing	  to	  import	  finished	  micros	  had	  to	  compensate	  these	  imports	  by	  exporting	  three	  
times	  their	  value.	  	  Again,	  this	  shift	  in	  de	  facto	  policy	  reflected	  both	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  
up–to–date	  technology	  in	  México,	  and	  the	  growing	  emphasis	  on	  balancing	  foreign	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  SECOFI,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  1987,	  Table	  3.	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Balance	  of	  Trade	  
	   Not	  surprisingly,	  México	  experienced	  chronic	  balance	  of	  trade	  deficits	  in	  the	  
area	  of	  electronics.	  	  These	  deficits	  worsened	  significantly	  in	  1979–80	  when	  computer	  
imports	  increased	  from	  $78.4	  million	  to	  $217.1	  million,	  thus	  giving	  strong	  impetus	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  coherent	  policy	  concerning	  imports	  of	  computer	  equipment.	  	  	  
	   The	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  computers	  improved	  dramatically	  from	  1981	  to	  1983,	  
due	  primarily	  to	  the	  vast	  reduction	  of	  imports.	   	  As	  noted	  above,	  imports	  fell	  from	  
$234.5	  million	  in	  1981	  to	  $104.2	  million	  in	  1983.
343	  	  Not	  only	  were	  imports	  reduced,	  
their	  content	  was	  modified	  by	  the	  programme.	   	  Prior	   to	   the	  programme,	   imports	  
consisted	  almost	  entirely	  of	  finished	  computer	  products.	  	  In	  1983	  imports	  consisted	  
much	  more	  of	  inputs	  for	  production.	  
	   Exports	  were	  also	  given	  impulse	  by	  the	  programme.	  	  Exports	  were	  less	  than	  $4	  
million	  in	  1981	  and	  increased	  to	  $25	  million	  by	  1983.
344	  	  After	  1983	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  
sharp	  increase	  in	  exports	  that	  improves	  the	  trade	  balance	  as	  imports	  increased	  again	  
after	  1983.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  these	  exports	  came	  almost	  entirely	  from	  computer	  
transnationals	  producing	  equipment	  in	  México	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  programme	  
(figures	  do	  not	  include	  exports	  from	  maquiladoras).	  
TABLE	  8.10	  
Foreign	  Trade	  in	  Computers	  1981–1989	  
($	  Current	  Millions)	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	   1981	  	  	  	  1982	  	  	  	  1983	  	  	  	  1984	  	  	  	  1985	  	  	  	  1986	  	  	  	  1987	  	  	  	  1988	  
Exports	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  	  	  	  	  	  	  252	  	  
Imports	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  235	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  	  	  	  	  	  	  177	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  	  	  	  	  	  275	  	  	  	  	  236	  	  	  	  	  	  	  332	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ===	  	  	  
Net	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  -­‐231	  	  	  	  	  -­‐145	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐79	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐123	  	  	  	  	  -­‐196	  	  	  	  	  -­‐196	  	  	  	  -­‐120	  	  	  	  	  	  	  -­‐80	  
Exp/Imp	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  .02	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .02	  	  	  	  	  	  .24	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .31	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .49	  	  	  	  	  	  	  .75	  	  	  
	  
Source:	  SECOFI	  and	  IMC	  1990.	  Figures	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  $1m.	  
	   Balance	  of	  trade	  became	  the	  central	  policy	  thrust	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  Export	  
commitments	  were	  actively	  enforced	  and	  pushed	  on	  the	  TNCs	  who,	  in	  some	  cases,	  
                                                
343	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  6.	  (Table	  5).	  
344	  	  Ibid.,	  p.	  6.	  (Table	  5)	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took	  to	  exporting	  non–electronic	  items	  to	  generate	  foreign	  exchange.	  	  TNC	  exports	  
grew	  as	  a	  result:	  from	  $25	  million	  in	  1983	  to	  over	  $116	  million	  in	  1987.
345
	  	  The	  primary	  
market	  for	  these	  exports	  was	  the	  United	  States.	  
	   Indeed,	  the	  computer	  transnationals	  unanimously	  agreed	  that	  México	  offered	  
a	  good	  base	  for	  exports.	  	  Labour	  costs	  in	  México	  were	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  and	  
proximity	  to	  the	  United	  States	  facilitates	  managerial	  control	  and	  lowers	  transportation	  
costs.	  
	   While	   the	  government	  pressured	  TNCs	   to	  export,	   it	  pushed	   locally–owned	  
companies	  to	   improve	  their	   foreign	  currency	  balance	  primarily	  by	   increasing	   local	  
content.	  	  Such	  a	  two–pronged	  strategy	  seemed	  to	  work	  as	  the	  export–import	  ratio	  
improved	  from	  24%	   in	  1983	  to	  49%	   in	  1987.	   	  However,	   the	  strategy	  destined	  the	  
locally–owned	  companies	  to	  the	  low–end	  of	  the	  market	  as	  the	  local	  suppliers	  were	  
unable	  to	  provide	  many	  high–technology	  components.	  
	   The	  rapid	  rise	  of	  imports	  was	  a	  worrying	  trend	  for	  policy–makers,	  however.	  	  
Clearly	  improvements	  in	  the	  overall	  trade	  balance	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  unless	  
the	   manufacturers	   incorporated	   a	   greater	   amount	   of	   Mexican–made	   parts	   and	  
components	  in	  their	  equipment.	  
	  
Investment	  in	  Research	  and	  Development	  
	   The	  programme	  required	  participating	  companies	  to	  spend	  three	  to	  six	  percent	  
of	   their	   local	   sales	   on	   research	   and	   development.	   	   In	   the	   years	   just	   after	   the	  
programme	  was	  enacted,	  levels	  of	  investment	  in	  local	  research	  and	  development	  in	  
computer	  electronics	  were	  extremely	  disappointing,	  especially	  given	  the	  importance	  
of	   these	   investments	   to	   the	   development	   of	   national	   capabilities	   in	   computer	  
technology.	  	  The	  programme	  envisaged	  an	  investment	  in	  R&D	  on	  the	  order	  of	  $18.5	  
million	  in	  1983.	  	  The	  actual	  amount	  spent	  was	  just	  $1.9	  million,	  barely	  10%	  of	  the	  
amount	  projected.
346
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  Ibid. 
346	  	  Zermeño,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1984)	  p.	  22,	  (Table	  4).	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   In	  addition	  to	  other	  problems	  stemming	  from	  the	  difficult	  economic	  situation	  
existing	  during	  1983,	  these	  figures	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  policies	  for	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  national	  technological	  capacity	  encountered	  stubborn	  resistance	  from	  foreign	  
TNCs,	  which	  maintained	  central	  R&D	  facilities	  in	  their	  home	  countries.	  
	   All	  of	  the	  companies	  interviewed	  insisted	  that	  they	  were	  spending	  the	  required	  
3–6%	  of	  sales	  on	  local	  research	  and	  development	  efforts.	  	  However,	  aggregate	  figures	  
for	  the	  industry	  indicated	  that	  only	  $10	  million	  was	  spent	  on	  R&D	  in	  1985––a	  fraction	  
of	  1%	  of	  industry	  sales.
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   The	  division	  of	  responsibilities	  within	  SECOFI	  for	  monitoring	  R&D	  expenditures	  
inhibited	  enforcement	  of	   this	   requirement.	   	   Zermeño’s	  office	  was	   responsible	   for	  
monitoring	   the	   level	   of	   expenditures	  while	   the	  Office	   of	   Foreign	   Investment	   and	  
Technology	  Transfer	  monitored	  how	  the	  money	  was	  spent.	  	  There	  was	  little,	  if	  any,	  
coordination	  between	  the	  two	  offices.	  	  Thus,	  while	  the	  requisite	  amount	  was	  spent,	  
much	  of	  the	  so–called	  R&D	  investment	  was	  in	  fact	  dedicated	  to	  market	  development	  
(e.g.,	  customer	  education,	  donations	  of	  equipment	  to	  educational	  institutions,	  etc.)	  
	   Interestingly,	  the	  Office	  of	  Foreign	  Investment	  and	  Technology	  Transfer	  was	  
headed	   by	   Undersecretary	   Adolfo	   Hegewisch	   who	   strongly	   supported	   foreign	  
investment	   in	   the	   computer	   industry	   and	   approved	   the	   IBM	  decision	   against	   the	  
wishes	   of	   the	   Office	   of	   the	   Electronics	   Industry.	   	   While	   Hegewisch's	   office	   was	  
concerned	  to	  promote	  foreign	  investment	  in	  this	  sector,	  it	  was	  not	  as	  enthusiastic	  
about	  ensuring	  investment	  in	  local	  research	  and	  development	  projects.	  	  Hegewisch's	  
close	  relationship	  with	  President	  De	  la	  Madrid	  meant	  that	  any	  protests	  from	  the	  Office	  
of	  Electronics	  Industry	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears.	  	  	  
	  
Levels	  of	  Local	  Integration	  
	   The	  computer	  decree	  required	  local	  content	  to	  increase	  from	  25	  to	  35	  percent	  
in	  minicomputers,	  and	  from	  35	  to	  45	  percent	  in	  micros.	  	  Initially,	  actual	  figures	  were	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somewhat	   lower	   than	   this.	   	   It	   was	   estimated	   that	   nationally	   manufactured	  
components	  accounted	  for	  20%	  of	  the	  direct	  cost	  of	  the	  finished	  products	  and	  30%	  of	  
the	  cost	  of	  the	  parts	  used	  in	  their	  production.
348	  	  	  
	   At	  first	  the	  levels	  of	  local	  integration	  improved,	  however,	  and	  there	  were	  other	  
encouraging	   signs.	   	   Other	   branches	   of	   the	   electronics	   industry	   (i.e.	   passive	  
components)	   began	   to	   sell	   the	   majority	   of	   their	   products	   to	   the	   producers	   of	  
professional	   electronic	   equipment.	   	   This	   was	   a	   significant	   change	   from	   previous	  
historical	  patterns,	  when	  most	  of	  these	  passive	  components	  were	  being	  purchased	  by	  
the	  consumer	  electronics	  industry.	  	  Further,	  several	  of	  the	  transnationals	  established	  
international	  purchasing	  offices	  whereby	  they	  could	  export	  parts	  and	  components	  
manufactured	  by	  "qualified	  suppliers"	  to	  subsidiaries	  in	  other	  countries.	  	  Hewlett–
Packard	  and	  IBM	  both	  established	  such	  offices.	  	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  these	  
two	   companies	   in	   particular	   to	   encourage	   exports	   of	   this	   type	   given	   their	  
commitments	  to	  the	  Mexican	  government	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Further,	  in–bond	  assembly	  
plants	   (maquiladoras)	   established	   by	   computer	   TNCs	   to	   produce	   electronic	  
components	  were	  allowed	  to	  sell	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  production	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  
in	  addition	  to	  supplying	  the	  export	  market,	  which	  was	  their	  original	  role.	  
	   Though	   formal	   levels	   of	   local	   content	   were	   increasing,	   it	   was	   generally	  
admitted	  that	  supplier	  development	  was	  very	  disappointing	  indeed.	  	  Locally–sourced	  
components	  tended	  to	  be	  low–technology	  commodity	  items	  such	  as	  harnesses,	  cables,	  
and	  low–resolution	  terminals.	  	  Computer	  manufacturers,	  both	  foreign	  and	  Mexican	  
alike,	  complained	  of	  long	  lead	  times	  and	  low	  quality	  from	  local	  suppliers.	  	  	  
	   The	  slow	  development	  of	  component	  suppliers	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  
crisis,	   the	   high	   levels	   of	   fixed	   investment	   required,	   and	   uncertainty	   about	   the	  
persistence	  of	  the	  industrial	  development	  policy,	  which	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  
most	   local	   suppliers.	   	   However,	   it	   also	   can	   be	   attributed	   in	   part	   to	   the	   common	  
practice	  of	  component	  purchase	  agreements	  as	  a	  form	  of	  technology	  licensing.	  	  In	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these	  agreements	  the	  national	  company	  agreed	  to	  purchase	  certain	  vital	  components	  
exclusively	  from	  the	  foreign	  technology	  provider	  in	  exchange	  for	  assistance	  in	  setting	  
up	  assembly	  and	  testing	  operations	  and	  exclusive	  marketing	  rights	  in	  México.	  	  These	  
arrangements	  clearly	  inhibited	  improvements	  in	  the	  sector’s	  balance	  of	  trade.	  	  
	   Indeed	  the	  government	  shifted	  its	  emphasis	  with	  regard	  to	  local	  integration,	  
due	  partly	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  supplier	  development	  and	  partly	  to	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  
exports.	   	   	   	   The	   government	  moved	   to	   emphasize	   local	   process	   rather	   than	   local	  
content.	   That	   is,	   the	  Office	   of	   Electronics	   Industry	   in	   SECOFI	  was	   concerned	   that	  
manufacturing	  processes	  take	  place	  on	  Mexican	  soil	  even	  if	  the	  components	  used	  
were	   not	   made	   in	   the	   country.	   	   However,	   given	   that	   the	   import	   of	   finished	  
microcomputers	  was	  allowed	  after	  1986,	  local	  integration,	  whether	  measured	  by	  local	  
content	   or	   process,	   did	   not	   improve.	   The	   percent	   of	   national	   integration	   in	   the	  
production	  of	  computers	  almost	  halved	  from	  10.5%	  in	  1983	  to	  5.8%	  in	  1987.349	  
	   The	  existence	  of	  a	  strong	  contraband	  market	  meant	  that	  the	  government	  was	  
unable	   to	   require	   local	   integration	   that	   was	   fundamentally	   uneconomical.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  the	  government	  should	  have	  placed	  more	  emphasis	  
on	   the	   local	   production	   of	   components	   as	   the	   most	   basic	   way	   of	   developing	   a	  
technology	  base	  in	  electronics	  and	  as	  a	  way	  of	  improving	  the	  balance	  of	  payments.	  	  
Given	  the	  high	  risk	  involved,	  however,	  the	  government	  of	  México	  would	  have	  had	  to	  
commit	  its	  own	  resources	  to	  such	  a	  project	  rather	  than	  relying	  solely	  on	  local	  private	  
investors.	  
	  
Creation	  of	  Employment	  
	   The	   number	   of	   new	   jobs	   created	   in	   the	   industry	   was	   impressive.	   	   Total	  
employment	   in	   the	   industry	  grew	   from	   less	   than	  1,600	   in	  1981	   to	  5,160	   in	  1985.	  	  
Furthermore,	   direct	   employment––that	   is,	   employment	   in	   production	   and	  
development	  grew	  from	  less	  than	  30	  to	  2,657.	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TABLE	  8.11	  
Employment	  in	  the	  Mexican	  Computer	  Industry	  
	   	   	   	   1981	   	   	   1983	   	   	   1985	  
Direct	  Employment	   	   	  	  <30	   	   	   1,162	   	   	   2,657	  
Indirect	  Employment	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  <1,570	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1,609	   	   	   2,503	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   ======	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   =====	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =====	  	  
TOTAL	  EMPLOYMENT	  	  	  	   <1,600	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2,771	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5,160	  
	  
	   Of	   the	   2,771	   jobs	   in	   the	   industry	   in	   1983,	   only	   400	  were	   in	   the	   areas	   of	  
assembly	  and	  testing,	  762	  were	  in	  development	  and	  engineering,	  and	  1,609	  were	  in	  
sales,	  administration,	  and	  other	  activities.
350
	  
	   The	   growth	   in	   employment	   naturally	   came	   from	   the	   growth	   in	   the	  
microcomputer	  sector.	  	  Of	  an	  estimated	  2,500	  employees	  in	  this	  sector,	  1,500	  were	  
involved	  in	  manufacturing,	  625	  in	  sales	  and	  marketing,	  and	  375	  in	  administration.
351
	  	  	  
	  
	   In	   summary,	   the	  primary	   success	   of	   the	   computer	   industrial	   development	  
programme	  was	  limited,	  with	  only	  the	  improved	  balance	  of	  trade	  objective	  clearly	  
met.	  Balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector	  improved	  as	  the	  programme	  restricted	  imports	  and	  
enforced	  export	  commitments	  from	  TNCs.	  And	  the	  programme	  helped	  to	  generate	  
professional/technical	   employment	   opportunities	   in	   the	   sector.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
programme	  established	  some	  order	  in	  a	  chaotic	  market,	  facilitated	  the	  market	  entry	  of	  
national	  players,	  and	  prompted	  initial	  technology	  transfer	  through	  domestic/foreign	  
joint	  ventures	  and	  licensing	  agreements.	  As	  a	  result,	  computer	  production	  expanded	  
to	  meet	  local	  market	  needs,	  but	  prices	  remained	  significantly	  higher	  than	  international	  
standards.	  	  
	   The	  policy	  thus	  succeeded	  in	  areas	  where	  required	  investment	  was	  small––the	  
market	  presence	  of	  national	  companies	  licensing	  technology,	  assembling,	  and	  selling	  
micros––and	  failed	  where	  the	  stakes	  were	  higher––component	  supplier	  development	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and	  investment	  in	  basic	  research	  and	  development.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  government	  was	  
unable	  to	  sustain	  the	  policy	  as	  it	  was	  originally	  formulated	  undermined	  the	  confidence	  
of	  the	  already	  skittish	  Mexican	  investor	  that	  a	  long–term	  investment	  in	  technology	  
would	  pay	  off.	  	  Thus,	  Mexican	  firms	  remained	  technologically	  dependent	  and	  were	  
increasingly	  losing	  ground	  to	  the	  wholly–owned	  TNCs	  in	  the	  microcomputer	  market.	  
	   In	  the	  context	  of	  a	  macro-­‐economic	  policy	  of	  trade	  liberalization,	  the	  challenge	  
for	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  programme	  was	  to	  maintain	  some	  bargaining	  power	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	  the	  foreign	  computer	  companies.	  	  Day	  to	  day	  policy	  still	  rested	  with	  the	  Office	  of	  
the	  Electronics	  Industry	  in	  SECOFI.	  	  There	  was	  little	  support	  from	  above	  for	  industrial	  
development	  programmes;	  but	  there	  was	  support	  for	  export	   initiatives.	   	  Zermeño	  
made	  good	  use	  of	  even	  the	  weakened	  programme	  to	  force	  hefty	  export	  commitments	  
from	  the	  TNCs.	  	  Policy	  strategy	  moved	  increasingly	  to	  a	  system	  of	  differential	  tariffs	  
whereby	  components	  destined	  as	  inputs	  to	  manufacture	  could	  be	  imported	  at	  very	  
low	  duty,	  while	  SKD	  kits	  carried	  higher	  tariffs,	  and	  finished	  products	  higher	  tariffs	  still.	  
	  
Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  from	  the	  Mexican	  Case	  
	   Following	  is	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  salient	  characteristics	  of	  the	  process	  that	  led	  to	  
the	  formulation	  of	  a	  nationalist	  computer	  industry	  development	  programme,	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  implementation	  of	  a	  substantially	  watered–down	  version	  of	  the	  original	  
initiative.	  
	   Firstly,	   the	   dynamic	   and	   vital	   nature	   of	   the	   computer	   electronics	   industry	  
provided	  a	  general	  motivation	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  coherent	  industrial	  policy	  for	  
the	  sector.	  However,	  the	  specific	  impetus	  for	  the	  policy	  initiative	  was	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  
rapidly	  deteriorating	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  computers.	  
	   The	  rapid	  growth	  and	  change	  in	  the	  industry	  provided	  the	  policy–makers	  some	  
leverage	  with	  which	   to	  develop	  a	  domestic	   computer	   industry.	   	   In	  particular,	   the	  
advent	   and	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	  microcomputer,	   along	  with	   its	   lower	   capital	   and	  
technological	  barriers	  to	  entry,	  gave	  the	  government	  of	  México	  a	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  
the	  broader	  computer	  electronics	  complex.	  	  The	  primary	  technology	  associated	  with	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microcomputers––the	  integrated	  circuit	  or	  chip––was	  readily	  accessible	  from	  a	  great	  
number	  of	  firms	  the	  world	  over	  on	  a	  commodity	  basis.	  	  Further,	  the	  large	  number	  of	  
small	  microcomputer	  manufacturers,	  particularly	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  comprised	  a	  
large	  "pool"	  of	  potential	  sources	  of	  product	  and	  process	  technology	  available	  to	  the	  
Mexican	   industry.	   	   Indeed,	   all	   of	   the	   successful	  Mexican	  microcomputer	   vendors	  
purchased	  technology	  from	  these	  rather	  smaller	  players	  in	  the	  U.S.	  industry	  who	  were	  
not	   interested	   in	   setting	   up	   production	   facilities	   in	   México	   themselves.	   Thus,	  
competitive	   fragmentation	   at	   the	   low	   end	   of	   the	   computer	  market	   provided	   the	  
Mexican	  state	  policymakers	  with	  enhanced	  bargaining	  leverage.	  
	   The	  original	  guidelines,	  in	  their	  opening	  paragraphs,	  noted	  the	  relatively	  small	  
size	  of	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market.	  	  Yet	  they	  emphasized	  the	  potential	  size	  of	  the	  
market	  and	  México's	  attractiveness	  as	  a	  base	  from	  which	  to	  export	  to	  the	  United	  
States	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   Latin	   America.
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   Indeed	   the	   Mexican	   market	   for	  
microcomputers	  largely	  fulfilled	  its	  growth	  prospects	  despite	  the	  difficult	  economic	  
climate	   in	   the	  country	   in	   the	  1980s.	   	  The	  private	  Mexican	   investors	   focused	   their	  
investment	  in	  this	  segment	  of	  the	  industry.	  	  However,	  the	  transnationals	  were	  lured	  
more	  by	   the	  potential	   for	  an	  attractive	  export	  platform	   than	  by	   the	  potential	   for	  
growth	  in	  the	  local	  market.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Next,	  the	  academic/technical	  elites	  were	  able	  to	  influence	  computer	  policy	  in	  
large	  part	   because	  of	   the	   complexity	   inherent	   in	   the	   sector.	   	   Lacking	   the	   specific	  
technical	  competence	  within	  the	  government	  bureaucracy,	  José	  Warman	  and	  Ricardo	  
Zermeño	  were	  brought	  in	  from	  the	  outside	  and	  given	  substantial	  scope	  to	  formulate	  
policy	  within	  the	  broad	  guidelines	  of	  the	  ambitious	  National	  Industrial	  Development	  
Plan.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  competent	  and	  committed	  elites	  to	  influence	  
high	  technology	  policy	  may	  be	  a	  general	  one.
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  It	  certainly	  applied	  to	  both	  México	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Again,	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  José	  Warman's	  entree	  into	  the	  government	  bureaucracy	  was	  
not	  a	  general	  one	  as	  he	  was	  hired	  as	  a	  consultant	  by	  his	  brother	  Natán.	  	  However,	  Zermeño	  
and	  Montoya	  in	  INEGI	  are	  examples	  of	  real	  "outsiders"	  who	  attained	  positions	  of	  influence.	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and	   Brazil.	   In	   that	   sense,	   national	   computer	   policy	  was	  managed	   by	   people	  who	  
embodied	   important	   aspects	   of	   the	   developmental	   state	   ideal:	   meritocratic	  
competence	  and	  civil	  society	  embeddedness.	  	  	  
	   In	  México,	   the	   lack	   of	   specific	   policy	   direction	   from	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	  
government	   expanded	   the	   opportunity	   from	   influencing	   policy	   content	   to	  
implementing	  policy.	   	  However,	  Warman	  and	  Zermeño	  were	  unable	   to	  develop	  a	  
broad	  political	  consensus	  for	  their	  policy	  objectives,	  either	  within	  the	  government	  
bureaucracy	  or	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  They	  were	  initially	  more	  successful	  at	  striking	  
favourable	   bargains	   with	   computer	   TNCs	   than	   they	   were	   inside	   their	   own	   state	  
apparatus.	  
	   The	  policy	  opportunity	  was	  limited	  by	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  	  First	  there	  was	  the	  
historical	  domination	  of	  the	  local	  computer	  industry	  by	  the	  transnationals.	  	  Related	  to	  
this	   TNC	   dominance	  was	   the	   lack	   of	  Mexican	   technological	   capability.	   	   Specialist	  
training	  was	  largely	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  themselves;	  training	  that	  was	  
geared	   to	   developing	   competent	   users,	   sales	   and	   maintenance	   personnel––not	  
researchers	  and	  designers.	  	  The	  Mexican	  national	  education	  system	  was	  unable	  to	  
attract	   and	  maintain	   a	   critical	   mass	   of	   academic	   research	   staff	   and	  most	   of	   the	  
students	  who	  were	  attracted	  to	  the	  various	  courses	  did	  not	  finish	  them.	  	  Furthermore,	  
the	  training	  and	  research	  that	  was	  going	  on	  was	  not	  closely	  integrated	  with	  the	  needs	  
of	   industrial	   production.	   	   This	   chronic	   gap	   in	   specialist	   training	   in	   the	   national	  
education	  system	  had	  two	  salient	  results.	  	  One	  is	  the	  desperate	  shortage	  of	  skilled	  
Mexican	   computer	   scientists	   capable	   of	   generating	   and	   sustaining	   a	   national	  
technology	  base.	  	  The	  second	  is	  a	  shortage	  of	  academic	  elites	  with	  a	  personal	  interest	  
in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry	  with	  its	  consequent	  opportunities	  
for	  basic	  and	  applied	  research.	  	  Hence,	  while	  academic	  elites	  were	  able	  to	  influence	  
policy	   formulation	   and	   implementation,	   they	   were	   too	   few	   in	   number	   and	   too	  
dispersed	  to	  form	  a	  strong,	  coherent	  lobby	  for	  a	  nationalist	  computer	  policy.	  	  	  
Even	  had	  there	  been	  such	  a	  strong	  lobby,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  lobby	  would	  
have	  been	  effective	  in	  México.	  	  The	  sphere	  of	  effective	  political	  influence	  was	  fairly	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wide	  at	  the	  implementation	  stage,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  influence	  did	  not	  
conflict	   with	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   presidency.	   	   Contrasting	   the	   government's	  
treatment	   of	   Apple	   and	   IBM	   sheds	   some	   light	   on	   this.	   	   Zermeño’s	   office	   put	  
considerable	  pressure	  on	  Apple	  to	  comply	  with	  its	  export	  commitments	  and	  ultimately	  
closed	  the	  borders	  to	  the	  company	  forcing	  its	  exit	  from	  the	  Mexican	  market.	  	  In	  this	  
case,	  Zermeño’s	  office	  successfully	  exercised	  power	  and	  influence.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  IBM,	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  same	  office	  was	  limited.	  	  Here,	  Warman	  and	  Zermeño	  
opposed	   an	   investment	   that	   promised	   to	   deliver	   substantial	   exports	   and	   send	   a	  
favourable	  signal	  to	  foreign	  investors	  and	  the	  country's	  international	  creditors.	  	  Thus,	  
where	  there	  was	  a	  conflict	  of	  fundamental	  objectives,	  the	  sphere	  of	  effective	  political	  
influence	   narrowed	   to	   the	   president	   and	   his	   closest	   advisers.	   	   After	   1982,	   the	  
proponents	  of	  the	  programme	  no	  longer	  had	  a	  sponsor	  inside	  this	  sphere.	  	  	  	  	  
	   In	  a	  number	  of	  ways,	  the	  policy	  suffered	  simply	  from	  bad	  timing.	  	  While	  the	  
development	  of	   the	   international	   computer	   industry	  provided	  an	  opportunity	   for	  
successful	  policy	  in	  this	  area	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  conditions	  in	  México	  
after	   that	   time	   limited	   the	  opportunity.	   	   In	  particular,	   the	   change	  of	   government	  
administrations	  and	  the	  severe	  economic	  crisis	  conspired	  against	  the	  policy	  and	  its	  
effective	  implementation.	  	  The	  policy	  was	  formulated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  expansionist	  
oil–rich	  years	  of	  the	  Lopez	  Portillo	  administration.	  	  Approval	  for	  the	  policy	  was	  sought	  
during	  the	  tumultuous	  final	  months	  of	  Lopez	  Portillo's	  presidency	  when	  government	  
ministers	  and	  civil	  servants	  were	  concerned	  with	  their	  positions	  in	  (and	  outside)	  the	  
incoming	  government.	  	  Implementation	  of	  the	  policy	  was	  attempted	  in	  a	  climate	  of	  
economic	  crisis.	  	  De	  la	  Madrid	  purged	  his	  cabinet	  of	  nationalist/expansionist	  influence	  
and	  pursued	  a	  broadly	  free–market	  economic	  policy	  that	  favoured	  foreign	  investment,	  
emphasized	   industrial	   efficiency,	   promoted	   manufactured	   exports,	   and	   limited	  
government	  spending.	  	  	  	  Clearly	  a	  policy	  that	  aimed	  to	  protect	  a	  nascent	  domestic	  
computer	   industry	   was	   not	   compatible	   with	   the	   macro	   objectives	   of	   the	   new	  
administration.	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   Furthermore,	   the	   U.S.	   computer	   industry,	   via	   the	   U.S.	   Department	   of	  
Commerce	   added	   its	   voice	   of	   concern	   about	   the	   policy	   to	   those	  within	   the	   new	  
Mexican	  administration	  at	  this	  sensitive	  time.	  
	   In	  this	  context,	  Warman	  and	  Zermeño	  were	  able	  to	  generate	  little	  ideological	  
enthusiasm	   for	   their	   nationalist	   programme.	   	   Thus,	   while	   the	   nationalist	   elites	  
successfully	   influenced	   the	   country's	   computer	  policy	   in	  both	   its	   formulation	  and	  
implementation,	  their	  influence	  was	  ultimately	  limited	  by	  their	  inability	  to	  generate	  
committed	   political	   support:	   	   (i)	   at	   the	   cabinet	   level	   after	   the	   change	   of	  
administrations;	   (ii)	   from	   INEGI,	  which	   failed	   to	   offer	   consistent	   support	   through	  
government	   procurement	   and	   purchasing	   power;	   and	   (iii)	   from	   large	   private	  
industrialists	  who	  were	  (rightly)	  unconvinced	  of	  the	  government's	  commitment	  to	  the	  
programme	  and	  were	  more	  concerned	  with	  product	  quality	  and	  price	  than	  with	  the	  
development	  of	  indigenous	  capability	  in	  computers.	  
	   The	  IBM	  decision	  simply	  manifested	  the	  fundamental	  weakness	  of	  political	  
support	  for	  the	  programme	  at	  the	  time.	  	  The	  decision	  serves	  as	  a	  salient	  reminder	  that	  
(a)	  the	  state	  is	  not	  a	  monolithic	  negotiator;	  and	  (b)	  the	  bargains	  struck	  inside	  the	  state	  
itself	   (the	   bargaining	   game-­‐within-­‐the-­‐game)	   often	   prove	   decisive.	   	   One	   must	  
therefore	  be	  cautious	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  and	  bargaining	  gains	  
and	   losses.	   	   The	   state	   is	   a	  more	   diverse	   and	   complex	   actor	   than	   the	   TNC	   in	   the	  
bargaining	  game.	  	  This	  complexity	  can	  work	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  state,	  making	  it	  difficult	  
for	  the	  TNC	  to	  appreciate	  fully	  the	  politics	  in	  the	  government	  bureaucracy.	  	  However,	  
the	  diversity	  can	  work	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  TNC	  to	  the	  extent	  the	  company	  is	  able	  to	  play	  
the	   objectives	   of	   one	   part	   of	   the	   state	   against	   those	   of	   another.	   	   IBM	   did	   this	  
successfully	  by	  applying	  pressure	  from	  the	  moment	  the	  policy	  was	  written,	  and	  then	  
enlisting	  the	  support	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  for	  the	  company’s	  strategic	  aims.	  	  	  
	   There	  was	  a	  shift	  of	  dependency,	  as	  the	  government	  capitalized	  initially	  on	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  market.	  	  There	  was	  some	  import	  substitution	  in	  
micros,	  with	  most	  assembly	  and	  testing	  transferred	  inside	  the	  country.	  	  And	  private	  
local	  capital	  staked	  out	  a	  position	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market.	  	  However,	  the	  shift	  fell	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well	  short	  of	  the	  technology	  development	  objectives	  envisaged	  by	  the	  programme	  in	  
1981.	  	  	  Even	  in	  micros,	  the	  industry	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  foreign	  technology	  in	  
components,	  particularly	  semiconductors.	   	  And	  the	  TNCs'	  position	  in	  the	  mini	  and	  
mainframe	  markets	  was	  never	  threatened.	  	  	  
	   Inasmuch	   as	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   policy	   were	   subsequently	   narrowed	   to	  
improving	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector	  and	  ensuring	  an	  efficient	  supply	  to	  the	  local	  
market,	   the	   policy	   had	   greater	   success.	   	   However,	   these	   trade	   balance	   gains	   are	  
vulnerable	  as	  long	  as	  the	  country	  would	  fail	  to	  develop	  local	  component	  suppliers.	  
	  	  	  
	   In	   sum,	   the	   combination	   of	   several	   exogenous	   factors
354
	   created	   an	  
opportunity	  for	  México	  to	  alter	  its	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  international	  computer	  
industry:	   	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   the	   industry;	   the	   dynamic	   growth	   of	   the	  
microcomputer	  segment;	  the	  accessibility	  of	  microcomputer	  technology;	  and	  México's	  
local	  market	  potential	   and	  attractiveness	  as	   an	  export	  base	   to	   the	  U.S.	   and	   Latin	  
America.	  	  However,	  several	  important	  factors	  limited	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  country	  
would	  capitalize	  on	  the	  opportunity:	  the	  historical	  dominance	  of	  the	  Mexican	  market	  
by	  the	  computer	  TNCs;	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  computer	  scientists	  and	  engineers;	  
the	  change	  of	  administration	  and	  loss	  of	  nationalist	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  at	  cabinet	  
level;	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  which	  limited	  the	  scope	  for	  direct	  government	  investment	  in	  
the	  industry	  and	  conditioned	  the	  de	  facto	  objectives	  of	  the	  programme,	  narrowing	  
them	  primarily	  to	  balance	  of	  trade	  considerations;	  the	  mounting	  pressure	  from	  the	  
TNCs	  led	  by	  IBM	  with	  the	  active	  support	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  	  
	   The	   interaction	  of	   these	   factors	   that	   opened	  up	   and	   subsequently	   limited	  
opportunities	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	   industry	  should	  not	  be	  
viewed	  mechanically,	  however.	  	  A	  strongly	  committed	  and	  united	  Mexican	  state	  could	  
have	   overcome	   the	   obstacles	   encountered	   by	   offering	   a	   strong	   lead	   to	   private	  
industry.	  	  This	  lead	  could	  have	  been	  given	  through	  a	  proactive	  procurement	  policy	  and	  
direct	  investment	  in	  the	  industry,	  perhaps	  in	  components.	  	  The	  government's	  failure	  to	  
                                                
354	  By	  "exogenous	  factors,"	  the	  author	  means	  those	  things	  outside	  the	  country's	  influence.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  México	  didn't	  create	  the	  opportunity	  for	  itself	  is	  important.	  	  Policy	  in	  this	  area	  
has	  continued	  to	  be	  reactive	  to	  external	  forces	  and	  conditions.	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provide	  such	  a	  lead	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  short–term	  outlook	  of	  the	  leadership	  
(e.g.,	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  education	  system),	  the	  self–interested	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  
bureaucracy	  (in	  its	  procurement	  policy	  that	  failed	  to	  give	  consistent	  support	  to	  the	  
nascent	  Mexican	  industry),	  and/or	  simply	  to	  the	  interaction	  of	  changing	  priorities	  and	  
limited	  resources.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  proponents	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  industry	  in	  México	  
were	  unable	  to	  generate	  the	  political	  will	  within	  the	  state	  bureaucracy	  to	  overcome	  
the	  obstacles	  they	  encountered.	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CHAPTER	  9	  
AFTERWORD:	  
SUMMARY	  OF	  DEVELOPMENTS	  IN	  THE	  MEXICAN	  CASE	  SINCE	  1990	  
This	  chapter	  summarizes	  the	  key	  developments	  in	  the	  Mexican	  case	  since	  1990	  
when	   President	   Salinas	   eliminated	   the	   important	   elements	   of	   the	   computer	  
development	  program	  enacted	  eight	  years	  earlier.	  The	  pattern	  for	  state	  policy	  and	  the	  
future	  development	  of	  the	  industry	  was	  set	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  changed	  little	  after	  that,	  
so	  this	  chapter	  will	  look	  most	  closely	  at	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  the	  shift	  in	  
policy.	  It	  begins	  by	  reviewing	  the	  shift	  in	  policy	  itself	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   informatics	   industry	   in	   México.	   This	   chapter	   concludes	   with	  
observations	  about	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  policy	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  
host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining.	  
Policy	  Development:	  Big	  Bang	  Liberalization	  
The	  Computer	  Electronics	  Development	  Program	  formulated	  in	  1981	  set	  out	  
four	   basic	   objectives:	   (i)	   to	   promote	   technology	   development,	   linking	   in-­‐country	  
production	  with	  R&D	  centers;	  (ii)	  to	  produce	  internationally	  competitive	  computer	  
equipment	  for	  the	  local	  market;	  (iii)	  to	  promote	  exports	  while	  reducing	  imports;	  and	  
(iv)	  to	  promote	  the	  development	  of	  Mexican	  component	  suppliers.	  Foreign	  capital	  was	  
limited	   to	   minority	   interest	   in	   microcomputers,	   peripherals	   and	   component	  
operations.	   Local	   content	   requirements	  were	   set.	   Companies	   registered	  with	   the	  
program	  were	  given	  preferential	  treatment	  for	  government	  procurement	  contracts,	  
but	  they	  had	  to	  invest	  a	  percentage	  of	  their	  sales	  to	  fund	  the	  creation	  of	  research	  
centers	  and	  training	  programs.	  Import	  quotas	  and	  tariffs	  were	  established	  to	  ensure	  
priority	  was	  given	  to	  national	  production.	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As	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  original	  case	  material,	  by	  the	  late	  1980s	  the	  policy’s	  
actual	  objectives	  diverged	  from	  those	  outlined	  in	  the	  written	  policy.	  In	  practice,	  the	  
policy	  emphasis	  had	  already	  shifted	  away	  from	  promoting	  the	  development	  of	  an	  
integrated	  local	  informatics	  industry	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  competitive	  electronics	  
export	  base.	  	  
Following	  his	  disputed	  election	  victory	   in	  1988,	  President	  Salinas	  de	  Gotari	  
accelerated	   the	   structural	   reforms	   and	   liberalization	   initiated	   by	   his	   predecessor	  
Miguel	  de	  la	  Madrid.	  Beginning	  in	  1990,	  Salinas	  lifted	  most	  restrictions	  on	  trade	  and	  
foreign	   investment	  as	  part	  of	   the	   liberalization	  program.	  The	  government	  slashed	  
average	  import	  tariffs	  from	  29%	  to	  10%	  and	  eliminated	  import	  licenses	  on	  all	  but	  5%	  of	  
products	  coming	  into	  the	  country.355	  Salinas	  privatized	  Telmex,	  two	  national	  airlines	  
and	  the	  four	  largest	  banks.	  In	  fact,	  he	  oversaw	  a	  huge	  privatization	  program,	  selling,	  
closing	  or	  merging	  75%	  of	  the	  1,155	  parastatals	  in	  the	  country.356	  Tax	  reforms	  were	  
enacted	  and	  public	  spending	  cut	  to	  address	  the	  deficit.	  	  
Restrictions	  on	  foreign	  investment	  were	  lifted	  under	  a	  new	  Foreign	  Investment	  
Law	  in	  1993	  and	  trade	  barriers	  were	  further	  lowered	  under	  a	  new	  Foreign	  Trade	  Law.	  
As	  a	  result,	  investor	  confidence	  soared.	  Foreign	  investment	  inflows	  grew	  fourfold	  in	  
two	  years,	  from	  $3	  billion	  in	  1989	  to	  $12.2	  billion	  in	  1991.	  Salinas	  then	  successfully	  
anchored	  the	  liberalization	  policies	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  North	  American	  Free	  
Trade	  in	  January	  1994.	  	  
                                                
355	  Knecht,	  Peter,	  series	  ed.	  Background	  Notes:	  México	  1991.	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  United	  
States	  Department	  of	  State,	  Bureau	  of	  Public	  Affairs,	  Office	  of	  Public	  Communication,	  
1991).	  
356	  Ibid. 
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In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  sweeping	  liberal	  market	  reforms,	  Salinas	  took	  specific	  
steps	  to	  open	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market.	  In	  1990	  import	  permits	  and	  quotas	  were	  
eliminated	   entirely.	   Initially,	   import	   tariffs	   that	   were	   largely	   consistent	   with	   the	  
original	  program	  remained	  in	  force:	  20%	  maximum	  import	  tariff	  for	  finished	  products,	  
15%	  for	  parts	  and	  5%	  for	  components	  with	  high-­‐technology	  content.	  The	  import	  tariffs	  
were	  reduced	  later	  in	  the	  decade.	  PCs	  attracted	  a	  12%	  import	  duty	  under	  NAFTA	  in	  
1994	   until	   the	   tariffs	   were	   eliminated	   altogether	   in	   1998.	   R&D	   investment	  
requirements	  were	  dropped	  and	  all	   companies	  were	  given	  access	   to	  government	  
procurement	  contracts.	  	  
While	  lip	  service	  was	  paid	  to	  industry	  promotion	  at	  various	  times	  throughout	  
the	  1990s,	  the	  market	  was	  open	  and	  the	  industry	  was	  largely	  left	  to	  its	  own	  devices.	  
Ernesto	   Zedillo	   was	   elected	   president	   at	   the	   end	   of	   1994	   and	   called	   for	   the	  
development	   and	   exploitation	   of	   information	   technology	   as	   a	   national	   goal.	   He	  
adopted	  a	  “Plan	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  Informatics”	  that	  sought	  to	  promote	  IT	  use,	  
human	  resource	  development,	  R&D,	  the	  development	  of	  a	  local	  IT	  industry	  to	  exploit	  
niche	  opportunities,	  improvement	  of	  the	  telecom	  infrastructure,	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
legal	  framework	  to	  protect	  intellectual	  property.	  The	  Plan	  had	  little	  impact,	  however.	  
The	  new	  informatics	  plan	  contained	  no	  new	  funding	  and	  assigned	  no	  pilot	  agency	  to	  
ensure	  coordination	  among	  institutions	  that	  would	  be	  involved	  in	  its	  implementation.	  	  
The	  result	  was	  various	  ad	  hoc	  attempts	  to	  support	  the	  development	  of	  local	  
suppliers	  to	  the	  large	  foreign	  electronics	  companies.	  SECOFI	  with	  the	  support	  of	  two	  
development	  banks	  -­‐	  Banco	  Nacional	  de	  Comercio	  Exterior	  and	  Nacional	  Financiera	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provided	  capital	  to	  local	  suppliers.357	  In	  Jalisco	  –	  the	  center	  of	  México’s	  information	  
technology	   cluster	   –	   a	   separate	   organization	   was	   created	   in	   early	   1998	   named	  
Electronics	  Industry	  Production	  Chain	  (CADELEC).	  CADELEC	  sought	  to	  promote	  the	  
development	  of	  local	  suppliers	  to	  the	  large	  electronics	  companies	  operating	  in	  that	  
state.	  However,	  efforts	  were	  uncoordinated,	  funding	  was	  limited,	  and	  an	  overarching	  
strategy	  was	  completely	  absent.358	  
Industry	  Development:	  Rapid	  Adjustments	  
How	   did	   the	   Mexican	   computer	   industry	   develop	   following	   the	   Big	   Bang	  
liberalization	  of	  1990	  and	  the	  subsequent	  adoption	  of	  NAFTA	  in	  1994?	  Interpreting	  the	  
results	  is	  complicated	  by	  the	  peso	  crisis	  and	  recession	  of	  1994-­‐95,	  but	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  
industry	  over	  the	  whole	  decade	  provides	  a	  clear	  picture.	  	  
Continuing	   its	   general	   direction	   of	   travel	   since	   the	   IBM	   decision	   in	   1985,	  
México’s	  computer	  industry	  developed	  into	  an	  export	  platform	  for	  the	  US	  market,	  
dominated	  by	  large,	  foreign	  TNCs.	  Production	  focused	  on	  assembly	  activities	  using	  
imported	  high-­‐tech	  components.	  Subsequently,	  NAFTA	  encouraged	  foreign	  producers	  
to	  supply	  their	  Mexican	  assembly	  plants	  from	  México	  rather	  than	  import	  parts	  and	  
semi-­‐finished	   inputs	   from	  Asia.	   As	   a	   result,	  México	   has	   seen	   rapid	   growth	   in	   the	  
production	  of	  circuit	  boards,	  cables,	  connectors	  and	  other	  parts,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  
semiconductors	  and	  disk	  drives.	  	  
While	  the	  consumer	  electronics	  industry	  clustered	  near	  the	  U.S.	  border,	  the	  
computer	  industry’s	  primary	  locus	  is	  Jalisco	  (Guadalajara)	  where	  IBM	  established	  its	  
                                                
357	  In	  a	  sense,	  NAFTA	  generalized	  some	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  maquiladora	  program	  
throughout	  the	  country.	  	  
358	  Jason	  Dedrick,	  Kenneth	  L.	  Kraemer	  and	  Juan	  Palacios,	  Impacts	  of	  Liberalization	  and	  
Economic	  Integration	  on	  México’s	  Computer	  Sector,	  Center	  for	  Research	  on	  Information	  
Technology	  and	  Organizations,	  University	  of	  California,	  Irvine,	  CA,	  January	  2001.	  
        273 
production	  facility.	  This	  region	  produces	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  nation’s	  computer	  output	  
and	  was	  home	  to	  120	  companies	  employing	  50,000	  employees	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.359	  	  
Figure	  9.1	  below	  shows	  that	  computer	  production	  in	  México	  remained	  flat	  
during	  the	  transition	  period	  of	  1989-­‐91.	  It	  then	  expanded	  rapidly	  from	  $916	  million	  in	  
1991	  to	  $2.9	  billion	  in	  1997,	  excluding	  maquiladora	  production.	  If	  maquiladoras	  are	  
included,	  production	  of	  computer	  hardware	  exceeded	  $4.5	  billion	  in	  1997.	  	  	  
Figure	  9.1	  	  
Computer	  Hardware	  Production	  in	  México360	  
	  
Sales	  of	  personal	  computers	  –	  the	  part	  of	  the	  market	  that	  had	  been	  hitherto	  
reserved	  for	  local	  majority-­‐owned	  firms	  –	  amounted	  to	  250,000	  units	  in	  1990.	  After	  
the	  market	  was	  opened,	  sales	  grew	  at	  about	  20%	  per	  year	  up	  to	  1994	  to	  roughly	  
                                                
359	  IBM	  alone	  accounted	  for	  10,000	  of	  these	  employees	  at	  the	  time.	  Dedrick,	  Kraemer,	  
Palacios	  and	  Tigre	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2001),	  p.	  1208.	  
360	  Source:	  Reed	  Electronics	  Research,	  Yearbook	  of	  World	  Electronics	  Data,	  cited	  in	  
Dedrick,	  Kraemer	  and	  Palacios,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2001),	  p.	  33. 
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500,000	   units.	   After	   a	   dip	   in	   1995	   resulting	   from	   the	   peso	   crisis,	   annual	   sales	  
accelerated	  to	  nearly	  1.4	  million	  units	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade.361	  	  
The	  top	  PC	  producers	  were	  all	  foreign.	  By	  1998,	  Compaq	  was	  largest	  with	  a	  
21%	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  IBM	  was	  second	  with	  a	  13%	  share.	  Acer	  was	  third	  and	  HP	  
fourth	  with	  11%	  and	  10%	  shares	  of	  the	  market	  respectively.	  Printaform,	  one	  of	  the	  few	  
national	  success	  stories	  under	  the	  Computer	  Development	  Policy	  of	  the	  1980s	  clung	  to	  
a	  0.4%	  share	  of	  the	  market	  in	  1998.	  After	  liberalization	  the	  company	  survived	  primarily	  
by	  producing	  office	  equipment.	  	  
Lanix,	  a	  private	  Mexican	  company	  established	  in	  1990,	  produced	  its	  first	  PC	  in	  
1995.	  By	  1998	  Lanix	  held	  nearly	  3%	  of	  the	  market.	  Lanix	  has	  continued	  to	  grow	  and	  
diversify	  its	  product	  range,	  manufacturing	  under	  its	  own	  brand	  as	  well	  as	  under	  private	  
label	   contracts,	   and	   is	   now	   easily	   the	   largest	   Mexican	   consumer	   electronics	  
manufacturer.	   In	   2005,	   the	   company	   had	  more	   than	   11,000	   employees	   and	  was	  
exporting	  to	  other	  markets	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
Post	  1990,	  with	  lower	  tariffs	  and	  expanded	  production,	  prices	  fell.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  3,000	  assemblers	  of	  so-­‐called	  white	  box	  PC	  clones	  and	  components	  were	  the	  
biggest	  losers	  during	  the	  1990s.	  Their	  market	  share	  plummeted	  from	  an	  estimated	  
70%	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  to	  21%	  in	  1998.	  	  
In	  1998,	  91%	  of	  packaged	  software	  was	  imported	  while	  customized	  software	  
and	  services	  were	  largely	  developed	  in	  México.362	  Softek,	  a	  Mexican	  firm	  founded	  in	  
1982,	  became	  the	  largest	  player	  in	  this	  segment	  with	  2,000	  employees	  and	  $50	  million	  
                                                
361	  IDC	  data,	  cited	  in	  Dedrick,	  Kraemer,	  and	  Palacios,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2001):	  19.	  
362	  US	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  1998.	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in	   sales	   in	   1997.	   The	   company	   developed	   a	   very	   successful	   “near-­‐shore”	   data	  
processing	  service	  with	  increasingly	  global	  reach.	  	  	  
After	  the	  government	  opened	  up	  the	  informatics	  market,	  new	  foreign	  players	  
entered	  and	  imports	  grew	  rapidly.	  The	  peso	  crisis	  and	  recession	  of	  1995/6	  halted	  the	  
growth	  in	  imports,	  albeit	  temporarily.	  What	  is	  more	  striking	  is	  the	  development	  of	  
exports.	  Exports	  actually	  declined	  steadily	  from	  1989	  to	  1992,	  while	  imports	  grew	  
sharply.	  This	  seems	  natural	  considering	  that	  this	  period	  saw	  a	  large	  number	  of	  new	  
foreign	  entrants	  establishing	  and	  then	  ramping	  up	  production	  facilities	  in	  México	  post	  
liberalization.	  Once	  production	  was	  established,	  exports	  began	  to	  grow	  and	  received	  a	  
big	   boost	   from	   the	   NAFTA	   accords	   and	   the	   peso	   devaluation	   (see	   Figure	   9.2).	  
According	  to	  SECOFI,	  PC	  exports	  increased	  from	  $553	  million	  in	  1990	  to	  $3.8	  billion	  in	  
1997.363	  	  
Since	  1990,	  IBM	  diversified	  production	  at	  its	  plant	  in	  Guadalajara.	  By	  removing	  
concerns	  about	  export	  quotas	  or	  local	  content	  requirements,	  liberalization	  allowed	  
IBM	  de	  México	  to	  play	  its	  natural	  role	  in	  the	  company’s	  global	  production	  and	  supply	  
chain	  network.	  In	  the	  1990s,	  IBM	  diversified	  production	  in	  México	  to	  include	  desktop	  
and	  laptop	  PCs,	  PC	  servers	  and	  disk	  drives.	  Employment	  expanded	  to	  an	  estimated	  
8,000	  workers	   in	  1998.	  The	  company	  has	  invested	  in	  the	  development	  of	  México-­‐
based	  suppliers	  (local	  and	  foreign-­‐owned).	  In	  1998,	  the	  company	  was	  reported	  to	  be	  
sourcing	   components	   from	  25	  México-­‐based	   suppliers	  among	   the	  200	  companies	  
supplying	  IBM	  de	  México.	  
	  
                                                
363	  "Estadísticas	  sobre	  la	  Industria	  de	  Computadoras	  en	  México."	  Secretaria	  de	  Comercio	  y	  
Fomento	  Industrial,	  Dirección	  de	  la	  Industria	  Electrónica.	  	  México	  D.F.:	  SECOFI,	  1998.	  
        276 
Figure	  9.2	  	  
México’s	  Trade	  in	  Computer	  Hardware364	  
	  
In	  1999	  IBM	  took	  the	  decision	  to	  expand	  its	  manufacturing	  facility	  in	  Jalisco	  to	  
include	  tape	  and	  disk	  drives	  that	  were	  previously	  made	  in	  California.365	  The	  expansion	  
was	  reported	  to	  create	  2,750	  jobs.	  In	  the	  late	  1990s	  IBM	  employed	  a	  team	  of	  150	  
software	   engineers	   focused	   on	   its	   AS/400	   product	   line	   and	   acquired	   TecnoSys,	   a	  
customized	   applications	   software	   firm,	   to	   expand	   IBM’s	   service	   to	   customers	   in	  
México.	  
The	  development	  of	  Hewlett	  Packard’s	  operations	  in	  México	  followed	  along	  
similar	  lines.	  In	  1989,	  HP’s	  Mexican	  operations	  assumed	  global	  responsibility	  for	  line	  
impact	  printers.	  In	  1992,	  HP	  México	  began	  doing	  final	  assembly	  and	  distribution	  of	  
personal	  computers	  for	  Latin	  American	  markets.	  On	  the	  heels	  of	  NAFTA,	  HP	  México	  
                                                
364	  Source:	  Reed	  Electronics	  Research,	  Yearbook	  of	  World	  Electronics	  Data,	  Dedrick,	  
Kraemer	  and	  Palacios,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2001):	  32.	  
365	  “IBM	  Begins	  Layoffs	  at	  Disk	  Drive	  Operation	  in	  San	  Jose,	  Calif.”	  San	  Jose	  Mercury	  News,	  
June	  25,	  1999.	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diversified	  production	  as	  a	   regional	  manufacturing	  center.	  By	  1998,	  HP’s	  Mexican	  
operations	  took	  prime	  regional	  responsibility	  for	  the	  company’s	  rapidly	  growing	  and	  
very	  profitable	  range	  of	  printers.	  The	  company’s	  Mexican	  operations	  weren’t	  confined	  
to	  production,	  however.	  At	  this	  time	  the	  company	  had	  35-­‐strong	  engineering	  team	  
that	  had	  generated	  15	  patents	  and	  seven	  products	  for	  five	  different	  printer	  platforms.	  
In	   summary,	   since	   liberalization	   and	   the	   adoption	   of	   NAFTA,	   México	   has	  
become	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  global	  supply	  chains	  of	  large	  informatics	  TNCs	  with	  a	  
focus	  on	  furnishing	  the	  US	  and	  Latin	  American	  markets.	  Correspondingly,	  exports	  have	  
expanded	   rapidly	   resulting	   in	  a	  positive	  balance	  of	   trade	   in	   the	   sector.	  Computer	  
production	  in	  the	  country	  has	  expanded	  rapidly	  with	  competitive	  technology	  and	  price	  
levels.	  However,	  most	  of	   the	   local	  players	   that	  began	  operations	  under	   the	  1981	  
Computer	  Development	  Plan	  have	  been	  squeezed	  out;	  the	  market	  is	  concentrated	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  the	  large	  TNCs.	  In	  fact,	  the	  one	  player	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  thrived	  (Lanix)	  
only	  began	  after	  the	  policy	  had	  been	  abandoned.	  An	  impressive	  industry	  cluster	  has	  
developed	  around	  Guadalajara,	  expanding	  employment	  of	  technicians	  and	  managers	  
in	  the	  process,	  but	  the	  industry	  remains	  reliant	  on	  imports	  of	  high-­‐tech	  components.	  	  
Concluding	  Observations	  
To	  borrow	  Evans’	  nomenclature	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  Mexican	  case,	  the	  state	  
played	  the	  role	  of	  midwife	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  national	  computer	  industry	  from	  1981-­‐
86	  (to	  be	  generous	  with	  the	  timescale),	  with	  some	  modest	  success.	  Operating	  with	  
only	  half-­‐hearted	  support	  from	  above,	  the	  policy	  implementers	  can	  be	  credited	  with	  
the	   growth	   in	   the	   number	   of	   companies	   manufacturing	   microcomputers,	  
minicomputers	  and	  peripherals	  in	  México.	  Under	  the	  policy	  guidelines,	  two-­‐thirds	  of	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those	  companies	  were	  financed	  with	  Mexican	  capital,	  while	  the	  remaining	  third	  were	  
joint	  ventures	  that	  were	  majority	  Mexican-­‐owned.	  	  
The	  Mexican	  state	  never	  attempted	  anything	  resembling	  “husbandry”	  after	  
playing	  the	  midwife	  role	  for	  those	  few	  years.	  The	  result	  wasn’t	  a	  stillborn	  national	  
industry,	  but	  the	  local	  players	  were	  competitively	  fragile.	  They	  were	  largely	  assembling	  
and	   selling	   outdated	   technology	   at	   prices	   that	   were	   50-­‐75%	   higher	   than	   the	  
international	  standard.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   being	   economically	   vulnerable,	   the	   national	   industry	   was	  
politically	  exposed.	  As	  has	  been	  explained	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  the	  IBM	  decision	  and	  
the	  results	  that	  followed	  seem	  well	  explained	  by	  classic	  bargaining	  theory.	  In	  this	  case,	  
longer	   hindsight	   only	   confirms	  what	  was	   apparent	   in	   the	   late	   1980s.	   Apart	   from	  
establishing	   some	   order	   in	   a	   chaotic	   market,	   assisting	   the	   balance	   of	   trade	   and	  
generating	   employment,	   policy	   successes	  were	   limited	   to	  modest	   and	   temporary	  
bargaining	  wins	  with	  IBM,	  HP	  and	  Apple.	  	  
Few	  Mexican	  players	  survived	  market	  liberalization.	  As	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil,	  the	  
state	  cannot	  take	  credit	  for	  those	  few	  exceptional	  local	  players	  that	  thrived	  in	  the	  
competitive	   marketplace.	   The	   success	   of	   Lanix	   and	   Softek	   owes	   more	   to	   the	  
entrepreneurial	  talent	  of	  the	  founders	  and	  managers	  than	  to	  anything	  the	  state	  did	  or	  
didn’t	  do.	  	  
México’s	  location	  next	  to	  the	  world’s	  largest	  IT	  market	  and	  its	  membership	  of	  
NAFTA	  provide	   rare	  advantages.	   The	   rapid	  and	   sustained	   increase	   in	  exports	   and	  
corresponding	   balance	   of	   trade	   surplus	   in	   the	   sector	   reflect	   those	   advantages.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  government	  has	  not	  sought	  to	  fully	  capitalize	  on	  the	  position.	  There	  
has	   been	   no	   proactive,	   coordinated,	   funded	   national	   strategy	   to	   develop	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infrastructure,	   human	   capital	   or	   the	   technology	   base	   to	   support	   the	   national	  
informatics	  industry.	  The	  industry	  has	  developed	  largely	  according	  to	  its	  own	  global	  
commercial	  logic.	  Production	  has	  indeed	  expanded	  enormously	  in	  México,	  accelerated	  
by	  the	  general	  industry	  practice	  of	  global	  sourcing	  and	  regional	  production	  to	  keep	  up	  
with	  ever-­‐shorter	  product	  cycles.	  	  	  
The	  Mexican	  state’s	  free	  market	  policies	  helped	  the	  country	  participate	  in	  the	  
global	  computer	  industry.	  But	  the	  hands	  off	  approach	  has	  not	  been	  sufficient	  to	  fully	  
capitalize	  on	  the	  unique	  position	  the	  country	  has	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  industry	  dynamics	  
and	  the	  country’s	  proximity	  to	  the	  US.	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CHAPTER	  10	  
SUMMARY	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  
	  	  	  
	   The	  central	  objective	  of	  this	  research	  project	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  policy	  initiatives	  
followed	   and	   the	   factors	   that	   explain	   different	   policy	   outcomes	   in	   the	   two	   cases	  
considered,	  thereby	  deepening	  our	  understanding	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining,	  
emphasising	  country-­‐specific	  factors.	  The	  thesis	  thus	  addresses	  itself	  to	  four	  tasks	  in	  
order:	   	  (i)	  to	  describe	  the	  Mexican	  and	  Brazilian	  experience	  with	  the	  international	  
computer	  industry	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s;	  (ii)	  to	  evaluate	  the	  results	  of	  Mexican	  
and	  Brazilian	  government	  policy	  in	  this	  sector	  in	  light	  of	  the	  policies’	  objectives;	  (iii)	  to	  
explain	  the	  relative	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  policy	  initiatives;	  and	  (iv)	  to	  draw	  relevant	  
implications	  for	  theories	  of	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining.	  The	  preceding	  chapters	  
have	  addressed	  the	  first	  three	  ‘tasks’	  in	  detail,	  analysing	  the	  cases	  sequentially.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  concluding	  chapter	  is	  to	  address	  the	  fourth	  objective,	  considering	  the	  
implications	  for	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining.	  	  
This	  chapter	  begins	  with	  a	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  summary	  of	  the	  two	  cases,	  focusing	  on	  
the	  market	  reserve	  policy	  (objectives,	  content,	  support	  and	  duration),	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
state,	   the	  response	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  capital,	  and	  finally,	   the	   impact	  of	  the	  
policy	  while	  in	  place	  and	  its	  lasting	  legacy.	  Preceding	  chapters	  have	  discussed	  these	  
points	  in	  detail	  but	  it	  is	  a	  helpful	  reminder	  to	  see	  the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  two	  cases	  
side	  by	  side.	  The	  chapter	  then	  reprises	  the	  primary	  tenets	  of	  the	  bargaining	  model	  
before	  drawing	  implications	  for	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  from	  the	  two	  cases	  
studied.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  extraordinary	  difficulty	  of	  directing	  the	  development	  of	  such	  a	  
hyper-­‐dynamic	  globalised	  sector,	  the	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  suggesting	  a	  potentially	  
more	  effective	  –	  and	  practical	  –	  catalytic	  role	  that	  developmental	  states	  might	  play	  to	  
achieve	  their	  objectives.	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Table	  10.1	  
Summary	  Comparison	  of	  Cases	  














Control	  the	  process	  of	  informatization	  
in	  the	  country.	  
Develop	  Brazilian	  capability	  to	  ensure	  
design,	  development	  and	  production	  in	  
Brazil.	  
Create	  professional	  jobs	  in	  the	  sector.	  
Limit	  market	  share	  of	  TNCs	  to	  ensure	  a	  
leading	  position	  for	  national	  
companies.	  
Achieve	  favourable	  balance	  of	  trade.	  
Create	  opening	  for	  the	  development	  of	  
parts	  and	  components	  industry.	  
Promote	  national	  technological	  
development	  linking	  producers	  with	  
R&D	  centres.	  
Produce	  computers	  for	  the	  local	  
market	  that	  are	  internationally	  
competitive	  in	  price	  and	  technology.	  
Develop	  Mexican	  component	  
suppliers	  (horizontal	  integration).	  










Began	  by	  reserving	  minicomputers	  to	  
national	  players,	  allowing	  single	  round	  
of	  technology	  licensing.	  	  
Later,	  extended	  the	  reserve	  to	  
superminis,	  microcomputers	  &	  
software.	  
Established	  import	  restrictions	  and	  
quotas.	  
Fiscal	  incentives	  for	  investment	  in	  R&D,	  
training	  and	  components	  
(microelectronics).	  	  
	  
Mainframes	  and	  minicomputers	  
open	  to	  100%	  foreign	  ownership.	  
Foreign	  capital	  limited	  to	  minority	  
interest	  in	  microcomputers,	  
peripherals	  and	  component	  
operations.	  	  
Local	  content	  requirements.	  
Registered	  companies	  given	  
preference	  for	  government	  
procurement.	  	  
Required	  investment	  in	  designated	  
R&D	  centres	  and	  technical	  training.	  








Broad	  and	  deep	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  
until	  the	  late	  1980s:	  military	  concerned	  
with	  national	  security,	  sector	  
technocrats	  concerned	  with	  
professional	  opportunity,	  large	  
domestic	  capital	  groups,	  especially	  
banks,	  attracted	  by	  the	  market	  
opportunity.	  
Policy	  became	  a	  national	  priority.	  
Support	  limited	  to	  the	  sector	  
technocrats	  who	  drafted	  the	  policy	  
and	  were	  charged	  with	  its	  
implementation	  and	  beneficiaries	  of	  
the	  policy.	  	  
Political	  support	  undermined	  by	  
change	  of	  administration	  and	  
financial	  crisis.	  









n	   16	  years:	  1977	  to	  1992,	  though	  in	  
practice	  the	  policy	  began	  to	  be	  eroded	  
in	  the	  late	  1980s	  so	  was	  in	  full	  force	  for	  
c.	  14	  years.	  
4	  years:	  1982	  to	  1985	  (post-­‐IBM	  
decision),	  though	  a	  few	  tenets	  of	  the	  
policy	  remained	  in	  force	  longer.	  










Regulator	  via	  CAPRE	  and	  SEI,	  managing	  
scope	  of	  the	  reserve,	  technology	  
licensing,	  import	  quotas,	  etc.	  
Direct	  participant	  via	  ownership	  of	  
Cobra.	  
Creator	  and	  manager	  of	  “greenhouse	  
conditions”	  for	  local	  capital.	  
Large	  domestic	  buyer	  with	  ambiguous	  
purchasing	  practices.	  
Regulator	  via	  SECOFI,	  seeking	  to	  
enforce	  policy	  restrictions	  and	  
offering	  incentives	  (e.g.,	  financing,	  
fiscal	  credits,	  etc.)	  
Largest	  domestic	  buyer	  seeking	  best	  














Domestic	  capital	  was	  reticent	  at	  first	  to	  
participate	  in	  state	  flagship,	  Cobra.	  
Large	  domestic	  finance	  and	  industrial	  
groups	  were	  enticed	  into	  the	  market	  
over	  time.	  
Late	  1980s,	  leading	  domestic	  players	  
entered	  into	  licensing	  agreements	  and	  
JVs	  with	  the	  TNCs,	  trading	  protection	  
from	  the	  state	  for	  access	  to	  finance	  and	  
technology.	  
Large	  users	  of	  informatics,	  concerned	  
about	  inflated	  prices	  and	  outdated	  
technology	  arrayed	  against	  the	  reserve.	  
Few	  large	  domestic	  groups	  were	  
enticed	  to	  invest	  (exceptions:	  
Banamex	  and	  CCI).	  
A	  number	  entered	  into	  majority	  JV	  
partnerships	  with	  large	  TNCs	  (H-­‐P,	  
Burroughs,	  Apple).	  	  
More	  licensed	  technology	  from	  
second-­‐tier	  foreign	  players.	  
Local	  investment	  primarily	  focused	  
at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market:	  IBM	  
clone	  assembly,	  dot	  matrix	  printers,	  
etc.	  	  















Defiance	  and	  failed	  pre-­‐emptive	  strikes	  
(IBM).	  
Initial	  failed	  attempt	  to	  enlist	  US	  
government	  support	  to	  overturn	  policy	  
(Data	  General).	  
Expand	  share	  in	  mainframes.	  
Regularly	  test	  the	  policy	  at	  the	  margins	  
(superminis,	  data	  processing).	  
TNCs	  with	  in-­‐country	  operations	  were	  
ambivalent	  about	  US	  government-­‐
initiated	  trade	  dispute.	  	  
With	  the	  exception	  of	  IBM,	  the	  
leading	  TNCs	  entered	  into	  minority	  
JVs.	  
Second-­‐tier	  players	  licensed	  
technology	  to	  micro	  and	  peripheral	  
manufacturers.	  
IBM	  resisted	  and	  enlisted	  the	  
support	  of	  the	  US	  government.	  
IBM	  granted	  permission	  for	  100%	  
ownership	  in	  micros	  and	  peripherals	  
in	  exchange	  for	  commitment	  to	  
large	  investment	  and	  export	  
programme.	  
Most	  other	  TNCs	  dissolved	  their	  JVs	  
shortly	  thereafter	  while	  agreeing	  to	  
aggressive	  export	  targets.	  








Attracted	  large	  number	  of	  domestic	  
firms	  into	  the	  industry.	  
Expanded	  professional	  employment	  in	  
the	  sector.	  
Limited	  TNC	  market	  shares.	  
Failed	  to	  simulate	  sustained	  R&D	  
investment.	  
Eroded	  balance	  of	  trade.	  
Remained	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  high-­‐
tech	  components.	  
Locally	  produced	  equipment	  was	  not	  
internationally	  competitive,	  except	  in	  
bank	  automation.	  
Contraband	  market	  grew.	  
Local	  supply	  remained	  
uncompetitive	  in	  price	  and	  
technology,	  even	  though	  the	  policy	  
exerted	  some	  initial	  downward	  
pressure	  on	  price.	  	  
Improved	  sector’s	  balance	  of	  trade.	  
Expanded	  professional	  employment	  
in	  the	  sector.	  
Failed	  to	  stimulate	  investment	  in	  
R&D.	  	  
Initial	  improvement	  in	  local	  content	  
could	  not	  be	  sustained.	  
Development	  of	  local	  suppliers	  
limited	  to	  low	  end	  of	  the	  market	  
(cables,	  low	  res	  terminals,	  etc.)	  
Helped	  extract	  concessions	  from	  
IBM	  and	  TNCs	  for	  investment	  levels	  
and	  export	  targets.	  









Liberalisation,	  shifting	  emphasis	  from	  
local	  ownership	  to	  local	  production.	  	  
Emphasis	  on	  improving	  quality	  and	  
lowering	  price	  of	  local	  supply	  through	  
competition.	  
Maintained	  mix	  of	  tariffs	  and	  taxes	  to	  
incentivise	  local	  production.	  
Continued	  R&D	  investment	  
requirements.	  	  
Dismantled	  central	  administration	  of	  
policy.	  
Rapid	  liberalisation;	  laissez	  faire	  
approach	  to	  the	  industry.	  
Encourage	  exports	  and	  
internationally	  competitive	  
equipment	  for	  the	  local	  market.	  
Some	  lip	  service	  to	  R&D	  and	  
component	  supply	  promotion	  but	  
no	  funding	  to	  back	  it	  up.	  











Initial	  wave	  of	  local/TNC	  JVs	  gradually	  
gave	  way	  to	  foreign	  majority	  
ownership.	  
A	  number	  of	  internationally	  
competitive	  Brazilian	  players	  (e.g.,	  
Itautec,	  PROCOMP,	  Sistema,	  Rima).	  	  
Large	  cadre	  of	  professionals.	  
Poor	  balance	  of	  trade	  driven	  by	  
dependency	  on	  imported	  components.	  
Dependence	  shifted	  from	  hardware	  to	  
components.	  
Few	  of	  the	  entrants	  under	  the	  
Reserve	  survived.	  
The	  very	  few	  Mexican	  success	  
stories	  developed	  without	  help	  from	  
the	  policy.	  
México	  has	  developed	  as	  export	  
base	  controlled	  by	  TNCs	  with	  
globally	  integrated	  sourcing.	  
Strong	  balance	  of	  trade	  as	  a	  result.	  
Key	  lasting	  success	  is	  the	  growth	  of	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As	  explained	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  the	  bargaining	  construct	  rests	  on	  four	  
basic	  assumptions:	  (i)	  relations	  between	  host	  countries	  and	  TNCs	  are	  characterised	  
both	  by	  divergent	  and	  mutual	  interests;	  (ii)	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  shared,	  non-­‐zero-­‐
sum	  gains;	  (iii)	  the	  actual	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  depends	  on	  the	  relative	  bargaining	  
power	  of	  each;	  and	  (iv)	  there	  is	  a	  shift	  over	  time	  in	  relative	  bargaining	  power	  in	  favour	  
of	  the	  host	  countries	  (the	  “obsolescing	  bargain”).	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  host	  
country,	   the	   state’s	   effective	   bargaining	   “power”	   –	   and	   therefore	   the	   expected	  
distribution	  of	  benefits	  –	  is	  thought	  to	  depend	  on	  six	  factors:	  
(i) Host	  country	  ability	  to	  monitor	  investor	  and	  industry	  behaviour;	  
(ii) The	  cost	  of	  duplicating	  or	  forgoing	  what	  the	  investor	  offers;	  
(iii) Competition	  within	  the	  industry;	  
(iv) The	   vulnerability	   of	   the	   foreign	   assets	   and	   earnings	   to	   adverse	  
treatment	  by	  the	  host	  country;	  
(v) The	  ability	  of	  the	  host	  country	  to	  discount	  the	  international	  political	  
tension	  caused	  by	  investment	  disputes;	  
(vi) The	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  investment	  project.366	  
The	  implications	  for	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  bargaining	  arising	  from	  the	  experience	  
of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  can	  now	  be	  explored	  by	  
examining	   two	  key	  questions:	   (a)	  do	   these	  six	   factors	  offer	  adequate	  explanatory	  
power	  and	  insight	  into	  the	  cases	  studied;	  and	  (b)	  does	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  seem	  to	  
apply	  in	  the	  dynamic,	  globalised	  high-­‐tech	  world	  of	  informatics?	  	  
	  
Underrated	  Factors	  
This	  analysis	  of	   the	  experience	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	   international	  
computer	  industry	  firstly	  reveals	  a	  bargaining	  landscape	  that	  is	  in	  practice	  much	  more	  
dynamic	  than	  the	  traditional	  bargaining	  model,	  with	  its	  six	  bargaining	  “chips”	  suggests.	  
                                                
366	  Bergsten,	  Horst,	  Moran.	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1978):	  369-­‐370.	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While	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  six	  factors	  to	  the	  two	  cases	  is	  beyond	  question367,	  three	  
fundamental	   and	   critically	   important	   factors	   are	  underestimated	   in	   the	   construct	  
above:	  the	  hyper-­‐dynamism	  of	  the	  global	  computer	  industry	  which	  opened	  and	  closed	  
windows	  of	  opportunity	  to	  re-­‐strike	  the	  bargain	  while	  presenting	  enormous	  challenges	  
for	  the	  states	  in	  question	  to	  adapt	  policy	  initiatives	  to	  the	  changing	  realities	  in	  the	  
international	  industry;	  country-­‐specific	  differences,	  including	  the	  states’	  ability	  to	  build	  
and	  maintain	  coalitions	  of	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  and	  country	  situational	  factors;	  and	  
the	  importance	  of	  firm	  level	  strategy	  and	  capability	  which	  better	  explain	  the	  enduring	  
success	  that	  a	  few	  national	  players	  have	  enjoyed.	  A	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  
the	  experience	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  must	  
take	  good	  account	  of	  these	  three	  factors.	  	  	  
In	  exploring	  the	  different	  policy	  choices	  and	  outcomes	  in	  the	  two	  cases,	  the	  
thesis	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  complex	  and	  ongoing	  interplay	  between	  market	  and	  political	  
forces.	  	  Both	  sector-­‐specific	  policy	  and	  private	  investment	  decisions	  act	  as	  endogenous	  
variables	   in	   these	  cases	  of	  TNC-­‐country	  bargaining.	   	  The	  preceding	  chapters	  have	  
explored	  a	  number	  of	  mutual	  adjustments	  (“bargains”)	  that	  have	  occurred	  in	  each	  
case:	   	   (i)	   the	   adjustment	   of	   top	   political	   authorities	   to	   their	   supporters;	   (ii)	   state	  
officials	  to	  each	  other	  (including	  top	  authorities);	  and	  (iii)	  state	  officials	  and	  market	  
agents	  (both	  investors	  and	  consumers,	  foreign	  and	  domestic)	  to	  each	  other.	  	  	  The	  most	  
important	  exogenous	  variables	  are	   the	  competitive	  dynamics	  of	   the	   international	  
informatics	   industry,	   the	  macro	   goals	   of	   the	   host	   country	   regime,	   the	   industry’s	  
importance	  to	  these	  macro	  goals,	  the	  industry’s	  complexity,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  
country-­‐specific	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  historical	  endowment	  of	  a	  technological	  base,	  the	  
                                                
367	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  not	  to	  prove	  or	  disprove	  the	  
bargaining	  model,	  or	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative	  theoretical	  construct	  re:	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  
relations	  over	  investments.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  enrich	  our	  understanding	  by	  highlighting	  factors	  
that	  these	  theoretical	  constructs	  underestimate.	  For	  that	  reason,	  in	  what	  follows	  the	  
author	  has	  not	  offered	  a	  systematic	  assessment	  of	  the	  six	  factors	  in	  relation	  to	  computer	  
bargaining	  in	  México	  and	  Brazil.	  Instead,	  this	  concluding	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  factors	  
that	  best	  explain	  the	  results	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  studied.	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potential	   market	   size,	   and	   geographic	   proximity	   to	   export	   markets.	   	   The	   most	  
impressive	  feature	  of	  these	  various	  factors	  is	  their	  dynamism.	  	  
	   By	  comparing	  the	  two	  cases	  in	  this	  way,	  this	  study	  has	  sought	  to	  avoid	  the	  
stagnationist	  error	  into	  which	  ‘snapshots’	  of	  TNC-­‐country	  bargaining	  fall.	  This	  research	  
project	  has	  detailed	  the	  distinctive	  country-­‐specific	  factors	  that	  have	  shaped	  policy	  
courses	  and	  outcomes,	  which	  have	  been	  often	  neglected	  in	  studies	  of	  this	  kind.	  	  	  	  
	   Without	  doubt,	  the	  dynamism	  of	  the	  computer	  electronics	  industry	  shaped	  and	  
constrained	  opportunities	  for	  México	  and	  Brazil	  to	  alter	  their	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  international	  industry.	  	  Before	  moving	  on	  to	  compare	  country-­‐specific	  factors,	  it	  is	  
imperative	  to	  understand	  more	  clearly	  the	  industry	  specifics	  that	  opened	  and	  closed	  
windows	  of	  opportunity	  in	  the	  bargaining	  “game”	  during	  the	  period	  under	  study.	  
	  
Underrated	  Factors:	  Industry	  Dynamism	  and	  Windows	  of	  Opportunity	  
	   The	  computer	  industry	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  one	  in	  which	  foreign	  capital	  holds	  
the	  whip	  hand.	  	  The	  industry	  is	  characterised	  by:	  rapidly–changing	  high	  technology;	  
on–going	   product	   innovation;	   economies	   of	   scale	   in	   component	   purchasing,	  
production,	  and	  research	  and	  development;	  high	  capital	  requirements;	  and	  increasing	  
global	  integration.	  Indeed,	  during	  the	  period	  under	  study,	  a	  truly	  globalized	  industry	  
emerged	   with	   common	   international	   technology	   standards	   effectively	   set	   and	  
maintained	  by	  a	  few	  large	  companies	  like	  IBM,	  Microsoft	  and	  Intel.	  This	  industry,	  in	  
short,	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  TNCs	  would	  seem	  to	  hold	  all	  the	  bargaining	  chips	  in	  a	  very	  
fast–paced	  and	  dynamic	  game.	  
	   However,	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  international	  computer	  
electronics	   industry	   is	   vital	   to	   any	   clear	   understanding	   of	   real	   bargaining	   power	  
between	  developing	  nation	  hosts	  and	  computer	  TNCs.	  The	  dynamic,	  global	  nature	  of	  
the	  industry	  provided	  both	  opportunities	  and	  risks	  to	  host	  countries	  and	  transnational	  
computer	  companies	  in	  the	  bargaining	  process.	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(i)	  	  Diffusion	  of	  computer	  technology.	  
	  
"Technology	   is	   itself	   a	   body	   of	   knowledge	   about	   certain	   classes	   of	  
events	  and	  activities.	   	   It	   is	  not	  merely	  the	  application	  of	  knowledge	  
brought	   from	   another	   sphere.	   	   It	   is	   a	   knowledge	   of	   techniques,	  
methods,	  and	  designs	  that	  work,	  and	  that	  work	  in	  certain	  ways	  and	  




	   	  
The	  two	  most	  obvious	  types	  of	  "technology"	  related	  to	  the	  computer	  industry	  
are	   product	   design	   technology,	   which	   includes	   basic	   and	   applied	   research	   and	  
development	  related	  both	  to	  hardware,	  software,	  and	  microelectronics,	  and	  process	  
or	  manufacturing	  technology.	  	  Employing	  Rosenberg’s	  definition	  above,	  two	  other	  
"technologies"	   (or	  capabilities)	   that	  a	  successful	  computer	   firm	  must	  possess	  are:	  	  
managerial	  competence,	  including	  capabilities	  in	  international	  component	  sourcing,	  
access	  to	  credit,	  human	  resource	  development,	  and	  strategic	  planning;	  and	  marketing	  
and	   support	   service	   ‘technologies’	   which	   include	   the	   abilities	   of	   the	   firm	   to	  
differentiate	   its	  product	   from	  those	  of	   its	   competitors,	   to	   successfully	  access	  and	  
manage	  distribution	  channels,	  and	  to	  provide	  support	  services	  to	  vendors	  and	  end–
users.	  	  These	  capabilities	  are	  vital	  in	  the	  technologically	  complex	  computer	  industry	  
where	  customers	  often	  base	  their	  purchase	  decision	  upon	  their	  confidence	  in	  the	  firm	  
and	  its	  brand	  promise	  more	  than	  a	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  the	  product	  itself.	   	  
Both	  Brazil	  and	  México	  tried	  to	  gain	  these	  four	  ‘technologies’	  by	  promoting	  
local	   investment	   in	   the	   computer	   industry	   and	   restricting	   and	  orientating	   foreign	  
capital	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   local	   capabilities	   had	   room	   to	   develop,	   while	   foreign	  
capabilities	  are	  transferred	  to	  local	  companies.	  	  The	  diffusion	  of	  product	  and	  process	  
technologies	   in	   the	   international	   computer	   industry	   aided	  both	   countries	   in	   their	  
quest.	  
	   Much	  computer	  product	   technology	   is	  proprietary,	  especially	   in	   the	   larger	  
more	  advanced	  computer	  systems.	  	  However,	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  market,	  most	  of	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Nathan	   Rosenberg,	   Inside	   the	   Black	   Box:	   	   Technology	   and	   Economics,	   (Cambridge:	  	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1982):	  143.	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the	  technology	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  integrated	  circuits	  (ICs	  or	  chips)	  and	  the	  operating	  
system	   (basic	   software).	   	   Because	   companies	   that	   were	   not	   involved	   in	   the	  
manufacture	   of	   end–user	   equipment	   were	   the	   ones	   to	   develop	   chips	   for	  
microcomputers,
369	   these	   technology–intensive	   chips	   became	   available	   on	   the	  
international	  market.	  	  As	  the	  market	  for	  micros	  experienced	  dynamic	  growth,	  and	  the	  
process	   technology	   associated	   with	   semiconductor	   manufacturing	   became	   more	  
advanced,	   standard	   chips	   became	   relatively	   cheap	   international	   commodities.	  	  
Competition	  in	  microelectronics	  intensified	  as	  Japanese	  and	  European	  firms	  entered	  
the	  fray.	  	  Indeed,	  Japan	  overtook	  the	  U.S.	  in	  supply	  of	  ICs	  to	  the	  world	  market	  during	  
the	  period	  under	  study.	  	  Thus	  the	  primary	  technology	  associated	  with	  micros	  became	  
readily	  accessible	  the	  world	  over.	  	  	  
	   Although	  the	  computer	  industry	  can	  rightly	  be	  described	  as	  oligopolistic	  in	  that	  
market	   concentration	   was	   high	   in	   the	   sector,	   the	   industry	   has	   remained	   very	  
entrepreneurial,	  with	  new	  entrants	  carving	  out	  positions	  in	  the	  global	  market	  and	  
small	  players	  thriving	  in	  sub-­‐sectors.	  	  There	  are	  many	  hundreds	  of	  companies	  that	  
operate	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  market	  and	  possess	  technology	  know–how	  comparable	  
to	   the	   giant	   computer	   transnationals.	   	   These	   companies	   are	   potential	   sources	   of	  
product	  and	  process	  technology	  for	  a	  less	  developed	  economy.	  	  Brazil	  successfully	  
tapped	  companies	  of	  this	  sort	  in	  Ferranti	  and	  Sycor	  before	  landing	  the	  larger	  computer	  
TNCs	  in	  licensing	  agreements.	  	  Likewise,	  Mexican	  companies	  licensed	  microcomputer	  
technology	  from	  the	  likes	  of	  Columbia	  (subsequently	  bankrupt)	  and	  Televideo.	  	  
	   In	   sum,	   increasing	   diffusion	   of	   computer	   technology	   served	   to	   open	   the	  
window	  for	  Brazilian	  and	  Mexican	  players	  to	  gain	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  computer	  industry.	  
	  
                                                
369	  Intel	  was	  the	  first	  to	  introduce	  the	  microprocessor,	  which	  can	  be	  programmed	  to	  carry	  out	  
information	  processing	  and	  control	   functions	   in	  1971.	   	  Those	  that	   followed	   include	  Texas	  
Instruments,	  Motorola,	  Zilog,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  U.S.,	  Japanese,	  and	  European	  companies.	  	  
IBM	  purchased	  shares	  of	  Intel	  and	  has	  very	  strong	  capabilities	  in	  microelectronics;	  however,	  
this	  has	  in	  no	  way	  limited	  the	  international	  market	  for	  microprocessors.	  	  Interestingly,	  IBM	  
purchased	  chips	  from	  Intel	  for	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  its	  personal	  computer;	  but	  used	  more	  of	  
its	  own	  chips	  in	  the	  second	  generation.	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(ii)	  Rapid	  and	  progressive	  advances	  in	  processing	  power.	  
	   The	  revolution	  in	  semiconductor	  technology	  that	  occurred	  since	  the	  transistor	  
was	   integrated	  with	   other	   components	   into	   a	   silicon	   base	   served	   to	   dramatically	  
reduce	  manufacturing	   costs,	   enlarge	   information	   storage	   capacities,	   and	   increase	  
efficiency	  in	  computing.	  	  Moore's	  law	  has	  proved	  uncannily	  accurate	  over	  the	  past	  few	  
decades:	  the	  number	  of	  transistors	  that	  can	  be	  placed	  inexpensively	  on	  an	  integrated	  
circuit	  has	  doubled	  approximately	  every	  two	  years.370	  Processes	  of	  large	  scale	  and	  very	  
large	  scale	  integration	  (LSI	  and	  VLSI)	  and	  tools	  such	  as	  computer-­‐aided	  design	  (CAD)	  
have	  further	  propelled	  the	  field	  of	  microelectronics,	  driving	  costs	  ever	  downward	  and	  
computing	  power	  ever	  upward.	  
	   Thus,	  computing	  power	  has	  become	  embodied	  in	  ever-­‐smaller	  equipment:	  	  
first	   came	   the	  minicomputer	   in	  1965,	   then	   the	  microcomputer	   in	   the	   late	  1970s.	  	  
Concurrently,	  computing	  power	  has	  become	  progressively	  less	  expensive.	  	  The	  price	  
per	  information	  'bit'	  of	  storage	  fell	  from	  1	  cent	  per	  bit	  in	  1970	  to	  nearly	  0.001	  cent	  in	  
1984.	   	   A	   32–bit	  microprocessor	  with	   the	   power	   of	   a	  mainframe	   computer	   could	  




	   These	   twin	   effects	   in	   turn	   contributed	   to	   the	   explosion	   of	   the	  market	   for	  
computer	  electronics.	  	  The	  early	  1980s	  witnessed	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  "home	  computer"	  
in	   the	   U.S.,	   Japan,	   and	   Europe,	   thus	   including	   virtually	   every	   household	   in	   the	  
addressable	  market	  for	  computer	  equipment	  and	  software.	  	  While	  the	  markets	  of	  
México	   and	   Brazil	   remained	   much	   more	   limited,	   many	   more	   professionals	   and	  
businesses	  could,	  by	  then,	  be	  included	  in	  the	  market.	  	  This	  rapid	  expansion,	  discussed	  
below,	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  for	  México	  and	  Brazil	  to	  profitably	  develop	  capability	  
in	  this	  new	  area.	  	  
                                                
370	  Intel’s	  co-­‐founder	  Gordon	  Moore	  first	  described	  this	  trend	  in	  a	  1965	  paper	  reproduced	  
in	  Electronics	  Magazine,	  November	  11,	  2006,	  p.	  4.	  It	  has	  since	  become	  accepted	  wisdom	  in	  
the	  industry.	  	  
371	  Atul	  Wad,	  "Microelectronics:	  	  Implications	  and	  Strategies	  for	  the	  Third	  World,"	  Third	  World	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  (October	  1982):	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  56.	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However,	  direct	  participation	  in	  microelectronics	  remained	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  
México	  and	  Brazil.	  Microelectronics	  design	  and	  manufacture	  is	  problematic	  both	  in	  
economic	  and	  technical	  terms.	  The	  design	  and	  process	  technologies	  are	  complex	  and	  
costly.	   Experienced	   integrated	   circuit	   designers	   are	   scarce	   and	   expensive.	   And	  
production	   is	  extremely	  capital	   intensive.	  Hence,	  microelectronics	  has	  remained	  a	  
globally	  concentrated	  industry.	  
(iii)	  Explosive	  growth	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  market.	  
	   Advances	  in	  microelectronics	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  computer	  that	  was	  
compact,	  affordable,	  and	  thus	  accessible	  by	  several	  new	  markets:	  	  small	  businesses,	  
professionals,	  and	  home	  users.	  	  	  	  	  
	   With	  the	  entry	  of	  IBM	  into	  the	  microcomputer	  market	  in	  1981,	  the	  product	  was	  
effectively	   legitimised	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   all	   segments	   of	   the	   business	  market.	   	   Large	  
businesses	  began	  purchasing	  microcomputers	  by	  the	  hundreds	  and	  the	  micro	  market	  
exploded.	  	  	  
	   Interestingly,	   IBM	   entered	   the	   market	   with	   a	   product	   that	   was	   largely	  
assembled	   with	   parts	   and	   components	   produced	   by	   sub-­‐contractors.	   	   Having	  
previously	  neglected	  this	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  market	  for	  computer	  equipment	  and	  seeing	  
now	   its	   great	   potential,	   IBM	   needed	   to	   enter	   the	   market	   quickly.	   	   Further,	   the	  
company	  understood	  that	  the	  appeal	  of	  its	  PC	  would	  be	  directly	  proportional	  to	  the	  
quantity	  and	  quality	  of	  applications	  software	  available	  to	  the	  end	  user.	  	  Hence,	  IBM	  
opted	  for	  an	  operating	  system	  based	  on	  an	  "open	  architecture"	  so	  that	  anyone	  could	  
write	  applications	  software	  for	  the	  PC.	  	  	  
	   These	  events	  and	  choices	  all	  had	  an	  important	  effect	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
international	  microcomputer	  (later	  dubbed	  the	  “PC”)	  industry.	  	  IBM's	  PC	  quickly	  took	  
the	   lion's	   share	   of	   the	   microcomputer	   market,	   becoming	   the	   effective	   industry	  
standard	  by	  1983.	  	  The	  microcomputer	  industry,	  so	  fragmented	  at	  first,	  was	  beginning	  
to	  mirror	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   computer	  market,	   at	   least	   for	   a	   season.	   	   However,	   the	  
industry	   standard	   bearer	   comprised	   non–proprietary	   design	   and	   components.	  	  
Technological	  barriers	  to	  entry	  remained	  low.	  	  Hence,	  copies	  or	  "clones"	  of	  the	  IBM	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PC,	   which	   could	   run	   the	   plethora	   of	   software	   developed	   for	   the	   IBM,	   began	   to	  
proliferate,	  driving	  prices	  down	  still	  further.	  	  	  
	   The	  relatively	  'low–tech'	  nature	  of	  the	  microcomputer	  industry	  provided	  an	  
important	  opportunity	  for	  México	  and	  Brazil	  to	  develop	  indigenous	  microcomputer	  
assembly	  operations.	  
(iv)	  Rapid	  rate	  of	  technological	  innovation.	  
	   While	  the	  foregoing	  factors	  provided	  opportunities	  for	  México	  and	  Brazil	  to	  
enter	  the	  computer	  industry,	  the	  continued	  dynamism	  of	  the	  industry	  posed	  a	  threat	  
to	   their	   efforts.	   	   As	   the	   international	   industry	   raced	   ahead,	   the	   financial	   and	  
technological	  gaps	  re–opened.	  	  	  
	   As	   markets	   became	   increasingly	   competitive,	   the	   largest	   computer	   TNCs	  
increasingly	   employed	   proprietary	   technology	   in	   their	   equipment	   in	   order	   to	  
differentiate	  their	  product	  and	  protect	  market	  share.	  	  IBM	  did	  this	  with	  its	  subsequent	  
range	  of	  personal	  computers,	  Personal	  System	  2.	  	  DEC	  did	  this	  when	  it	  introduced	  a	  
new	   range	   of	   superminicomputers––VAXII.	   	   In	   these	   machines	   DEC	   employed	  
extremely	  powerful	  chips	  that	  it	  developed	  internally.	  
	   Brazilian	  and	  Mexican	  state	  and	  industry	  actors	  discovered	  that	  the	  effort	  to	  
keep	  up	  with	  technological	  change	  was	  at	  least	  as	  great	  as	  the	  effort	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  
foreign	  technology	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  
(v)	  	  Global	  industry	  standards	  
	   During	   the	  hyper-­‐dynamic	  decade	  of	   the	  1980s	   in	  computers,	  a	  globalized	  
industry	  developed	  based	  on	  de	  facto	  international	  technology	  standards	  based	  on	  
IBM’s	   hardware	   platform,	   MS-­‐DOS	   (and	   later	   Microsoft’s	   Windows)	   and	   UNIX	  
operating	  systems,	  and	  Intel’s	  chip.	  Thus,	  	  
	  
…”thousands	  of	  companies	  are	  doing	  research,	  designing	  and	  manufacturing	  
products,	  and	  developing	  software	  for	  a	  few	  standard	  technology	  platforms,	  
particularly	  the	  IBM/Wintel	  PC.”372	  	  	  
                                                
372	  Dedrick	  et	  al.	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2001),	  p.	  1201. 
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   Thus,	   from	   the	   late	   1980s	   onward	   it	   was	   very	   difficult	   and	   exceedingly	  
expensive	  to	  maintain	  local	  or	  national	  computer	  technology	  that	  varied	  from	  the	  de	  
facto	  international	  standards.	  The	  investment	  required	  to	  maintain	  separate	  standards	  
was	   untenable,	   particularly	   considering	   that	   export	  markets	  would	   effectively	   be	  
closed	  or	  at	  least	  very	  limited	  in	  size;	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  was	  rapidly	  adopting	  and	  
benefiting	  from	  the	  global	  supply	  chain.	  	  
	   Brazil’s	  market	  –	  even	  when	  combined	  with	  the	  other	  MERCOSUR	  markets	  –	  
was	   nowhere	   near	   large	   enough	   to	   sustain	   alternative	   technology	   standards.	  
Meanwhile,	  México	   was	   in	   a	   position	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   trend	   toward	   globally	  
integrated	  supply	  chains	  and	  its	  proximity	  to	  the	  U.S.	  market.	  
(vi)	  	  Blurring	  industry	  boundaries	  
Traditional	   boundaries	   between	   computers,	   consumer	   electronics	   and	  
telecommunications	  were	  blurring	  in	  the	  1980s.	  This	  fact	  multiplied	  complexity	  for	  
host	  country	  policymakers,	  whose	  job	  was	  already	  difficult	  enough.	  Neither	  Brazil	  nor	  
México	  coordinated	  policy	  well	  across	  industrial	  sectors	  such	  as	  consumer	  electronics	  
and	  telecommunications.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  growing	  confluence	  of	  basic	  technology	  (i.e.	  
microelectronics)	   in	   these	   industries,	   the	   countries	   risked	   an	   unsustainable	  
contradiction	  of	  policy	  across	  the	  industries.	  	  Moreover,	  without	  domestic	  capabilities	  
in	  microelectronics	  –	  already	  very	  problematic	  as	  noted	  above	  –	  they	  found	  it	  difficult	  
to	  reap	  economies	  of	  scale.	   	  Their	  respective	  domestic	  markets	  were	  too	  small	  to	  
provide	  economies	  of	  scale	  in	  any	  one	  product;	  however,	  the	  basic	  technology	  and	  
early	  production	  and	  testing	  procedures	  were	  common	  across	  such	  diverse	  product	  
groups	  as	  PABX	  telecommunication	  systems	  and	  microcomputers.	  
(vii)	  	  Increasing	  cooperation	  among	  firms	  in	  the	  industry.	  
	   The	   computer	   industry	   is	   characterized	   by	   rapid	   technological	   change,	  
technological	   complexity,	   and	   a	   growing	   confluence	   of	   computer	   and	  
telecommunications	  technologies	  blurring	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  transformation	  
and	  transportation	  of	  information.	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  contribute	  to	  the	  high	  degree	  
of	  risk	  associated	  with	  investment	  in	  this	  industry.	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   Firms	   responded	   to	   increasing	   complexity	   by	   entering	   into	   cooperative	  
agreements	  with	  other	  firms	  in	  order	  to	  share	  the	  investment	  risk.	  	  These	  cooperative	  
agreements	  have	  assumed	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  including:	  total	  or	  partial	  acquisition	  of	  
equity;	  joint	  venture;	  OEM	  agreements;	  joint	  technology	  development;	  licensing	  and	  
cross–licensing	  agreements;	  and	  co–marketing	  agreements.373	  
While	  Mexican	  and	  Brazilian	  firms	  faced	  the	  risks	  inherent	  in	  the	  industry,	  
the	  increasing	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  international	  computer	  firms	  to	  cooperate	  
in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  increased	  negotiating	  flexibility	  with	  foreign	  capital.	  
	  
In	  sum,	  careful	  consideration	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  international	   industry	  
reveals	   a	   variety	   of	   factors	   that	   served	   in	   some	   cases	   to	   open	   the	   window	   of	  
opportunity	  for	  host	  country	  policymakers	  and	  domestic	  capital,	  and	  in	  others	  to	  close	  
it.	  Even	  highly	  skilful,	  competent	  state	  actors	  with	  strong	  political	  support	  would	  find	  it	  
incredibly	  difficult	  to	  keep	  adapting	  policy	  to	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  bargaining	  landscape.	  
While	  the	  global	  hyper-­‐dynamism	  of	  the	  industry	  created	  opportunities	  to	  strike	  and	  
re-­‐strike	  a	  favourable	  bargain,	  states	  are	  neither	  rapid	  decision-­‐makers	  nor	  nimble	  
organisational	  actors.	  This	  is	  indeed	  one	  of	  the	  important	  conclusions	  of	  this	  study:	  
host	   state	   policy	   speed	   and	   adaptability	   are	  more	   important	   than	   prescience	   or	  
bargaining	  shrewdness.	  Speed	  and	  adaptability	  may	  also	  be	  more	  rare.	  
	  
Underrated	  Factors:	  Country-­‐Specific	  Differences	  	  
	   While	  bargaining	  terms	  were	  constantly	  shifting	  due	  to	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  
computer	  industry,	  country–	  and	  state-­‐specific	  factors	  influenced	  the	  host	  country’s	  
ability	  to	  exploit	  opportunities	  when	  they	  arose.	  The	  factors	  that	  relate	  México	  and	  
Brazil	  to	  international	  capital	  generally	  and	  to	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  specific	  are	  
compared	  below.	   	   The	   comparison	   reveals	   the	   importance	  of	   state	   leadership	   as	  
                                                
373	  Ohmae	  documents	  these	  international	  computer	  consortia	  in	  his	  book	  Triad	  Power.	  
Ohmae,	  Kenʼichi.	  Triad	  Power:	  the	  Coming	  Shape	  of	  Global	  Competition.	  (New	  York:	  Free	  
Press,	  1985):	  136-­‐137.	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investor,	   consumer,	   regulator	   and	   coalition-­‐builder	   to	  policy	  effectiveness.	   It	   also	  
reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  several	  other	  country-­‐specific	  factors	  including	  differences	  
in	  the	  size	  and	  geographic	  location	  of	  the	  host	  countries,	  and	  the	  macro-­‐economic	  
conditions	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  policy	  initiatives.	  
State	  Leadership	  
	   The	  Mexican	  state	  largely	  confined	  its	  role	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  computer	  industry	  to	  
that	  of	  a	  consumer.	  	  At	  no	  time	  did	  the	  state	  invest	  directly	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  Without	  a	  
national	  computer	  "flagship"	  company	  supported	  by	  government	   investment,	   the	  
country	   lacked	   a	   focus	   around	   which	   to	   galvanise	   support	   for	   an	   industrial	  
development	  policy	  in	  this	  area.	  	  It	  must	  be	  remembered,	  however,	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
the	  formulation	  and	  introduction	  of	  the	  industrial	  development	  programme	  México	  
was	   entering	   the	   worst	   recession	   in	   decades.	   	   The	   government	   thus	   never	  
contemplated	  committing	  public	  funds	  in	  any	  way	  other	  than	  through	  fiscal	  incentives.	  	  
Moreover,	  support	  for	  the	  programme	  was	  not	  ideological	  or	  even	  developmental,	  but	  
was	   rather	  more	  pragmatic.	   	   Several	   influential	  members	  of	   the	   state	   apparatus,	  
especially	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce	  (SECOM)	  and	  Finance	  (Hacienda),	  supported	  
the	  1981	  program	  primarily	  because	  it	  would	  help	  to	  reduce	  a	  burgeoning	  import	  bill	  
in	  computers.	  	  Support	  for	  the	  policy	  within	  the	  state	  was	  thus	  motivated	  more	  by	  
considerations	   of	   'damage	   control'	   with	   the	   external	   market	   than	   by	   a	   positive	  
investment	  mentality.	  
	   While	   the	   government	   was	   unwilling	   to	   invest	   directly	   in	   the	   industry,	   it	  
nevertheless	  played	  an	   influential	   role	   in	   the	  development	  of	   the	   industry.	   	  Most	  
obviously,	   the	   state	   intervened	  with	   the	   1981	   industrial	   development	   guidelines,	  
seeking	  to	  create	  conditions	  by	  which	  domestic	  capital	  could	  invest	  in	  the	  sector	  and	  
develop	  successful	  businesses	  supplying	  the	  local	  market.	  	  Policy	  makers	  had	  initial	  
success	  enticing	  transnationals	  to	  invest	  in	  minority	  JV	  positions	  with	  local	  capital.	  
However,	  with	  little	  political	  support	  and	  subsequent	  bargaining	  losses	  with	  IBM,	  the	  
state	   was	   ultimately	   able	   to	   do	   little	   more	   than	   extract	   concessions	   related	   to	  
investment	  levels	  and	  export	  targets.	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Less	  obvious	  but	  equally	  important	  was	  the	  government's	  role	  as	  the	  number	  
one	  buyer	  of	  computer	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  One	  way	  or	  another,	  the	  Mexican	  
government	  continued	  to	  account	  for	  more	  than	  two–thirds	  of	  the	  national	  market.	  	  
As	   an	   effective	  monopsony,	   the	   government	   possessed	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   potential	  
leverage	  over	  the	  computer	  transnationals.	  	  However,	  this	  potential	  leverage	  was	  not	  
initially	  employed	  to	  further	  the	  industrial	  development	  efforts.	  	  Until	  1985-­‐86,	  the	  
government	  agency	  responsible	  for	  overseeing	  all	  purchases	  of	  computer	  equipment	  
and	  services	  by	  the	  state	  and	  its	  affiliated	  enterprises	  (INEGI)	  was	  concerned	  only	  with	  
acquiring	   the	   best	   products	   at	   the	   best	   prices.	   	   Given	   the	   strategic	   nature	   of	  
information	   technology	   for	   exercising	   and	   expanding	   control	   in	   a	   complex	  
environment,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  Mexican	  government	  would	  want	  state–of–
the–art	  equipment.	  	  There	  was	  little	  cooperation	  or	  coordination	  with	  the	  government	  
entity	  (SECOFI)	  that	  was	  attempting	  to	  persuade	  the	  transnationals	  to	  invest	  in	  the	  
country	  as	  opposed	  to	  merely	  supplying	  it.	  	  	  
	   With	  a	  change	  of	  personnel	  in	  INEGI	  in	  1985	  the	  state	  adopted	  a	  harder	  line	  
with	  the	  TNCs	  and	  began	  to	  employ	  its	  monopsony	  to	  help	  the	  Mexican	  investors.	  	  
However,	  subsequent	  changes	  in	  the	  leadership	  of	  INEGI	  spelled	  another	  about–face	  
with	  the	  government	  using	  its	  market	  power	  merely	  to	  extract	  price	  concessions	  from	  
the	  computer	  TNCs.	  	  
	   Unlike	  México,	   the	   Brazilian	   state	   took	   a	   direct	   ownership	   interest	   in	   the	  
national	  computer	  industry,	  even	  some	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  an	  industrial	  
development	  policy.	  	  Via	  the	  national	  development	  bank	  (BNDES),	  and	  with	  the	  strong	  
support	  of	  the	  military,	  which	  was	  concerned	  about	  technological	  dependence	  and	  its	  
implications	  for	  national	  security,	  the	  government	  financed	  a	  flagship	  company	  to	  
develop	  and	  produce	  a	  minicomputer.	  	  Cobra	  was	  launched	  in	  1974	  with	  a	  product	  
developed	  with	   technology	   licensed	   from	   the	  British	  military	   contractor,	   Ferranti,	  
which	  had	  produced	  computers	  for	  vessels	  purchased	  by	  the	  Brazilian	  Navy.	  	  	  
        296 
	   A	  mark	  of	  the	  state's	  commitment	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  computer	  
company,	   if	   not	   industry,	   was	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   continued	   to	   supply	   Cobra	   with	  
investment	  capital	  even	  though	  it	  was	  a	  commercial	  disaster.	  	  	  
	   Cobra	  was	  not	  the	  only	  significant	  direct	  state	  involvement	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  
SERPRO,	  the	  state	  agency	  responsible	  for	  data	  processing	  branched	  out	  from	  a	  purely	  
service	  role	  to	  a	  limited	  manufacturer	  of	  specialized	  types	  of	  computer	  equipment	  for	  
its	  own	  use.	  	  Out	  of	  the	  agency	  sprang	  several	  entrepreneurial	  Brazilian	  computer	  
manufacturers	  with	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  market	  reserve	  in	  
computers.	   	   	  Thus,	  Cobra––the	  national	   flagship––became	  a	   focus	  of	  nationalistic	  
support	  for	  an	  industrial	  development	  policy,	  and	  both	  Cobra	  and	  SERPRO	  served	  as	  
training	   grounds	   and	   launching	   pads	   for	   Brazilian	   engineers	   and	   entrepreneurs	  
wanting	  to	  capitalize	  on	  government	  protection	  for	  the	  industry.	  
	   In	  broader	  terms	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  had	  a	  
history	  of	  protecting	  and	  its	  partitioning	  national	  market.	  	  Historically	  concessionist,	  a	  
market	  reserve	  in	  computers	  was	  not	  a	  new	  departure	  for	  Brazil;	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  
was	  used	  to	  playing	  that	  role.	  	  
	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  the	  Brazilian	  state,	  like	  its	  Mexican	  counterpart,	  is	  
far	  from	  monolithic	  and	  internally	  consistent.	  	  Like	  México,	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  is	  a	  large	  
consumer	  of	  computer	  equipment	  and	  services.	  	  In	  its	  role	  as	  consumer,	  the	  Brazilian	  
state	  had	  strict	  nationalist	  guidelines	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  acquisition	  of	   computer	  
equipment	  after	  CAPRE	  developed	  them	  in	  1974.	  	  However,	  in	  practice,	  the	  rigour	  with	  
which	   these	  guidelines	   applied	   varied	  enormously.	   	   The	  military	   is	   a	   salient	   case.	  	  
Strong	  proponents	  of	  the	  nationalistic	  policy	  of	  market	  reserve	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  
national	   security,	   the	  military	  nevertheless	  continued	   to	  acquire	   state–of–the–art	  
informatics	  equipment	  and	  technology	  from	  abroad,	  often	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  state's	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Coalition-­‐Building:	  	  The	  Creation	  of	  Privileged	  Investors	  
	   Given	   the	   perceived	   lack	   of	   broad	   government	   commitment	   to	   extending	  
protection	  to	  Mexican	  investors	  in	  the	  computer	  industry,	  Mexican	  investors	  were	  
attracted	  to	  the	  industry	  only	  on	  a	  relatively	  small	  scale.	  
	   Initially,	   the	   industrial	   development	   programme	   envisaged	   joint	   ventures	  
between	   foreign	  and	   local	   capital	   in	   the	  microcomputer	   sector,	  with	   local	   capital	  
holding	  the	  majority	  share.	  	  Two	  such	  arrangements	  were	  hailed	  as	  policy	  successes	  in	  
1984	  when	  Apple	  Computer	  and	  Hewlett–Packard	  entered	  into	  joint	  ventures	  with	  
local	   partners.	   	   However,	   after	   IBM	   entered	   the	  microcomputer	   business	   with	   a	  
wholly–owned	  subsidiary	  in	  1985,	  first	  H–P	  and	  then	  Apple	  moved	  to	  buy	  out	  their	  
Mexican	  partners	  who	  were	  only	  too	  willing	  to	  sell.	  	  The	  only	  significant	  surviving	  joint	  
venture	  was	  that	  between	  Unisys,	  Banamex,	  and	  a	  private	  Mexican	  investment	  group.	  
	   Interestingly,	  the	  largest	  capital	  groups	  that	  chose	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Mexican	  
computer	   industry	  committed	  funds	   in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  TNCs	  (e.g.,	  Banamex'	  
investment	  in	  Compubur,	  Unisys'	  microcomputer	  venture).	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  balance	  of	  
the	   "national	   effort"	   in	   computers	   rested	   with	   a	   number	   of	   entrepreneurially–
orientated,	  mostly	  opportunistic	  investors	  producing	  mainly	  IBM	  clones.	  
	   Without	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  a	  critical	  mass	  of	  major	  Mexican	  capital	  
groups,	  the	  local	  industry	  lacked	  an	  effective	  political	  constituency	  willing	  to	  fight	  for	  
nationalist	   policy.	   	   Mexican	   capital	   with	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   industry	   did	   form	   an	  
association	  (AMFABI)	  whose	  aim	  was	  promote	  the	   interests	  of	  Mexican	  computer	  
manufacturers.	  	  AMFABI	  achieved	  a	  high	  profile	  during	  the	  government's	  negotiations	  
with	   IBM	  as	   it	   lobbied	  vigorously	  against	   the	  acceptance	  of	   IBM's	  microcomputer	  
proposal.	   	  Unable	  to	  generate	  much	  support	   in	  government,	  nor	  broader	  national	  
support	  for	  its	  cause,	  AMFABI	  failed	  to	  stop	  IBM’s	  proposed	  100%	  microcomputer	  
operation	  and	  ended	  up	  politically	  isolated.	  	  	  	  	  
	   It	  is	  a	  testimony	  to	  the	  tenacity	  of	  the	  pro–reservist	  lobby	  in	  Brazil	  and	  the	  
longevity	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  that	  a	  number	  of	  very	  important	  local	  capital	  groups	  
invested	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  The	  country's	  two	  largest	  private	  banks,	  Bradesco	  and	  Banco	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Itau,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  industrial	  firms,	  Docas	  de	  Santos,	  played	  a	  strategic	  role	  in	  
the	  growth	  and	  development	  of	  the	  country's	  three	  largest	  private	  national	  computer	  
companies:	  SID	  Informatica,	  Itautec,	  and	  Elebra	  respectively.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  domestic	  
private	   capital	   with	   a	   vested	   interest	   in	   the	   market	   reserve	   policy	   became	   an	  
important	  driver	  of	  the	  industry's	  development.	  
	   In	  contrast	  to	  AMFABI,	  its	  Brazilian	  counterpart––ABICOMP––was	  an	  effective	  
political	  force	  in	  support	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  Leadership	  of	  ABICOMP	  revolved	  
between	  members	  of	  the	  technocratic	  elite	  who	  helped	  formulate	  the	  policy	  in	  the	  
days	  of	  CAPRE.	  	  ABICOMP	  was	  instrumental	  in	  fostering	  support	  in	  Congress	  for	  the	  
legislation	  that	  codified	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy	  in	  1984	  prior	  to	  the	  departure	  
of	  General	  Figueiredo's	  military	  regime.	  
	   Although	  private	  Brazilian	  capital	  had	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  industry,	  this	  was	  
not	  enough	  to	  ensure	  the	  continuance	  of	  the	  restrictive	  policy	  regulations.	  	  Private	  
capital,	  like	  the	  state,	  is	  not	  a	  monolith;	  it	  is	  a	  heterogeneous	  group	  whose	  members	  
often	  have	  conflicting	  interests.	  	  There	  were	  the	  engineering	  pioneers	  who	  started	  
computer	  companies	  under	  the	  market	  reserve	  (e.g.,	  Edson	  Fregni	  of	  Scopus)	  and	  
whose	  business	  success	  depended	  upon	  the	  continued	  restrictions	  on	  foreign	  capital.	  	  
Then	  there	  were	  the	  very	  large	  investors	  such	  as	  Matias	  Machline	  of	  Sharp	  and	  Olavo	  
Setubal	  of	  Banco	  Itau	  who	  wielded	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  personal	  political	  influence.	  	  Their	  
businesses	   too	  were	   dependent	   in	   part	   upon	   the	  market	   reserve;	   however,	   they	  
showed	   an	   increasing	   interest	   in	   dealing	  with	   foreign	   capital	   directly	   to	   establish	  
technology	  agreements	  or	  procure	  further	  finance.	  	  	  
	   Once	  formal	  joint	  ventures	  and/or	  alliances	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
capital	  were	  established,	  the	  state	  was	  left	  with	  a	  dilemma.	  The	  “privileged”	  firms	  had	  
traded	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  state	  for	  access	  to	  international	  finance	  and	  technology.	  
ABICOMP	  was	  eventually	  expanded	  to	  include	  the	  TNCs	  producing	  equipment	  in	  Brazil.	  
Lines	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  capital	  were	  blurred;	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  clear	  which	  
players	  the	  state	  should	  now	  “privilege.”	  The	  alliances	  themselves	  had	  changed	  the	  
bargaining	  equation.	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Given	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  computer	  technology	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  
national	  and	  international	  economies,	  it	  became	  even	  more	  difficult	  for	  Brazilian	  and	  
Mexican	   industries	   to	   profitably	   participate	   in	   the	   international	   economy	   if	   their	  
governments	  restricted	  the	  markets	  for	  computer	  equipment	  and	  services.	  The	  cause	  
of	  broader	  economic	  prosperity	  	  -­‐	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  prosperity	  of	  domestic	  players	  in	  
the	  informatics	  sector	  alone	  –	  was	  seized	  by	  Brazilian	  industrialists	  who	  were	  growing	  
increasingly	  weary	  of	  paying	  high	  prices	  for	  computer	  equipment	  that	  was	  not	  up	  to	  
international	   standards.	   	   These	   large	   users	   of	   computer	   equipment	   and	   services	  
perceived	   that	   their	   ability	   to	   successfully	   compete	   in	   international	  markets	  was	  
impaired	   by	   a	   local	   computer	   industry	   that	   was	   still	   trying	   to	   catch	   up	   to	   the	  
international	  market.	  	  They	  became	  increasingly	  vociferous	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  
market	  reserve	  and	  included	  Gerdau	  (which	  tested	  the	  policy	  guidelines	  by	  entering	  
into	  an	  agreement	  with	  IBM	  in	  1986	  to	  form	  GSI––a	  data	  processing	  bureau),	  Embraer,	  
and	  the	  entire	  automobile	  industry	  en	  bloc.	  	  	  
FIESP,	   the	  most	  powerful	   industrial	   association	   in	   the	   country	   at	   the	   time	  
(which	  also	  appointed	  a	  member	  on	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Informatics––CONIN),	  
became	  the	  institutional	  focus	  for	  the	  national	  and	  foreign	  industrialists	  who	  were	  
disgruntled	  with	  the	  restrictive	  policy.	  	  On	  December	  22,	  1986	  FIESP	  presented	  a	  paper	  
to	  CONIN	  attacking	  SEI's	  restrictions	  on	  technological	  joint	  ventures	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  At	  
the	  time,	  most	  of	  the	  people	  interviewed	  thought	  it	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  SEI	  would	  
openly	  yield	  to	  such	  pressure.	  However,	  large	  informatics	  users	  and	  manufacturers	  
alike	  remarked	  on	  SEI's	  increasing	  “flexibility.”	  Indeed,	  subsequent	  events	  validated	  
this	  view;	  SEI	  could	  no	  longer	  develop	  and	  implement	  policy	  without	  accounting	  for	  
the	  wishes	  of	  Brazilian	  industry	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  	   Proponents	  for	  a	  national	  computer	  development	  policy	  in	  México	  were	  never	  
able	  to	  generate	  a	  national	  interest	  in	  their	  cause.	  	  This	  failure	  is	  partly	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   industry,	   the	   general	   lack	   of	   public	   debate	   in	   the	   country,	   and	   a	  
nationalism	  that	  is	  rather	  more	  culturally	  defined	  than	  developmentally	  orientated.	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   Computer	  technology,	  unlike	  oil,	  is	  not	  a	  national	  resource,	  nor	  is	  it	  perceived	  
to	  be	  in	  any	  sense	  'locally–owned.'	  Popular	  mobilisation	  was	  not	  possible	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
computers	  in	  México	  because	  of	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  industry	  itself.	  Treatment	  of	  
the	  issue	  in	  the	  national	  press	  and	  media	  was	  sparse	  and	  often	  misleading.	  	  IBM's	  
negotiations	  with	  the	  Mexican	  government	  received	  considerable	  attention	  in	  the	  
press,	   but	   when	   the	   agreement	   was	   reached,	   impossibly	   overinflated	   figures	  
concerning	  IBM's	  proposed	  investment	  were	  reported	  unquestioningly	  in	  the	  leading	  
dailies.	  	  
	   Brazil	  had	  rather	  more	  success	  than	  México	  in	  generating	  a	  broader	  base	  of	  
support	  for	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy.	  	  Cries	  of	  'the	  oil	  is	  ours!'	  were	  replaced	  by	  
'the	  computers	  are	  ours!'.	  	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Brazil	  had	  developed	  a	  
critical	  mass	  of	  technocratic	  elite	  with	  an	  interest	  in	  the	  development	  of	  a	  national	  
computer	  industry.	  	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  technicians	  and	  engineers	  led	  the	  cry	  
for	  the	  market	  reserve	  was	  not	  due	  solely	  to	  self-­‐interest.	  	  The	  country	  had	  a	  long	  
history	  of	  national	  developmentalism.	  	  Brazil	  persisted	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  and	  
against	   long	   odds	   to	   develop	   their	   alcohol	   fuels,	   off–shore	   oil,	   hydroelectric	   and	  
nuclear	  power	  industries	  to	  name	  but	  a	  few	  examples.	  
Coalition-­‐Building	  in	  Government	  	   	  
It	  was	  unfortunate	  timing	  for	  the	  formulators	  of	  Mexican	  computer	  policy	  that	  
attempts	   to	   formally	   initiate	   the	   guidelines	   coincided	   with	   the	   change	   of	  
administrations	  in	  the	  Mexican	  government.	  	  The	  two	  strongest	  proponents	  of	  the	  
policy	  guidelines,	  Natán	  Warman––Undersecretary	  of	  Industrial	  Development––and	  
Ernesto	  Marcos––Director	   General	   of	   Industries––were	   to	   lose	   their	   posts	   in	   the	  
subsequent	  administration.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  ministry	  under	  which	  the	  
policy	   was	   to	   be	   implemented	   was	   set	   to	   change.	   	   The	   ministries	   of	   trade	   and	  
industrial	  development	  were	  to	  be	  merged	  under	  common	  leadership.	  	  And	  by	  late	  
1981	  several	  of	  the	  government	  ministers	  who	  were	  meant	  to	  formally	  approve	  the	  
policy	   knew	   what	   their	   new	   posts	   would	   be	   in	   the	   next	   administration.	   	   These	  
ministerial	  changes,	  and	  these	  men's	  foreknowledge	  of	  them,	  made	  them	  reticent	  to	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commit	  themselves	  to	  a	  policy	  whose	  ramifications	  they	  did	  not	  fully	  understand.	  	  
Thus,	   apart	   from	   the	   normal	   bureaucratic	   delays	   inherent	   in	   a	   change	   of	  
administration,	   the	   political	   and	   institutional	   dynamics	   associated	   with	   such	   a	  
transition	  inhibited	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  new	  policy	  initiative	  in	  computers.	  	  	  
	   Pressure	  from	  the	  U.S.	  government	  against	  the	  new	  policy	  played	  a	  role	  at	  this	  
juncture	  as	  well.	  	  In	  early	  1982	  the	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  Commerce	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  his	  
counterpart	   in	  México	  expressing	  American	  concern	  about	   the	  policy.	   	  While	   this	  
pressure	  did	  not	  result	   in	  a	  repudiation	  of	   the	  policy	   initiative,	   it	  did	   increase	  the	  
reticence	  of	  the	  Mexican	  ministers	  and	  indefinitely	  forestalled	  the	  program's	  passage	  
into	  law.	  	  	  
	   President	  De	  la	  Madrid	  inherited	  a	  country	  in	  deep	  economic	  crisis	  in	  1982–83.	  	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  prolific	  spending	  of	  the	  oil	  boom,	  it	  was	  apparent	  to	  the	  new	  
administration	   that	  manufacturing	  would	  have	   to	   finance	   its	  own	  growth.	   	   Lopez	  
Portillo's	  nationalization	  of	  the	  banking	  industry	  in	  1982	  had	  shaken	  the	  confidence	  of	  
foreign	  investors.	   	  De	  la	  Madrid	  needed	  foreign	  capital	  to	  invest	   in	  manufacturing	  
more	  than	  ever.	  	  Thus,	  in	  the	  1983–88	  National	  Development	  Plan,	  the	  new	  president	  
signalled	  the	  greater	  opening	  of	  the	  Mexican	  economy.	  	  The	  Plan	  aimed	  to	  “raise	  the	  
contribution	  of	  foreign	  technology,	  administration,	  and	  finance	  resources	  that	  are	  
required	  in	  the	  country's	  process	  of	  development.”	  	  The	  official	  fate	  of	  the	  restrictive	  
computer	   industry	  development	  was	   thus	   sealed.	   	   It	  was	  within	   the	   context	   of	   a	  
political	  and	  economic	  landscape	  that	  had	  shifted	  dramatically	  that	  implementation	  of	  
the	  new	  policy	  was	  attempted.	  
	   In	  Brazil,	  it	  was	  the	  military	  that	  ultimately	  ensured	  the	  consistency	  with	  which	  
the	  market	  reserve	  policy	  was	  applied	  from	  its	  inception	  in	  1976	  to	  its	  passage	  to	  law	  
in	  1984.	   	  The	  return	  to	  civilian	  rule	   in	  1985	  did	  pose	  some	  problems	  for	  the	  pro–
reservists,	  however.	  
	   The	  codification	  into	  Brazilian	  Law	  of	  the	  National	  Informatics	  Policy	  was	  a	  
great	  triumph	  for	  the	  pro–reservist	  lobby.	  It	  was	  perceived	  as	  absolutely	  critical	  to	  the	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assured	  continuance	  of	  the	  market	  reserve.	  	  Yet	  the	  legislation	  itself	  was	  a	  two–edged	  
sword.	  	  	  
	   The	  transition	  from	  military	  rule	  to	  civilian	  government	  affected	  the	  informatics	  
policy	   in	   three	   important	  ways:	   	   (i)	   the	  policy	  and	   its	   implementers	   (SEI)	  were	  no	  
longer	  insulated	  from	  political	  pressure	  as	  they	  had	  been	  inside	  the	  National	  Security	  
Council;	  (ii)	  the	  codification	  removed	  some	  of	  SEI's	  discretionary	  power	  and	  made	  it	  
easier	  for	  the	  TNCs	  to	  exploit	  loopholes	  in	  the	  law;	  (iii)	  effective	  control	  over	  the	  policy	  
shifted	  from	  SEI	  to	  Congress,	  a	  much	  more	  politically	  diffuse	  and	  malleable	  entity.	  	  	  
	   Changes	  in	  party	  politics	  in	  Brazil	  also	  posed	  difficulties	  for	  the	  policy.	  	  By	  1987	  
leftists	  in	  the	  majority	  PMDB	  were	  losing	  ground	  to	  more	  conservative	  voices	  in	  the	  
party	  and	  in	  government.	  	  Several	  strong	  nationalist	  proponents	  of	  the	  1984	  law	  no	  
longer	  had	  seats	  in	  Congress.	  	  Support	  for	  the	  national	  informatics	  policy	  was	  eroding	  
in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  
	   Interestingly,	  U.S.	  pressure	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  to	  relax	  its	  market	  
reserve	  was	  more	  public	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  much	  less	  effective	  than	  U.S.	  pressure	  
on	  México	  was,	  even	  though	  President	  Sarney,	  like	  his	  Mexican	  counterpart,	  was	  not	  
ideologically	  committed	  to	  the	  market	  reserve.	  The	  American	  government's	  public	  
threats	  of	  trade	  retaliation	  (some	  of	  which	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  November	  1987)	  were	  
in	   large	   part	   a	   response	   to	   domestic	   congressional	   pressure	   on	   the	   Reagan	  
administration	  to	  tackle	  the	  enormous	  balance	  of	  payments	  problem	  in	  the	  United	  
States.	  	  To	  ease	  domestic	  pressure	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  issued	  strong	  
public	  warnings	  to	  the	  Brazilian	  government	  and	  entered	  bilateral	  negotiations.	  	  The	  
public	  nature	  of	  the	  U.S.	  pressure	  combined	  with	  the	  broad	  support	  for	  a	  nationalist	  
policy	  in	  Brazil	  prevented	  Sarney	  from	  emasculating	  the	  market	  reserve	  to	  any	  great	  
extent.	  	  	  
It	   was	   domestic	   economic	   crises	   that	   provided	   a	   greater	   impetus	   for	  
liberalisation.	  After	  a	  decade	  of	  extraordinary	  growth,	   the	  market	   for	   informatics	  
equipment	  and	  services	  slowed	  in	  1987	  when	  Brazil	  plunged	  into	  economic	  crisis.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  many	  of	  the	  smaller	  Brazilian	  computer	  firms	  went	  out	  of	  business,	  while	  most	  
        303 
of	  the	  larger	  ones	  incurred	  severe	  losses.	  	  The	  remaining	  firms	  were	  without	  capital	  to	  
fund	  new	  product	  development,	  or	  even	  to	  purchase	  spare	  parts	  and	  supplies	  from	  
abroad.	   	   In	  order	   to	   survive,	  many	  of	   the	  Brazilian	   firms	  began	   to	   look	   for	   joint–
venture	  partners	  based	  outside	  of	  Brazil.	  	  The	  economic	  crisis	  thereby	  increased	  the	  
bargaining	  power	  of	  foreign	  capital	  and	  worked	  to	  encourage	  the	  ultimate	  approval	  of	  
a	   greater	   number	   of	   joint–ventures	   and	   alliances	   between	   foreign	   and	   domestic	  
players	  in	  the	  industry.	  	  
The	   foregoing	   review	   of	   the	   two	   cases	   studied	   once	   again	   reveals	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	   bargaining	   “game-­‐within-­‐the-­‐game”.	   While	   the	   state-­‐state	  
bargaining	  played	  a	  part,	  the	  intra-­‐state	  bargains	  were	  more	  decisive	  in	  determining	  
the	  ultimate	  policy	  that	  could	  be	  implemented	  and	  the	  bargaining	  power	  that	  could	  be	  
applied	  by	  the	  state	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  capital.	  	  
Host	  Country	  –	  TNC	  Mutual	  Adjustments	  
	   North	   American	   computer	   transnationals	   saw	   México	   as	   an	   extremely	  
attractive	  and	  appropriate	  base	  for	  exports	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  Latin	  America,	  and	  indeed,	  to	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Low	  labour	  costs	  (even	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  four	  Asian	  countries	  
which	   have	   become	   synonymous	   with	   electronics	   manufacturing	   and	   export:	  	  
Singapore,	  Korea,	  Hong	  Kong,	  and	  Taiwan),	  the	  ease	  of	  managerial	  oversight	  (it	  takes	  
no	  longer	  to	  fly	  from	  New	  York	  to	  México	  City	  than	  to	  Los	  Angeles),	  and	  the	  proximity	  
to	  the	  largest	  national	  market	  for	  computer	  equipment––implying	  low	  transportation	  
costs	   and	   faster	   delivery––were	   cited	   as	   the	   most	   important	   reasons	   to	   set	   up	  
production–for–export	  facilities	  in	  México.
374
	  
	   Clearly,	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  Mexican	  computer	  market,	  though	  much	  smaller	  
than	  Brazil's,	  was	  attractive	  to	  foreign	  capital.	  	  But	  México’s	  potential	  as	  an	  export	  
platform	   was	   a	   far	   bigger	   draw.	   	   Witness	   IBM's	   agreement	   with	   the	   Mexican	  
                                                
374	  The	   thesis	  does	  not	  mean	   to	  neglect	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   'maquiladora'	  or	   in–bond	  
manufacturing	  and	  assembly	  industries	  situated	  primarily	  along	  the	  U.S.–Mexican	  border.	  	  
Electronics	   accounted	   for	   50%	  of	   the	   output	   of	   these	   plants	   in	   the	   1980s.	   	  Many	   of	   the	  
computer	  TNCs	  with	  other	  operations	  in	  México	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  a	  maquiladora	  operation,	  
but	  with	  few	  exceptions	  they	  are	  limited	  to	  component	  assembly	  and	  test	  rather	  than	  final	  
equipment	  assembly.	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government.	  	  As	  part	  of	  its	  global	  manufacturing	  strategy,	  IBM	  established	  its	  fourth	  
microcomputer	  assembly	  plant	  in	  Guadalajara,	  promising	  the	  Mexican	  government	  
that	  it	  would	  export	  92%	  of	  this	  plant's	  output.	  
	   While	  México	  was	  attractive	  as	  an	  export	  platform,	  Brazil	  was	  attractive	  to	  
foreign	  capital	  primarily	  because	  of	  its	  internal	  market.	  	  As	  an	  export	  platform,	  Brazil	  
was	   less	  attractive.	   	  Distance	   from	  the	  major	  world	  markets	  and	  headquarters	  of	  
computer	  transnationals	  coupled	  with	  rising	  labour	  costs	  that	  were	  not	  competitive	  
with	  México	  or	  Asia,	  combined	  to	  limit	  Brazil's	  attraction	  as	  a	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  
launch	  computer	  products	  to	  the	  worldwide	  market.	  
	   However,	  with	  a	  population	  twice	  as	  large	  as	  México's	  and	  a	  computer	  market	  
three	  to	  four	  times	  as	  large,	  Brazil's	  domestic	  market	  offered	  considerably	  greater	  
potential	  than	  México's.	  	  As	  a	  country	  that	  could	  lure	  the	  foreign	  investor	  based	  on	  its	  
domestic	   market	   potential	   Brazil	   had	   relatively	   greater	   bargaining	   leverage	   than	  
México	  whose	  primary	  lure	  was	  as	  an	  export	  base.	  	  There	  were	  a	  great	  many	  viable	  
worldwide	  manufacturing	  sites;	  but	  there	  weren’t	  very	  many	  national	  markets	  that	  
were	  worth	  US$	  3	  billion	  and	  growing	  at	  20-­‐30%	  annually.	  
	   From	  the	  perspective	  of	  TNC	  rationality,	  the	  longevity	  and	  consistency	  of	  policy	  
counts	  for	  much.	   In	  periods	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  transition,	  TNC	  managers	  will	  take	  
actions	  that	  provide	  a	  hedge	  against	  future	  events	  and	  preserve	  a	  number	  of	  attractive	  
or	  viable	  strategic	  options.375	  	  In	  México,	  some	  of	  the	  computer	  TNCs	  made	  tentative	  
investments	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  guidelines	  (e.g.,	  Apple	  and	  H–P)	  in	  order	  to	  
get	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  local	  market	  in	  case	  the	  government	  persevered	  with	  the	  policy.	  	  
The	  original	  guidelines	  never	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  take	  firm	  hold	  in	  the	  industry	  without	  
the	  backing	  of	  the	  president's	  office.	  	  Hence,	  IBM's	  victory	  is	  hardly	  surprising.	  	  And	  
when	  it	  came,	  the	  other	  computer	  TNCs	  were	  quick	  to	  follow	  IBM's	  lead	  and	  alter	  the	  
nature	  of	  their	  local	  ventures.	  	  
                                                
375	  Business	  scholars	  call	  this	  “maximizing	  option	  value.”	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   In	  Brazil,	  after	  failed	  initial	  attempts	  to	  pre-­‐empt	  the	  policy	  and	  its	  impact,	  the	  
computer	   TNCs	   also	   adopted	   a	   wait–and–see	   attitude.	   	   In	   the	   1977	   round	   of	  
minicomputer	   licensing,	   none	   of	   the	   major	   computer	   TNCs	   participated.	   	   Their	  
reasoning:	  	  why	  sell	  proprietary	  technology	  in	  a	  market	  that	  you	  may	  wish	  to	  enter	  at	  
some	  later	  date?	  	  Seven	  years	  later	  it	  appeared	  that	  'later	  date'	  might	  never	  come.	  	  In	  
the	   new	   round	   of	   superminicomputer	   licensing	   most	   of	   the	   major	   computer	  
transnationals	  sold	  technology	  to	  Brazilian	  licensors.	  
	  
The	  Case	  of	  IBM:	  A	  Closer	  Look	  
	   A	  closer	  look	  at	  IBM’s	  de	  facto	  leadership	  in	  bargaining	  with	  México	  and	  Brazil	  
is	  instructive	  at	  this	  point.	  	  This	  discussion	  of	  IBM’s	  responses	  to	  the	  policy	  initiatives	  in	  
Brazil	  and	  México	  reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  country	  specific	  factors	  to	  bargaining	  
approaches	   and	   outcomes.	   That’s	  why	   it	  makes	   sense	   to	   summarise	   these	   here.	  
However,	   this	   account	   of	   IBM	   links	   directly	   to	   the	   second	   ‘underrated	   factor’	  
considered	  in	  the	  next	  section	  below:	  firm-­‐level	  strategy	  and	  management,	  which	  
applies	  equally	  to	  local	  capital	  and	  to	  the	  transnational	  firms	  like	  IBM.	  	  
In	   the	   1970s	   IBM	   was	   the	   runaway	   global	   leader	   among	   information	  
technology	  firms.	  Big	  Blue	  led	  not	  only	  in	  market	  share,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  political	  force	  due	  
to	  the	  company’s	  importance	  as	  a	  large	  investor	  and	  the	  primary	  supplier	  of	  essential	  
equipment	   and	   services	   to	   government	   agencies	   and	   the	  military.	   As	   a	   relatively	  
mature	   company	   with	   a	   broad	   international	   reach,	   IBM	   was	   also	   the	   most	  
sophisticated	  multinational	  actor	  among	  the	  computer	  firms	  at	  the	  time,	  many	  of	  
which	  were	  less	  than	  a	  decade	  old.376	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  other	  computer	  TNCs	  
therefore	  tended	  to	  follow	  and	  benefit	  from	  IBM’s	  broad	  bargaining	  plough.	  	  
	   IBM’s	  strategic	  rationale	  with	  respect	  to	  emerging	  markets	  was	  very	  clear	  up	  to	  
the	  early	  1980s	  when	   it	  evolved	   in	  a	   couple	  of	   important	   respects.	  The	  company	  
                                                
376	  This	  discussion	  of	  IBM’s	  position	  and	  strategic	  operating	  rationale	  relies	  on	  Rex	  Malik,	  
And	  Tomorrow…	  the	  World?	  Inside	  IBM.	  London:	  Millington,	  1975;	  author	  interviews	  and	  
familiarity	  with	  IBM	  and	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  through	  his	  consulting	  
experience	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	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maintained	  strictly	  proprietary,	  centralised	  research	  &	  development	  and	  production,	  
exporting	   equipment	   to	   international	  markets.	   IBM	  hired	   and	   trained	   local	   sales,	  
marketing	  and	  basic	   technical/data	  processing	   staff	   in	   the	  markets	   served	  by	   the	  
company.	  National	  subsidiaries	  tended	  to	  be	  sales	  and	  service	  operations;	  strategic	  
decision-­‐making	   was	   centralised	   in	   the	   company’s	   New	   York	   headquarters.	   IBM	  
supplied	  government	  agencies	  and	  large	  corporations	  with	  mainframe	  computers	  and	  
related	  technical	  support	  and	  data	  processing	  services,	  typically	  on	  a	  lease	  basis.	  The	  
company	  harvested	  its	  large,	  central	  investment	  in	  R&D	  by	  leasing	  older,	  second	  and	  
third	  generation	  equipment	  to	  customers	  in	  emerging	  or	  secondary	  markets	  like	  Brazil	  
and	  México.	  Customers	  faced	  very	  high	  switching	  costs	  as	  IBM’s	  mainframes	  ran	  on	  
proprietary	  operating	  systems	  that	  were	  incompatible	  with	  those	  of	  the	  competition.	  
The	  company	  was	  understandably	  fiercely	  protective	  of	  its	  proprietary	  technology	  
(hardware	   and	   operating	   systems),	   so	   would	   not	   consider	   licensing	   or	   alliance	  
relationships	  that	  may	  jeopardise	  the	  company’s	  centralised	  control	  over	  the	  “crown	  
jewels.”	  
	   By	   the	  mid-­‐1980s,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   global	   information	   technology	  
industry	   –	   particularly	   the	   growth	   of	  microelectronics	   and	   independent	   software	  
vendors	   –	   forced	   two	   important	   changes	   on	   Big	   Blue’s	   operating	   logic.	   First,	   the	  
company	  would	  no	  longer	  control	  all	  the	  technology	  elements	  in	  its	  products.	  It	  had	  to	  
shift	  to	  managing	  a	  global	  supply	  chain	  network.	  (For	  example,	  Microsoft	  designed	  the	  
operating	  software	  that	  controlled	  IBM’s	  first	  PC,	  launched	  in	  1981.	  And	  later,	  IBM	  
began	  to	  source	  the	  chips	  used	  to	  power	  its	  PCs	  from	  Intel).	  Second,	  the	  company	  
began	  to	  strike	  licensing	  and	  alliance	  arrangements	  to	  remain	  competitive,	  as	  players	  
in	  the	  industry	  became	  increasingly	  specialised.	  	  
	   IBM’s	  actions	  (and	  reactions)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  computer	  policy	  initiatives	  in	  
Brazil	  and	  México	  can	  now	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  company’s	  overall	  operating	  
rationale	  described	  above.	  Apart	  from	  the	  obvious	  motivation	  to	  defend	  and	  advance	  
its	  market	  position,	  the	  company	  responded	  in	  both	  cases	  by	  seeking	  to	  (a)	  leverage	  its	  
market	  leadership	  position;	  (b)	  protect	  proprietary	  technology;	  (c)	  preserve	  autonomy	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in	  production	  and,	  later,	  in	  global	  supply	  chain	  management;	  (d)	  bargain	  with	  local	  
investment	  and	  export	  commitments.	  Interestingly,	  IBM	  actively	  enlisted	  the	  political	  
support	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  México,	  not	  Brazil.	  Data	  
General’s	  early	  failed	  attempt	  to	  do	  so	  with	  respect	  to	  Brazil	  may	  have	  dissuaded	  IBM	  
in	  that	  case.	  
	   In	  Brazil,	  IBM	  attempted	  to	  circumvent	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  minicomputers	  by	  
manufacturing	   its	   System	   32	   machines	   in	   its	   Sumare	   plant	   just	   prior	   to	   the	  
government's	   'competition'	   for	  concessions	   to	  manufacture	  minicomputers	   in	   the	  
country.	  IBM	  then	  proceeded	  to	  collect	  some	  400	  statements	  of	  interest	  from	  local	  
business	   in	  the	   'new'	   (to	  Brazil)	  product.	   	  By	  going	  straight	  to	  the	  market	  with	  an	  
attractive	  new	  minicomputer	  system	  entailing	  considerable	  investment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	  company,	  IBM	  had	  launched	  a	  “pre-­‐emptive	  strike”	  against	  the	  market	  reserve,	  
leveraging	  its	  market	  leading	  position.	  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  IBM	  had	  mistaken	  Brazil’s	  
policy	  for	  traditional	  import	  substitution	  (in	  which	  case,	  their	  commitment	  to	  local	  
manufacture	  would	  have	  been	  sufficient	  to	  secure	  their	  position	  in	  the	  market).	  It	  is	  
clear	  that	  IBM	  had	  mistaken	  the	  commitment	  of	  CAPRE’s	  ‘technicians’	  to	  the	  market	  
reserve	  and	  the	  level	  of	  political	  support	  they	  had	  generated,	  particularly	  from	  the	  
military.	   IBM’s	   bold	   attempt	   failed,	   and	   the	   company	   was	   forced	   to	   export	   the	  
minicomputers	  it	  had	  manufactured	  and	  ordered	  to	  cease	  production.	  	  IBM	  may	  have	  
been	  the	  most	  sophisticated	  of	  the	  computer	  TNCs,	  but	  at	  this	  juncture	  the	  company	  
proved	  to	  be	  relatively	  naïve	  about	  host	  country	  politics.	  
	   Unsurprisingly,	  IBM	  chose	  not	  to	  participate	  in	  either	  the	  first	  (1977)	  or	  second	  
(1984)	   minicomputer	   technology	   licensing	   competitions	   –	   to	   do	   so	   would	   have	  
jeopardised	   the	   company’s	   control	   over	   proprietary	   technology	   and	   production	  
autonomy.	   Instead	   the	   company	   pursued	   a	   strategy	   of	   consistently	   testing	   the	  
government’s	  policy	  and	  resolve	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  policy,	  particularly	  at	  transition	  
points.	  Within	  a	  year	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  CAPRE	  to	  SEI,	  IBM	  tested	  the	  policy	  by	  
(again)	  proposing	  to	  manufacture	  its	  small,	  4331	  mainframe	  computer	  in	  Brazil.	  This	  
time	  the	  company	  was	  successful	  by	  making	  a	  commitment	  to	  export	  three	  machines	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for	  every	  two	  sold	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  company	  tested	  the	  regulatory	  environment	  
again	   in	  1986	  –	   in	   the	  midst	  of	   the	  301	   trade	  dispute	  with	   the	  US	  government	  –	  
successfully	  proposing	  a	  data	  processing	  services	  joint	  venture	  with	  the	  large	  Brazilian	  
group	  Gerdau.	  While	  the	  JV	  was	  an	  apparent	  departure	  from	  the	  norm	  for	  IBM,	  it	  must	  
be	  remembered	  that	  this	  arrangement	  involved	  transferring	  IBM	  data	  services	  staff	  to	  
Gerdau;	  the	  equipment	  used	  was	  still	  proprietary	  to	  IBM.	  Throughout	  this	  period	  the	  
company	  maintained	  a	  dominant	  market	  share	  in	  the	  country,	  continuing	  to	  supply	  
large	   corporations,	   government	   agencies	   and	   the	   military	   with	   its	   expensive	  
proprietary	  mainframe	  computers.	  
	   IBM	   applied	   the	   same	   corporate	   logic	   in	   México,	   though	   the	   company’s	  
bargaining	  counterpart	  was	  not	  as	  unified	  in	  its	  objectives	  as	  Brazil	  was	  at	  the	  outset.	  
While	  managers	  at	  IBM	  de	  México	  did	  not	  claim	  to	  apply	  learning	  from	  the	  company’s	  
experience	  in	  Brazil,	  there	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  company	  executives	  in	  New	  York	  had	  
learned	  some	  useful	   lessons	  from	  1977	  to	  1981.	   In	  a	  departure	  from	  its	  tactics	   in	  
Brazil,	  IBM	  enjoined	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  in	  early	  1982––	  just	  after	  the	  
policy	  guidelines	  were	  written––	  to	  apply	  pressure	  against	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
new	  policy.	  	  Later	  IBM	  approached	  the	  Mexican	  government	  with	  a	  proposal	  to	  invest	  
in	  a	  wholly–owned	  microcomputer	  manufacturing	  plant	  whose	  production	  would	  be	  
aimed	  primarily	  at	  the	  export	  market.	  	  Foreign	  ownership	  of	  such	  an	  operation	  directly	  
contradicted	  the	  policy	  guidelines.	  
	   The	  Mexican	   government	   succeeded	   in	   getting	   IBM	   to	  modify	   its	   original	  
proposal,	  promising	  greater	  investment	  and	  exports	  –	  the	  two	  bargaining	  chips	  that	  
IBM	  was	  consistently	  prepared	  to	  play.	  Two	  days	  after	  a	  visit	  from	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  George	  Schultz,	  IBM	  was	  allowed	  to	  establish	  a	  microcomputer	  subsidiary	  in	  
México,	  despite	  the	  policy	  restrictions	  and	  the	  protestations	  of	  a	  rather	  weak	  band	  of	  
Mexican	  investors	  in	  the	  industry.	  
	   At	  first	  blush,	  the	  main	  difference	  between	  the	  approaches	  IBM	  took	  in	  México	  
and	  Brazil	  is	  the	  company’s	  move	  to	  enlist	  the	  support	  of	  its	  “home”	  country	  at	  the	  
outset.	  However,	  it	  is	  critical	  not	  to	  mistake	  this	  as	  the	  prime	  reason	  for	  the	  different	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bargaining	  and	  policy	  outcomes.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  México,	  IBM	  was	  negotiating	  with	  a	  
government	  that	  was	  more	  economically	  vulnerable	  and	  politically	  amenable	  to	  its	  
proposal.	   	   Proponents	  of	   the	  Mexican	  market	   reserve	  had	  not	  been	   successful	   in	  
winning	  allies	  committed	  to	  their	  cause	  within	  the	  new	  administration.	  	  Indeed,	  those	  
enforcing	  the	  policy	  were	  swimming	  increasingly	  upstream	  against	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  new	  
administration's	  'economic	  restructuring.'	  De	  la	  Madrid’s	  primary	  objective	  was	  the	  
very	  thing	  IBM	  was	  happy	  to	  promise	  without	  sacrificing	  its	  commitment	  to	  protecting	  
technology	  and	  production	  autonomy:	  exports.	  This	  confluence	  of	  country-­‐specific	  
factors	  and	  IBM’s	  strategic	  interests	  resulted	  in	  a	  “win-­‐win”	  bargain,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  
perceived	  as	  “win-­‐lose”	  to	  the	  Office	  of	  Electronics	  Policy	  and	  the	  local	  capital	  invested	  
in	  the	  sector.	  
	   The	  other	  major	  computer	  TNCs	  adopted	  a	  wait–and–see	  attitude	  with	  regard	  
to	  the	  policy	  initiatives	  of	  both	  countries.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  in	  Brazil	  these	  companies	  
refused	   to	  participate	   in	   the	   first	   round	  of	   licensing	   in	  1977,	  hoping	   the	  Brazilian	  
government	  would	  soon	  see	  the	  error	  of	  its	  ways.	  	  When	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  an	  
about–face	  would	  not	  be	  forthcoming,	  these	  companies	  changed	  strategy	  along	  with	  
IBM,	  and	  actively	  sought	  to	  diffuse	  their	  technology	  in	  the	  country.	  	  IBM	  did	  this	  by	  
publicly	  emphasizing	  the	  interconnectability	  of	  IBM–compatible	  national	  products	  with	  
IBM	   mainframes.	   	   Other	   TNCs	   such	   as	   DEC,	   H–P,	   and	   Data	   General	   all	   licensed	  
superminicomputer	  technology	  in	  1984,	  diffusing	  their	  technology	  and	  educating	  the	  
market	  in	  the	  operating	  environments	  of	  their	  systems.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  TNCs	  were	  
both	  admitting	  a	  temporary	  bargaining	  setback	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  preparing	  for	  the	  
time	  when	  the	  market	  reserve	  would	  be	  abolished––which	  happened	  in	  the	  early	  
1990s.	  In	  so	  doing,	  these	  companies	  could	  then	  address	  a	  market	  that	  was	  familiar	  
with	  their	  systems	  when	  the	  reserve	  was	  relaxed.	  
	   Having	  learned	  from	  their	  experience	  in	  Brazil,	  some	  of	  the	  TNCs	  took	  tentative	  
positions	   in	   the	  Mexican	  market	  with	   small	   investments	  and	  nominal	   compliance	  
shortly	  after	  the	  imposition	  of	  the	  new	  policy	  guidelines	  there.	  	  However,	  when	  IBM	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prevailed	   over	   the	   ownership	   restrictions,	   two	   important	   TNCs	   quickly	   followed,	  
buying	  out	  their	  joint–venture	  partners.	  
	   In	  each	  case,	  the	  large	  TNCs	  were	  most	  inclined	  to	  contribute	  to	  exports	  and	  
local	   supplier	   development	  where	   this	  was	   economically	   viable.	   	   Like	   IBM,	   these	  
companies	   were	   most	   reticent	   to	   relinquish	   or	   share	   control	   of	   technology	  
development.	  	  Fortunately	  for	  both	  countries,	  there	  were	  many	  smaller	  companies	  
that	  were	  willing	   to	   license	   their	   technology	   in	  exchange	   for	   royalty	  payments	  or	  
exclusive	  component	  purchase	  contracts.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  host	  country	  state	  had	  
success,	   at	   least	   for	   a	   time,	   in	   shaping	   and	   directing	   the	   investment	   decisions	   of	  
leading	  transnationals	  in	  the	  computer	  industry.	  	  
	   The	  foregoing	  discussion	  of	  IBM	  and	  the	  other	  computer	  TNCs	  reveals	  a	  critical	  
but	  oft-­‐neglected	  fact	  in	  the	  study	  of	  TNC	  –	  host	  state	  relations.	  Just	  as	  writers	  in	  
international	  political	  economy	  have	  been	  rightly	  urging	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  nuanced	  
analysis	  of	  “the	  state”	  and	  its	  constituent	  actors377;	  serious	  scholarship	  must	  do	  the	  
same	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   transnational	   (and	   domestic)	   firms	   whose	   strategies,	  
organisational	  models,	  and	  managerial	  competence	  vary	  from	  one	  another	  and	  vary	  
over	   time.	   The	   firms’	   overarching	   market	   and	   financial	   goals	   may	   be	   easy	   to	  
characterise,	  but	  their	  responses	  to	  policy	  initiatives	  will	  be	  better	  understood	  –	  and	  
anticipated	  –	  if	  their	  individual	  corporate	  history,	  competitive	  strategy	  and	  managerial	  
experience	  are	  subject	  to	  more	  detailed	  investigation.	  Whereas	  the	  units	  of	  analysis	  in	  
this	   study	  have	  been	   two	   states	   and	  an	   industry,	   each	  has	   required	   considerable	  
“unpacking”	  to	  understand	  the	  bargaining	  outcomes	  experienced.	  	  
	  
	   Thus,	  while	  industry	  and	  market	  factors	  created	  and	  constrained	  viable	  policy	  
choices	  for	  each	  of	  the	  host	  countries,	  country-­‐specific	  factors	  conditioned	  the	  policies	  
adopted,	  TNC	  responses	  to	  them,	  and	  the	  results	  documented.	  Attempts	  to	  prioritise	  
the	   explanatory	   power	   of	   industry	   factors	   over	   country-­‐specific	   factors	   are	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  Evans’	  Embedded	  Autonomy	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this.	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1995).	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confounded	   by	   the	   two	   cases	   studied.	   The	   evolution	   of	   policy	   and	   the	   national	  
industry,	  and	  the	  resulting	  bargaining	  gains	  and	  losses	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  
analysing	  the	  on-­‐going	  interplay	  between	  industry	  and	  host	  country	  specific	  factors.	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Underrated	  Factors:	  Firm-­‐Level	  Strategy	  and	  Management	  
	   The	  bargain	  model	  focuses	  on	  relations	  between	  the	  host	  country	  state	  and	  
foreign	  capital,	  contending	  that	  host	  countries	  can	  harness	  foreign	  investment	  and	  
direct	  it	  to	  the	  country’s	  advantage.	  This	  study	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  México	  and	  Brazil	  
with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  confirms	  the	  theory,	  even	  if	  gains	  are	  not	  
always	  as	  predictable	  and	  enduring	  as	  the	  host	  country	  (and	  the	  model’s	  proponents)	  
might	  prefer.	  	  
The	  model	  seeks	  to	  explain	  realised	  gains	  based	  on	  the	  relative	  bargaining	  
power	  of	  the	  host	  country	  state	  and	  foreign	  capital.	  But	  the	  actual	  results	  documented	  
in	  the	  cases	  studied	  cannot	  be	  fully	  understood	  without	  reference	  to	  (a)	  the	  intra-­‐state	  
bargaining	  “game-­‐within-­‐the-­‐game”	  discussed	  at	  length	  immediately	  above;	  and	  (b)	  
the	   firm-­‐level	   strategic	  choices	  and	   the	  management	  capability	  of	   local	   capital.378	  
Discussion	  of	  the	  latter	  is	  conspicuously	  absent	  from	  discussions	  of	  dependency	  and	  
bargain	  theory.	  	  
	   Policymakers	  in	  Brazil	  and	  México	  employed	  a	  variety	  of	  instruments	  to	  create	  
the	  space	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  local	  capital	  to	  invest	  and	  then	  flourish	  in	  certain	  
parts	  of	  the	  informatics	  industry.	  The	  policies	  successfully	  enticed	  local	  private	  sector	  
actors	   to	   enter	   the	   protected	   markets.	   Indeed,	   a	   number	   of	   domestic	   groups	  
established	  market	  positions	  and	  grew.	  In	  general,	  those	  that	  adopted	  opportunistic	  
strategies	  based	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  government	  policy	  alone	  did	  not	  fare	  well	  in	  the	  
longer	  term,	  however.	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  The	  discussion	  of	  IBM	  above	  showed	  how	  TNC	  firm-­‐level	  strategy	  and	  competence	  
influenced	  responses	  to	  the	  computer	  initiatives	  in	  the	  two	  countries	  studied.	  Attention	  is	  
now	  turned	  to	  firm-­‐level	  strategy	  and	  competence	  of	  local	  capital,	  which	  equally	  cannot	  be	  
considered	  as	  a	  homogenous	  bloc. 
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The	  most	  notable	  example	  of	  this	  in	  México	  is	  Printaform.	  Printaform	  licensed	  
technology	  from	  Columbia	  under	  the	  Computer	  Development	  Policy	  in	  1981,	  and	  grew	  
revenues	  approaching	  $14	  million	  by	  1986.	  Twelve	  years	  later,	  Printaform	  survived	  
primarily	   by	  producing	   and	   selling	  office	   equipment.	   The	   company’s	   share	  of	   the	  
domestic	  PC	  market	  was	  reduced	  to	  0.4%.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Mexican	  leader	  in	  PCs	  and	  
consumer	  electronics	  is	  Lanix	  –	  a	  private	  company	  established	  in	  1990,	  well	  after	  the	  
Mexican	  market	  reserve	  was	  dismantled.	  In	  fact,	  Lanix	  didn’t	  produce	  its	  first	  PC	  until	  
1995;	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  IBM	  decision	  spelled	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Computer	  Development	  
Policy	   in	   México.	   The	   other	   big	   Mexican	   success	   story	   in	   the	   industry	   is	   Softek.	  
Although	   Softek	  was	   founded	   in	   1982	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  market	   reserve	   in	  
microcomputers,	  the	  company	  focused	  on	  computer	  services	  and	  customised	  software	  
–	  subsectors	  that	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  policy.	  The	  success	  of	  these	  two	  companies	  
owes	  to	  the	  competitive	  strategy	  choices	  (where	  to	  play	  and	  how	  to	  win)	  and	  the	  
entrepreneurial	  capabilities	  of	  their	  founders	  and	  managers,	  not	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  their	  
host	  country	  governments	  or	  the	  computer	  TNC	  reactions	  to	  those	  policies.	  
Brazil’s	  policy	  created	  greater	  space	  for	  local	  capital	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time.	  
Unlike	   in	  México,	  a	  number	  of	   large	   finance	  and	   industrial	  groups	   invested	   in	   the	  
reserved	  sector.	  Interviews	  with	  these	  players	  revealed	  a	  variety	  of	  strategies.	  Elebra	  
tended	  to	  pursue	  a	  more	  opportunistic	  strategy,	  focused	  on	  commercialising	  foreign	  
technology	  from	  DEC	  wherever	  possible.	  Players	  like	  Itautec	  and	  Scopus	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	   actively	   pursued	   the	   development	   of	   proprietary	   technology.	   Among	   the	  
domestic	   players	   interviewed,	   Itautec	   was	   pursuing	   the	   most	   focused	   strategy,	  
building	  a	  strong	  position	  in	  banking	  software	  and	  automation.	  	  
While	  relatively	  few	  Brazilian	  players	  succeeded	  in	  the	  marketplace	  after	  the	  
reserve	  was	  dismantled,	  Itau	  Group	  is	  the	  most	  notable	  exception.	  With	  Itautec,	  this	  
banking	  group	  entered	  the	  informatics	  sector	  in	  1979,	  sensing	  an	  opportunity	  afforded	  
by	   the	   market	   reserve	   enacted	   two	   years	   earlier.	   Over	   time	   the	   Group	   built	   a	  
formidable	   array	   of	   information	   technology	   and	   electronics	   businesses:	   Itaucom	  
(semiconducors);	  SESA	  (telecommunications);	  Philco	  (consumer	  electronics,	  purchased	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from	  Ford	  in	  1987).	  Itautec	  invested	  heavily	  in	  R&D,	  successfully	  negotiated	  with	  IBM	  
to	  become	  one	  of	  two	  worldwide	  manufacturers	  for	  IBM	  communication	  controllers,	  
and	   leveraged	   the	   Group’s	   banking	   knowledge	   and	   presence	   to	   establish	   an	  
internationally	  competitive	  position	  in	  banking	  software	  and	  automation	  that	  survives	  
today.	  As	  evidence	  of	  this,	  Itautec	  began	  exporting	  ATMs	  to	  the	  US	  and	  Europe	  in	  
2001.	  	  
Thus,	   the	   expected	   and	   actual	   share	   of	   bargaining	   gains	   between	   host	  
countries	  and	  foreign	  capital	  cannot	  be	  well	  understood	  without	  taking	  account	  of	  
differences	  in	  the	  strategic	  choices,	  and	  the	  entrepreneurial	  and	  management	  talent	  
of	  local	  capital.	  Power	  relationships,	  structural	  conditions	  and	  policy	  instruments	  alone	  
do	  not	  explain	  the	  sustained	  market	  success	  of	  players	  like	  Itautec	  amidst	  the	  failure	  of	  
so	  many	  other	  firms.	  Host	  country	  policy	  may	  entice	  local	  capital	  to	  enter,	  but	  local	  
capital’s	  sustained	  success	  will	  depend	  more	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  firm’s	  strategy	  and	  
management	  than	  on	  the	  level	  or	  skill	  of	  state	  sponsorship.	  
	  
The	  Obsolescing	  Bargain	  
The	  fourth	  tenet	  of	  the	  bargaining	  model	  is	  the	  presumed	  shift	  over	  time	  in	  
relative	  bargaining	  power	   in	   favour	  of	   host	   countries,	   known	  as	   “the	  obsolescing	  
bargain”.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  introductory	  chapter,	  this	  shift	  of	  power	  to	  host	  countries	  is	  
most	   readily	   seen	   in	   extractive	   industries	   with	   very	   high	   initial	   capital	   costs	   and	  
technology	  diffusion.	  	  
Traditional	  bargain	  theorists	  such	  as	  Kindelberger,	  Horst,	  Moran	  and	  Kobrin	  
have	  expressed	  doubts	  that	  bargain	  power	  will	  shift	  to	  host	  countries	  over	  time	  in	  
technology-­‐intensive	  industries.	  The	  most	  they	  were	  prepared	  to	  allow	  is	  a	  very	  slow	  
shift	  in	  bargaining	  power.379	  In	  more	  recent	  analysis,	  Tarzi	  asserts	  that	  the	  probability	  
of	  obsolescence	  in	  high	  technology	  industries	  is	  “extremely	  low.”380	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However,	  Adler	  and	  Grieco	  argued	  that	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  did	  indeed	  
apply	  to	  the	  computer	  industry	  in	  Brazil	  and	  India	  respectively.381	  Does	  experience	  of	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  with	  the	  international	  computer	  industry	  provide	  evidence	  for	  the	  
obsolescing	  bargain	  as	  these	  two	  authors	  have	  asserted?	  The	  short	  answer	  is	  no.	  	  
Both	  countries	  can	  claim	  some	  bargaining	  successes	  as	  previously	  documented,	  
though	  the	  ambitions,	  longevity	  and	  achievements	  of	  the	  Mexican	  policy	  were	  more	  
limited	  than	  Brazil’s.	   	  Brazil’s	  policy	  remained	   in	   force	  with	  broad,	  strong	  political	  
support	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade.	  If	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  were	  to	  apply	  to	  one	  of	  the	  
two	  cases,	  it	  would	  apply	  to	  Brazil.	  When	  Adler	  published	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  Brazilian	  
case	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1986,	   Brazil	   had	   successfully	   enticed	   a	   large	   number	   of	  
domestic	   players	   into	   the	   industry	   –	   including	   some	  major	   finance	   and	   industrial	  
groups,	  developed	  a	  large	  cadre	  of	  computer	  professionals,	  developed	  indigenous	  
commercial	  technology,	  and	  limited	  the	  scope	  of	  TNC	  operations	  and	  their	  market	  
shares	  in	  the	  country.	  Adler’s	  optimism	  about	  a	  shift	  of	  bargaining	  power	  in	  favour	  of	  
Brazil	  at	  that	  time	  is	  understandable.	  	  
However,	  just	  a	  year	  later	  these	  bargaining	  gains	  looked	  much	  less	  secure.	  The	  
failure	  of	  the	  Cruzado	  Plans,	  the	  subsequent	  economic	  recession,	  and	  a	  price	  war	  in	  
computers	  exerted	  severe	  pressure	  on	  the	  Brazilian	  players.	  Most	  were	  not	  producing	  
internationally	  competitive	  products	  so	  the	  export	  market	  was	  off	  limits.	  They	  were	  
short	   on	   capital	   and	   state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   technology.	   Meanwhile,	   global	   technology	  
advances	  continued	  unabated;	  Moore’s	  Law	  waited	  for	  no	  one.	  	  
Political	  support	  for	  the	  policy	  was	  also	  wavering.	  Major	  Brazilian	  industrial	  
users	  of	  informatics	  were	  lobbying	  against	  the	  reserve,	  concerned	  that	  the	  protective	  
shield	  the	  state	  maintained	  around	  the	  domestic	  computer	  players	  hampered	  their	  
own	   competitiveness.	   In	   short	   order,	   TNCs	   began	   to	   regain	   lost	   ground.	   New	  
technology	  licensing	  agreements	  between	  major	  Brazilian	  players	  and	  foreign	  capital	  
were	  authorised.	  Texas	   Instrument’s	   investment	  plans	   for	  a	  new	  microelectronics	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plant	  was	  approved	  after	  that	  sector	  was	  “reserved’	  for	  three	  Brazilian	  firms.	  Thus,	  it	  
was	  already	  clear	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1987	  that	  the	  bargaining	  gains	  of	  the	  first	  decade	  
of	  the	  market	  reserve	  were	  in	  jeopardy.	  	  
With	   the	   benefit	   of	   longer	   hindsight,	   one	   sees	   many	   of	   the	   important	  
bargaining	   gains	   lost.	   Technology	   licensing	   gave	   way	   to	   joint	   ventures,	   which	  
eventually	   became	   controlled	   by	   foreign	   capital.	   Brazil	   continued	   to	   depend	   on	  
imported	  high-­‐tech	  components.	  And	  few	  Brazilian	  players	  have	  succeeded	  in	  the	  
market	  absent	  the	  protective	  rubric	  of	  the	  reserve.	  	  
The	  obsolescing	  bargain	  clearly	  does	  not	  apply	   in	   the	  cases	  of	  México	  and	  
Brazil.	  The	  real	  problem	  with	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  as	   framed	   is	   that	   it	  posits	  a	  
progressive,	  one-­‐directional	  shift	  in	  bargaining	  power	  over	  time	  to	  host	  countries.	  In	  
dynamic,	  global,	  technology-­‐intensive	  industries	  windows	  of	  opportunity	  are	  always	  
opening	   and	   shutting.	   There	   are	   periodic	   opportunities	   for	   the	   host	   country	   and	  
foreign	  capital	  to	  re-­‐strike	  the	  bargain.	  This	  study	  shows	  that	  both	  México	  and	  Brazil	  
were	  able	  to	  achieve	  some	  bargaining	  gains	  in	  the	  computer	  industry	  and	  they	  were	  
vulnerable	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  	  	  
	   	  
Concluding	  Observations	   	  
The	   cases	   underline	   the	   fundamental	   trade–off,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   short	   and	  
medium	   terms,	   between	   objectives	   of	   technology	   transfer	   and	   international	  
competitiveness.	  	  Brazil	  has	  pursued	  the	  former	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  latter,	  while	  
México	  placed	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  international	  competitiveness	  and	  exports,	  to	  a	  
large	  extent	  forfeiting	  indigenous	  technological	  development.	  	  Both	  countries	  had	  to	  
balance	  one	  against	  the	  other,	  recognizing	  the	  difficulty	  of	  having	  both	  at	  the	  same	  
time.	  	  The	  dilemma	  for	  the	  host	  country	  can	  be	  couched	  in	  the	  question:	  	  Is	  it	  better	  to	  
be	  a	  dependent	  consumer	  of	  state–of–the–art	  informatics	  equipment	  and	  services,	  or	  
an	  autonomous	  producer	  of	  inferior	  information	  technology?	  	  To	  answer	  the	  question	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one	  must	  take	  good	  account	  of	  the	  increasing	  dependence	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  
on	   information	   technology.	   	   This	   pervasive	   dependence	   raised	   the	   stakes	   in	   the	  
bargaining	  game.	  	  Interestingly,	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  
both	   countries	   based	   their	   arguments	   on	   the	   pervasive	   influence	   of	   information	  
technology.	   Those	   favouring	   the	   market	   reserve	   argue	   that	   national	   economic	  
development	  can	  only	  be	  self-­‐directed	  if	  there	  is	  a	  truly	  national	  informatics	  industry	  
and	  capability.	  Proponents	  of	  a	  more	  liberal	  approach	  argue	  that	  the	  competitiveness	  
of	   the	   entire	   economy	   is	   jeopardized	   without	   access	   to	   the	   latest	   productivity-­‐
enhancing	  information	  technology.	  	  
	   This	  study	  also	  reveals	  the	  resilience,	  resourcefulness,	  and	  determination	  of	  
the	  market	  in	  pursuing	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  it	  needs	  and	  wants.	  	  Where	  the	  market	  
is	  knowledgeable	  about	  international	  standards	  of	  price	  and	  technology,	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	  sustain	  a	  policy	  that	  restricts	  the	  market's	  access	  to	  such	  products	  and	  services.	  	  The	  
existence	  of	  significant	  and	  growing	  contraband	  markets	  in	  both	  countries	  in	  the	  1980s	  
testifies	  to	  this	  fact.	  	  Further	  evidence	  of	  the	  market's	  determination	  is	  its	  increasingly	  
vociferous	  opposition	  to	  the	  market	  reserve	  in	  Brazil.	  	  It	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  prevent	  
copying	  of	  technology	  in	  such	  a	  case	  simply	  by	  legislating	  against	  it.	  	  The	  potential	  
profits	   from	   supplying	   latent	   market	   demand	   are	   too	   great	   an	   incentive	   for	  
opportunist	  investors.	  	  Illegal	  imports	  and	  product	  copying	  have	  undermined	  both	  
indigenous	  technology	  development	  and	  balance	  of	  trade	  in	  the	  sector.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  
cases	   studied	   provide	   empirical	   support	   for	   the	   state-­‐to-­‐market	   power	   shift	   that	  
Strange	   contends.	   Power	   over	   outcomes	   was	   indeed	   “exercised	   impersonally	   by	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markets	   and	   often	   unintentionally	   by	   those	   who	   buy	   and	   sell	   and	   deal	   in	   the	  
markets.”382	  
My	  final	  observation	  concerns	  a	  role	  and	  more	  flexible	  mechanism	  the	  state	  
could	  have	  used	  but	  did	  not:	  the	  role	  of	  lead	  venture	  capital	  investor.	  This	  is	  a	  role	  that	  
seems	  well	  suited	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  effective	  “greenhouses”	  for	  local	  capital	  in	  very	  
dynamic	   industries	   like	   informatics	   –	   the	   host	   country	   state	   functions	   that	   Evans	  
described	  as	  “midwifery”	  and	  “husbandry.”383	  It	  is	  a	  flexible	  mechanism	  that	  would	  
help	   states	   overcome	   the	   impossible	   challenge	   of	   anticipating	   the	   evolution	   of	   a	  
hyper-­‐dynamic	  industry	  and	  determining	  which	  policy	  mechanisms	  to	  apply	  exactly	  
when	  in	  order	  to	  deliver	  intended	  outcomes.	  It	  provides	  adaptability	  where	  sufficient	  
prescience	  and	  shrewdness	  are	  impossible	  to	  guarantee	  outcomes.	  
The	  Brazilian	  state	  invested	  capital	  in	  a	  single	  company,	  Cobra.	  However,	  the	  
state	  could	  have	  invested	  in	  a	  venture	  capital	  fund,	  run	  by	  (say)	  a	  proven	  Silicon	  Valley	  
venture	  capital	  manager,	  with	  a	  well-­‐defined	  mandate	  to	  develop	  a	  national	  computer	  
industry	  over	  a	  10-­‐year	  period.	  Such	  a	  mechanism	  is	  inherently	  more	  adaptable	  to	  
changing	   opportunities	   and	   challenges	   than	   the	   mechanisms	   employed	   by	   the	  
Brazilian	  or	  Mexican	  states.	  The	  idea	  can	  be	  elaborated	  a	  little	  further	  with	  respect	  to	  
Brazil.	  
Once	  the	  policy	  objectives	  shifted	  from	  developing	  Brazilian-­‐owned	  informatics	  
companies	  supplying	  a	  protected	  domestic	  market,	  to	  developing	  an	  internationally	  
competitive	  informatics	  industry	  cluster	  in	  Brazil,	  lessons	  from	  the	  successful	  US	  high-­‐
technology	  cluster	  model	  are	  relevant	  and	  applicable.	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High-­‐tech	  companies	  start	  up	  in	  Silicon	  Valley,	  Boston	  and	  the	  like	  attracted	  by	  
the	  existence	  of	  an	  eco-­‐system	  that	  includes:	  
♦ Top	  class	  universities	  with	  strong	  science	  and	  technology	  R&D.	  
♦ Flagship	  companies	  that	  attract	  and	  ultimately	  spawn	  smaller	  companies	  in	  their	  
own	  industry	  sectors	  forming	  the	  clusters.	  Cisco,	  Apple,	  Google	  and	  Oracle	  have	  
attracted	  others	  to	  co-­‐locate	  in	  Silicon	  Valley.	  Likewise	  Genentech,	  Amgen	  and	  
Abbot	  have	  done	  the	  same	  in	  various	  locations	  to	  create	  biotechnology	  clusters.	  	  
♦ Hi-­‐technology	  support	  services	  companies.	  
♦ Clusters	   of	   venture	   capital	   and	   investment	   firms	   with	   investment	   capital,	  
networks	  and	  expertise	  in	  the	  industry	  cluster.	  
♦ Cities	  with	  good	  infrastructure	  and	  access	  to	  international	  airports.	  
	   In	  the	  past,	  clusters	  grew	  up	  around	  leading	  US	  universities	  like	  Stanford	  and	  
MIT.	  Today,	  high-­‐tech	  start-­‐ups	  are	  located	  where	  the	  venture	  capital	  firms	  are	  based.	  
Technology	  and	  talent	  have	  tended	  to	  follow	  the	  money	  and	  expertise,	  most	  often	  to	  
the	  Silicon	  Valley.	  
	   If	  the	  government	  of	  Brazil	  (or	  México,	  for	  that	  matter)	  had	  been	  prepared	  to	  
commit	  capital	  to	  develop	  the	  sector,	  it	  could	  have	  invited	  a	  variety	  of	  international	  
venture	  capital	  firms	  to	  match	  government	  funds.384	  The	  government	  could	  have	  then	  
set	  conditions	  for	  the	  mandate,	  for	  example:	  
♦ Venture	  capital	  firms	  must	  locate	  in	  Brazil	  and	  raise	  matching	  funds	  from	  private	  
institutions.	  	  
                                                
384	  This	  approach	  was	  adopted	  on	  a	  relatively	  small	  scale	  in	  Malaysia	  with	  the	  
biotechnology	  industry,	  for	  example.	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♦ Funds	  can	  only	  be	   invested	   in	  companies	   located	   in	  a	   specific	   region	  of	   the	  
country	   where	   there	   is	   a	   developing	   ecosystem	   and	   where	   an	   agreed	  
percentage	  of	  activities	  must	  occur	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  Brazil	  in	  São	  Paolo	  state,	  and	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  México	  in	  Jalisco).	  	  
♦ Funds	   will	   be	   agnostic	   about	   the	   country	   of	   origin	   of	   the	   technology.	   The	  
advantage	  of	  inviting	  international	  VCs	  is	  that	  they	  will	  bring	  in	  foreign	  investors	  
(for	  the	  match	  funding)	  as	  well	  as	  technologies.	  A	  US	  venture	  capital	  firm	  based	  
in	  Brazil	  can	  persuade	  a	  US-­‐based	  company	  to	  locate	  in	  Brazil	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  
funding.	  While	  this	  approach	  would	  have	  been	  incompatible	  with	  the	  original	  
policy	  objectives	  in	  Brazil	  circa	  1977,	  it	  could	  have	  accelerated	  internationally	  
competitive	   local	   production	   when	   the	   policy	   shifted	   from	   protection	   to	  
promotion	  in	  1990.	  	  
♦ Venture	  capital	  managers	  seldom	  invest	  alone	  and	  often	  syndicate	  deals	  with	  
other	  VC	   firms.	   So	   the	   leverage	   from	   the	  government’s	   seed	  capital	   can	  be	  
considerable,	  on	  the	  order	  of	  five	  to	  ten	  times.	  
	   Midwifery	  and	  husbandry	  are	  seemingly	  attractive	  and	  important	  functions	  for	  
a	  developmental	  state	  to	  play.	  But	  the	  hyper	  dynamism	  of	  the	  informatics	  industry	  
makes	  these	  roles	  exceedingly	  difficult	  for	  the	  state	  to	  play	  well,	  even	  if	   local	  and	  
international	  politics	  are	  supportive.	  And	  the	  stakes	  are	  high	  –	  informatics	  is	  not	  just	  a	  
collection	  of	  standard	  industrial	  codes;	  it	  is	  a	  cluster	  of	  industries	  that	  have	  a	  critical	  
impact	  on	  the	  productivity	  and	  therefore	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  national	  economy.	  	  
Thus,	  states	  must	  make	  realistic	  assumptions	  about	  what	  role	  they	  can	  play	  to	  
encourage	  the	  development	  of	  competitive	  high-­‐tech	  industries.	  Perhaps	  adopting	  the	  
role	  of	  a	  catalytic	  investor	  –	  not	  in	  an	  individual	  flagship	  company	  but	  in	  a	  fund	  or	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funds	  that	  are	  better	  geared	  to	  fuelling	  the	  growth	  of	  an	  internationally	  competitive	  
industry	  cluster	  –	  is	  a	  role	  that	  will	  help	  states	  to	  transition	  from	  midwife	  to	  husband	  
and	  yield	  more	  lasting	  success.	  	  
	  
Main	  Contributions	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
	   This	  final	  section	  summarises	  the	  main	  empirical	  and	  conceptual	  contributions	  
the	  thesis	  makes	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  relations	  between	  host	  country	  states	  
and	  TNCs	  in	  a	  highly	  dynamic	  industry	  sector	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
Empirical	  Contributions	  
The	  research	  findings	  are	  supported	  by	  extensive	  empirical	  research	  that	  draws	  
from	   primary	   sources,	   including	   interviews	   with	   decision	   makers	   in	   the	   state	  
bureaucracies,	  and	  in	  local	  and	  transational	  firms.	  Based	  on	  ninety-­‐six	  field	  interviews	  
and	  numerous	  secondary	  sources,	  the	  research	  project	  documents	  in	  rich	  detail	  the	  
development	   of	   computer	   policies	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   1980s,	   together	   with	   the	  
responses	  of	  foreign	  TNCs	  and	  domestic	  capital	  to	  the	  evolving	  policy	  and	  market	  
environments.	   The	   thesis	   is	   distinctive	   in	   its	   thorough	   interdisciplinary	   historical	  
documentation	   and	  exploration	  of	   (a)	   domestic	   and	   international	   politics	   at	   both	  
macro	   and	   sectorial	   levels;	   (b)	   industry	   structure	   development	   and	   competitive	  
dynamics;	  (c)	  market	  response	  and	  influence;	  and	  (d)	  firm	  level	  strategy,	  success	  and	  
failure.	  As	  such,	  the	  case	  studies	  integrate	  and	  synthesise	  perspectives	  from	  history,	  
politics,	  economics	  and	  business.	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As	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  Brazilian	  case	  has	  received	  more	  attention	  
since	  the	  fieldwork	  for	  this	  thesis	  was	  conducted.385	  However,	  this	  analysis	  of	  policy	  
impact	  and	  emphasis	  on	  the	  dynamic	  interplay	  between	  market	  and	  political	  forces	  is	  
distinctive.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Mexican	  case	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  relatively	  neglected.386	  
The	  case	  material	  alone	  on	  México	  therefore	  adds	  to	  the	  body	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  
market	  reserve	  experiment	  in	  that	  country	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  
The	  thesis	  also	  adds	  to	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  compares	  the	  experiences	  of	  
developing	  economies	  with	   the	   international	   informatics	   industry.387	  The	  cases	  of	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  have	  not	  been	  compared	  systematically	  with	  a	  view	  to	  drawing	  
lessons	  for	  TNC	  –	  host	  country	  bargaining.388	  In	  fact,	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  rarely	  discussed	  
together.	  Yet	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  interesting	  comparators,	  not	  just	  because	  they	  offer	  a	  
test	  and	  potential	  refinement	  of	  bargain	  theory	  in	  high	  technology	  industries.	  Both	  
cases	   developed	   in	   a	   period	   of	   national	   history	   characterised	   by	   growing	  
democratisation	  and	  transition	  to	  free	  market	  economies	  –	  economic	  policies	  that	  
have	  largely	  endured	  to	  this	  day.	  This	  comparative	  case	  study	  documented	  at	  this	  
particular	  time	  in	  history	  therefore	  offers	  a	  distinctive	  and	  relevant	  perspective.	  	  
Conceptual	  Contributions	  
The	  distinctive	  contributions	  the	  thesis	  makes	  to	  conceptual	  scholarship	  on	  the	  
relations	  between	  developing	  country	  states	  and	  transnational	  firms	  in	  globalising	  high	  
                                                
385	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995);	  Evans,	  Frischtak	  and	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1992);	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.	  
(1995);	  and	  Schoonmaker,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (2002).	  	  
386	  Montoya	  Martín	  Del	  Campo,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1992);	  Borja,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995).	  
387	  Brazil’s	  experience	  with	  the	  international	  informatics	  industry	  has	  been	  compared	  at	  
some	  level	  to	  India	  and	  Korea	  in	  the	  mid	  and	  late	  1990s	  in	  Evans,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1995);	  and	  
Evans,	  Frischtak	  and	  Tigre,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1992).	  	  
388	  A	  summary	  comparison	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  liberalization	  on	  the	  computer	  industries	  in	  
México	  and	  Brazil	  has	  been	  documented	  in	  Dedrick,	  Jason,	  Kraemer,	  Palacios	  and	  Tigre	  Op.	  
Cit.	  (2001),	  but	  there	  is	  little	  discussion	  of	  host	  country	  politics	  or	  host	  country	  –	  TNC	  
bargaining	  in	  the	  article.	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technology	  industries	  are	  fourfold.	  The	  thesis:	  (i)	  demonstrates	  the	  inapplicability	  of	  
the	   obsolescing	   bargain	   in	   the	   cases	   studied,	   instead	   detailing	   a	   more	   dynamic	  
bargaining	  environment	  where	  industry	  and	  country-­‐specific	  factors	  open	  and	  close	  
windows	  of	  opportunity	  for	  both	  host	  country	  and	  transnational	  firms;	  (ii)	  highlights	  
the	   trade-­‐offs	   between	   the	   objectives	   of	   technology	   transfer	   and	   international	  
economic	  competitiveness;	  (iii)	  illustrates	  the	  importance	  of	  firm-­‐level	  strategy	  and	  
managerial	   competence	   to	   explain	   industrial	   success,	   whatever	   the	   policy	  
environment;	  and	  finally	  (iv)	  demonstrates	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  standard	  host	  state	  
“toolkit”	  and	  identifies	  an	  alternative	  role	  that	  developmental	  host	  country	  states	  can	  
play	  in	  knowledge-­‐intensive	  globalised	  industries,	  despite	  the	  challenges	  that	  such	  
hyper-­‐dynamic	  industries	  present.	  
Inapplicability	  of	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain.	  Vernon’s	  original	  articulation	  of	  the	  
obsolescing	  bargain	  theory	  forty	  years	  ago	  was	  based	  largely	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  
foreign	   investment	   in	   extractive	   industries.389	   Stephen	   Kobrin	   (along	   with	   other	  
traditional	  bargain	  theorists	  like	  Kindelberger,	  Horst	  and	  Moran)	  subsequently	  argued	  
that	  manufacturing	  and	  export-­‐oriented	  foreign	  investors	  were	  less	  vulnerable	  to	  host	  
country	   treatment	   arising	   from	   an	   obsolescing	   bargain.390	   Malesky	   noted	   more	  
recently	  that	  foreign	  investors	  learn	  and	  direct	  their	  investments	  into	  countries	  where	  
they	  are	  less	  susceptible	  to	  an	  obsolescing	  bargain	  post	  investment.391	  However,	  Adler	  
and	  Grieco	  argued	  that	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  did	  indeed	  apply	  to	  the	  computer	  
                                                
389	  Vernon,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1971);	  (1980).	  	  
390	  Kobrin,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (1987).	  
391	  Malesky,	  Op.	  Cit.,	  (2005)	  p.	  8.	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industry	  in	  Brazil	  and	  India	  respectively.	  These	  papers	  were	  published	  in	  1984	  and	  
1987	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  sufficient	  longitudinal	  perspective.392	  	  
While	  this	  study	  is	  not	  offered	  as	  a	  rigorous	  testing	  of	  theoretical	  models,	  the	  
detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  dynamics	  of	  state	  –	  TNC	  interactions	  over	  a	  multi-­‐decade	  
period	  of	  time	  provides	  conclusive	  proof	  that	  the	  obsolescing	  bargain	  does	  not	  apply	  
in	  these	  cases.	  While	  both	  México	  and	  Brazil	  achieved	  some	  bargaining	  gains	  in	  the	  
computer	  industry,	  they	  were	  both	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  This	  
study	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	   interplay	  of	  political,	   industry	  and	  market	  forces	  revealed	  a	  
bargaining	   landscape	   that	   is	   more	   complex	   and	   variable	   than	   the	   unidirectional	  
obsolescing	  bargain	  assumes.	  The	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  static	  positional	  asset-­‐
based	  models	  to	  identify	  winners	  and	  losers	  lack	  sufficient	  explanatory	  power.	  
By	   unpacking	   the	   country-­‐specific	   factors,	   this	   study	   also	   revealed	   the	  
importance	  of	  the	  bargaining	  “game-­‐within-­‐the-­‐game”	  in	  determining	  the	  actual	  policy	  
courses	  followed.	  By	  contrast,	  much	  of	  the	  bargaining	  literature	  treats	  states	  and	  firms	  
as	  “whole	  actors”,	  neglecting	  the	  micro-­‐politics	  and	  bargains	  struck	  inside	  each	  state	  
and	  firm	  that	  were	  decisive	  in	  determining	  state-­‐firm	  bargaining	  terms	  and	  outcomes.	  
Even	  ‘triangular	  bargaining	  models’393	  underplay	  the	  importance	  of	  intra-­‐state	  and	  
intra-­‐firm	  bargains.	  	  
Trade-­‐off	  between	  technology	  transfer	  and	  international	  competitiveness.	  The	  
thesis	  highlights	  a	  fundamental,	  shared	  dilemma	  for	  host	  countries	  with	  respect	  to	  
information	  technology:	  Is	  it	  better	  to	  be	  a	  dependent	  consumer	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  
informatics	  equipment	  and	  services,	  or	  an	  autonomous	  producer	  of	  uncompetitive	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  Adler,	  Op.	  Cit.	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393	  Stopford	  and	  Strange,	  Op.	  Cit.	  (1992).	  
        324 
information	  technology?	  The	  two	  cases	  studied	  side	  by	  side	  illustrate	  the	  fundamental	  
trade-­‐off	   between	   objectives	   of	   international	   competitiveness	   and	   technology	  
transfer.	  Brazil	  aggressively	  pursued	  the	  latter	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time,	  to	  the	  
detriment	   of	   the	   former.	   México	   placed	   greater	   emphasis	   on	   international	  
competitiveness	  and	  exports	  much	  earlier,	  and	  forfeited	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  sustained	  
indigenous	  technology	  development.	  The	  thesis	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  difficulty	  of	  
pursuing	  an	  economic	  development	  strategy	  that	  isolates	  the	  country	  from	  state-­‐of-­‐
the	  art	  technology	  inputs.	  If	  the	  aim	  is	  national	  economic	  development,	  then	  a	  narrow	  
industrial	   development	   mindset	   (“protect	   and	   develop	   a	   national	   information	  
technology	  industry”)	  ignores	  the	  universal	  importance	  of	  information	  technology	  to	  
the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  national	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  will	  be	  better	  served	  by	  
framing	  the	  policy	  objective	  as	  “the	  rapid	  diffusion	  of	  information	  technology	  as	  the	  
critical	  productivity-­‐enhancing	  input	  for	  industry.”	  	  
Importance	  of	  firm-­‐level	  analysis.	  The	  thesis	  illustrates	  the	  importance	  of	  firm-­‐
level	  strategy	  and	  management	  competence	  to	  explain	  industrial	  success.	  In	  much	  of	  
the	  international	  political	  economy	  literature,	  the	  focus	  on	  industrial	  policy,	  national	  
and	  international	  politics	  and	  economics	  often	  obscure	  or	  ignore	  the	  importance	  of	  
firm-­‐level	   factors.	  Discussion	  of	   these	   is	  conspicuously	  absent	   from	  discussions	  of	  
dependency	  and	  bargain	  theory.	  However,	  the	  actual	  results	  documented	  in	  the	  cases	  
studied	  cannot	  be	  understood	  without	  reference	  to	  the	  firm-­‐level	  strategic	  choices	  
and	   the	  management	  capability	  of	   local	  capital.	  The	  general	   theoretical	  approach	  
cannot	  explain	  the	  competitive	  success	  of	  Lanix	  and	  Softek	  in	  México	  or	  Itautec	  and	  
PROCOMP	  in	  Brazil.	  These	  may	  indeed	  be	  exceptions	  to	  the	  general	  trend,	  but	  they	  are	  
important	  enough	  to	  show	  that	  “local	  capital”	  cannot	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  homogenous	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bloc.	  Scholarly	  work	  in	  the	  IPE	  field	  will	  benefit	  from	  integrating	  perspectives	  from	  the	  
business	  disciplines	  of	  competitive	  strategy	  and	  organisation	  with	  those	  of	  politics	  and	  
economics.	  
State	  role	  as	  catalytic	  venture	  fund	  investor.	  Finally,	  the	  thesis	  identified	  the	  
need	   for	  a	  more	  nimble	   toolkit	   to	  be	  applied	  by	  developmental	   states	   seeking	   to	  
harness	  dynamic,	  globalising,	  high	  technology	  industries	  to	  develop	  national	  capability	  
for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Evans	  documented	  the	  critical	  importance	  of	  
a	   highly	   competent	   state	  bureaucracy	   that	   is	   both	   embedded	   in	   varied	  networks	  
within	  its	  society,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  able	  to	  maintain	  sufficient	  autonomy	  to	  avoid	  
capture	  by	  vested	  interests	  so	  it	  can	  pursue	  its	  own	  vision	  of	  national	  development	  
(“embedded	  autonomy”).394	  Stopford	  and	  Strange	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  
understanding	  the	  international	  structures	  of	  industries	  and	  the	  competitive	  strength	  
of	  individual	  firms.395	  Findings	  from	  this	  thesis	  show	  that	  such	  embedded	  autonomy	  
and	  industry	  insight	  are	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  to	  harness	  and	  direct	  a	  rapidly	  
evolving	  high	  technology	  industry.	  	  Evans	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  concrete	  ways	  the	  state	  
may	   create	   “greenhouses”	   for	   local	   capital	   to	   invest	   and	   develop	   in	   strategic	  
industries,	  using	  the	  language	  of	  “midwifery”	  and	  “husbandry”	  to	  describe	  two	  of	  the	  
potential	  state	  roles.	  	  
However,	   this	   thesis	   shows	   that	   the	   hyper	   dynamism	   of	   the	   informatics	  
industry	  makes	  these	  roles	  exceedingly	  difficult	  for	  a	  state	  to	  play	  well,	  even	  if	  local	  
and	  international	  politics	  are	  supportive.	  The	  thesis	  posits	  a	  different	  role:	  that	  of	  a	  
catalytic	  investor	  not	  in	  a	  firm	  but	  in	  an	  industry	  via	  a	  professionally	  managed	  fund	  or	  
                                                
394	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funds	  that	  are	  better	  (even	  specially)	  suited	  to	  identify	  and	  develop	  competitive	  firms	  
in	  rapidly	  evolving	  sectors.	  While	  Malaysia	  has	  taken	  this	  approach	  with	  respect	  to	  
developing	  a	  biotech	  industry	  and	  Rwanda	  has	  assumed	  a	  similar	  role	  through	  two	  
national	  holding	  companies	  investing	  across	  sectors,	  this	  is	  a	  state	  role	  that	  is	  not	  well	  
documented	   or	   explored	   in	   the	   literature.396	   Even	   as	   it	   is	   mentioned	   here	   as	   a	  
distinctive	   contribution,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   this	   type	   of	   approach	  would	   benefit	   from	  
further	  research.	  
                                                
396	  A	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  Working	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  the	  case	  of	  Rwanda	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  2000,	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  is	  effectively	  an	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  in	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  holding	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  strategic	  
investments	  in	  national	  enterprises:	  Tri-­‐Star	  Investments	  (recently	  re-­‐branded	  Crystal	  
Ventures),	  owned	  by	  the	  ruling	  party;	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  Horizon	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  by	  the	  Rwandan	  military.	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APPENDIX	  B	  
 
DEPTH	  INTERVIEWS	  -­‐	  MÉXICO	  
	  
Name	   Title	   Organisation	   Date	  
INDUSTRY	   	   	   	  
Lee	  Ting	   VP	  International	   HP	  (California)	   01/87	  
Jorge	  Martínez	   VP	   HP	  de	  México	   04/87	  
Juan	  Flores	   Marketing	  Director	   Honeywell	  Bull	   04/87	  
Robert	  Cook	   President	   Unisys	  de	  México	   04/87	  
René	  Mondragón	   External	  Relations	   Unisys	  de	  México	   05/87	  
Ramiro	  Zavala	   President	   Control	  Data	  	   04/87	  
Rubén	  Bernal	   President	   NCR	  de	  México	   04/87	  
Gene	  Towle	   Marketing	  Director	   Apple	  de	  México	   04/87	  
Raúl	  de	  la	  Parra	   President	   Equipos	  y	  Sistemas	  	   03/87	  
Jaime	  Nares	   	   Tandem	  de	  México	   06/87	  
Rodrigo	  Guerra	   	   IBM	  de	  México	   05/87	  
José	  Gomez	   Marketing	  Director	   IBM	  de	  México	   05/87	  
Jorge	  Espinosa	   	   AES	  Printaform	   05/87	  
Antonio	  Castro	   President	   Grupo	  Mexel	   05/87	  
Alfredo	  Gonzalez	  	   President	   Grupo	  Sigma	   05/87	  
José	  Quiroga	   President	   Micrológica	  Aplicada	   05/87	  
Eduardo	  Sittón	   	   Planta	  Industrial	  Digital	   05/87	  
Fernando	  Ruiz	  Salazar	   	   IEPRO	  Olivetti	   05/87	  
Enrique	  Martínez	   Vice	  President	   Electron	   06/87	  
Luis	  Thion	   	   Sistemas	  Inteligentes	   06/87	  
	   	   	   	  
GOVERNMENT	   	   	   	  
Adolfo	  Hegewisch	   Undersecretary	   SECOFI	   06/87	  
José	  Warman	   Director	  General	   SECOFI	   03-­‐06/87	  
Ricardo	  Zermeño	   Director	  General	   SECOFI	   04-­‐05/87	  
Alberto	  Montoya	   Director	   INEGI	  	   03-­‐04/87	  
Pablo	  Grijalva	   Director	  General	   INEGI	   04/87	  
Pedro	  Treviño	   	   SECOFI	   04/87	  
Ernesto	  Marcos	   Dir	  Genl	  Industries	   SEPAFIN	   05/87	  
Mario	  Espinosa	   	   SECOFI	   05/87	  
Maurcicio	  de	  Maria	   	   SECOFI	   05/87	  
	   	   	   	  
ASSOCIATIONS	  &	   ACADEMICS	   	   	  
J.	  Francisco	  Thions	   President	   Infocom	   03,	  06/87	  
Ricardo	  Rosas	   	  President	   	  AMFABI	   03/87	  
Irma	  Amaya	  Gonalez	   	   CANIECE	   03/87	  
José	  Luiz	  Marquez	   	   CANIECE	   03/87	  
Matthias	  Sachse	   	   ITAM	   01-­‐05/87	  
Victoria	  Bajar	   	   ITAM	   02/87	  
Margaret	  Miller	   	   ITAM	   02/87	  
Rogelio	  Ramírez	   	   Ecanal	   03/87	  
Franklin	  Rendón	   	   CONACYT	   03/87	  
Timothy	  Berry	   	   Infotext	  (California)	   01/87	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DEPTH	  INTERVIEWS	  -­‐	  BRAZIL	  
	  
Name	   Title	   Organisation	   Date	  
INDUSTRY	   	   	   	  
Paulo	  Aratangy	   President	   Tesis/Hewlett	  Packard	   09/87	  
Celso	  Furiani	   External	  Relations	   Tenpo/Olivetti	   09/87	  
Edson	  Fregni	   President	   Scopus	   09-­‐10/87	  
Fernando	  Dominques	   Vice	  President	   Scopus	   09-­‐10/87	  
Conrado	  Venturini	   Director	   Itautec	   09-­‐10/87	  
Roberto	  Mors	   Manufacturing	  Dir	   IBM	  Brasil	   09/87	  
Georg	  Herz	   External	  Relations	   Unisys	  Brasil	   10/87	  
Henry	  Eicler	   President	   Unisys	  Brasil	   10/87	  
Enrico	  Misosi	   President	   Olivetti	   09/87	  
Arnon	  Schreiber	   President	   Digirede	   10/87	  
Koenraad	  Visser	   President	   DEC	  Brasil	   10/87	  
Paulo	  Tigre	   Planning	  Director	   Cobra	   10/87	  
Mario	  Ripper	   President	   Elebra	   10/87	  
Herman	  Katzender	   	   Elebra	   10/87	  
Claudio	  Mammana	   	   Elebra	   10/87	  
Mario	  Frassatti	   Director	   Prologica	   10/87	  
José	  Nelson	  Salvetti	   General	  Manager	   Texas	  Instruments	  Brasil	   10/87	  
Henry	  Maller	   General	  Manager	   Fairchild	  Brasil	   09/87	  
Antonio	  Carlos	  Rego	  	   President	  	   SID	  Informatica	   09/87	  
Ricardo	  Maciel	   	   SID	  Informatica	   10/87	  
	   	   	   	  
MAJOR	  USERS	   	   	   	  
Jon	  Elsasser	   President	   Timken	  do	  Brasil	   09/87	  
John	  Blahmik	   Treasurer	   EDS	  (General	  Motors)	   09/87	  
Luiz	  Fernandes	   	   EDS	  (General	  Motors)	   09/87	  
George	  King	   President	   Kodak	  Brasileira	   09/87	  
David	  Benadof	   President	   J.I.	  Case	   10/87	  
Norbert	  Gmur	   President	   Ciba	  Geigy	  Quimica	   10/87	  
John	  Mancel	   Director	  of	  Admin	   Ciba	  Geigy	  Quimica	   10/87	  
Vitor	  Baumgartener	   President	   Caterpillar	  do	  Brasil	   10/87	  
Eugenio	  Monteiro	   	   Romi	  Ind.	  SA	   10/87	  
Morris	  Abadi	   Finance	  Director	   Metal	  Leve	   10/87	  
Ricardo	  Hamlet	  C.	   	   Cofab	  CIA	  Fabric.	   10/87	  
Sirleu	  Jose	  Protti	   General	  Manager	   Gerdau	  Metalurgica	  SA	   10/87	  
	   	   	   	  
ASSOCIATIONS	  	   	   	   	  
Arturo	  Perera	  Nunes	   President	   ABICOMP	   10/87	  
Claudio	  Mammana	   President	   	  ABICOMP	   10/87	  
Washington	  Franco	   	   SUCESU	   09/87	  
Edson	  Fermeni	   	   FIESP	   10/87	  
Chris	  Lund	   	   Grupo	  das	  30	   10/87	  
Laerte	  Setubal	   	   Grupo	  das	  30	   10/87	  
Luigi	  Nese	   President	   ASSESSPRO	   10/87	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Name	   Title	   Organisation	   Date	  
GOVERNMENT	   	   	   	  
José	  Ezil	   	   SEI	   10/87	  
Roberto	  Spolidoro	   	   SEI	   10/87	  
Dorgival	  Brandão	   	   SEI	   10/87	  
Luciano	  Coutinho	   Secretary	  General	   Science	  &	  Tech	  Ministry	   10/87	  
Clelia	  Piragibe	   	   Science	  &	  Tech	  Ministry	   10/87	  
Roberto	  Campos	   Senator	   Congress	   10/87	  
Cristina	  Taveres	   Senator	   Congress	   10/87	  
Severo	  Gomes	   Senator	   Congress	   10/87	  
Edison	  Dytz	   	   SEI	   10/87	  
Mike	  Delane	   	   US	  Consulate	   08/87	  
Steve	  Dacchi	   General	  Consul	   US	  Consulate	   09-­‐10/87	  
Claude	  Fontaine	   	   Canadian	  Consulate	   09/87	  
William	  Jackson	   	   Canadian	  Consulate	   09/87	  
	   	   	   	  
OTHER	   	   	   	  
Vivian	  Morgan-­‐
Mendez	  
Vice	  President	   Bank	  of	  Boston	   09-­‐10/87	  
Rik	  Turner	   	   McGraw-­‐Hill	   08-­‐10/87	  
Norman	  Gall	   	   Forbes	   10/87	  
Francisco	  Viana	   	   Senhor	   09/87	  
Esther	  Donio	  Bellegard	   	   Pinheiro	  Neto,	  Avogados	   10/87	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MEXICAN	  COMPUTER	  INDUSTRY	  




Company	  Name:	  	  	  	  	  	  __________________________	  
	  
Respondent:	  	  	  	  	  ______________________________	  
	  
Position:	  	  	  	  	  	  _________________________________	  
	  
Date:	  	  	  	  	  	  ____________________________________	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INTRODUCTION	  
	  
I.	  BACKGROUND	  ON	  LOCAL	  OPERATIONS	  
	  
1.1 Date	  of	  entry	  in	  México?	  
• As	  distributor	  (for	  what	  firm?)	  
• As	  subsidiary	  office	  for	  foreign	  company	  
• As	  manufacturer/assembler	  
• Other	  
	  
1.2 What	  is	  the	  range	  of	  products	  being	  sold	  in	  México?	  How	  long	  have	  they	  been	  
sold	  here?	  
	  
1.3 Which	  products	  are	  being	  produced	  in	  México?	  For	  how	  long?	  
	  
1.4 Annual	  product	  sales	  &	  growth?	  
	  
1.5 Number	  of	  employees	  and	  percent	  employed	  in	  which	  areas?	  (Does	  this	  include	  
maquiladora	  operations?)	  
• Manufacturing	  
• Marketing	  (including	  sales)	  
• Management/administration	  
• Maintenance	  service	  
• Research	  &	  development	  
• Other	  
	  
1.6 Of	  your	  managements	  and	  R	  &	  D	  personnel,	  what	  percentage	  are	  foreign	  or	  
have	  lived	  abroad	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time?	  
	  
1.7 What	  is	  the	  educational	  background	  of	  your	  employees	  (%)?	  
• Ph.D.	  
• Masters	  
• Undergraduate	  degree	  
• High	  School	  
• No	  degree	  
	  
1.8 Did	  you	  have	  difficulty	  finding	  qualified	  personnel?	  For	  which	  areas?	  
	  
1.9 Do	  personnel	  receive	  training	  from	  the	  foreign	  firm?	  Who	  &	  how	  much?	  
	  





How	  does	  this	  differ	  from	  operations	  in	  the	  U.S.?	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1.11 Number	  and	  location	  of	  manufacturing	  facilities	  and	  number	  of	  square	  
meters	  in	  your	  manufacturing	  facilities?	  How	  has	  capacity	  changed	  since	  entry?	  
	  
II.	  GENERAL	  EFFECTS	  OF	  GOVERNMENT	  POLICY	  
	  
2.1 Is	  your	  firm	  registered	  with	  SECOFI?	  When	  was	  contact	  first	  made	  for	  
establishing	  local	  computer	  production?	  
	  
2.2 What	  was	  the	  role/impact	  of	  government	  policy	  pre-­‐1982?	  
	  
2.3 With	  which	  government	  institutions/representatives	  did	  you	  negotiate	  in	  
establishing	  your	  operations	  in	  México?	  
	  
2.4 To	  what	  extent	  has	  government	  policy	  affected	  your	  strategic	  decisions:	  
• Decision	  to	  assemble	  locally	  
• Level	  of	  investment	  
• Organization	  &	  ownership	  
• Level	  of	  exports	  
• Level	  of	  local	  integration	  




2.5 What	  areas	  were	  negotiable	  with	  SECOFI?	  (i.e.,	  what	  were	  the	  areas	  of	  
government	  flexibility	  and	  tradeoff?)	  
	  
2.6 How	  has	  the	  policy	  changed	  since	  its	  introduction	  in	  1982?	  What	  seem	  to	  be	  
the	  government’s	  policy	  objectives	  now?	  
	  
2.7 How	  has	  the	  policy	  change	  affected	  your	  business?	  Is	  the	  negotiated	  agreement	  
still	  binding?	  
	  
2.8 How	  has	  government	  policy	  affected	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  your	  products	  in	  
the	  Mexican	  market?	  International	  market?	  
	  
2.9 What	  have	  been	  its	  effects	  on	  the	  industry	  as	  a	  whole?	  
	  
2.10 What	  would	  you	  like	  to	  see	  as	  government	  policy	  in	  this	  area?	  
	  
Note:	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  interview	  focuses	  on	  more	  specific	  effects	  of	  government	  
policy	  in	  five	  areas:	  
1. Ownership	  &	  control	  
2. Foreign	  currency	  balance	  
3. Local	  integration	  
4. R	  &	  D	  investments	  
5. Marketing/pricing	  
	  
III.	  OWNERSHIP	  &	  CONTROL	  
        348 
	  
3.1 What	  is	  the	  capital	  structure	  of	  your	  firm?	  
• Total	  assets	  
• Shareholder	  equity	  
• Major	  shareholders	  &	  %	  of	  equity	  
	  
3.2 How	  has	  the	  capital	  structure	  changed	  since	  entry?	  
	  





3.4 To	  what	  extent	  are	  decisions	  controlled	  or	  influenced	  by	  the	  foreign	  firm?	  
• Product	  introduction	  
• Product	  positioning	  (e.g.,	  price)	  
• Management	  personnel	  
• Foreign	  trade	  
	  
IV.	  FOREIGN	  TRADE	  
	  
4.1 What	  is	  the	  value	  of	  your	  exports?	  
• Products	  exported?	  
• To	  which	  markets?	  
• Trends	  in	  exports?	  
	  
4.2 What	  products	  are	  produced	  in	  in-­‐bond	  facilities?	  What	  is	  the	  value	  of	  these	  
exports?	  Trend?	  
	  
4.3 Is	  México	  a	  good	  export	  base?	  Why?	  
	  
4.4 What	  is	  the	  value	  of	  your	  imports?	  
• Products/components	  imported?	  
• For	  internal	  use/for	  re-­‐sale?	  
• Trends	  in	  imports?	  
	  
4.5 What	  percent	  of	  these	  imports	  are	  dedicated	  to	  your	  in-­‐bond	  facilities?	  
	  
4.6 Have	  you	  had	  trouble	  obtaining	  import	  licenses?	  In	  which	  cases?	  
	  
V.	  LOCAL	  INTEGRATION	  
	  
5.1 What	  components	  are	  sourced	  from	  vendors	  located	  in	  México?	  From	  whom?	  
Are	  your	  suppliers	  affiliated	  with	  your	  company?	  
	  
5.2 Do	  you	  have	  trouble	  finding	  competitive	  components	  in	  México?	  How	  many	  
suppliers	  are	  there	  to	  choose	  from	  for	  each	  major	  component	  sourced	  locally?	  
        349 
	  
	  
5.3 What	  percentage	  “local	  integration”	  is	  there	  in	  your	  products?	  How	  has	  this	  
changed	  since	  entry?	  
	  
5.4 If	  the	  government	  stopped	  requiring	  domestic	  content,	  how	  would	  your	  
sourcing	  operations	  change?	  
	  
VI.	  RESEARCH	  &	  DEVELOPMENT	  
	  
6.1 What	  is	  the	  level	  of	  R	  &	  D	  investments	  in	  México?	  How	  has	  this	  changed	  since	  
entry?	  
	  
6.2 How	  are	  R	  &	  D	  moneys	  being	  spent?	  
• Basic	  research	  
• Product	  adaptation	  
• Supplier	  development	  
• Software	  development	  
• Other	  
	  
How	  does	  this	  compare	  with	  your	  operations	  in	  the	  U.S.?	  
	  
6.3 Which	  investments	  count	  toward	  your	  local	  R	  &	  D	  requirement?	  
	  





7.1 What	  percentage	  of	  your	  sales	  are	  attributed	  to:	  
• Government	  (excluding	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises)	  
• Banks/financial	  
• Large	  industrial	  





Has	  this	  changed?	  
	  
7.2 What	  factors	  are	  most	  important	  to	  your	  customers	  (e.g.,	  price,	  technology,	  
time	  of	  delivery,	  support,	  etc.)?	  Have	  these	  changed?	  
	  
7.3 What	  product-­‐markets	  are	  served	  by	  direct	  sales?	  Which	  by	  dealers?	  Has	  your	  
distribution	  strategy	  changed?	  Why?	  
	  
7.4 How	  do	  the	  prices	  of	  your	  products	  in	  México	  compare	  to	  prices	  of	  the	  same	  
products	  in	  the	  U.S.?	  In	  Europe?	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7.5 Have	  your	  prices	  been	  lowered	  as	  a	  result	  of	  market	  forces	  (i.e.,	  increased	  
competition),	  by	  government	  policy	  restricting	  price	  differentials,	  or	  other?	  
	  
7.6 What	  are	  the	  key	  success	  factors	  for	  computer	  manufacturers	  in	  México?	  How	  
do	  these	  differ	  from	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Europe,	  or	  Japan?	  
	  
VIII.	  GENERAL	  COMMENTS	  
	  
	  
